309 Ga. 457 FINAL COPY
S20A0648. THE STATE v. HINTON.
PETERSON, Justice.
The trial court found that the State failed to prove that
Evontae Hinton, after invoking his right to remain silent, initiated
further discussions with a detective and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent; the court therefore suppressed statements Hinton
then made to the detective. The State appeals and argues that the
trial court misapplied the law and made erroneous factual and
credibility determinations, because the detective’s testimony at the
motion to suppress hearing clearly showed that Hinton waived his
rights and reinitiated discussions with the detective. But the trial
court was not required to credit the detective’s testimony, and the
State did not introduce any other evidence to meet its burden of
establishing the voluntariness of Hinton’s custodial statements. We
affirm. The State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant’s custodial statement was
voluntary. Philpot v. State, 300 Ga. 154, 159 (3) (794 SE2d 140)
(2016). As we have explained before, “[w]hen the facts material to a
motion to suppress are disputed, it generally is for the trial judge to
resolve those disputes and determine the material facts.” Hughes v.
State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). A trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 803
(3) (b) (2) (750 SE2d 148) (2013). In reviewing a trial court’s order
on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidentiary record in the
light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial
court and also limit our review of the disputed facts to those
expressly found by the trial court. Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 (1). “These
principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the
State or the defendant.” Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 282 (811 SE2d
353) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). The State attempted to prove that Hinton’s custodial
statement was voluntary by calling only one witness at the motion
to suppress hearing: Detective Michael Young of the Atlanta Police
Department. Viewing Detective Young’s testimony according to the
principles set forth above, Detective Young testified that he wanted
to speak to Hinton about a homicide he was investigating. After
learning that Hinton might be present at a residence where other
police officers were planning to execute a narcotics search warrant,
Detective Young went to that residence. Detective Young
encountered Hinton at the residence after Hinton was arrested.
Detective Young drove Hinton to a police station and audio-recorded
conversations with him during the drive. After arriving at the police
station, Detective Young video-recorded further conversations with
Hinton.
Based on these statements and other evidence, Hinton was
later charged with multiple offenses in a multi-count indictment,
and he moved to suppress his recorded conversations on the basis
that they were not voluntary. At the motion to suppress hearing, the State attempted to admit the recordings into evidence, but withdrew
its attempt after Hinton objected for lack of authentication. At that
hearing, Detective Young evinced only a general recollection of his
encounter with Hinton, although he had reviewed the recordings
prior to the hearing to refresh his memory. Detective Young said he
“probably” elicited only Hinton’s name before advising Hinton of his
Miranda1 rights. Detective Young did not remember exactly the
advisement of rights he provided Hinton and explained that he
usually reads off a printed card, which he did not have in his
possession at the hearing.
Detective Young further testified that, after advising Hinton of
his rights, Hinton said he did not want to talk to the detective.
Detective Young thought Hinton assumed the detective was
investigating a narcotics offense, so Detective Young informed
Hinton that he was not there for that reason. According to Detective
Young, when Hinton asked why the detective was there, Detective
Young explained that he investigated “crimes against persons” but
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). could say no more because Hinton had said he did not want to talk
to him without a lawyer. Detective Young testified that when Hinton
began asking him questions, the detective reiterated that he could
not talk to Hinton because Hinton asked for a lawyer. According to
Detective Young, Hinton responded that he never said he did not
want to talk to Detective Young, and an interview then commenced.
Detective Young admitted at the motion to suppress hearing,
however, that when he reviewed the audio recording, he was unable
to understand what Hinton had said regarding whether he wanted
to talk and was unable to discern whether Hinton had asked for an
attorney or wanted to stop the interview. Detective Young also
admitted that Hinton did not complete a waiver-of-rights form
showing that Hinton understood his rights and agreed to waive
them. When asked if such a form was available at the police station
at the time Hinton was interviewed, Detective Young said he was
not sure. Detective Young also said that he did not ask Hinton about
his level of education or whether Hinton read and understood the
English language. Following the hearing, the trial court granted Hinton’s motion
to suppress. In its order, the trial court recited Detective Young’s
testimony and noted that, once ruling that a defendant invoked his
right to remain silent, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry
to determine whether the defendant initiated further conversations
with police and whether he voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent. Under this analysis, the trial court concluded that Detective
Young’s testimony “was so vague regarding the conduct of the
interview” that it failed to meet the State’s burden of establishing
that Hinton had initiated further conversations with the police and
waived his right to silence voluntarily.
On appeal, the State objects to several factual findings made
by the trial court, asserting that the record does not support them.
The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that
Detective Young did not have an independent recollection of
everything said to Hinton, and erred by concluding that Detective
Young was not specific enough regarding his reading of Miranda
rights to Hinton. The State also argues that even if the trial court’s factual findings were correct, the trial court misapplied the law to
those facts because the Miranda warnings were adequate, Hinton
understood those rights, and he voluntarily waived his right to
remain silent.
After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude
that none of the State’s arguments have merit. The central questions
in this appeal are whether Hinton asserted his right to remain silent
and, if he did, whether he waived that right by initiating a
conversation with Detective Young. Our review of the record reveals
that it supports the trial court’s conclusions on those questions, and
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
309 Ga. 457 FINAL COPY
S20A0648. THE STATE v. HINTON.
PETERSON, Justice.
The trial court found that the State failed to prove that
Evontae Hinton, after invoking his right to remain silent, initiated
further discussions with a detective and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent; the court therefore suppressed statements Hinton
then made to the detective. The State appeals and argues that the
trial court misapplied the law and made erroneous factual and
credibility determinations, because the detective’s testimony at the
motion to suppress hearing clearly showed that Hinton waived his
rights and reinitiated discussions with the detective. But the trial
court was not required to credit the detective’s testimony, and the
State did not introduce any other evidence to meet its burden of
establishing the voluntariness of Hinton’s custodial statements. We
affirm. The State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant’s custodial statement was
voluntary. Philpot v. State, 300 Ga. 154, 159 (3) (794 SE2d 140)
(2016). As we have explained before, “[w]hen the facts material to a
motion to suppress are disputed, it generally is for the trial judge to
resolve those disputes and determine the material facts.” Hughes v.
State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). A trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 803
(3) (b) (2) (750 SE2d 148) (2013). In reviewing a trial court’s order
on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidentiary record in the
light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial
court and also limit our review of the disputed facts to those
expressly found by the trial court. Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 (1). “These
principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the
State or the defendant.” Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 282 (811 SE2d
353) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). The State attempted to prove that Hinton’s custodial
statement was voluntary by calling only one witness at the motion
to suppress hearing: Detective Michael Young of the Atlanta Police
Department. Viewing Detective Young’s testimony according to the
principles set forth above, Detective Young testified that he wanted
to speak to Hinton about a homicide he was investigating. After
learning that Hinton might be present at a residence where other
police officers were planning to execute a narcotics search warrant,
Detective Young went to that residence. Detective Young
encountered Hinton at the residence after Hinton was arrested.
Detective Young drove Hinton to a police station and audio-recorded
conversations with him during the drive. After arriving at the police
station, Detective Young video-recorded further conversations with
Hinton.
Based on these statements and other evidence, Hinton was
later charged with multiple offenses in a multi-count indictment,
and he moved to suppress his recorded conversations on the basis
that they were not voluntary. At the motion to suppress hearing, the State attempted to admit the recordings into evidence, but withdrew
its attempt after Hinton objected for lack of authentication. At that
hearing, Detective Young evinced only a general recollection of his
encounter with Hinton, although he had reviewed the recordings
prior to the hearing to refresh his memory. Detective Young said he
“probably” elicited only Hinton’s name before advising Hinton of his
Miranda1 rights. Detective Young did not remember exactly the
advisement of rights he provided Hinton and explained that he
usually reads off a printed card, which he did not have in his
possession at the hearing.
Detective Young further testified that, after advising Hinton of
his rights, Hinton said he did not want to talk to the detective.
Detective Young thought Hinton assumed the detective was
investigating a narcotics offense, so Detective Young informed
Hinton that he was not there for that reason. According to Detective
Young, when Hinton asked why the detective was there, Detective
Young explained that he investigated “crimes against persons” but
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). could say no more because Hinton had said he did not want to talk
to him without a lawyer. Detective Young testified that when Hinton
began asking him questions, the detective reiterated that he could
not talk to Hinton because Hinton asked for a lawyer. According to
Detective Young, Hinton responded that he never said he did not
want to talk to Detective Young, and an interview then commenced.
Detective Young admitted at the motion to suppress hearing,
however, that when he reviewed the audio recording, he was unable
to understand what Hinton had said regarding whether he wanted
to talk and was unable to discern whether Hinton had asked for an
attorney or wanted to stop the interview. Detective Young also
admitted that Hinton did not complete a waiver-of-rights form
showing that Hinton understood his rights and agreed to waive
them. When asked if such a form was available at the police station
at the time Hinton was interviewed, Detective Young said he was
not sure. Detective Young also said that he did not ask Hinton about
his level of education or whether Hinton read and understood the
English language. Following the hearing, the trial court granted Hinton’s motion
to suppress. In its order, the trial court recited Detective Young’s
testimony and noted that, once ruling that a defendant invoked his
right to remain silent, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry
to determine whether the defendant initiated further conversations
with police and whether he voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent. Under this analysis, the trial court concluded that Detective
Young’s testimony “was so vague regarding the conduct of the
interview” that it failed to meet the State’s burden of establishing
that Hinton had initiated further conversations with the police and
waived his right to silence voluntarily.
On appeal, the State objects to several factual findings made
by the trial court, asserting that the record does not support them.
The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that
Detective Young did not have an independent recollection of
everything said to Hinton, and erred by concluding that Detective
Young was not specific enough regarding his reading of Miranda
rights to Hinton. The State also argues that even if the trial court’s factual findings were correct, the trial court misapplied the law to
those facts because the Miranda warnings were adequate, Hinton
understood those rights, and he voluntarily waived his right to
remain silent.
After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude
that none of the State’s arguments have merit. The central questions
in this appeal are whether Hinton asserted his right to remain silent
and, if he did, whether he waived that right by initiating a
conversation with Detective Young. Our review of the record reveals
that it supports the trial court’s conclusions on those questions, and
thus we find no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of the
motion to suppress.
1. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Hinton asserted his right to remain silent.
Beginning with the first critical question, although the trial
court did not expressly find that Hinton asserted his right to remain
silent, its order makes clear that it implicitly found that he did,
because the trial court focused its analysis on whether, after Hinton invoked his right to remain silent, his subsequent statements were
admissible.2 See Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 244 (2) (765 SE2d 896)
(2014) (“If, after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant
is found to have initiated contact with authorities and then
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his ensuing
statements will be considered properly obtained.”). Detective
Young’s testimony supports this finding, as he testified that Hinton
did not want to talk after being advised of his rights. The State does
not dispute this material fact in its appellate brief. Indeed, the State
notes that “it is undisputed that [Hinton] initially decided to exercise
that right.” Instead, the State argues that the trial court made an
erroneous factual finding regarding whether the Miranda warnings
were adequate or understood. But these arguments are irrelevant to
whether Hinton invoked his right, because “[a] person in the custody
2 Although Detective Young appeared to testify that Hinton’s reason for
not wanting to talk was because Hinton wanted an attorney, the trial court made no mention of Hinton invoking his right to counsel. But regardless of which right Hinton invoked, the guiding principles remain the same in either situation ⸺ “police may not immediately subject a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel or his right to remain silent to further interrogation absent reinitiation by the defendant.” State v. Pauldo, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2) n.5 (___ SE2d ___) (2020) (emphasis omitted). of law enforcement officers has a constitutional right to remain
silent in response to their questions, regardless of whether he fully
understands that right or has been advised of it under Miranda.”
Davidson v. State, 304 Ga. 460, 468 (4) (819 SE2d 452) (2018).
Having answered the first question, we turn to the effect of Hinton’s
assertion of his right to remain silent.
2. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the State failed to establish that Hinton initiated further conversations with the police or that he voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.
When a suspect indicates at any time prior to or during a
custodial interview that he wishes to remain silent, the admissibility
of statements after assertion of that right depends on whether police
“scrupulously honored” the defendant’s right to remain silent. See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-104 (96 SCt 321, 46 LE2d 313)
(1975); State v. Moon, 285 Ga. 55, 57 (673 SE2d 255) (2009). Whether
police have scrupulously honored a suspect’s right to remain silent
depends on several factors, including whether police immediately
ended the interrogation once the suspect invoked his right to silence,
whether police resumed the interrogation only after the passage of a significant amount of time, and whether police focused on a
different crime in the second round of questioning. See Mack, 296
Ga. at 243-244 (2) (citing Mosley); Fields v. State, 266 Ga. 241, 243
(1) (466 SE2d 202) (1996). An “interrogation” is defined as “express
questioning by law enforcement officers” or its functional
equivalent, meaning “any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” Lucas v. State, 273 Ga. 88, 91 (2) (538
SE2d 44) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Even when a suspect’s right to remain silent has not been
scrupulously honored, a suspect may waive his right to remain silent
by voluntarily reinitiating contact with the police, in which case his
ensuing statements are admissible against him. See Rowland v.
State, 306 Ga. 59, 62 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019); Mack, 296 Ga. at 244
(2). To the extent these issues depend on disputed issues of fact and
questions of credibility, we must accept a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous.
See Brown, 293 Ga. at 803 (3) (b) (2).
Given that it is undisputed that Hinton asserted his right to
remain silent, the State had the burden to prove that Detective
Young scrupulously honored that right or that Hinton voluntarily
waived that right by reinitiating contact with the detective. See
State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 648-649 (3) (619 SE2d 684) (2005). The
record supports the trial court’s finding that the State did not meet
its burden in this respect.
Detective Young testified repeatedly that he did not have a
clear memory of the relevant events. When asked whether he had
an independent recollection of the advisements he had given Hinton,
Detective Young said, “Not verbatim.” Detective Young also testified
that he did not “remember exactly” what Hinton said after Detective
Young provided Miranda warnings. At another point, Detective
Young confirmed that he did not have an independent recollection
of where Hinton was sitting in the patrol car during the interview.
Although he had tried to refresh his recollection by reviewing an audio recording of his interaction with Hinton, Detective Young
admitted that he was unable to understand what Hinton was saying
in the recording. The trial court was authorized to conclude ⸺ as it
did ⸺ that Detective Young did not scrupulously honor Hinton’s
assertion of his right to remain silent and that Hinton did not
reinitiate contact with him. See Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286, 289 (2)
(702 SE2d 888) (2010) (“[T]he trier of fact is not obligated to believe
a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or
reject any portion of the testimony.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
The State argues that Hinton reinitiated communications with
Detective Young, who honored Hinton’s right to remain silent by
responding to Hinton’s questions by saying he could not talk to
Hinton without his attorney being present. But the State’s position
would require crediting Detective Young’s testimony on those
points. The trial court’s order indicates that the trial court
questioned Detective Young’s credibility, specifically citing the
vague nature of his testimony and the detective’s professed lack of memory on key points. And it was for the trial court ⸺ not this Court
⸺ to determine whether Detective Young was credible.
The State has not shown that the trial court’s credibility
determination was clearly erroneous, or that the court erred in
concluding that the State failed to show that Hinton reinitiated
contact. Indeed, Detective Young admitted at the motion to suppress
hearing that immediately after Hinton said he did not want to talk,
Detective Young initiated further discussions by informing Hinton
that he was there to investigate crimes against persons, because he
believed that Hinton assumed the detective was investigating a
narcotics offense. Having reviewed the trial court’s order and
Detective Young’s testimony, the State has failed to show that the
trial court’s credibility findings were clearly erroneous and therefore
has failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding that the
State did not carry its burden of establishing that Hinton’s
statements were admissible. See United States v. Johnson, 812 F2d
1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1986) (defendant’s inculpatory statement
made after invocation of right to counsel was inadmissible where officer initiated discussion of the investigation against the
defendant); Nash, 279 Ga. at 649-650 (3) (where law enforcement
agent asked question related to the investigation that was not a
routine booking question, the trial court did not err in suppressing
statements made by defendant following assertion of his right to
remain silent).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2020 Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Rieder. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Juliana Sleeper, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Deborah W. Young, for appellee.