State v. Horton

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 2, 2024
• Docket: 24-29
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 24-29

Filed 2 July 2024

Duplin County, No. 20 CRS 051388

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

WILLIE CARL HORTON, JR., Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 June 2022 by Judge Frank

Jones in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 May 2024.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Christine M. Ryan, for the State.

Wake Forest University School of Law Appellate Advocacy Clinic, by John J. Korzen, for Defendant.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of

failure to work after being paid and obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant

contends the indictment and the State’s evidence at trial were insufficient to sustain

a conviction of obtaining property by false pretenses where the indictment and

evidence both failed to allege and/or prove the essential element of intent. We find

no error.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 4 June 2020, L. Britt paid Defendant $4,000 to complete construction work STATE V. HORTON

Opinion of the Court

on his home. Britt repeatedly inquired as to when Defendant would begin work on

his home. Defendant initially provided excuses for his delay, but after several

months, Defendant stopped taking Britt’s phone calls.

At some point, Britt’s sister, T. Ard, became involved as she often helped her

brother handle his business affairs.

On or around 18 September 2020, Ard contacted Duplin County Sheriff’s Office

who began investigating the matter. Detective Green contacted Defendant and told

him Britt and Ard had filed a report but would prefer him to return the $4,000.

Defendant agreed to meet Britt and Ard on 25 September 2020 to return the $4,000

but failed to do so.

On 24 May 2021, Defendant was indicted for failing to work after being paid

and obtaining property by false pretenses, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-104

and 14-100, respectively. An ancillary indictment also charged Defendant with

attaining habitual felon status.

On 13 June 2022, the matter came on for trial before Judge Jones in Duplin

County Superior Court. On 15 June 2022, the jury found Defendant guilty of failing

to work after being paid and obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant further

pled guilty to attaining habitual felon status. Defendant was sentenced to 63 to 88

months’ imprisonment. On 16 June 2022, Defendant noticed appeal in open court.

On 6 June 2023, this Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal stating Defendant

failed to timely file notice of appeal in violation of Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules

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of Appellate Procedure. On 22 June 2023, Defendant filed a petition for writ of

certiorari, requesting this Court review the merits of his appeal. On 28 August 2023,

this Court granted Defendant’s petition to allow this appeal.

II. Analysis

Defendant contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment

against him as the indictment was insufficient to charge Defendant with obtaining

property by false pretenses, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100. Defendant

further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as there was

insufficient evidence to sustain Defendant’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

100.

A. Sufficiency of the Indictment

Defendant specifically contends the indictment failed to allege the essential

element of intent as the facts asserted only a breach of contract, in violation of N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b). We disagree.

Although Defendant did not object to the sufficiency of the indictment prior to

this appeal, he may raise an issue concerning the sufficiency of an indictment for the

first time on appeal. State v. Ellis, 368 N.C. 342, 345, 776 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2015). In

doing so, Defendant “must show that the indictment contained a statutory or

constitutional defect and that such error was prejudicial.” State v. Stewart, No.

23PA22, slip op. at 6 (N.C. May 23, 2024). We review Defendant’s contentions here

de novo to determine whether the indictment was sufficient to charge Defendant with

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obtaining property by false pretenses. See State v. Pender, 243 N.C. App. 142, 146,

776 S.E.2d 352, 357 (2015).

An indictment is a formal accusation against a defendant which serves to

charge him with committing a criminal offense. See State v. Abbott, 217 N.C. App.

614, 617, 720 S.E.2d 437, 439 (2011). The purpose of an indictment is to “identify

clearly the crime being charged, thereby putting the [defendant] on reasonable notice

to defend against it and prepare for trial, and to protect the [defendant] from being

jeopardized by the State more than once for the same crime.” State v. White, 372 N.C.

248, 250, 827 S.E.2d 80, 82 (2019) (internal marks and citation omitted).

Generally, “an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense is

charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent

words.” State v. Harris, 219 N.C. App. 590, 593, 724 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2012) (internal

marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d

343, 346 (1984) (“It is generally held that the language in a statutorily prescribed

form of criminal pleading is sufficient if the act or omission is clearly set forth so that

a person of common understanding may know what is intended.”). An indictment

must therefore contain:

A plain and concise factual statement in each count which, . . . asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant’s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant . . . of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2023). Still, our Supreme Court recently reiterated,

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“the plain language and intent of the law has been to move away from common law

pleading requirements in criminal cases which were overwrought with

technicalities.” State v. Singleton, 318PA22, slip op. at 1 (N.C. May 23, 2024). Thus,

although a valid bill of indictment is essential to confer jurisdiction upon the trial

court, “a mere pleading deficiency in an indictment [will] not deprive the courts of

jurisdiction.” Singleton, 318PA22, slip op. at 48. As such, the test used to determine

the validity of an indictment is simply, “‘whether the indictment alleges facts

supporting the essential elements of the offense to be charged.’” Stewart, No. 23PA22,

slip op. at 6 (quoting State v. Newborn, 384 N.C. 656, 659, 887 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2023)).

North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-100, criminalizes the act of

obtaining property by false pretenses, stating:

If any person shall knowingly and designedly by means of any kind of false pretense whatsoever, whether the false pretense is of a past or subsisting fact or of a future fulfillment or event, obtain or attempt to obtain from any person within this State any money, goods, property, services, chose in action, or other thing of value with intent to cheat or defraud any person of such money, goods, property, services, chose in action or other thing of value, such person shall be guilty of a felony.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 (2023). Relevant here, the essential elements of the offense

include: (1) the defendant made a false representation; (2) the defendant intended the

false representation to deceive; (3) the false representation did deceive; and (4) the

defendant obtained money from another person as a result of the false representation.

See State v. Hussain, 291 N.C. App. 253, 259, 895 S.E.2d 447, 452 (2023) (citation

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omitted). As to an indictment charging a defendant with obtaining property by false

pretenses, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) specifically states, “it shall be sufficient [for

the indictment] to allege that the party accused did the act with intent to defraud,

without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person, and without alleging any

ownership of the money[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a).

Here, the indictment includes a factual statement as to each essential element

of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 and Defendant’s commission thereof:

[Defendant] [ ] unlawfully and willfully and feloniously did knowingly and designedly, with the intent to cheat and defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain $4,000 US Currency from [victim] by means of false pretense which was calculated to deceive and did deceive.

The false pretense consisted of the following: [D]efendant accepted $4,000 from [victim] as a deposit to replace windows on [victim’s] house when [D]efendant did not begin any work on [victim’s] house nor did he replace any windows on the home.

Still, Defendant argues the indictment did not sufficiently allege the essential

element of intent as the facts asserted allege only a breach of contract in violation of

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b) notes, “evidence of nonfulfillment of a contract,

without more, cannot establish the essential element of intent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

100(b). Despite Defendant’s contention, this section in no way relates to what is

required in an indictment charging a defendant with obtaining property by false

pretenses. Instead, section 14-100(b) directly relates to the sufficiency of the State’s

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evidence offered to prove intent at trial, not the facts to be asserted in the indictment.

An indictment is not required to establish the essential elements of the crime

charged; rather, an indictment only needs to assert facts supporting each element of

the offense. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5). Moreover, as to the essential

element of intent, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) specifically states, an indictment

charging a defendant with obtaining property by false pretenses need only allege the

defendant acted with the intent to defraud. The statute does not require the

indictment allege all the evidence the State plans to introduce at trial to prove intent.

To do so would directly conflict with our precedent which shows a major deviation

from the hyper-technical pleading standards previously required at common law. See

Singleton, 318PA22, slip op. at 17.

The indictment here contains allegations of facts supporting each essential

element of obtaining property by false pretenses, including the element of intent per

the requirements provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a). Thus, the indictment was

sufficient to notice Defendant of the charges against him. Because the indictment

was sufficient, we hold the trial court maintained jurisdiction to enter judgment

against Defendant.

B. Sufficiency of the State’s Evidence

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100. Specifically, Defendant argues the State failed to

offer substantial evidence to prove he had the requisite intent to obtain property by

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false pretenses. We disagree.

We review issues concerning the sufficiency of the State’s evidence de novo to

determine whether, in the light most favorable to the State, there is “substantial

evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being

the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920,

925 (1996); see also State v. Rose, 339 NC 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994) (“[A]ll

evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, [is to be viewed] in the light

most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference

and resolving any contradictions in its favor.”). “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-9, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citation omitted).

The essential elements of obtaining property by false pretenses are: “(1) a false

representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is

calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which

one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another.” State v. Seelig, 226

N.C. App. 147, 152, 738 S.E.2d 427, 431 (internal marks and citation omitted); see

also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a). Considering the essential element of intent, our

Court has repeatedly held, “[i]ntent is seldom provable by direct evidence [and] must

ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.” State v.

Bennett, 84 N.C. App. 689, 691, 353 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (1987); see also State v. Hines,

54 N.C. App. 529, 533, 284 S.E. 2d 164, 167 (1981). Circumstantial evidence of the

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defendant’s intent “may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even

when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Fritsch,

351 N.C. 373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (internal marks and citation omitted).

Where the State introduces such evidence, the trial court “must consider whether a

reasonable inference of [the] defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.”

Id. “If so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination,

satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.” State

v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1965).

Our Court has previously held the introduction of circumstantial, Rule 404(b)

evidence, tending to establish a pattern or scheme from the defendant’s prior wrongs

committed within the same general timeframe as the crime charged, may constitute

substantial evidence from which a rational juror could infer intent. See State v.

Barker, 240 N.C. App. 224, 232, 770 S.E.2d 142, 148 (2015); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may [ ] be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or

accident.”).

As to the State’s presentation of evidence, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b) explicitly

provides the State cannot establish the essential element of intent through evidence

of nonfulfillment of a contract alone. See supra. II.A.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

100(b). To this end, our Court in State v. Compton stated, “[N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

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100(b)], [ ] recognizes the danger that juries may improperly infer criminal intent

merely from a defendant’s failure to carry out his promise, and provides that evidence

of the nonfulfillment of a contractual obligation, standing alone, is not sufficient to

show an intent to defraud.” 90 N.C. App. 101, 104, 367 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1988).

Nonetheless, evidence of nonfulfillment of a contract, together with additional Rule

404(b) evidence of the same, is sufficient evidence from which a jury may inter intent.

See State v. Barfield, 127 N.C. App. 399, 402, 489 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1997) (the

defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied as there was a reasonable

inference of intent where the State offered testimony from two other witnesses who

contracted with the defendant and obtained the same results—the defendant

obtained money for a promise to move their houses, did not move the houses, and

retained the money without completing the job).

Here, Defendant contends the State failed, under section 14-100(b), to

introduce evidence showing he maintained the requisite intent as the State’s evidence

only indicated Defendant and the victim entered into a contract, and Defendant failed

to take steps to begin fulfilling the contract despite the victim having paid a $4,000

deposit to Defendant.

The State’s evidence at trial tended to show Britt and Defendant met at a gas

station in Goldsboro. Britt asked Defendant if he was willing to do some construction

work on Britt’s home and Defendant agreed. Britt initially paid Defendant $2,000 to

screen in his front and back porch. After the work was completed, Britt asked

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Defendant to install vinyl and windows. Defendant indicated he was willing to do

the installation but would need $4,000 for materials. On 4 June 2020, Britt paid

Defendant $4,000 and Defendant provided Britt with a signed receipt. Defendant

never began work on Britt’s home citing several reasons for his delayed performance,

including personal illness, the death of his mother, and failure on behalf of Builder’s

Discount Center to obtain the materials ordered. The manager at Builder’s Discount

Center was never able to locate an order placed by Defendant. Further, Defendant

failed to return the $4,000 to Britt. The State further provided evidence tending to

show Defendant conducted a similar scheme at or around the same time he was

involved with Britt. At trial, H. Clifton testified she, in July 2020, contracted with

Defendant to replace certain windows in her home. Clifton wrote Defendant a check

for $2,165 and Defendant provided Clifton with a signed receipt. Defendant never

installed the windows and further failed to return the payment.

Although the State did introduce evidence of Defendant’s nonfulfillment of the

contract with Britt, the State also introduced additional Rule 404(b) evidence

suggesting a scheme by which Defendant obtained money upon contracting with

individuals to do construction work on their homes, neglected to perform the work,

and failed to return payment. This evidence of Defendant’s nonfulfillment of the

contract with Britt, together with the additional Rule 404(b) evidence of the same,

constitutes circumstantial evidence from which a rational juror could infer

Defendant’s intent. See Barfield, 127 N.C. App. at 402, 489 S.E.2d at 908.

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Having considered the State’s evidence in light most favorable to the State, we

hold the State offered substantial evidence of Defendant’s intent. Therefore, the trial

court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to dismiss.

III. Conclusion

We hold the indictment and the State’s evidence were independently sufficient

as to the essential element of intent. Thus, the trial court did not err.

Judges MURPHY and GORE concur.

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