State v. Hobbs

• Court: New Mexico Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 6, 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion Number:

3 Filing Date: February 6, 2024

4 No. A-1-CA-40849

5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

6 Plaintiff-Appellant,

7 v.

8 NATHANIEL HOBBS,

9 Defendant-Appellee.

10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY 11 Louis E. DePauli, Jr., District Court Judge

12 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Emily Bowen, Assistant Attorney General 15 Albuquerque, NM

16 for Appellant

17 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 18 Melanie C. McNett, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM

20 for Appellee 1 OPINION

2 MEDINA, Judge.

3 {1} Defendant Nathaniel Hobbs faced various charges in magistrate court after

4 police arrested him for driving under the influence. During a pretrial hearing, the

5 magistrate court reportedly excluded all of the State’s witnesses due to the State’s

6 late disclosure. Before the magistrate court entered its order, the State filed a nolle

7 prosequi and refiled the charges in district court to appeal the exclusion of its

8 witnesses under State v. Heinsen (Heinsen II), 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121

9 P.3d 1040. In the absence of an order from the magistrate court suppressing the

10 witnesses, the district court dismissed the State’s case for failure to comply with

11 Rule 6-506(B) NMRA, the magistrate court six-month rule.

12 {2} We hold that the district court could not exercise appellate review of the

13 magistrate court’s reported exclusion of witnesses, absent proof of an order from the

14 magistrate court or other documentation in the magistrate court record of the

15 exclusion, and the district court also erred by dismissing the case for violation of the

16 magistrate court six-month rule. We therefore reverse and remand.

17 BACKGROUND

18 {3} On March 22, 2022, the State filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court

19 charging Defendant with driving under the influence, driving with an open container,

20 causing intentional damage to personal property of another, driving without a 1 license, proof of registration, and insurance. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102 (2016)

2 (driving under the influence); NMSA 1978, § 66-8-138(A) (2013) (open container);

3 NMSA 1978, § 30-15-1 (1963) (causing intentional damage to the personal property

4 of another); NMSA 1978, § 66-5-2 (2013) (drivers must be licensed); NMSA 1978,

5 § 66-3-13 (2013) (drivers must show proof of registration); NMSA 1978, § 66-5-

6 229(C) (2019) (drivers must show proof of financial responsibility).

7 {4} The magistrate court set trial for August 5, 2022. The State filed a witness list

8 in the magistrate court on April 8, 2022, but did not upload the witness list into the

9 Criminal Information System (CMS), until August 3, 2022. On August 4, 2022,

10 Defendant filed a motion to exclude all witnesses contending late witness disclosure

11 by the State. The magistrate court continued the August 5, 2022, trial setting and

12 heard Defendant’s motion to exclude witnesses on either August 18, 2022, or

13 September 1, 2022. On September 6, 2022, the State filed a nolle prosequi citing the

14 exclusion of its essential witnesses.

15 {5} On September 15, 2022, the State refiled the charges against Defendant in

16 district court. On September 30, 2022, Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal

17 information, arguing that the State had failed to comply with the six-month rule in

18 magistrate court because six months from the time the case was filed in magistrate

19 court had lapsed on September 21, 2022, and the State could not otherwise prove

20 that it had secured a new six-month period by filing a Heinsen appeal. See Heinsen

2 1 II, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 27 (“If the [s]tate can establish that it has acted in order to

2 preserve its right to appeal an order suppressing evidence, which is substantial proof

3 of a material fact in the proceeding, and that it is not doing so for the purpose of

4 delay, . . . the six-month rule should commence six months after the date of

5 arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, on the indictment or information or under

6 any other applicable provision of Rule 5-604[(B) NMRA (2005)] (former version of

7 rule governing commencement of trial in refiled concurrent jurisdiction cases)”).

8 Defendant specifically claimed that the district court could not hear the refiled case

9 because the magistrate court had not filed a suppression order before the State filed

10 its nolle prosequi. See Heinsen II, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 27 (“[W]e hold that a new

11 six-month rule period should begin to run when the [s]tate files a nolle prosequi

12 following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in district court.”

13 (emphasis added)).

14 {6} At the hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Defendant conceded that

15 the magistrate court asked him to prepare the order excluding the State’s witnesses

16 by September 8, 2022, but did not do so before the State filed the nolle prosequi on

17 September 6, 2022. The district court informed the parties that it would dismiss the

18 case because the six-month rule in magistrate court applied and had run. The district

19 court subsequently entered an order dismissing the criminal information in which it

20 found, in part, that “the [m]agistrate [c]ourt had never entered an [o]rder

3 1 [s]uppressing witnesses,” the “[t]ime for [c]ommencement of [the] trial in the

2 [m]agistrate [c]ourt ran on September 21, 2022,” and “[w]ithout a finding of

3 suppression of evidence at the [m]agistrate [c]ourt level, the State is not entitled to

4 a new six[-]month rule date on this matter.” The State appealed.

5 DISCUSSION

6 {7} We begin by addressing the State’s attempt to obtain a Heinsen appeal from

7 the magistrate court’s reported exclusion of its witnesses. We hold that the district

8 court could not conduct appellate review under Heinsen absent a written order or

9 some other clear indication in the record of the magistrate court’s ruling.

10 Nevertheless, as we discuss in the final section of this opinion, the district court erred

11 when it dismissed the case for a violation of the magistrate court six-month rule in

12 light of our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Savedra, which withdrew the six-

13 month rule in district court. 2010-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 8, 9, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20.

14 We explain.

15 I. Standard of Review

16 {8} “We review the application and interpretation of constitutional provisions,

17 statutes, and court rules de novo to determine the right to an appeal and the scope of

18 the appeal allowed by law.” State v. Heinsen (Heinsen I), 2004-NMCA-110, ¶ 9, 136

19 N.M. 295, 97 P.3d 627. We also apply de novo review to determine what justifies

4 1 dismissal by the district court. See State v. Rayburns, 2008-NMCA-050, ¶ 7, 143

2 N.M. 803, 182 P.3d 786.

3 II. The District Court Could Not Review the Reported Magistrate Court’s 4 Exclusion of Witnesses.

5 {9} The State argues that it dismissed the charges in magistrate court to pursue a

6 Heinsen appeal, which would automatically allow the district court to review the

7 exclusion of witnesses regardless of whether the magistrate court entered an order

8 thereon. The State contends a written order is not required for the district court’s

9 review of the magistrate court’s suppression ruling.

10 {10} The State further argues that the record does contain evidence of the

11 magistrate court ruling and that consequently the district court should have accepted

12 the appeal despite the absence of a clear record of a written or oral order. In support,

13 the State cites both the nolle prosequi, which stated that the State dismissed the case

14 because essential witnesses had been excluded, and the underlying briefing on the

15 motion to dismiss.

16 {11} Defendant responds that we should affirm the district court because it lacked

17 jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. 1 Defendant argues that neither statute nor the

18 New Mexico Constitution guarantee the State an appeal from the magistrate court,

We briefly note that questions regarding the application of the six-month rule 1

are procedural in nature—not jurisdictional. See State v. Stevens, 2022-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 17-19, 508 P.3d. 902.

5 1 see Heinsen I, 2004-NMCA-110, ¶ 1, and that the State failed to properly preserve

2 its arguments for appeal to the district court because of ambiguities in the magistrate

3 court record. Defendant ultimately submits that the State should have pursued a

4 written order from the magistrate court under Rule 5-826(G) NMRA or could have,

5 with prior approval, made a record of the proceeding to preserve evidence of the

6 magistrate court’s order.

7 {12} When appeals arise from the magistrate court—including in the Heinsen

8 context—the district court is to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate record.

9 See State v. Verret, 2019-NMCA-010, ¶ 14, 458 P.3d 529. The record “consists of,

10 among other things, copies of all papers or pleadings filed in the [magistrate] court,

11 copies of the judgment or final order to be reviewed, and any exhibits filed in the

12 proceedings.” City of Farmington v. Piñon-Garcia, 2013-NMSC-046, ¶ 12, 311 P.3d

13 446 (emphasis added). The record serves important purposes: it “establishes what

14 issues were preserved in the lower court and facilitates a district court’s de novo

15 review of such issues.” Id. However, in this case, with the exception of the State’s

16 representation on its nolle prosequi, the magistrate record contains no notation or

17 order reflecting the magistrate’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to exclude the State’s

18 witnesses.

19 {13} To the extent the State relies on State v. Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, 134 N.M.

20 224, 75 P.3d 824 and City of Roswell v. Warner, A-1-CA-37249, mem. op. (N.M.

6 1 Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (nonprecedential) for the proposition that no written order

2 was required in this case, we disagree and explain.

3 {14} In Foster, although this Court held that the “absence of a written order

4 declaring a mistrial and finding manifest necessity” was not fatal to our appellate

5 review, we reached that conclusion because the magistrate’s ruling was documented

6 in its handwritten notation “‘[m]otion [g]ranted’ on the [s]tate’s motion requesting

7 the magistrate court to order a mistrial, find manifest necessity and to set a second

8 jury trial date.” 2003-NMCA-099, ¶¶ 22, 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).

9 Simply put, in Foster, unlike in the case before us, the magistrate court’s ruling was

10 clearly set forth in the record. See id. Similarly, in Warner, we concluded that “the

11 absence of a written order denying [the d]efendant’s motion” to exclude evidence as

12 a consequence for a discovery violation, did not preclude our review because the

13 State was permitted to present the evidence during trial, thereby making it “self-

14 evident that the municipal court denied [the d]efendant’s motion.” A-1-CA-37249,

15 mem. op. ¶¶ 6-7. In contrast, the record of the proceedings in the magistrate court

16 here, lacks clarity as to how that court ruled on Defendant’s motion outside of

17 statements of the parties in district court.

18 {15} Further, we are not persuaded by the State’s position that the mere act of

19 dismissing the charges in magistrate court to pursue a Heinsen appeal would allow

20 the district court to review the exclusion of witnesses regardless of whether the

7 1 magistrate court issued a suppression order. We read Heinsen II to require, at a

2 minimum, evidence that the magistrate court entered an order and that the parties

3 proceeded thereon. See 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1 (“We . . . hold the practical finality

4 exception to the final judgment rule is not applicable, because the State may obtain

5 judicial review of such a suppression order by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some

6 or all of the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is entered and

7 refiling in the district court for a trial de novo.” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 27 (“[W]e

8 hold that a new six-month rule period should begin to run when the [s]tate files a

9 nolle prosequi following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in

10 district court.” (emphasis added)). Although we acknowledge that a written order

11 may not always be necessary in this context, we have no evidence from the

12 magistrate record to suggest that the magistrate court had entered its order before the

13 State filed the nolle prosequi and pursued the charges in the district court.

14 {16} We therefore conclude the district court could not conduct appellate review

15 under Heinsen absent a written order or some other clear indication, in the record of

16 the magistrate court proceedings, of the magistrate court’s exclusion ruling. As we

17 discuss below, the district court should not have dismissed the case for expiration of

18 the six-month rule. Rather, it should have abided by its duty to oversee cases of

19 concurrent jurisdiction. See Rule 5-604(A).

8 1 III. The District Court Should Not Have Dismissed Defendant’s Case for 2 Violation of the Magistrate Court Six-Month Rule.

3 {17} In this portion of the opinion, we reiterate how the New Mexico Supreme

4 Court’s holding in Savedra affected the Heinsen appeal process and the expiration

5 of the six-month rule in cases that are dismissed from a court of limited jurisdiction

6 and refiled in the district court. “New Mexico has long recognized that the [s]tate

7 has wide discretion to dismiss a criminal case in magistrate court by filing a nolle

8 prosequi and reinstating charges in district court.” Heinsen II, 2005-NMSC-035,

9 ¶ 25. In Heinsen II, our Supreme Court held that the district court has the discretion

10 to supervise the dismissal and refiling of a case from magistrate court “to ensure that

11 the six-month rule and the defendant’s due process rights are not unduly infringed.”

12 Id. Under Heinsen II, the district court would “not prevent the [s]tate from filing a

13 nolle prosequi when the [s]tate has a good and sufficient reason for doing so,” but

14 would intervene “to prevent the [s]tate from using the dismissal for purposes of delay

15 or to circumvent the rules.” Id.

16 {18} However, in Savedra, the Supreme Court expressed disapproval of the “long

17 line of appellate court opinions [that] sought to preserve the protections of the six-

18 month rule by requiring the [s]tate to demonstrate that its decision to dismiss and

19 refile was not done in bad faith.” 2010-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 3-7. The Savedra Court noted

20 the “‘good faith-bad faith’ analysis . . . renders a defendant’s right to be promptly

21 tried as a contingent right, one that may provide protection only if the [s]tate had

9 1 ‘bad’ reasons for dismissing and refiling.” Id. ¶ 7. The Supreme Court held this

2 analysis impermissible, id., and concluded that “any inquiry into the [s]tate’s reasons

3 for dismissing and refiling in district court should be done within the context of any

4 speedy trial challenge the defendant may raise after the case is refiled in district

5 court.” Id. ¶ 8. The Supreme Court Rules Committee subsequently amended Rule 5-

6 604 to reflect this change.

7 {19} The State argues that the district court erred upon dismissing the case “without

8 first conducting a review of the State’s reason for refiling within the context of

9 Defendant’s speedy trial rights.” See Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 8-9; see also

10 Rule 5-604(B) (same). Defendant counters that the district court properly dismissed

11 the case on speedy trial grounds, submitting an analysis of the speedy trial factors

12 under State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. However, we

13 cannot evaluate Defendant’s argument because it is a fact-driven inquiry raised for

14 the first time on appeal. See Wild Horse Observers Ass’n v. N.M. Livestock Bd.,

15 2016-NMCA-001, ¶ 29, 363 P.3d 1222 (“An appellee is not required to preserve

16 arguments to affirm so long as those arguments are not fact-based such that it would

17 be unfair to the appellant to entertain those arguments.” (internal quotation marks

18 and citation omitted)).

19 {20} Rather, we emphasize the changes to Rule 5-604 under Savedra. Once the

20 State refiled the case before six-months had expired in magistrate court, Defendant

10 1 could have challenged the delay resulting from the refiling of the charges in district

2 court by filing a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. See Savedra, 2010-

3 NMSC-025, ¶ 8. But dismissal on the grounds that the six-month rule ran in

4 magistrate court was not an option. We therefore reverse the district court’s

5 dismissal of the charges in this case.

6 CONCLUSION

7 {21} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings

8 consistent with this opinion.

9 {22} IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 ______________________________ 11 JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

12 WE CONCUR:

13 _____________________________ 14 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

15 _____________________________ 16 KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge