State v. Hirsch

2002 WI App 8, 640 N.W.2d 140, 249 Wis. 2d 757, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1194
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 21, 2001
Docket01-0023-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2002 WI App 8 (State v. Hirsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hirsch, 2002 WI App 8, 640 N.W.2d 140, 249 Wis. 2d 757, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1194 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

ANDERSON, J.

¶ 1. Arden C. Hirsch appeals *760 from his conviction by a jury for second-degree murder contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1969). 1 The sole issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of second-degree murder. Because we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.

¶ 2. In order to be convicted of second-degree murder, the evidence must show that the accused's conduct was: (1) imminently dangerous to another; (2) of such a character that it evinced a depraved mind, regardless of life; and (3) the cause of the victim's death. Wis. Stat. § 940.02.

¶ 3. Hirsch contends that the evidence fails to show that the nature of the conduct which caused his daughter Laurie Hirsch's death was "conduct imminently dangerous to another" or that his conduct "evinced a depraved mind." He argues that the evidence fails to prove the specific act or particular conduct in which he engaged and the existence of the specific state of mind necessary for a second-degree murder conviction.

*761 Standard of Review

¶ 4. The State must prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 135 Wis. 2d 453, 456, 400 N.W.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1986). When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that this court be convinced of the defendant's guilt. Id. Rather, this court need only be satisfied that the jury, acting reasonably, could be so convinced. Id. Thus, if any possibility exists that the jury could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt, we will not overturn the verdict even if we believe a jury should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it. Id.

¶ 5. A conviction may be based in whole or in part upon circumstantial evidence. Id. The test for circumstantial evidence is whether it is strong enough to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. Circumstantial evidence satisfies the reasonable doubt burden of proof when all the facts necessary to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence are consistent with each other and with the main fact sought to be proved and the circumstances taken together are of a conclusive nature leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no other person committed the offense charged. Id. at 456-57.

¶ 6. Hirsch's conviction was based on circumstantial evidence. It is well recognized that there is a *762 particular need to rely extensively on circumstantial evidence in prosecutions involving child victims. Id. at 457. In Johnson, a "battered child syndrome" case, 2 we adopted some applicable reasoning from the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. Like Hirsch, Johnson was convicted of second-degree murder of a child and he appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Id. at 455. Johnson was a live-in boyfriend of the child's mother and was home alone with the victim. Id. at 462-63. Johnson testified as to his version of the events that led up to the child's injuries. Id. at 462. He said that he was painting in a basement hallway when he heard a crash whereupon he came upstairs and found the child sitting on the living room floor. Id. He testified that the child said she had fallen down the second story stairs. Id. He said that the child then phased in and out of consciousness and eventually, after attempting to rouse the child, he went to a pay phone and called 911. Id. at 462-63. The emergency room doctor and a forensic pathologist testified. Id. at 458-59. The emergency room doctor said he suspected child abuse after examining the victim. Id. The forensic pathologist who examined the body testified that the child suffered from a blunt force injury and said there was "no way" that her injury resulted from an accident. Id. at 459-61.

¶ 7. The case before us involves issues similar to those in the Johnson case because both are child victim cases. In Johnson, we noted that the harm often occurs when the child is in the exclusive control of a parent. Id. *763 at 457. Usually the child is too young or too intimidated to testify as to what happened and is easily manipulated on cross-examination. Id. at 457-58. That a child does not survive strengthens, rather than diminishes, the law's concern for the special problems of prosecuting a defendant in a "battered child" case. Id. at 458. Crucial to identifying a case in which a child is victimized by a parent are the discrepancies between the parent's version of what happened to the child when the injuries occurred and the testimony of medical experts as to what could not have happened, or must have happened, to produce the injuries. Id.

¶ 8. The reasoning in Johnson is applicable here because, like the battered child syndrome cases that result in the death of a child, this child victim case resulted in the death of a child. Like those cases, this case concerns a harm that occurred when the child was in the exclusive control of her parent. And, finally, as in the battered child cases, the fact that a child did not survive strengthens, rather than diminishes, the law's concern.

¶ 9. We now turn to a review of the evidence to determine "if any possibility exists that the jury could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt." Id.

¶ 10. On December 2,1970, Hirsch's wife, Patricia Campbell, 3 put their three children to bed and went Christmas shopping. Hirsch was in charge of the children. Later that evening, Hirsch asked his downstairs neighbor, Allen Mohs, to drive him and his one-month-old baby, Laurie, to the hospital. Mohs testified that *764 Hirsch told him that Hirsch's two-year-old daughter Melissa had hit Laurie over the head and that Laurie's head was swelling up. Mohs drove Hirsch and Laurie to the hospital, dropping them off at the emergency room.

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Bluebook (online)
2002 WI App 8, 640 N.W.2d 140, 249 Wis. 2d 757, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hirsch-wisctapp-2001.