State v. Honaker

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 25-1001
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Jefferson Griffin

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-1001

Filed 3 June 2026

Forsyth County, No. 25CR000278-330

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JERRY EUGENE HONAKER, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 28 April 2025 by Judge Aaron Jay

Berlin in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March

2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Tyler W. Smith, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jillian C. Franke, for Defendant.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant Jerry Eugene Honaker appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking

his probation, arguing the State presented insufficient evidence that Defendant

absconded. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking

Defendant’s probation. STATE V. HONAKER

Opinion of the Court

I. Factual and Procedural History

Defendant, a resident of Forsyth County, was found to have willfully violated

the terms and conditions of probation on 28 April 2025. During the violation hearing,

the State introduced evidence that tended to show the following:

Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and fleeing to allude

arrest on 26 January 2024 in Davie County pursuant to Alford. Under the terms of

the plea arrangement, the court sentenced Defendant to eight to nineteen months in

the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections. The sentence was suspended

for twenty-four months on conditions, which in relevant part included, “[D]efendant

shall . . . (6) [n]ot abscond, by willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making

[D]efendant’s whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer.”

On 6 February 2025, Defendant’s probation officer, Laura Clark, filed a

violation report in Forsyth County, alleging three violations. The first violation

alleged failure to “[r]eport as directed by the [trial court], Commission or the

supervising officer to the officer at reasonable times and places” because Defendant

failed to report to Officer Clark on 6 and 27 January 2025; Officer Clark was unable

to locate Defendant at Defendant’s provided address on 14, 18, and 24 January 2025;

Officer Clark was unable to contact Defendant at Defendant’s provided phone

number; and Officer Clark made contact with Defendant’s sister who had filed a

missing person’s report on Defendant. The second violation alleged Defendant faield

to “pay to the Clerk of Superior Court the ‘Total Amount Due’ as directed by the [trial

-2- STATE V. HONAKER

court] or probation officer.” The third violation alleged Defendant failed to “[r]emain

gainfully and suitably employed or faithfully pursue a course of study or vocational

training that will equip [D]efendant for suitable employment.” The trial court issued

an order for arrest against Defendant on 6 February 2026. Officer Clark then sought

assistance from the Apprehension Capture Enforcement (ACE) team’s Officer

Heather Bowden.

On 11 February 2025, ACE searched for Defendant at City of Dwellings

community center and other homeless shelters. On 17 February 2025, Officer

Bowden attempted to contact Defendant’s girlfriend by phone. The following day,

ACE attempted to visit Defendant’s sister. On 19 February 2025, ACE unsuccessfully

attempted contact with Defendant by phone. ACE successfully contacted Defendant’s

sister who claimed Defendant was seeking admission to the Addiction Recovery Care

Association (ARCA). ACE’s team chief called ARCA, who refused to provide

information regarding Defendant. ACE made a final attempt to visit Defendant at

his last known address, meeting the current resident who confirmed Defendant no

longer lived at the property.

Officer Clark filed a violation report addendum on 24 February 2025 alleging

Defendant “willfully violated” the condition “[n]ot to abscond by willfully avoiding

supervision or by making the supervisee’s whereabouts unknown to the supervising

probation officer” because Defendant had not contacted Officer Clark since 4

December 2024; Officer Clark was unable to contact Defendant by phone on 17 and

-3- STATE V. HONAKER

19 February 2025; and Officer Clark was unable to locate Defendant at any of his

known addresses. The violation also alleged Officer Clark unsuccessfully attempted

to locate Defendant by conducting jail record checks.

Defendant turned himself in on 3 March 2025. While in custody, Defendant

provided a letter to Officer Bowden confirming Defendant had been seeking

treatment at ARCA for two weeks. The magistrate issued a written promise to

appear, and Defendant was released from custody. Defendant informed Officer Clark

he was living in a tent at Bolton Park. Accordingly, Officer Clark and Defendant

arranged a meeting at Bolton Park on 9 April 2025.

When Officer Clark arrived at Bolton Park, she was unable to locate Defendant

or establish contact by phone. Defendant texted Officer Clark on 13 April 2025 to

inform her that Defendant had a new phone number and would meet Officer Clark

at his tent in Bolton Park the next day. Defendant never arrived. Defendant called

Officer Clark and asked to move the meeting to 15 April 2025. Officer Clark declined,

stating she “would see him in court[.]”

At the close of the State’s evidence at the violation hearing, Defendant elected

to testify. Defendant stated he was actively seeking substance abuse treatment and

housing during the time of the alleged absconding. Specifically, Defendant testified,

on 11 February 2025, he underwent an assessment from the Creative Counseling and

Wellness Corporation who referred Defendant to ARCA. During cross-examination,

Defendant admitted to failing to communicate with Officer Clark on multiple

-4- STATE V. HONAKER

occasions. At the close of all evidence, the trial court found Defendant willfully

violated the terms and conditions of his probation, incorporating the violation report

and the addendum violation report in finding 3 as conditions violated, and activated

his suspended sentence. Defendant orally appealed.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Defendant’s

probation because Defendant demonstrated, during the time of his alleged

absconding, he was actively seeking treatment at ARCA.

“The findings of [a] judge, if supported by competent evidence, and his

judgment based thereon are not reviewable on appeal, unless there is a manifest

abuse of discretion.” State v. Guffey, 253 N.C. 43, 45, 116 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1960)

(citations omitted). “Competent evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support the finding.” State v. Chukwu, 230 N.C. App. 553, 561,

749 S.E.2d 910, 916 (2013) (quoting Eley v. Mid/East Acceptance Corp. of N.C., Inc.,

171 N.C. App. 368, 369, 614 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2005)). Under abuse of discretion

review, the trial court’s judgment will not be disturbed absent a decision that “is

manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the

result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 279, 677 S.E.2d 796,

808 (2009) (citation and marks omitted).

The trial court may revoke probation if it finds a criminal defendant has

absconded by “willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making [their]

-5- STATE V. HONAKER

whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer” without lawful excuse.

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1343(b)(3a), 1344(a) (2025). The State bears the burden of

proving the defendant willfully absconded and need not do so beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Seagraves, 266 N.C. 112, 113, 145 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1965); State v.

Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 285, 103 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1958). The State need only

demonstrate that the evidence “be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the

exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has violated a valid condition upon

which the sentence was suspended.” Robinson, 248 N.C. at 285–86, 103 S.E.2d at

379. If the State meets its burden, the defendant must then “demonstrate through

competent evidence his inability to comply with the terms” of his probation to show

his noncompliance was not willful. State v. Talbert, 221 N.C. App. 650, 652, 727

S.E.2d 908, 910–11 (2012) (quoting State v. Terry, 149 N.C. App. 434, 437–38, 562

S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002)).

In State v. Crompton, the defendant’s probation officer filed several violation

reports, including a report alleging the defendant had willfully absconded. 270 N.C.

App. 439, 441, 842 S.E.2d 106, 109 (2020). At the violation hearing, the probation

officer testified he was unable to contact the defendant by phone or by visiting the

defendant’s verified address on multiple occasions. Id. at 441, 842 S.E.2d at 109. The

officer also alleged the defendant failed to report for scheduled appointments. Id. At

the close of all evidence, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation. Id. On

appeal, this Court held the probation officer “exhausted all available avenues” when

-6- STATE V. HONAKER

attempting to contact the defendant. Id. at 448, 842 S.E.2d at 113. Accordingly, this

Court further held the trial court did not abuse its discretion when revoking the

defendant’s probation. Id. at 449, 842 S.E.2d at 114.

Here, Defendant argues the State did not prove Defendant willfully absconded

by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, Defendant argues the trial court abused its

discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation pursuant to insufficient evidence.

The facts of this case are substantially similar to those in Crompton. Officers

Clark and Bowden made multiple attempts to contact Defendant to no avail. The

probation officers attempted to contact Defendant by phone at multiple different

phone numbers, attempted to visit Defendant at his verified addresses, and visited

Defendant’s sister to attempt to establish contact with Defendant. When Officer

Clark was finally able to establish contact with Defendant at Bolton Park, Defendant

failed to keep multiple appointments and failed to maintain contact by phone.

The State, having shown each of these failures, sufficiently proved that Officer

Clark had “exhausted all available avenues” to contact Defendant. See id. at 448, 842

S.E.2d at 113. The cumulative effect of these failures would reasonably lead the trial

court to find Defendant willfully avoided supervision by Officer Clark and would be

grounds to revoke Defendant’s probation. See Robinson, 248 N.C. at 285–86, 103

S.E.2d at 379. Defendant’s argument that he was seeking treatment does not absolve

him of his inability to keep appropriate contact with Officer Clark during the time

outside of the two weeks spent at ARCA. See Talbert, 221 N.C. App. at 652, 727

-7- STATE V. HONAKER

S.E.2d at 910–11. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking

Defendant’s probation for willfully absconding.

We note the trial court checked the box for finding 4, which states “[e]ach

violation is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis upon which [the trial court] should

revoke probation and activate the suspended sentence.” “The court may only revoke

probation for a violation of a condition of probation under G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1) or G.S.

15A-1343(b)(3a), except as provided in G.S. 15A-1344(d2).” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

1344(a). “Therefore, an offender must commit a criminal offense or abscond probation

in order for a trial court to revoke probation if the [d]efendant has not been previously

confined due to violations of probation.” State v. Mayfield, --- N.C. App. ---, ---, ---

S.E.2d ---, ---, 2026 WL 1235344, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (citing State v.

Hemingway, 278 N.C. App. 538, 544, 863 S.E.2d 279, 283 (2021)). Here, the violation

report included probation violations outside of the committal of a criminal offense or

absconding in addition to the absconding violation. Thus, because “each violation”

was not a “sufficient basis upon which [the trial court] should revoke probation and

activate the suspended sentence,” the trial court erred in checking box 4. Id.

However, because we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

Defendant willfully absconded, we affirm the trial court’s probation revocation

because the trial court checked the box for finding 5a, revoking probation for

absconding. Id. (“[W]hen this Court is ‘able to ascertain that the trial court properly

weighed the probation violations’ and it is clear ‘the revocation of Defendant’s

-8- STATE V. HONAKER

probation was based upon [grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a)],’ the trial

court’s judgment should be affirmed.” (quoting State v. Daniels, 290 N.C. App. 443,

447, 893 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2023) (alteration in original)).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking

Defendant’s probation as modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge WOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

-9-