[Cite as State v. Hodge, 2025-Ohio-4478.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240633 TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/16633 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
LAURYNE HODGE, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and appellant discharged. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/26/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Hodge, 2025-Ohio-4478.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240633 TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/16633 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION
LAURYNE HODGE, :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 26, 2025
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Joshua Loya, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Angela J. Glaser, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Judge.
{¶1} Lauryne Hodge appeals from her conviction for criminal trespassing. In
one assignment of error, Hodge contends that her conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hodge knowingly refused to leave the library, and that she was without privilege to
enter and remain on the property. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and discharge Hodge from further prosecution.
Factual Background
{¶2} Lauryne Hodge was charged with criminal trespassing, in violation of
R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), for entering a library branch after her privilege to enter all library
branches had been revoked. According to the complaint, “staff and police advised
Hodge that she was trespassed from all Cincinnati library locations. Hodge refused to
leave and [was] taken into custody.”
{¶3} Hodge proceeded to a bench trial. A public safety officer with the library
testified that he is the public safety officer for all of the library branches. Although
stationed primarily at the main branch, he is dispatched to the other branches as
needed. The safety officer encountered Hodge on July 22, 2024, when he was
dispatched to the Mt. Washington (“MW”) branch for a staff complaint. He met with
the branch manager, and the two of them approached Hodge, who was sitting on a
bench across from the library branch, to deliver a suspension notice. Hodge refused
to accept the notice and told them to leave. Hodge said she would be back and that
there were other branches.
{¶4} The safety officer informed Hodge that she was suspended from all
branches, and she said to go away and shouted obscenities at them. The notice
explained that she was suspended from all 41 branches for 30 days for disruptive
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conduct. Hodge told them to leave before she got violent.
{¶5} The safety officer explained that the library has procedures for enforcing
standards of behavior. When a behavior standard is violated, the library policy is to
issue a warning. After that, if the conduct persists, a suspension notice is issued that
also informs the person how long he or she is suspended. If the person entered onto
library property during the suspension, another warning would inform the person that
he or she could be charged for criminal trespass and that the suspension length would
be increased. A subsequent violation would result in a lengthier suspension. The
officer did not have a copy of the notice he tried to give to Hodge, but he provided a
blank form to the State.
{¶6} On re-direct, the following exchange occurred,
Q. And I just want to ask you, you said that the library has
procedures?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. And is it correct to say that the suspensions are
progressive?
A. Yes.
Q. So if she had received prior suspensions, would the notice
be more than 30 days?
Q. And I spoke to a lot of people in a short period of time,
but I thought - - is it - - I thought she was suspended for 90 days.
Is that part of your knowledge?
A. So the initial suspension is for 30 days. If she is
suspended within 365 days of that initial suspension, it will be
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increased to 90 days, and then a year, and then so on and so
forth, and including within. So if she is back to any of the
branches within that 30 days, then it’s immediately up to 90
days. If she is afterward - - so if she served the suspension and
stayed away, and then she has come back and violated the
standard of behavior after that is suspended again, it will be
increased to - - again within that 365 days, it will be increased to
90 days and then progressively further out.
Q. Okay. And the question that I have for you is do you know
how many days Ms. Hodge was suspended from using the library
in total?
A. My knowledge of Ms. Hodge and all events with her
essentially begins and ends with the Mount Washington
incident[.]
{¶7} The next witness was employed at the Clifton branch library. She had
encountered Hodge at the Clifton library on August 15, 2024. The employee conducted
a welfare check because someone was in the restroom for a long time. When she
knocked on the restroom door, Hodge was in the restroom. On September 4, 2024,
the library employee spoke with Hodge in the lower level of the library when Hodge
asked for her name. On September 25, the library employee observed Hodge enter the
library and proceed to the lower level. She knew that Hodge had been suspended, so
she called the police. After two officers responded, the three of them went to the lower
level to confront Hodge.
{¶8} When they approached, Hodge was using a library computer. The
employee informed Hodge that she was not allowed in the library, and she must leave.
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Hodge did not want to leave and became upset.
{¶9} On cross-examination, the library employee confirmed that she did not
ask Hodge to leave on August 15 or on September 4. On September 4, the library
employee learned something through the computer system to the effect that Hodge
was not supposed to be there. The employee confirmed she had no personal
knowledge of the information. Based on the computer information she learned on
September 4, she called the police when she saw Hodge on September 25.
{¶10} A Cincinnati police officer testified that he responded to the Clifton
branch on September 25th for a trespass. When he arrived, he was notified by a library
employee that Hodge had been trespassed from the library.
{¶11} When the officer confronted Hodge, she was in the basement working
on a computer. He instructed the employee to advise Hodge to leave. Hodge became
argumentative, and he informed Hodge that she would be arrested for trespassing if
she refused to leave. When Hodge continued to refuse to leave, he arrested her. The
officer charged Hodge “for refusing to leave once police and staff members on scene
were telling her to leave, not from previous incidents. I’m charging the trespassing for
her refusing to leave once an employee of the library was telling her to leave.” The
incident lasted for five minutes.
{¶12} Hodge testified that she was sitting on a bench outside the MW branch
library when she was approached by the branch manager and the security officer. The
branch manager spoke with her, and the security officer observed the conversation.
The branch manager tried to give her a written notice and informed her that she was
being suspended for an incident that had occurred 30 minutes prior. Hodge
responded, “Please get out of my face. You followed me off the property. I left the
library because I wanted to put distance between yourself and myself. To follow me
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
off the library premises is just agitating the situation.” Hodge was told that she was
suspended from the library for 30 days.
{¶13} Hodge confirmed that she used the Clifton branch library on August 15
and September 4 without incident. No one informed her that she could not be in the
Clifton branch on those days. When Hodge used the library on September 25, she
believed she was allowed to be there. Hodge explained that she had been using the
library computer for telehealth appointments every two weeks. That day, Hodge
logged into her email but was told to leave less than 10 minutes after her arrival by two
police officers.
{¶14} Hodge tried to explain to the police why she was there and that she had
filed a grievance based on the encounters she had had at the MW and Clifton branches.
Hodges further explained that she filed a grievance with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission on July 23 after the suspension, and had filed grievances between April
and September with the district manager of the library.
{¶15} On cross-examination, Hodge testified that she believed the suspension
only applied at the MW branch. When asked if she had a “heated discussion” when
she was suspended, Hodge responded, “No,” and further explained that she told them
she felt threatened and triggered by them. Afterwards, Hodge called their supervisors.
Hodge did not raise her voice while speaking with the branch manager, but by the time
she had spoken with the district manager, her tone was elevated. Hodge admitted that
she refused the notice and testified that there was no mention of the suspension
applying at all 41 branches. Hodge also admitted that she went to the Clifton branch
during the 30-day suspension.
{¶16} When confronted at the Clifton library, Hodge was told by the library
employee that she had been suspended for 30 days from the MW branch, and that she
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was now suspended for the rest of the year due to an issue at the Clifton branch. The
employee left, and Hodge continued conversing with the officers.
{¶17} When asked to leave, Hodge started gathering her things and requested
her I.D. Hodge had reserved a study room, which required her to provide her I.D.
While retrieving her I.D., she was informed that she would be “trespassed” if she did
not give them her name. Hodge responded that she was complying with the officers’
request and asked if she should call another officer. Hodge proceeded to call 911, and
at that point, one of the officers took her phone and placed her under arrest. The entire
encounter lasted five minutes.
{¶18} The trial court found that although the employee of the Clifton branch
was initially unaware of the suspension, once she found out, she called the police, and
the employee had the authority to ask her to leave. When Hodge refused to leave, she
was arrested. The court found her guilty.
{¶19} Hodge now appeals, and in one assignment of error, Hodge contends
the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hodge knowingly refused to leave the library,
and that she did not have privilege to enter and remain on the property.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶20} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing
court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶21} Hodge was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of R.C.
2911.21(A)(1), which provides: “No person, without privilege to do so, shall * * *
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
[k]knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another.” “To sustain a
conviction for criminal trespass, the state must prove the defendant (1) without
privilege to do so (2) knowingly (3) entered or remained on (4) the land or premises
of another.” State v. Webb, 2023-Ohio-4817, ¶ 1 (1st Dist.). In general, “a person has
a privilege to enter and be upon the public areas of public property.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing
State v. Shelton, 63 Ohio App.3d 137 (4th Dist. 1989); City of Cleveland v. Dickerson,
2016-Ohio-806, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). However, “[a] person may commit a criminal
trespass onto public property when his or her general privilege to be there has been
properly revoked.” Webb at ¶ 20.
{¶22} Hodge contends that the State failed to prove that she lacked the
privilege to enter the library on September 25, 2024, because her 30-day suspension,
issued on July 22, had ended prior to her use of the library in September. We agree.
{¶23} Here, the evidence established that Hodge had been issued a 30-day
library ban on July 22, 2024. That ban expired on August 21, 2024. Thus, on
September 24, the date of the alleged trespass, Hodge’s ban had terminated.
{¶24} The library employee called the police due to her belief that Hodge’s
temporary suspension was still in effect. The library employee informed Hodge that
she was currently “trespassed” from the library, but her belief was not based on her
personal knowledge. Rather, the employee relied on information she saw on the
computer on September 4, 20 days prior to the incident. The library employee did not
explain what information she gleaned from the computer, so it is not part of our
record. The library safety officer testified that he was only aware of the 30-day ban
that he issued in June. Although he testified that a person who violates the ban could
be served a notice extending the ban to 90 days, there was no evidence that Hodge had
received a notice extending her ban. The State did not establish that Hodge was
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
suspended on September 24. Thus, the evidence did not support a finding that Hodge
had no privilege to enter the library on September 24.
{¶25} The State argues that Hodge’s suspension was automatically extended
when she violated the 30-day suspension by entering the Clifton branch on August 21.
However, the State misconstrues the testimony of the safety officer. Although the
safety officer testified that a subsequent violation could result in an increased
suspension to 90 days, he testified that an additional warning would be issued
informing the person of the increase. The State presented no evidence that Hodge
received a subsequent warning.
{¶26} The State further argues that when the Clifton library employee revoked
Hodge’s privilege by asking her to leave, Hodge committed the offense by refusing to
leave. Thus, even if Hodge had a privilege to enter the library branch, the privilege
was revoked when the employee asked her to leave. The basis of the trial court’s guilty
verdict was the fact that Hodge did not leave when the library employee asked her to
leave.
{¶27} However, the complaint alleged that the offense was based on the fact
that “staff and police advised Hodge that she was trespassed from all Cincinnati library
locations.” “In a legal sense, being ‘trespassed’ means a person’s permission to be in a
particular area has been revoked.” State v. Deckard, 2023-Ohio-1398, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.),
citing State v. Roark, 2010-Ohio-2841, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.) (“In this case police had a
reasonable suspicion that Defendant was trespassing on DMHA property. Officer
Wolpert knew Defendant was on the DMHA trespass list because, just four months
earlier, Wolpert had personally trespassed Defendant off of all DMHA property for
carrying concealed weapons.”); State v. Scott, 2004-Ohio-271, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“We
emphasize that Fletcher was aware of the DMHA criminal trespass policy and of the
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
fact that Scott had been given trespass notices, thus barring him from DMHA property,
pursuant to that policy.”); State v. McLemore, 2011-Ohio-243, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.) (noting
that officers found a field-interview card stating the defendant had “been trespassed”
from a BP station, meaning he had been informed that he was no longer allowed on
the property); Gessner v. Vore, 2008-Ohio-3870, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.) (citing a “trespass
notice” advising an individual “that he was no longer authorized to enter and/or
remain on the premises”). Thus, the charge was based on Hodge’s entry into the
library after her privilege was revoked and not on her refusal to leave when asked by
the library employee.
{¶28} Moreover, with respect to public property, “the privilege to enter or
remain upon specific property, once granted or conferred, may not be withdrawn
arbitrarily or capriciously.” State v. Staley, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing
Columbus v. Andrews, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 829, *7 (10th Dist. Feb. 27, 1992). As
the Andrews Court explained,
There must be some reasonable or legitimate basis for
withdrawing the privilege. This is particularly true with regard to
persons charged with the supervision of public property. As they are
not the actual owners of the property, they have no right to exclude
persons from the property for any reason or no reason at all. As public
officers, they must act reasonably and within the scope of their
authority. When a person charged with the supervision of public
property acts unreasonably or exceeds the scope of his or her authority,
the purported revocation of the privilege to enter the property is void
and of no further effect.
Andrews at *30-31. “Whether there was a reasonable and legitimate basis to revoke
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the privilege is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.”
Webb, 2023-Ohio-4817, at ¶ 20 (1st Dist.).
{¶29} In this case, the library employee revoked Hodge’s privilege on
September 24 due to her belief that Hodge’s temporary suspension was still in effect.
Notably, there was no testimony to establish that the library employee had the
authority to revoke Hodge’s privilege to enter the library branch, and no evidence that
the purported revocation complied with the library policy of presenting a notice when
the privilege has been revoked. Additionally, as previously discussed, Hodge’s 30-day
privilege revocation ended on August 21, 2024. The State presented no evidence of an
additional revocation or suspension. Based on these facts, the library employee had
no reasonable or legitimate basis to order Hodge to leave, and this “purported
revocation of the privilege to enter the property is void and of no further effect.”
Andrews at *31. Thus the conviction could not be based on the library employee’s
purported revocation of Hodge’s privilege to enter and remain in the library.
{¶30} Accordingly, we sustain Hodge’s first assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶31} Having sustained Hodge’s sole assignment of error, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and discharge Hodge from further prosecution.
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
KINSLEY, P.J., and NESTOR, J., concur.