NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 05-OCT-2021 07:59 AM NO. CAAP-20-0000121Dkt. 63 SO
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY ANDREW HORTON, Defendant/Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey A. Horton (Horton) appeals
from the Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence; Notice of
Entry of Judgment, filed on February 3, 2020, by the Circuit
Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court).1 Horton was
convicted, following a jury trial, of Negligent Injury in the
Second Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §
707-706(1) (2014).2
On appeal, Horton's sole contention is that the Circuit
Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
(MJOA).
1 The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided. 2 HRS § 707-706(1) states, "(1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent injury in the second degree if that person causes substantial bodily injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle in a negligent manner." NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Horton's point of error as follows, and affirm.
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i's (State) Amended
Complaint charged Horton with the offenses of: Count 1, Duty to
Give Information and Render Aid, in violation of HRS § 291C-
14(a); Count 2, Accidents Involving Bodily Injury, in violation
of HRS § 291C-12.6(a); Count 3, Inattention to Driving, in
violation of HRS § 291-12; and Count 4, Negligent Injury in the
Second Degree, in violation of HRS 707-706(1). The State
dismissed Counts 1 and 3; the jury acquitted Horton of Count 2,
and adjudged him guilty of Count 4.
The following evidence was adduced at trial. Horton
was alleged to have been involved in a collision with a moped
rider on Hawai#i Island when Horton attempted to cross the
intersection of Queen Ka#ahumanu Highway and Hina Lani Street.
Witnesses testified that the moped collided with Horton as
Horton's vehicle made a left turn against a red light from the
highway onto Hina Lani Street.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Horton made
an MJOA, arguing that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of the charge. The Circuit Court
denied the motion. At the close of evidence, Horton renewed his
MJOA on the same grounds. The Circuit Court elected to reserve
its decision on the motion pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of Penal
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 29(b).3 After the jury returned a verdict
finding Horton guilty on Count 3, the record does not reflect a
ruling on the renewed MJOA.
Horton contends that the Circuit Court erred in denying
his MJOA where there was no substantial evidence that he operated
his vehicle in a negligent manner. Specifically, Horton argues
that the State did not prove that he negligently operated a
vehicle because no witnesses saw him run a red light. Horton's
contention is without merit.
"On appeal the test for the denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal is that applied to determine sufficiency of
the evidence to support the conviction." State v. Davalos, 113
Hawai#i 385, 389, 153 P.3d 456, 460 (2007) (citing State v.
Okumura, 78 Hawai#i 383, 403 n.15, 894 P.2d 80, 100 n.15 (1995)
("[A]lthough different language is sometimes used to describe the
standard of review when the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal is appealed, the test on appeal is actually identical —
if there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the
motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied; if there
was insufficient evidence, the denial of the motion was
3 HRPP Rule 29(b) states,
(b) Reservation of decision on motion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution, the court shall not reserve decision thereon. If such motion is made after all parties have rested, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. (Bolding in original).
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
error.")). We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as
follows: Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.
State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai#i 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)
(citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
"[G]uilt in a criminal case may be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from
circumstantial evidence." State v. Bright, 64 Haw. 226, 228, 638 P.2d 330, 332 (1981) (citation omitted). "Circumstantial
evidence is competent evidence and can be used to prove facts
necessary to establish the commission of a crime." State v. Hoe,
122 Hawai#i 347, 349, 226 P.3d 517, 519 (App. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Even though no witnesses offered direct testimony that
Horton turned against a red light, the record reflects
substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could
infer that fact. See id. at 349-50, 226 P.3d at 519-20
(rejecting the defendant's contention that, because there was no
direct evidence he had consumed alcohol, there was insufficient
evidence to support conviction for underage drinking, and
concluding there was substantial circumstantial evidence to show
defendant consumed liquor and support the conviction).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 05-OCT-2021 07:59 AM NO. CAAP-20-0000121Dkt. 63 SO
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY ANDREW HORTON, Defendant/Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey A. Horton (Horton) appeals
from the Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence; Notice of
Entry of Judgment, filed on February 3, 2020, by the Circuit
Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court).1 Horton was
convicted, following a jury trial, of Negligent Injury in the
Second Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §
707-706(1) (2014).2
On appeal, Horton's sole contention is that the Circuit
Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
(MJOA).
1 The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided. 2 HRS § 707-706(1) states, "(1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent injury in the second degree if that person causes substantial bodily injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle in a negligent manner." NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Horton's point of error as follows, and affirm.
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i's (State) Amended
Complaint charged Horton with the offenses of: Count 1, Duty to
Give Information and Render Aid, in violation of HRS § 291C-
14(a); Count 2, Accidents Involving Bodily Injury, in violation
of HRS § 291C-12.6(a); Count 3, Inattention to Driving, in
violation of HRS § 291-12; and Count 4, Negligent Injury in the
Second Degree, in violation of HRS 707-706(1). The State
dismissed Counts 1 and 3; the jury acquitted Horton of Count 2,
and adjudged him guilty of Count 4.
The following evidence was adduced at trial. Horton
was alleged to have been involved in a collision with a moped
rider on Hawai#i Island when Horton attempted to cross the
intersection of Queen Ka#ahumanu Highway and Hina Lani Street.
Witnesses testified that the moped collided with Horton as
Horton's vehicle made a left turn against a red light from the
highway onto Hina Lani Street.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Horton made
an MJOA, arguing that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of the charge. The Circuit Court
denied the motion. At the close of evidence, Horton renewed his
MJOA on the same grounds. The Circuit Court elected to reserve
its decision on the motion pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of Penal
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 29(b).3 After the jury returned a verdict
finding Horton guilty on Count 3, the record does not reflect a
ruling on the renewed MJOA.
Horton contends that the Circuit Court erred in denying
his MJOA where there was no substantial evidence that he operated
his vehicle in a negligent manner. Specifically, Horton argues
that the State did not prove that he negligently operated a
vehicle because no witnesses saw him run a red light. Horton's
contention is without merit.
"On appeal the test for the denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal is that applied to determine sufficiency of
the evidence to support the conviction." State v. Davalos, 113
Hawai#i 385, 389, 153 P.3d 456, 460 (2007) (citing State v.
Okumura, 78 Hawai#i 383, 403 n.15, 894 P.2d 80, 100 n.15 (1995)
("[A]lthough different language is sometimes used to describe the
standard of review when the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal is appealed, the test on appeal is actually identical —
if there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the
motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied; if there
was insufficient evidence, the denial of the motion was
3 HRPP Rule 29(b) states,
(b) Reservation of decision on motion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution, the court shall not reserve decision thereon. If such motion is made after all parties have rested, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. (Bolding in original).
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
error.")). We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as
follows: Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.
State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai#i 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)
(citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
"[G]uilt in a criminal case may be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from
circumstantial evidence." State v. Bright, 64 Haw. 226, 228, 638 P.2d 330, 332 (1981) (citation omitted). "Circumstantial
evidence is competent evidence and can be used to prove facts
necessary to establish the commission of a crime." State v. Hoe,
122 Hawai#i 347, 349, 226 P.3d 517, 519 (App. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Even though no witnesses offered direct testimony that
Horton turned against a red light, the record reflects
substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could
infer that fact. See id. at 349-50, 226 P.3d at 519-20
(rejecting the defendant's contention that, because there was no
direct evidence he had consumed alcohol, there was insufficient
evidence to support conviction for underage drinking, and
concluding there was substantial circumstantial evidence to show
defendant consumed liquor and support the conviction).
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Here, Hawai#i Police Department (HPD) Officer Dayton
Taniguchi (Taniguchi) testified that the southbound direction of
Queen Ka#ahumanu Highway at the intersection with Hina Lani
Street comprises two left-turn lanes and a left-turn traffic
signal light. HPD Officer Marco Segobia (Segobia) testified that
he was approaching the intersection of Queen Ka#ahumanu Highway
and Hina Lani Street from the northbound side of the highway at
the time of the accident. Segobia witnessed Horton make a left
turn from the southbound direction of Ka#ahumanu Highway onto
Hina Lani Street while the northbound traffic had a green light.
Segobia stated that Horton must have had a red light because the
northbound traffic had a green light, and Horton was the only
person making the left turn across the oncoming traffic. Ezra
Figueroa (Figueroa) testified that he was stopped at the
intersection, and saw the cars in the two northbound highway
lanes start to move into the intersection while Horton made a
left turn onto Hina Lani Street. Figueroa stated that because
the cars in both northbound lanes began to move into the
intersection simultaneously, they must have had the green light,
and Horton had the red light.
Horton was the sole witness who gave contrary testimony
that he had a green light when he turned onto Hina Lani Street
from the highway.
The record in this case contains sufficient evidence,
viewed in the strongest light for the prosecution, describing the
traffic activity and circumstances through the testimonies of
Taniguchi, Segobia, and Figueroa at the time of the collision.
The record reflects substantial circumstantial evidence from
5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
which the jury could reasonably infer that Horton negligently
turned against a red light into oncoming traffic. See Kalaola,
124 Hawai#i at 49, 237 P.3d at 1115; Bright, 64 Haw. at 228, 638
P.2d at 332. The jury heard the conflicting testimonies of
Horton and the State's witnesses, and weighed the credibility of
all the witnesses, as the trier of fact. See State v. Lioen, 106
Hawai#i 123, 130, 102 P.3d 367, 374 (App. 2004) ("We also give
full play to the province of the trier of fact to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw rational inferences
from the facts.") (citation omitted).
Viewing this substantial evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence upon which
the jury could find Horton's conduct was negligent, and that
Horton should have known that turning against a red light into
oncoming traffic would pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of harm, and that his conduct constituted a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in
the same situation. See HRS § 702-206(4) (2014).4 There was
4 HRS § 702-206(4) states,
(4) "Negligently." (a) A person acts negligently with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk taken that the person's conduct is of the specified nature. (b) A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circumstances when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist.
(c) A person acts negligently with respect to a result of his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result. (d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
also sufficient evidence to support a jury's conclusion that
Horton should have known there was a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of a result of "substantial bodily injury to
another person" by turning against a red light in a busy
intersection. HRS § 707-706; see HRS § 702-206(4). There was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction for Negligent
Injury in the Second Degree, and the Circuit Court properly
denied the MJOA. See Davalos, 113 Hawai#i at 389, 153 P.3d at
460; Kalaola, 124 Hawai#i at 49, 237 P.3d at 1115.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment of
Conviction and Probation Sentence; Notice of Entry of Judgment,
filed on February 3, 2020, by the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit, is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 5, 2021.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Jon N. Ikenaga Presiding Judge Deputy Public Defender for Defendant-Appellant /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge Stephen L. Frye Deputy Prosecuting Attorney /s/ Karen T. Nakasone County of Hawai#i Associate Judge for Plaintiff-Appellee
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.