IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-50
Filed 7 January 2026
Johnston County, Nos. 22CR051766-500, 22CR000462-500
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
BILLY HODGES, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 January 2024 by Judge Paul A.
Holcombe, III, in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19
November 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Manuel C. Davis, for the State.
John W. Moss for defendant-appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Defendant Billy Hodges, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia and his guilty plea to attaining habitual-felon
status. On appeal, Defendant argues that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss; 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial
attorney; and 3) the trial court erred by neglecting to give him notice and an
opportunity to be heard before imposing a civil judgment for attorney’s fees. After
careful review, we conclude that Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review STATE V. HODGES
Opinion of the Court
any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence; we dismiss Defendant’s claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to his right to reassert it in a
motion for appropriate relief filed with the trial court; and we dismiss Defendant’s
claim regarding the civil judgment for attorney’s fees.
I. Background
Defendant’s case came on for jury trial on 11 December 2023 in Johnston
County Superior Court. At trial, evidence was presented tending to show the
following:
In the early morning hours of 16 April 2022, Benson Police Sergeant Ramiro
Velazquez pulled over a vehicle after it ran a red light. Defendant was driving the car
while a female passenger—Amanda Warren—rode in the front passenger seat. After
discovering that Defendant had a suspended driver’s license and the license plate of
the vehicle was expired, Sergeant Velazquez issued a citation to Defendant and asked
him whether there was “anything in the car illegal.” Defendant answered that there
was not and consented to Sergeant Velazquez’s search of the vehicle.
Two other officers arrived on the scene and Sergeant Velazquez proceeded to
search the vehicle. Sergeant Velazquez discovered “a small red toolbox,” concealed by
its placement “tucked into the sunroof.” Inside the toolbox, he found “a small silver
spoon” and a small plastic bag containing “a white crystal substance,” which he
believed—and subsequent testing confirmed—to be methamphetamine. According to
Sergeant Velazquez, both occupants of the car initially denied owning the contents of
-2- STATE V. HODGES
the toolbox. But after being placed under arrest, Defendant stated: “I will take it. The
drugs [are] mine . . . . I’m taking the charge for the . . . toolbox. It’s on the sunroof.”
Defendant testified that he did not own the vehicle, that it belonged to someone
staying at the motel at which Defendant resided, and that he “was just working on
[the vehicle] at the time.” He also testified that when Sergeant Velazquez asked him
for permission to search the vehicle, Defendant told him: “[Y]ou can because it’s not
my car, and there is nothing here that belongs to me.” Defendant further testified
that he did not “know that there was anything in the car,” and that Sergeant
Velazquez’s testimony regarding Defendant’s admission to owning the drugs and
drug paraphernalia was either “untruthful” or “mistaken.”
Defense counsel made a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence
and renewed his motion after the charge conference and the trial court instructed the
jury; the court denied the motion on both occasions.
At the trial’s conclusion on 13 December 2023, the jury returned verdicts
finding Defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. That same day, Defendant pleaded guilty to attaining habitual-felon
status. The trial court orally pronounced a criminal judgment and a civil judgment
for attorney’s fees.
On 2 January 2024, the trial court consolidated Defendant’s convictions and
entered judgment, sentencing him to a term of 45 to 66 months’ imprisonment in the
custody of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction. This criminal
-3- STATE V. HODGES
judgment was included in the record on appeal; the record is devoid of a civil
judgment.
Defendant timely filed notice of appeal from the criminal judgment.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred by
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of
methamphetamine; 2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
from his trial attorney; and 3) whether the trial court’s order assessing attorney’s fees
as a civil judgment is invalid.
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
the charge of possession of methamphetamine because “the State did not present
substantial evidence of [his] power and intent to control [the substance’s] disposition
and use.” However, Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) “provides that errors based upon insufficiency
of the evidence may be the subject of appellate review even though no objection,
exception or motion has been made in the trial division.” State v. Stocks, 319 N.C.
437, 439, 355 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) (2023). Yet
N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(3) provides that where the defendant presents evidence, “if a
defendant fails to move to dismiss the action . . . at the close of all the evidence, [the]
defendant may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the
-4- STATE V. HODGES
crime charged.” N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(3).
Our Supreme Court resolved this conflict, explaining that “[t]o the extent that
[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-1446(d)(5) is inconsistent with N.C.R. App. P. 10[(a)](3), the
statute must fail.” Stocks, 319 N.C. at 439, 355 S.E.2d at 493; see also State v.
Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 747 & n.2, 821 S.E.2d 402, 406 & n.2 (2018) (noting that in
Stocks, our Supreme Court held N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) to be an
“unconstitutional encroachment[ ] on the rulemaking authority of the Court”); State
v. Spaugh, 321 N.C. 550, 552–53, 364 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1988); State v. Blackmon, 208
N.C. App. 397, 399–400, 702 S.E.2d 833, 835–36 (2010) (concluding that “in
accordance with Rule 10, [the] defendant ha[d] waived appellate review of” the
sufficiency of the evidence where the defendant moved to dismiss the charges at the
close of the State’s evidence but, after presenting evidence, failed to renew the motion
at the close of all evidence).
In the case at bar, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the charges at the
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-50
Filed 7 January 2026
Johnston County, Nos. 22CR051766-500, 22CR000462-500
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
BILLY HODGES, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 January 2024 by Judge Paul A.
Holcombe, III, in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19
November 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Manuel C. Davis, for the State.
John W. Moss for defendant-appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Defendant Billy Hodges, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia and his guilty plea to attaining habitual-felon
status. On appeal, Defendant argues that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss; 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial
attorney; and 3) the trial court erred by neglecting to give him notice and an
opportunity to be heard before imposing a civil judgment for attorney’s fees. After
careful review, we conclude that Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review STATE V. HODGES
Opinion of the Court
any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence; we dismiss Defendant’s claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to his right to reassert it in a
motion for appropriate relief filed with the trial court; and we dismiss Defendant’s
claim regarding the civil judgment for attorney’s fees.
I. Background
Defendant’s case came on for jury trial on 11 December 2023 in Johnston
County Superior Court. At trial, evidence was presented tending to show the
following:
In the early morning hours of 16 April 2022, Benson Police Sergeant Ramiro
Velazquez pulled over a vehicle after it ran a red light. Defendant was driving the car
while a female passenger—Amanda Warren—rode in the front passenger seat. After
discovering that Defendant had a suspended driver’s license and the license plate of
the vehicle was expired, Sergeant Velazquez issued a citation to Defendant and asked
him whether there was “anything in the car illegal.” Defendant answered that there
was not and consented to Sergeant Velazquez’s search of the vehicle.
Two other officers arrived on the scene and Sergeant Velazquez proceeded to
search the vehicle. Sergeant Velazquez discovered “a small red toolbox,” concealed by
its placement “tucked into the sunroof.” Inside the toolbox, he found “a small silver
spoon” and a small plastic bag containing “a white crystal substance,” which he
believed—and subsequent testing confirmed—to be methamphetamine. According to
Sergeant Velazquez, both occupants of the car initially denied owning the contents of
-2- STATE V. HODGES
the toolbox. But after being placed under arrest, Defendant stated: “I will take it. The
drugs [are] mine . . . . I’m taking the charge for the . . . toolbox. It’s on the sunroof.”
Defendant testified that he did not own the vehicle, that it belonged to someone
staying at the motel at which Defendant resided, and that he “was just working on
[the vehicle] at the time.” He also testified that when Sergeant Velazquez asked him
for permission to search the vehicle, Defendant told him: “[Y]ou can because it’s not
my car, and there is nothing here that belongs to me.” Defendant further testified
that he did not “know that there was anything in the car,” and that Sergeant
Velazquez’s testimony regarding Defendant’s admission to owning the drugs and
drug paraphernalia was either “untruthful” or “mistaken.”
Defense counsel made a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence
and renewed his motion after the charge conference and the trial court instructed the
jury; the court denied the motion on both occasions.
At the trial’s conclusion on 13 December 2023, the jury returned verdicts
finding Defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. That same day, Defendant pleaded guilty to attaining habitual-felon
status. The trial court orally pronounced a criminal judgment and a civil judgment
for attorney’s fees.
On 2 January 2024, the trial court consolidated Defendant’s convictions and
entered judgment, sentencing him to a term of 45 to 66 months’ imprisonment in the
custody of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction. This criminal
-3- STATE V. HODGES
judgment was included in the record on appeal; the record is devoid of a civil
judgment.
Defendant timely filed notice of appeal from the criminal judgment.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred by
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of
methamphetamine; 2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
from his trial attorney; and 3) whether the trial court’s order assessing attorney’s fees
as a civil judgment is invalid.
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
the charge of possession of methamphetamine because “the State did not present
substantial evidence of [his] power and intent to control [the substance’s] disposition
and use.” However, Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) “provides that errors based upon insufficiency
of the evidence may be the subject of appellate review even though no objection,
exception or motion has been made in the trial division.” State v. Stocks, 319 N.C.
437, 439, 355 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) (2023). Yet
N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(3) provides that where the defendant presents evidence, “if a
defendant fails to move to dismiss the action . . . at the close of all the evidence, [the]
defendant may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the
-4- STATE V. HODGES
crime charged.” N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(3).
Our Supreme Court resolved this conflict, explaining that “[t]o the extent that
[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-1446(d)(5) is inconsistent with N.C.R. App. P. 10[(a)](3), the
statute must fail.” Stocks, 319 N.C. at 439, 355 S.E.2d at 493; see also State v.
Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 747 & n.2, 821 S.E.2d 402, 406 & n.2 (2018) (noting that in
Stocks, our Supreme Court held N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5) to be an
“unconstitutional encroachment[ ] on the rulemaking authority of the Court”); State
v. Spaugh, 321 N.C. 550, 552–53, 364 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1988); State v. Blackmon, 208
N.C. App. 397, 399–400, 702 S.E.2d 833, 835–36 (2010) (concluding that “in
accordance with Rule 10, [the] defendant ha[d] waived appellate review of” the
sufficiency of the evidence where the defendant moved to dismiss the charges at the
close of the State’s evidence but, after presenting evidence, failed to renew the motion
at the close of all evidence).
In the case at bar, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the charges at the
close of the State’s evidence, which the trial court denied. Defendant then presented
evidence. Although defense counsel eventually renewed the motion to dismiss, he
failed to do so within the timeframe mandated by Rule 10(a)(3): at the close of all the
evidence. Instead, defense counsel renewed his motion to dismiss after the charge
conference and after the trial court instructed the jury. Accordingly, Defendant failed
to preserve appellate review of any argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence.
-5- STATE V. HODGES
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a
result of his trial counsel’s failure to subpoena Ms. Warren to testify on his behalf at
trial after she “signed a statement claiming the methamphetamine at issue [w]as
hers and stating that she would appear at trial.”
“When a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis that counsel was
ineffective, he must show that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 279, 595 S.E.2d 381, 405 (2004)
(citation omitted). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. (citation omitted). “Both prongs of this test must be demonstrated in order to claim
successfully ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.
“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought on direct review will be
decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is
required, i.e., claims that may be developed and argued without such ancillary
procedures as the appointment of investigators or an evidentiary hearing.” State v.
Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 691, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 547
-6- STATE V. HODGES
U.S. 1073, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2006). “Therefore, on direct appeal we must determine
if these ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been prematurely brought. If so,
we must dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert
them during a subsequent motion for appropriate relief proceeding.” Id. (cleaned up).
In the present case, Defendant argues that counsel’s failure “to take reasonable
steps [to] secure the attendance of a material witness at trial”—Ms. Warren—“was
not a tactical decision” and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Yet
as Defendant acknowledges, “[i]t is not clear on this record that [d]efense [c]ounsel
attempted to use either method” of “obtaining or issuing a subpoena or requesting a
material witness order” to secure Ms. Warren’s presence at trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 15A-801, 15A-803(a).
The record is not fully developed, rendering this claim premature. Accordingly,
we dismiss Defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to
his right to reassert it during a subsequent proceeding upon a motion for appropriate
relief. See Campbell, 359 N.C. at 691, 617 S.E.2d at 30.
C. Attorney’s Fees
Defendant further asserts that “the trial court’s [o]rder that attorney’s fees
would be paid in a civil judgment should be vacated and the matter remanded for
further proceedings.” However, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim.
“In certain circumstances, trial courts may enter civil judgments against
convicted indigent defendants for the attorneys’ fees incurred by their court-
-7- STATE V. HODGES
appointed counsel.” State v. Friend, 257 N.C. App. 516, 522, 809 S.E.2d 902, 906
(2018); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-455.
Here, Defendant’s written notice of appeal references the criminal judgment
entered upon his “convictions of possession of methamphetamine and [attaining the
status of an] habitual felon.” (Capitalization omitted). With regard to a civil
judgment, the trial court stated its intention to enter a civil judgment for attorney’s
fees and the criminal judgment provides: “WAIVE JAIL FEES; OTHER MONIES
SHALL BE A CIVIL JUDGMENT”; nevertheless, the record on appeal is devoid of a
civil judgment. Additionally, Defendant neglected to appeal from a civil judgment
assessing attorney’s fees in his notice of appeal from the criminal judgment and did
not file a separate notice of appeal from a civil judgment.
Moreover, Defendant failed to include the civil judgment assessing attorney’s
fees in the record on appeal. As our Supreme Court has explained where “there is no
civil judgment in the record ordering [D]efendant to pay attorney fees, the Court of
Appeals ha[s] no subject matter jurisdiction on this issue.” State v. Jacobs, 361 N.C.
565, 566, 648 S.E.2d 841, 842 (2007); see also State v. Hester, 287 N.C. App. 282, 286,
882 S.E.2d 446, 450 (2022) (concluding that this Court could not review the civil
judgment imposing attorney’s fees because the defendant failed to include the
“judgment in the record on appeal and did not supplement the record with the
judgment pursuant to our Rules of Appellate Procedure”).
Defendant failed to provide this Court with a civil judgment imposing
-8- STATE V. HODGES
attorney’s fees—assuming that one was entered in this matter—or to appeal from any
such order, whether as a matter of right or by filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant’s argument regarding
the denial of his motion to dismiss is unpreserved for appellate review. We dismiss
Defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to his right to
reassert it in a subsequent motion for appropriate relief before the trial court. Finally,
we dismiss Defendant’s appeal regarding the civil judgment for attorney’s fees.
DISMISSED IN PART; DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART.
Judges FLOOD and STADING concur.
-9-