State v. Hopkins

2025 Ohio 4681

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hopkins, 2025-Ohio-4681.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-59 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-0845 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas JONATHAN HOPKINS : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on October 10, 2025, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2024-CA-59

ALANA VAN GUNDY, Attorney for Appellant CHRISTOPHER P. LANESE, Attorney for Appellee

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Jonathan Hopkins appeals from his convictions for aggravated

murder and having weapons while under disability following a jury trial in the Clark County

Court of Common Pleas. In support of his appeal, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance in multiple respects. Hopkins also claims that the trial court

erred by denying his mid-trial requests to hire new counsel and continue his trial. For the

reasons outlined below, we find that all of Hopkins’s claims lack merit and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On December 12, 2023, a Clark County grand jury returned a seven-count

indictment charging Hopkins with two counts of felony murder and single counts of

aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, aggravated robbery, and having weapons

while under disability. All charges, except the count of having weapons while under disability,

included a firearm specification.

{¶ 3} The indicted charges and specifications stemmed from allegations that on the

night of August 8, 2023, Hopkins shot and killed Michael Minter during an arranged meeting

outside Minter’s residence in Springfield, Ohio. It was alleged that Hopkins arranged to meet

with Minter so that Hopkins could purchase some bullets from him. It was further alleged

that, in addition to shooting Minter, Hopkins stole Minter’s bullets and fled the scene in a car

containing several people.

2 {¶ 4} On December 15, 2023, Hopkins appeared in court with his public defender and

pled not guilty to the indicted charges. The same day, the public defender filed demands for

a speedy trial, discovery, and a bill of particulars. Hopkins’s motion to suppress followed on

February 2, 2024, which sought to exclude evidence obtained from the execution of search

warrants for certain Facebook and Google accounts. Hopkins argued that the search

warrants were not supported by sufficient probable cause.

{¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on Hopkins’s motion to suppress on March 4,

2024, and overruled it on March 6, 2024. While the trial court’s decision on the motion to

suppress was pending, Hopkins’s public defender filed a motion requesting funds to hire a

firearms and ballistics expert. The trial court granted the motion on February 13, 2024. On

April 25, 2024, Hopkins filed a notice of substitution indicating that he had retained new

counsel.

{¶ 6} After two agreed trial continuances, Hopkins’s case proceeded to a three-day

jury trial beginning on September 23, 2024. The State called several witnesses, including

Minter’s fiancée, the mother of his children. Minter’s fiancée testified that she had known

Hopkins for a few years and that Hopkins was Minter’s “associate.” Trial Tr. 118. Minter’s

fiancée recalled that on the night of Minter’s death, he was at home on his cell phone text

messaging with Hopkins just before Minter told her that he was going outside “to take care

of something.” Trial Tr. 110.

{¶ 7} As Minter was going outside, Minter’s fiancée saw that Minter had taken a

baggie of bullets with him. Minter’s fiancée recounted that Minter had told her that he would

be coming back and that he loved her. Minter closed the door and went out to their front

porch. About two to five minutes later, Minter’s fiancée heard a “whole bunch of shots.” Trial

Tr. 112.

3 {¶ 8} After hearing shots, Minter’s fiancée ran to the front door and tried to call

Minter’s cell phone. She heard the phone ring but did not see Minter anywhere. She then

noticed that everything on their front porch had been knocked over. She also viewed a car

parked directly in front of their residence. Once she noticed the car, Minter’s fiancée saw

Hopkins get inside the car holding what appeared to be a gun.

{¶ 9} Minter’s fiancée indicated that she and Hopkins made eye contact and that

Hopkins “looked dead at me before he got in the car and said ‘pull off’” to the other people

in the vehicle. Trial Tr. 114. Minter’s fiancée witnessed three other people in the car with

Hopkins, and once Hopkins got inside, the car pulled away. Minter’s fiancée was interviewed

by the police on the night of the shooting, at which time she reported seeing Hopkins flee

the scene in a car. The day after the shooting, Minter’s fiancée identified Hopkins in a photo

lineup.

{¶ 10} Minter’s fiancée explained that when she saw Hopkins running toward the car,

he was coming from the area where she eventually found Minter—lying in a neighbor’s

driveway. When she found Minter, she grabbed his hand and attempted to get him to talk to

her, but he would not respond. Minter was just lying there with his eyes rolled in the back of

his head. Medics arrived at the scene and attempted to save Minter’s life, but he succumbed

to his injuries and died at the hospital. The coroner testified that Minter’s cause of death was

multiple gunshot wounds.

{¶ 11} Minter’s fiancée recalled that when she found Minter, he no longer had the bag

of bullets that he had taken with him. The authorities did, however, find a bag of cocaine

near Minter’s body.

{¶ 12} Minter’s fiancée added that on the night of the shooting, she found Minter’s

cell phone in their yard and picked it up. Minter’s fiancée did not immediately turn Minter’s

4 phone over to the police because she feared, from past experience, that she would not get

the phone back and would lose all the family pictures stored on the device. One of the

investigating detectives, Detective Kevin Miller, testified that Minter’s fiancée provided

Minter’s phone to law enforcement when it was requested from her after an unspecified

period of time. Miller ran Cellebrite reports on Minter’s phone and confirmed that on the night

of the shooting, Minter had been texting with Hopkins and that Minter and Hopkins had

arranged to meet so that Hopkins could purchase bullets in exchange for cocaine.

{¶ 13} Additionally, the State presented video evidence, which showed Hopkins in a

car with multiple people at a local Mini Mart and Speedway gas station shortly before the

shooting. One of the videos showed Hopkins inside the Mini Mart with what appeared to be

a firearm near the waistband of his pants. During his testimony, Miller explained that in the

video, he first saw “something sticking out of either [Hopkins’s] waistband or his pocket” and

then noticed “a change in silhouette amongst his body,” which he found “consistent with the

handle of a firearm.” Trial Tr. 387-389.

{¶ 14} Miller said that he was “looking for what’s called printing which is where a

firearm’s silhouette is pressing through a person’s clothing.” Trial Tr. 389. Miller indicated

that in the video “there is a slight discoloration to the pant pocket” and that he could “make

out the printing, shape, and the actual shape of the firearm in his pocket.” Trial Tr. 391. After

noticing that Hopkins had engaged in a common “grooming technique” of adjusting his pants

due to the weight of the firearm and had performed “security touch to the firearm” to resecure

and confirm it was still there, Miller was “firmly convinced that it [was] a firearm in [Hopkins’s]

pocket after watching the video . . . .” Trial Tr. 392.

{¶ 15} The State also presented evidence from a firearms and ballistics expert who

determined that shell casings found at the scene of the shooting were shot from two different

5 firearms—a Canik pistol and Glock pistol. The expert testified that two of the shell casings

were fired from the Canik and that ten of the shell casings and six bullets recovered from

Minter were fired from the Glock. Although the trial court had granted funds for the defense

to hire its own firearms and ballistics expert, Hopkins’s trial counsel did not hire such an

expert and simply cross-examined the State’s expert.

{¶ 16} Detective Miller testified that the Canik pistol was recovered from Jeffrey Sharp

in a separate investigation. During an interview with Miller, Hopkins admitted that he had

sold the Canik to Sharp. Hopkins’s Facebook account established that he had placed a

Canik pistol up for sale the same day that Minter was murdered, as well as a week later on

August 15, 2023. Miller stated that the Canik appeared to be the same firearm that was in

Hopkins’s pants pocket in the Mini Mart video. Miller also testified that the Glock appeared

to be the same firearm that one of Hopkins’s counterparts was carrying in the video.

{¶ 17} On the third day of trial, after the State had already rested its case, Hopkins

told the trial court that he wanted new counsel. Hopkins asserted that his counsel had not

requested a continuance at the beginning of trial based on the State’s late disclosure of

autopsy photographs. Hopkins told the trial court that he believed his counsel had lied to him

about requesting the continuance and that he “[didn’t] feel like [he was] being represented

like [he was] supposed to.” Trial Tr. 498.

{¶ 18} Following Hopkins’s request, defense counsel and the trial court explained

what had transpired and indicated that defense counsel had raised the issue of the State’s

late disclosure of the autopsy photographs and that the trial court had decided to rule on the

issue at a later time. The trial court denied Hopkins’s request for new counsel and declined

to continue trial. Hopkins then testified in his defense where he denied shooting Minter and

stealing the bullets from him. According to Hopkins, the exchange with Minter took place

6 without incident. Hopkins testified that just after he left Minter’s residence, he heard some

gunshots but did not think anything of it because it was “Queen Muffy Day”—a “holiday”

where guns are fired in honor of a deceased local woman, Queen Muffy. Trial Tr. 533-534.

{¶ 19} Hopkins maintained that the item Detective Miller saw in his pants pocket in

the Mini Mart video was not a firearm but an iPhone with a “clip-on holder.” Trial Tr. 570.

Hopkins further claimed that Minter was his friend and that he had no quarrel with him.

Hopkins presented testimony from his fiancée who confirmed that he and Minter were friends

and not just associates as claimed by Minter’s fiancée.

{¶ 20} The jury found Hopkins guilty as charged in the indictment. At sentencing, the

trial court merged all the charges, except for the charge of having weapons while under

disability. The State elected to have Hopkins sentenced for aggravated murder, for which

the trial court sentenced Hopkins to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial

court further sentenced Hopkins to 3 years in prison for the related firearm specification, as

well as 36 months in prison for having weapons while under disability. The trial court ordered

the 36-month prison term to run concurrently with Hopkins’s life sentence.

{¶ 21} Hopkins now appeals from his convictions and raises eleven assignments of

error for review.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 22} The first nine assignments of error raised by Hopkins are ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, Hopkins must show that his

trial counsel rendered deficient performance and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), paragraph two of the

syllabus; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. The

7 failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland at 697.

{¶ 23} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must show that his trial

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id. at

688. In evaluating counsel’s performance, a reviewing court “must indulge in a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Id. at 689. “The adequacy of counsel’s performance must be viewed in light of

all of the circumstances surrounding the trial court proceedings.” State v. Jackson, 2005-

Ohio-6143, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Strickland.

{¶ 24} To establish prejudice, the appellant must show that there is “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.”

State v. Hale, 2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at paragraph

two of the syllabus. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.’” Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694.

{¶ 25} When reviewing ineffective assistance claims, we will not second-guess trial

strategy decisions. State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157 (1998); Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. It is well established that “‘trial counsel is allowed wide latitude in formulating trial

strategy.’” State v. Collins, 2011-Ohio-4475, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Olsen, 2011-

Ohio-3420, ¶ 121 (2d Dist.). Therefore, “[d]ebatable strategic and tactical decisions may not

form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks

as if a better strategy had been available.” State v. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.),

citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525 (1992).

8 First Assignment of Error

{¶ 26} Under his first assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence that was

obtained from Minter’s cell phone. Hopkins asserts that this evidence should have been

suppressed due to possible tampering by Minter’s fiancée, who kept the phone in her

possession for an unspecified period before turning it over to the police. Hopkins claims that

this caused a defect in the chain of custody that prevented proper authentication of the

evidence. As a result, Hopkins asserts that admission of the evidence from Minter’s cell

phone prejudiced him and violated Evid. R. 901(A), which “requires, as a condition precedent

to the admissibility of evidence, a showing that the matter in question is what it purports to

be.” State v. Simmons, 2011-Ohio-2068, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 27} As a preliminary matter, “[f]ailing to file a motion to suppress does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Brown,

2007-Ohio-4837, ¶ 65. “‘It is only considered ineffective assistance of counsel when the

record demonstrates the motion to suppress would have been successful if made.’” State v.

Sitzes, 2023-Ohio-3915, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Black, 2016-Ohio-7901, ¶ 26

(2d Dist.). Therefore, “[w]here the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant making that claim must

prove that the basis of the suggested suppression claim is meritorious.” (Citations omitted.)

In re D.D., 2009-Ohio-808, ¶ 3 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 28} We find that a motion to suppress the evidence from Minter’s cell phone based

on an alleged violation of Evid.R. 901(A) would not have been successful because a motion

to suppress is not the proper vehicle to challenge the authenticity of the evidence. See State

v. Wolfe, 2025-Ohio-866, ¶ 93-97 (2d Dist.) (sustaining trial court’s decision that overruled

9 a motion to suppress challenging the authenticity of videotape evidence because a motion

to suppress was not the proper vehicle to challenge the authenticity of the evidence).

“Generally, motions to suppress are used to raise challenges to evidence that is alleged to

have been obtained in violation of the Constitution, while motions in limine are used to raise

challenges to evidence based on the Rules of Evidence.” State v. Hubbs, 2010-Ohio-4849,

¶ 15 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Edwards, 2005-Ohio-6180, ¶ 16 and State v. French, 72 Ohio

St.3d 446, 449 (1995).

{¶ 29} This court has explained:

“A ‘motion to suppress’ is defined as a ‘[d]evice used to eliminate

from the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally,

generally in violation of the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), the

Fifth Amendment (privilege against self incrimination), or the Sixth

Amendment (right to assistance of counsel, right of confrontation etc.), of

U.S. Constitution.’” [French at 449,] quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.

1990). Thus, a motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for raising

constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary rule first enunciated by

the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383

(1914), and made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961). French at 449.

Wolfe at ¶ 95.

{¶ 30} Because Hopkins’s suppression argument is not based on any of these

principles but rather on the alleged inauthenticity of the evidence, a motion to suppress

raising such an argument would have been inappropriate and would have failed. Hopkins’s

counsel consequently did not perform deficiently by failing to file such a motion to suppress.

10 The ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised under Hopkins’s first assignment of error

lacks merit.

{¶ 31} We note that a motion in limine would have been the appropriate way for

Hopkins’s counsel to have challenged the authenticity of the evidence obtained from the

victim’s cell phone. Although not argued by Hopkins, we find that he cannot demonstrate

that his counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion in limine or that he was prejudiced

by such failure. The record establishes that Minter’s cell phone was properly authenticated

by Minter’s fiancée, and no evidence established that Minter’s fiancée had tampered with

any messages on the phone. Minter’s fiancée testified that she did not immediately turn the

phone over to police after the shooting because, from experience, she had feared that the

phone would never be returned and that she would lose all the family photographs stored

on the device. The record also establishes that Minter’s fiancée cooperated with the police

and turned over the phone when it was eventually requested. There is absolutely nothing in

the record indicating that Minter’s fiancée did anything with the phone other than ensure her

family’s photographs were safe. If the authenticity and tampering issues had been raised,

the State would have likely presented phone records to confirm that the messages between

Minter and Hopkins had not been altered. Even if counsel had moved in limine to exclude

the evidence from Minter’s cell phone, it is likely that the motion would have been overruled.

{¶ 32} Hopkins’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶ 33} Under his second assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena Minter’s cell phone records. Hopkins

claims that Minter’s cell phone records could have potentially refuted the State’s testimony

11 indicating that he was the last person to contact Minter. Hopkins argues the records could

have also revealed whether any messages were deleted.

{¶ 34} The decision whether to subpoena Minter’s cell phone records was within the

purview of trial strategy and therefore cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. State v. Woodard, 2022-Ohio-3081, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.) (failing to subpoena cell

records did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because such a decision is a

matter of trial strategy), citing State v. Bennett, 2008-Ohio-5812, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.) (“[d]iscovery

decisions are presumed to be trial strategies which do not constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel”) and State v. McCoy, 2010-Ohio-2639, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (“counsel’s failure to

subpoena tapes would have been a matter of trial strategy”) (additional citations omitted).

{¶ 35} In this case, Hopkins’s trial counsel may have chosen not to subpoena Minter’s

cell phone records out of concern the effort would have been futile, as the records may have

favored the State’s case against Hopkins. Because even a debatable decision concerning

trial strategy cannot form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Hopkins’s

claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena Minter’s

cell phone records lacks merit. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553 at ¶ 56 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 36} Hopkins’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Third Assignment of Error

{¶ 37} Under his third assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to obtain a firearms and ballistics expert to challenge the testing and

analysis that was performed by the State’s expert. Hopkins claims this failure was especially

egregious since the trial court approved funds for his trial counsel to hire such an expert. We

disagree.

12 {¶ 38} “‘[T]he failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross-examination does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299

(2001), quoting State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 (1993). “In fact, in many criminal

cases trial counsel’s decision not to seek expert testimony ‘is unquestionably tactical

because such an expert might uncover evidence that further inculpates the defendant.’”

State v. Samatar, 2003-Ohio-1639, ¶ 90 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Glover, 2002-Ohio-

6392, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.); accord State v. Jackson, 2003-Ohio-6183, ¶ 76 (10th Dist.). Again,

“‘even if the wisdom of such an approach is debatable, “debatable trial tactics” do not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Samatar at ¶ 90, quoting Glover at ¶ 25,

quoting State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49 (1980).

{¶ 39} As a further matter, it is well established that “in direct appeals appellate courts

do not consider claims that rest on matters outside the record.” State v. Carver, 2022-Ohio-

2653, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.). Therefore, if demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel requires

proof outside the record, then such claim is not properly raised in a direct appeal. State v.

White, 2018-Ohio-3076, ¶ 71 (2d Dist.) (“[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot

be asserted on direct appeal if it relies on matters outside the record”), citing State v. Harris,

2017-Ohio-9052, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 40} To succeed in his ineffective assistance claim, Hopkins must establish that he

was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to call a firearms and ballistics expert, i.e., that there

was a reasonable probability that the expert’s testimony would have changed the outcome

of his trial. This requires proof outside the record, such as affidavits demonstrating the

expert’s probable testimony. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 391 (2000). Without such

proof, Hopkins’s ineffective assistance claim is based on pure speculation, and speculation

13 is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.; State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-

3641, ¶ 119; State v. Perez, 2009-Ohio-6179, ¶ 217.

{¶ 41} The decision to hire a firearms and ballistics expert was within the purview of

trial strategy. Considering the absence of anything in the record indicating the content of

such an expert’s testimony, resolving whether the testimony would have favored Hopkins’s

case is purely speculative. Hopkins cannot establish that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to hire a firearms and ballistics expert to testify at trial.

{¶ 42} Hopkins’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Fourth Assignment of Error

{¶ 43} Under his fourth assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to: (1) hire an expert witness in the field of eyewitness identification to

challenge the validity of the identification of him by Minter’s fiancée; and (2) adequately

cross-examine the witnesses who testified regarding how the photo lineup was administered

to Minter’s fiancée.

{¶ 44} In support of this claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an

eyewitness expert, Hopkins relies on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v.

Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723. Hopkins suggests that Bunch stands for the proposition that a trial

counsel’s failure to utilize an expert witness to explain the science and psychology behind

eyewitness identification can constitute deficient performance and render the use of the

photo lineup identification prejudicial for the purpose of an ineffective assistance claim.

{¶ 45} Hopkins’s reliance on Bunch is misplaced. In Bunch, the defendant filed a

petition for postconviction relief in which he asserted that his trial counsel had been

ineffective for failing to present expert testimony to help the jury understand the unreliability

of eyewitness identification, particularly under the circumstances in which the defendant was

14 identified by the victim. Id. at ¶ 2. The victim had been kidnapped from the street and

repeatedly raped by a group of strangers. Id. at ¶ 4. When the victim reviewed a photo lineup

that included the defendant’s picture, the victim stated that the photo of the defendant “might

be the fourth attacker, but she was not sure.” Id at ¶ 6. It was not until the victim saw a

picture of the defendant in the newspaper identifying him as a suspect that the victim was

certain that the defendant was the fourth attacker. Id.

{¶ 46} To support his ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant in Bunch attached

an affidavit from an expert in the field of eyewitness identification to his petition for

postconviction relief. Id. at ¶ 14. The expert averred that the victim’s identification of the

appellant was likely inaccurate. The expert explained that the victim’s inability to provide a

confident identification of the fourth perpetrator rendered her choice more likely to be

inaccurate and that her later identification of the appellant was likely a product of suggestion

and inference, and thus more prejudicial than probative. Id.

{¶ 47} Despite the information in the expert’s affidavit, the trial court rejected the

appellant’s ineffective assistance claim and denied his petition for postconviction relief

without holding a hearing, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed. Bunch, 2022-

Ohio-4723, at ¶ 2. Both courts relied on the principle that an attorney’s failure to use an

expert witness and instead rely on cross-examination was a matter of trial strategy and did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 17-19.

{¶ 48} The Supreme Court of Ohio faulted the lower courts’ failure “to apply the proper

standard for reviewing whether a hearing was required on [the defendant’s] post-conviction

ineffective assistance claim and . . . [treatment of the claim] as one on the merits in a direct

appeal.” Id. at ¶ 29. The courts had incorrectly held the defendant to “the standard of proving

15 that ‘the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficient

performance.’” Id. at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Bunch, 2021-Ohio-1244, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.).

{¶ 49} The Supreme Court faulted the lower courts’ reliance on the standard

articulated in Nicholas that “‘the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross-

examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting

Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d at 436. The Court explained that Nicholas involved a direct appeal,

which the court had “repeatedly held” is “not the appropriate place to consider allegations of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel that turn on information that is outside the record.” Id.

at ¶ 35. The court stressed that “[b]ecause we cannot consider information outside the record

in a direct appeal, we must often conclude that a defendant’s claims are speculative. . . .

And speculation alone cannot overcome ‘the “strong presumption” that counsel’s

performance constituted reasonable assistance.’” Id., quoting State v. Foust, 2004-Ohio-

7006, ¶ 89, quoting Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144.

{¶ 50} The Supreme Court explained the difference between direct appeals and

postconviction cases:

Our holding in Nicholas and its ilk, though broadly worded, is not applicable

to postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where courts

have the ability to consider evidence outside the record and are not limited

to mere speculation. In the present context of postconviction litigation, it is

possible and appropriate to question whether a trial counsel’s decisions were

in fact deliberate and strategic and whether strategic decisions were

reasonable ones. Trial strategy is usually within the “wide range of

reasonable professional assistance,” [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689], but

strategy is not synonymous with reasonableness.

16 Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, at ¶ 36.

{¶ 51} The Supreme Court ultimately concluded in Bunch that an evidentiary hearing

was necessary to reach the merits regarding whether the appellant’s trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to call an eyewitness identification expert at trial and that the trial court

erred by failing to hold such a hearing. Id. at ¶ 48-52. The Supreme Court stressed that its

decision was not focused on the merits of the appellant’s ineffective assistance claim, but

rather the adequacy of the process leading up to a decision on that claim. Id. at ¶ 51. Hopkins

incorrectly relies on Bunch for the proposition that the failure to call an eyewitness

identification expert amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, as that was not the holding

of the case.

{¶ 52} Bunch is further distinguishable from the present case because it involved a

postconviction claim as opposed to a direct appeal. In direct appeals, it is appropriate to

apply the standard in Nicholas that “the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross-

examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Nicholas 66 Ohio St.3d

at 436. Indeed, it was within the purview of trial strategy for Hopkins’s trial counsel to have

simply cross-examined the eyewitness and foregone calling an expert in the field of

eyewitness identification. As previously discussed, “trial counsel is allowed wide latitude in

formulating trial strategy.” State v. Olsen, 2011-Ohio-3420, ¶ 121 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 53} Unlike the eyewitness in Bunch, who was repeatedly raped by a group of

strangers and initially unsure whether the appellant was one of the assailants, the

eyewitness in this case, Minter’s fiancée, was familiar with Hopkins before the shooting and

confidently recognized him as the person she saw fleeing from the area where the Minter’s

body was found. Minter’s fiancée not only identified Hopkins during a photo lineup but also

identified him during an interview with the police shortly after the shooting. Hopkins’s counsel

17 could have reasonably believed that it would have been a waste of time to hire an eyewitness

identification expert to challenge the identification of Hopkins by Minter’s fiancée. We are

not at liberty to second-guess that decision. State v. Blanton, 2023-Ohio-89, ¶ 59 (“[i]n

reviewing ineffective assistance claims, we will not second-guess trial strategy decisions”),

citing Mason, 82 OhioSt.3d at 157.

{¶ 54} Additionally, Hopkins’s claim relies on matters outside the record that this court

cannot consider on direct appeal. See Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 391. To succeed in his

ineffective assistance claim, Hopkins must establish that an eyewitness identification

expert’s testimony would have changed the outcome of his trial. This requires proof of what

the expert would have testified to, which is not part of the appellate record. Therefore,

Hopkins’s ineffective assistance claim is based on pure speculation, and speculation is

insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.; Short, 2011-Ohio-3641 at

¶ 119; Perez, 2009-Ohio-6179 at ¶ 217. For the foregoing reasons, Hopkins’s claim that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert in the field of eyewitness identification

{¶ 55} Hopkins’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-

examine the witnesses who testified regarding how the photo lineup was administered also

lacks merit. “We have held that ‘trial counsel’s decision to cross-examine a witness and the

extent of such cross-examination are tactical matters.’” State v. Watters, 2016-Ohio-8083,

¶ 29 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Russell, 2007-Ohio-137, ¶ 55 (2d Dist.). As previously

discussed, “[a] reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel which can be

considered matters of trial strategy.” Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553 at ¶ 56 (2d Dist.), citing State

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98 (1985). We have reviewed the record and find nothing to indicate

that Hopkins’s trial counsel was ineffective in how he cross-examined the witnesses who

18 testified regarding the photo lineup. This portion of Hopkins’s ineffective assistance claim

fails as well.

{¶ 56} Hopkins’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Fifth Assignment of Error

{¶ 57} Under his fifth assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to subpoena the multiple witnesses who were with him on the evening

of the murder. Hopkins takes issue with his trial counsel failing to subpoena an individual

known as Honcho, a.k.a. Dontesz Brandon, who allegedly made a Facebook post in which

he took credit for killing the victim.

{¶ 58} As a preliminary matter, we note that the video evidence from Mini Mart and

Speedway and Hopkins’s own trial testimony established that Hopkins was with several

people on the evening of the shooting, one of whom was Brandon. The evidence also

established that there were two different firearms used during the shooting and that Brandon

was seen in the Mini Mart video carrying what appeared to be one of those firearms, the

Glock. Minter’s fiancée saw three other people in the vehicle that Hopkins entered when he

fled from the area where Minter’s body was discovered. Given this evidence, it is entirely

possible that more than one person was involved in the shooting, possibly explaining why

Brandon took credit for killing Minter.

{¶ 59} That said, the failure to call or subpoena witnesses falls within the purview of

trial strategy and therefore cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. State v.

Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 113 (“[c]ounsel’s decision to call a witness is a matter of trial

strategy”); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 489 (2001) (“counsel’s decision whether to

call a witness falls within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a

reviewing court”). As we have emphasized, even a debatable decision concerning trial

19 strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553 at ¶ 56

(2d Dist.).

{¶ 60} In this case, it is unknown from the record whether Hopkins provided his

counsel the necessary information to subpoena Brandon or any of the other people he had

contact with on the night of the shooting or whether Hopkins even wanted counsel to call

those individuals as witnesses at the trial. It is entirely possible that Hopkins wanted to

protect the other people who were with him or that his counsel specifically chose not to call

those individuals because of a legitimate concern that they might point the finger at Hopkins.

Alternatively, Hopkins’s counsel may have simply determined that the potential witnesses

lacked credibility and would not have assisted the defense. Because choosing not to call the

multiple people that Hopkins had contact with on the night of the shooting could have been

a strategic decision, such a decision does not amount to deficient performance and cannot

support an ineffective assistance claim.

{¶ 61} Even if Hopkins could demonstrate that his trial counsel performed deficiently

by failing to identify and subpoena these putative witnesses, a determination of Hopkins’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would again require evidence outside the record

to establish that counsel’s inaction prejudiced him. See State v. Hillman, 2014-Ohio-5760,

¶ 57 (10th Dist.); Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 391. The record does not provide any indication

as to what the potential witnesses’ testimony would have been; therefore, the nature of the

potential testimony and the effect it would have had on Hopkins’s trial is purely speculative.

Speculation is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Short, 2011-Ohio-

3641 at ¶ 119; Perez, 2009-Ohio-6179 at ¶ 217.

{¶ 62} Hopkins’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

20 Sixth Assignment of Error

{¶ 63} Under Hopkins’s sixth assignment of error, he claims that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State’s indication that he was under

a weapons disability without presenting evidence of such a disability. Upon review, we find

that Hopkins’s claim is belied by the record.

{¶ 64} As a preliminary matter, Hopkins was charged and convicted of having

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(4). The statute provides:

“Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process, no person shall

knowingly acquire, have, carry or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if . . . [t]he person

has a drug dependency, is in danger of drug dependence, or has chronic alcoholism.”

R.C. 2923.13(A)(4).

{¶ 65} “‘Person with a drug dependency’ means any person who, by reason of the

use of any drug of abuse, is physically, psychologically, or physically and psychologically

dependent upon the use of such drug, to the detriment of the person’s health or welfare.”

R.C. 3719.011(B). “‘Person in danger of becoming a person with a drug dependency’ means

any person who, by reason of the person's habitual or incontinent use of any drug of abuse,

is in imminent danger of becoming a person with a drug dependency.” R.C. 3719.011(C).

{¶ 66} We disagree with Hopkins’s claim that no evidence was presented at trial

establishing that he was under a weapons disability. Detective Miller testified that during his

interview with Hopkins, Hopkins admitted to using cocaine, being a “habitual drug user,” and

selling drugs. Trial Tr. 465-466. Miller specifically indicated that as a habitual drug user,

Hopkins was not legally able to own weapons in the state of Ohio. Trial Tr. 456.

{¶ 67} Hopkins himself testified that “off and on throughout the years, [he] had a drug

habit, cocaine.” Trial Tr. 522. Hopkins admitted that he had used cocaine with the victim “a

21 lot of times.” Trial Tr. 523. Hopkins said that he did not remember certain events during the

evening of the murder and had lied during his interview with Miller due to drug and alcohol

use. Id. at 539, 603, 606, 614.

{¶ 68} Based on this testimony, we reject Hopkins’s claim that no evidence was

presented at trial establishing that he was under a weapons disability. This court has

previously found similar evidence sufficient to establish that a defendant was a drug

dependent person or was in danger of becoming drug dependent person for purposes of

committing the offense of having weapons while under disability in violation of

R.C. 2923.13(A)(4). See, e.g., State v. Gex, 2011-Ohio-631, ¶ 37-38 (2d Dist.) (evidence

established that the defendant admitted to a detective that he was addicted to marijuana,

was growing it in his home, and that “he smokes weed every day and that he’s been doing

it since he was a kid”).

{¶ 69} Contrary to Hopkins’s claim otherwise, his trial counsel did attempt to refute

the claim that he was under a weapons disability. During closing argument, Hopkins’s trial

counsel argued that the evidence presented at trial did not support finding him guilty of

having weapons while under disability because there was “no testimony from anybody that

said he has been diagnosed as a drug addict or has a conviction of a drug charge.” Trial

Tr. 676.

{¶ 70} Because evidence in the record established that Hopkins was under a

weapons disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(4) and because Hopkins’s counsel did

attempt to address the issue during closing argument, we find that the ineffective assistance

claim raised under Hopkins’s sixth assignment of error lacks merit.

{¶ 71} Hopkins’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

22 Seventh Assignment of Error

{¶ 72} Under his seventh assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

was ineffective by failing to file a motion in limine to prohibit Curtis Gifford from testifying at

trial. Gifford testified that three months after Minter was murdered, Hopkins robbed him of a

firearm at gunpoint. Gifford stated that as Hopkins held him at gun point, he showed him a

video of a news clip that reported Minter’s murder. See State’s Ex. 130. Hopkins then told

Gifford that he was the person who killed Minter and that “if you make the wrong move or

you call anybody when I leave, then you can be like this.” Trial Tr. 363. In other words, the

testimony recounting Hopkins’s threat revealed his intimidation of Gifford during the

uncharged robbery and inculpated him in Minter’s death. Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

should have filed a motion in limine to exclude this testimony because “presenting

uncharged conduct at trial is prejudicial.”

{¶ 73} “‘A hallmark of the American criminal justice system is the principle that proof

that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not

admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused’s propensity or inclination to

commit crime.’” State v. Sutherland, 2021-Ohio-2433, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Curry,

43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1975). “Evid.R. 404 is the embodiment of that principle.” Id.

{¶ 74} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B)(1): “Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion

the person acted in accordance with the character.” Nonetheless, such “evidence may be

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid.R. 404(B)(2). “The

key is that the evidence must prove something other than the defendant’s disposition to

commit certain acts. Thus, while evidence showing the defendant’s character or propensity

23 to commit crimes or acts is forbidden, evidence of other acts is admissible when the evidence

is probative of a separate, nonpropensity-based issue.” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440,

¶ 22.

{¶ 75} The proponent of 404(B)(2) evidence must:

(a) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence the proponent

intends to introduce at trial so that an opposing party may have a fair

opportunity to meet it;

(b) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the

proponent intends to offer the evidence, and the reasoning that supports

the purpose; and

(c) do so in writing in advance of trial, or in any form during trial if the

court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

Evid.R. 404(B)(2)(a)-(c).

{¶ 76} The record in this case establishes that the State filed a written “Notice

Pursuant to 404(B)” prior to trial indicating that it planned to introduce evidence of a prior

crime, wrong, or act by Hopkins—the robbery of Gifford. The notice explained the nature of

the evidence and how it would be presented to show Hopkins’s admission to killing Minter

during his robbery of Gifford, a permissible use under Evid.R. 404(B)(2).

{¶ 77} Gifford’s testimony was not presented to prove Hopkins’s character or

propensity to commit criminal acts, and the State followed the correct procedure under

Evid.R. 404(B) for presenting this evidence. Hopkins’s trial counsel lacked a basis to move

to exclude Gifford’s testimony. We do not find that Hopkins’s counsel performed deficiently

by failing to file a baseless motion in limine. Because there was no deficient performance by

24 Hopkins’s trial counsel in relation to this issue, this ineffective assistance claim necessarily

fails.

{¶ 78} Hopkins’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

Eighth Assignment of Error

{¶ 79} Under his eighth assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Detective Miller giving unqualified

expert testimony about “printing,” which Hopkins claims is a pseudoscience that does not

exist. Miller testified that “printing” is when “a firearm’s silhouette is pressing through a

person’s clothing.” Trial Tr. 389. What Hopkins calls pseudoscience was simply Miller’s

observation in the Mini Mart video of what appeared to be the silhouette of a gun in Hopkins’s

pants pocket.

{¶ 80} Under Evid.R. 701, lay witnesses may give opinion testimony when it is:

“(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding

of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Evid.R. 701. “‘It is well-

settled that a police officer may testify concerning matters that are within his experience and

observations that may aid the trier of fact in understanding the other testimony pursuant to

Evid.R. 701.’” State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-4116, ¶ 108 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Tatum,

2011-Ohio-907, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). In other words, “police officers may offer lay opinion

testimony under Evid.R. 701 if it is based on the officers’ perceptions through experience.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Lavender, 2019-Ohio-5352, ¶ 96 (1st Dist.). For example, in

State v. Renner, 2013-Ohio-5463 (2d Dist.), this court held that an officer’s testimony that

injuries to a domestic violence victim were defensive wounds was admissible lay witness

testimony considering its basis in the officer’s personal observation of the victim, training as

25 a police officer regarding defensive wounds, and common understanding of how bruises,

abrasions, and rashes appear. Id. at ¶ 76-77.

{¶ 81} Miller’s testimony indicated that he had been a police officer for nine years and

that he had received training on how to identify whether someone is carrying a firearm on

their person. He testified that, as part of his training, he looked for “printing” and explained

what printing was. Miller described how he observed printing in the video evidence to help

the jury understand why he believed Hopkins was carrying a firearm. Contrary to Hopkins’s

claim otherwise, Miller did not have to be qualified as an expert to give this opinion because

it was based on his personal observations of the video and his experience as a police officer.

See State v. Stout, 42 Ohio App.3d 38, 42 (12th Dist. 1987) (police officer could give a lay

opinion that a stain depicted in a photograph appeared to be blood where the opinion was

based upon the officer’s perception and was helpful to a determination of a fact); State v.

Norman, 7 Ohio App.3d 17, 18-19 (5th Dist. 1982) (police officer could give lay opinion as

to shot pattern made by a shotgun where the opinion was based upon the officer’s

experience and observation and aided the trier of fact); see also State v. Platt, 2024-Ohio-

1330, ¶ 78-81 (4th Dist.) (police chief’s testimony about home gun-safety and gun-storage

practices admissible as lay opinion because it was rationally related to his perceptions and

based on his everyday experience as a law enforcement officer and gun owner).

{¶ 82} Because Miller was permitted to give the testimony at issue, we cannot say

that Hopkins’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to it at trial. We also fail to

see how the testimony prejudiced Hopkins, as the jurors were given the opportunity to view

the video and were free to decide whether they believed the item in the pocket of Hopkins’s

pants looked like a gun.

{¶ 83} Hopkins’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.

26 Ninth Assignment of Error

{¶ 84} Under his ninth assignment of error, Hopkins claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to file a motion to dismiss his case on statutory speedy-trial grounds.

We disagree.

{¶ 85} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Section 10, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a

speedy trial by the state. State v. O'Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 8 (1987). The constitutional right

to a speedy trial is statutorily enforced in Ohio by the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq.

State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68 (1989). Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71, a person charged

with a felony offense “shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the

person’s arrest.” R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). However, “[e]ach day the accused is held in jail in lieu

of bail is counted as three days.” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-648, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing

R.C. 2945.71(E). As a result, if the accused is incarcerated the entire time preceding trial,

the time limit for bringing the accused to trial is reduced to 90 days. State v. Dankworth,

2007-Ohio-2588, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 86} “A defendant establishes a prima facie speedy trial violation when his motion

[to dismiss] reveals that a trial did not occur within the time period prescribed by

R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Hill, 2020-Ohio-2958, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio

St.3d 28, 31 (1986). “If a defendant ‘establishes a prima facie case of a violation of his right

to a speedy trial, the burden then shifts to the State’ to demonstrate either that the statutory

limit was not exceeded, or that the State’s time to bring the defendant to trial was properly

extended.” State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Nichols, 2005-

Ohio-1771, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). Speedy-trial time may be extended by the circumstances listed

under R.C. 2945.72(A) through (J).

27 {¶ 87} Under R.C. 2945.72(H), speedy-trial time is tolled for: “The period of any

continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable

continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own motion.” R.C. 2945.72(H).

“Continuances that a defendant requests toll the clock under R.C. 2945.7[2](H)[.]” State v.

Lewis, 2021-Ohio-1895, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.). Likewise, “[a] continuance granted upon the parties’

joint motion tolls time under R.C. 2945.72(H) because the motion is made, in part, by the

defendant. Joint motions for a continuance toll a defendant's speedy-trial time because they

can be attributed to both parties.” State v. White, 2024-Ohio-2426, ¶ 35 (1st Dist.); accord

State v. Nelson, 2024-Ohio-5750, ¶ 47 (12th Dist.); State v. Dillon, 2006-Ohio-3312, ¶ 35

(10th Dist.); State v. Brown, 2005-Ohio-2939, ¶ 44 (7th Dist.); State v. Austin, 2019-Ohio-

686, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.); State v. Nelson, 2025-Ohio-2025, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.) (“A joint motion to

continue falls under R.C. 2945.72(H), which extends the speedy trial time for the period of

any continuance on the accused’s own motion.”).

{¶ 88} Under R.C. 2945.72(E), speedy-trial time is also tolled for: “Any period of delay

necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made

or instituted by the accused.” R.C. 2945.72(E). To qualify as a tolling event under

R.C. 2945.72(E), “all that the statute requires is that the delay be necessitated by the

defendant's action.” State v. Belville, 2022-Ohio-3879, ¶ 31. “Any period of delay

necessitated by a defendant's own motion automatically acts as a tolling event.” State v.

Whitfield, 2023-Ohio-240, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Belville at ¶ 31.

{¶ 89} It is well established that a motion to suppress tolls speedy-trial time pursuant

to R.C. 2945.75(E) “for at least a reasonable time until the motion is heard.” State v. Lilly,

1985 WL 17499, *3 (2d Dist. Nov. 19, 1985); accord State v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-2079, ¶ 21

(2d Dist.); State v. Wood, 2024-Ohio-5597, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.) “There is no bright line rule with

28 respect to what constitutes a reasonable amount of time to render a decision on a motion to

suppress.” Wood at ¶ 41. “Rather, a reviewing court must carefully examine the record and

consider the particular ‘“facts and circumstances of each case.”’” Id., quoting State v. Taylor,

1995 WL 680052, *12 (2d Dist. Nov. 17, 1995), quoting State v. McDaniel, 1995 WL 75394,

*3 (4th Dist. Feb. 21, 1995).

{¶ 90} The record indicates that Hopkins was arrested on December 12, 2023, so his

statutory speedy-trial time began running the following day on December 13, 2023. The

record does not indicate that Hopkins was released on bond; accordingly, he had 90 days

to be brought to trial. On February 2, 2024, after 51 speedy-trial days had elapsed, Hopkins

filed a motion to suppress, tolling the statutory speedy trial time. The trial court held a hearing

on the motion to suppress on March 4, 2024. Following the hearing, the trial court issued a

written decision denying the motion on March 6, 2024, which was a reasonable amount of

time. The speedy-trial clock then began to run after the decision.

{¶ 91} Fourteen days after the trial court issued its decision overruling Hopkins’s

motion to suppress, the trial court issued a scheduling order on March 20, 2024, indicating

that the parties had agreed to hold trial on July 8, 2024. A week prior to that date, the court

issued another entry stating that “by agreement of the parties, the July 8, 2024 jury trial is

continued” and that “trial is now set for 9/23/24 . . . .” The trial then went forward as scheduled

on September 23, 2024. These agreed continuances tolled the speedy-trial time pursuant to

R.C. 2945.72(H). See Nelson, 2025-Ohio-2025 at ¶ 34. When considering all these tolling

events, only 65 days of speedy-trial had elapsed before Hopkins was brought to trial, which

was within the 90-day statutory limit. There was no basis for Hopkins’s trial counsel to file a

motion to dismiss on statutory speedy-trial grounds, meaning that counsel did not perform

29 deficiently by failing to file such a motion. Because there was no deficient performance on

the part of counsel, Hopkins’s ineffective assistance claim fails.

{¶ 92} Hopkins’s ninth assignment of error is overruled.

Tenth Assignment of Error

{¶ 93} Under his tenth assignment of error, Hopkins claims that the trial court erred

and abused its discretion by failing to grant his midtrial request for a continuance of the trial

so that he could retain new counsel. We disagree.

{¶ 94} “The determination whether to grant a continuance is entrusted to the broad

discretion of the trial court.” State v. Froman, 2020-Ohio-4523, ¶ 91, citing State v. Unger,

67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), syllabus. Therefore, “an appellate court may not reverse the denial

of a continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” State v. Sigurani, 2025-

Ohio-1573, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that

is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34. “An

abuse of discretion most often involves an unreasonable decision that is not supported by a

sound reasoning process.” State v. McHenry, 2021-Ohio-3118, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA

Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161

(1990). “Abuse-of-discretion review is deferential and does not permit an appellate court to

simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Darmond at ¶ 34, citing State v.

Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14.

{¶ 95} In evaluating a motion for a continuance, “[s]everal factors can be considered:

the length of the delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, the reasons for the

delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other relevant factors.” State v.

Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 115 (1990), citing Unger at 67-68; accord Froman at ¶ 91.

30 {¶ 96} Hopkins claims that the trial court erred by denying him a trial continuance

because it did not address any of these aforementioned factors. Hopkins, however, fails to

cite any authority supporting the proposition that the trial court was required to give a

talismanic recitation of the specific factors it considered when it denied his requested

continuance. Upon review, we find that the trial court had no such obligation, and that the

issue is simply whether the record establishes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

{¶ 97} Hopkins requested a trial continuance for new counsel on the third day of trial

after the State had already rested its case. The request stemmed from Hopkins’s mistaken

belief that his counsel had not requested a continuance based on the State’s late disclosure

of certain autopsy photographs. Hopkins expressed to the court his belief that his counsel

had lied to him about requesting continuance and advised the court that he did not feel like

he was being properly represented.

{¶ 98} The record shows that at the beginning of trial, Hopkins’s counsel did in fact

bring the late disclosure of the photographs to the court’s attention. Hopkins’s counsel and

the trial court explained on the record that the court had indicated that it would rule on the

matter later and that a continuance would not be granted. The record does not indicate that

Hopkins had any other complaints or issues with his trial counsel.

{¶ 99} Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that it was unreasonable

for the trial court to deny Hopkins a trial continuance. Continuing Hopkins’s trial midway

through for the purpose of allowing Hopkins to retain new counsel for an unfounded reason

defies logic. The late timing of Hopkins’s request and its unfounded reasoning suggest that

Hopkins may have been disappointed with the strength of the State’s evidence against him

and was simply trying to delay the proceedings. Also, by the third day of trial, the trial court

31 had a prevailing interest in keeping the trial and docket moving. For all these reasons, we

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not continuing Hopkins’s trial.

{¶ 100} Hopkins’s tenth assignment of error is overruled.

Eleventh Assignment of Error

{¶ 101} Under his eleventh assignment of error, Hopkins claims that the trial court

violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it did not allow him to fire his retained

counsel midway through trial and hire new counsel of his choice. We disagree.

{¶ 102} “Decisions relating to the substitution of counsel are within the sound

discretion of the trial court.” State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 343 (2001), citing Wheat v.

United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). Therefore, “[t]he trial court’s decision is reviewed

under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 73 (1999);

accord State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 523 (2001); State v. McCoy, 2010-Ohio-2639,

¶ 45 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 103} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel

for his defence.” U.S. Const., Amend. VI. “An element of the constitutional right to counsel

is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will

represent him (or her).” State v. Newby, 2024-Ohio-1391, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.), citing United States

v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006).

{¶ 104} “‘[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is

comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to

guarantee an effective advocate . . . rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably

be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.’” Jones at 342, quoting Wheat at 159. “Thus,

‘[a] defendant has only a presumptive right to employ his own chosen counsel.’” (Emphasis

32 in original.) Id., quoting State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 137 (1998). “Accordingly, while

the right to counsel of one’s choice is embedded in our jurisprudence, it is not without

exceptions.” State v. Breneman, 2012-Ohio-2534, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing Wheat at 159.

{¶ 105} “Factors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in denying a

defendant’s motion to substitute counsel include ‘the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy

of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the conflict between the

attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing

an adequate defense.’” Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d at 342, quoting United States v. Jennings,

83 F.3d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1996). “‘[M]ere hostility, tension, and personal conflicts between

attorney and client do not constitute a total breakdown in communication if those problems

do not interfere with the preparation and presentation of a defense.’” State v. Coleman,

2015-Ohio-5381, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Coleman, 2004-Ohio-1305, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.);

accord State v. Brock, 2017-Ohio-759, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 106} “In addition, courts should ‘balanc[e] . . . the accused’s right to counsel of his

choice and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.’” Jones

at 342-343, quoting Jennings at 148. The United States Supreme Court has “recognized a

trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of

fairness, and against the demands of its calendar.” (Citations omitted.) Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. at 152. Moreover, the Court has recognized that trial courts have an “‘independent

interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the

profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.’” Id., quoting

Wheat 486 U.S. at 160.

{¶ 107} As a further matter, courts “‘“must beware that a demand for counsel may be

utilized as a way to delay proceedings or trifle with the court.”’” Breneman, 2012-Ohio-2534,

33 at ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Harmon, 2005-Ohio-1974, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.), quoting U.S.

v. Kryzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 1988). “We have previously found a suggestion

of bad faith where motions to substitute counsel are made on the day of trial, particularly

when the trial date has been set for some time.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing McCoy, 2010-Ohio-2639

at ¶ 48 (2d Dist.). “In such circumstances, there must be ‘a strong showing of good cause to

overcome the implication of bad faith resulting from the timing of the motion.’” McCoy at

¶ 48, quoting State v. Satterwhite, 2009-Ohio-6593, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 108} In this case, the record does not reflect that the conflict between Hopkins and

his counsel was “‘so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an

adequate defense.’” Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d at 342, quoting Jennings, 83 F.3d at 148. The

conflict arose from Hopkins erroneously believing that his counsel had lied to him about

discussing with the trial court the State’s late disclosure of autopsy photographs and about

counsel seeking a trial continuance on that basis. The record indicates that counsel had not

lied to Hopkins about those matters and that Hopkins had no other specific complaint about

his counsel’s performance. We cannot say that Hopkins’s misunderstanding about his

counsel’s actions resulted in a total breakdown of communication that would have interfered

with the preparation and presentation of his defense.

{¶ 109} The timing of Hopkins’s request to hire new counsel is also significant.

Hopkins made the request on the third day of trial after the State had already rested its case.

Such timing suggests that Hopkins may have been unhappy with the strength of the State’s

evidence against him and was simply trying to delay the proceedings. Hopkins made no

strong showing of good cause to overcome that implication.

{¶ 110} Taking the foregoing circumstances into consideration, and balancing

Hopkins’s right to be represented by the counsel of his choice against the interests of the

34 public in the prompt and efficient administration of justice, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Hopkins’s request to hire new counsel midway through trial.

{¶ 111} Hopkins’s eleventh assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 112} Having overruled all of Hopkins’s assignments of error, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

.............

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.