State v. Holden

Court of Appeals of Oregon

State v. Holden

598 P.2d 1252, 41 Or. App. 661, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 3158

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon

DecidedAugust 27, 1979

DocketNo. 78 2702 and 78 2703; CA 12726 and 12727

StatusPublished

This text of 598 P.2d 1252 (State v. Holden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Holden, 598 P.2d 1252, 41 Or. App. 661, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 3158 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

LEE, J.

Defendant appeals his convictions of selling unregistered securities, see ORS 59.055, and of fraudulent sale of securities, see ORS 59.135. He makes several assignments of error, including the refusal of the trial court to dismiss the charges against him because the state had failed to bring him to trial within the 90-day period specified by ORS 135.763.¹ See ORS 135.765² and ORS 135.760.³ Defendant was in the custody of the Corrections Division when notice described in ORS 135.760(2) was given.

Under ORS 135.763(1), an inmate defendant may request an early trial on the charges pending against him by serving a written notice on the district attorney of the county in which he is charged. The question here is whether a "certified true copy” of such a notice, [664]*664certified by defense counsel, is sufficient to invoke a defendant’s rights under ORS 135.760 et seq.

ORS 135.760(2) provides that the notice to the district attorney shall be "signed by the inmate.” The notice served upon the district attorney contained only "/S/” on the line above the word "defendant” but the ribbon copy that defendant had filed with the clerk of the court had been signed by defendant personally.

We are unaware of any case that addresses the question of what constitutes sufficient compliance with the notice provisions of ORS 135.760 enabling an inmate defendant to invoke the statutory right to a speedy trial. We do note, however, that ORS 135.760 et seq. was designed to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 87, 386 P2d 915 (1963). To foster that end, we liberally construe the requirement that the notice given to the district attorney be "signed by the inmate.” The notice filed did bear defendant’s signature and the copy informed the district attorney of defendant’s desire to avail himself of the rights accorded by ORS 135.760 et seq. Cf. Bevel v. Gladden, 232 Or 578, 583, 376 P2d 117 (1962); State v. Gray, 26 Or App 901, 905, 554 P2d 638 (1976).

We hold that under the facts of this case the "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” of the notice served on the district attorney was sufficient to cast upon the state the duty of bringing defendant to trial within 90 days. Since the state failed to do so or to ask for a continuance, see ORS 135.763(2), it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss. See ORS 135.765.

Reversed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

LEE, J.

Defendant appeals his convictions of selling unregistered securities, see ORS 59.055, and of fraudulent sale of securities, see ORS 59.135. He makes several assignments of error, including the refusal of the trial court to dismiss the charges against him because the state had failed to bring him to trial within the 90-day period specified by ORS 135.763.¹ See ORS 135.765² and ORS 135.760.³ Defendant was in the custody of the Corrections Division when notice described in ORS 135.760(2) was given.

Under ORS 135.763(1), an inmate defendant may request an early trial on the charges pending against him by serving a written notice on the district attorney of the county in which he is charged. The question here is whether a "certified true copy” of such a notice, [664]*664certified by defense counsel, is sufficient to invoke a defendant’s rights under ORS 135.760 et seq.

ORS 135.760(2) provides that the notice to the district attorney shall be "signed by the inmate.” The notice served upon the district attorney contained only "/S/” on the line above the word "defendant” but the ribbon copy that defendant had filed with the clerk of the court had been signed by defendant personally.

We are unaware of any case that addresses the question of what constitutes sufficient compliance with the notice provisions of ORS 135.760 enabling an inmate defendant to invoke the statutory right to a speedy trial. We do note, however, that ORS 135.760 et seq. was designed to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 87, 386 P2d 915 (1963). To foster that end, we liberally construe the requirement that the notice given to the district attorney be "signed by the inmate.” The notice filed did bear defendant’s signature and the copy informed the district attorney of defendant’s desire to avail himself of the rights accorded by ORS 135.760 et seq. Cf. Bevel v. Gladden, 232 Or 578, 583, 376 P2d 117 (1962); State v. Gray, 26 Or App 901, 905, 554 P2d 638 (1976).

We hold that under the facts of this case the "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” of the notice served on the district attorney was sufficient to cast upon the state the duty of bringing defendant to trial within 90 days. Since the state failed to do so or to ask for a continuance, see ORS 135.763(2), it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss. See ORS 135.765.

Reversed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

598 P.2d 1252, 41 Or. App. 661, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 3158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-holden-orctapp-1979.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack