State v. Hess

2025 Ohio 4429

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hess, 2025-Ohio-4429.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0003

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court, Case No. CRB2400164 DONALD L. HESS, JR., Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: September 19, 2025

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office, for Plaintiff-Appellee; ROSE M. FOX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Donald Hess, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for

Violating a Protection Order in the Muskingum County Court. The appellee is the State of

Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On March 18, 2024, the appellant appeared before the Muskingum County

Court for a hearing regarding charges of Aggravated Burglary, Felonious Assault, and

Domestic Violence. At the hearing, the trial court issued a temporary protection order.

The appellant did not appeal the issuance of the protection order. {¶3} On April 15, 2024, the appellant appeared in the trial court for arraignment

for allegedly violating the March 18, 2024, protection order. The appellant entered a plea

of not guilty.

{¶4} On November 18, 2024, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count

of Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1).

{¶5} The appellant timely filed his appeal and raised the following assignment of

error:

{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE TEMPORARY

PROTECTION ORDER WITHOUT A HEARING AS REQUIRED UNDER THE

STATUTE.”

I.

{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, the appellant argues the trial court erred

when it granted the temporary protection order without a hearing. We disagree.

{¶8} The entry of a plea of guilty is a decision by an accused to dispense with a

trial and allow the State to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult

process of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Machibroda v. United States,

368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). A plea of guilty constitutes a complete

admission of guilt. Crim. R. 11(B)(1). “By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not

simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting

guilt of a substantive crime.” United v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102

L.Ed.2d 927 (1989).

{¶9} The Supreme Court of the United States has previously stated: [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded

it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted

in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,

he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He

may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by

showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the

standards set forth in McMann.

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235

(1973). Furthermore, “[A] guilty plea * * * renders irrelevant those

constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid

establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction

if factual guilt is validly established.” Menna v. New York (1975), 423 U.S.

61, 62, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195, fn. 2. Therefore, a defendant who,

like the appellant, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea

with the assistance of counsel “may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett at 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235. See,

also, Ross v. Auglaize Cty. Common Pleas Court (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 323

(by entering a valid guilty plea, the defendant waives all nonjurisdictional

defects in prior stages of proceedings); State v. Spates (1992), 64 Ohio

St.3d 269, 271-273, 595 N.E.2d 351. {¶10} In the case sub judice, the appellant never challenged or appealed the

granting of the temporary protection order until he had already pleaded guilty to violating

it. The appellant cites our decision in State v. Conkle, 2003-Ohio-2410 (5th Dist.).

However, Conkle is distinguishable. In that case, the appellant had not entered a guilty

plea but had instead directly appealed the issuance of the temporary protection order. Id.

In the case sub judice, the appellant never challenged the issuance of the order until after

he entered a plea of guilty to violating it.

{¶11} Accordingly, the appellant’s challenge to the issuance of the temporary

protection order is barred. By entering a guilty plea, the appellant has waived his right to

assert pre-plea nonjurisdictional defects in stages of the proceedings prior to entering the

plea.

{¶12} The appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶13} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court is

hereby affirmed.

{¶14} Costs to the appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Popham, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.