State v. Henry

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 2301001270
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) I.D.: 2301001270 v. ) ) OLVIER HENRY, ) ) Defendant.

Submitted: April 7, 2025 Decided: May 6, 2025

ORDER On Defendant’s Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence

DENIED

This 23rd day of April, 2025, upon consideration of the instant Motion for

Correction of an Illegal Sentence, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a)1

brought by Defendant Oliver Henry (“Henry”), it appears to the Court that:

1. Henry entered into a plea agreement on March 6, 2024 and pled guilty to Murder

Second Degree. Henry was sentenced on July 6, 2024 to fifty (50) years at Level

V, suspended after twenty (20) years for six (6) months at Level IV, followed by

two (2) years at Level III probation.2 Murder in the Second Degree is a class A

felony3 with a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years of unsuspended Level V

1 Docket Item (“D.I.”) 56. 2 Id. p. 2. 3 11 Del. C. § 635. time and a maximum of life imprisonment.4 The Delaware SENTAC guidelines

provide the presumptive sentence for Murder Second Degree is 15 years at Level

V.5

2. In the instant Motion, Henry moves this Court for a review of his sentence under

Rule 35(a) which states “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time

and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided

herein for the reduction of sentence.”6

3. Henry maintains his fifty-year suspended Level V time is illegal because it

includes an enhancement which exceeds the statutory maximum.7 To support this

argument, Henry cites to United States Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New

Jersey which holds that any additional fact a sentencing judge relies on to

increase a defendant’s penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.8 Henry also cites to Blakely v.

Washington which supports Apprendi’s holding and clarifies “statutory

maximum” for Apprendi purposes “is the maximum sentence a judge may impose

solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant.”9 Henry argues the sentencing judge violated these cases by

4 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1). 5 2024 SENTAC Benchbook, p. 30. 6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 7 Id. p. 4. 8 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 9 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). supporting Henry’s sentence with two aggravating factors: (1) “excessive

cruelty” and (2) “undue depreciation for the offense.” He contends the United

States Supreme Court case law required the sentencing judge to find “additional

facts” to support a sentence beyond 15 years.

4. The Court does not find that the sentencing judge needed to obtain additional

facts to justify Henry’s suspended Level V time, and the aggravating factors

relied on by the sentencing judge were adequate to support Henry’s sentence. In

Shabazz v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “neither Apprendi nor

Blakely impact” a judge giving a sentence within the statutory range but above

the SENTAC guideline presumptive sentence “given the voluntary and

nonbinding nature of Delaware’s sentencing guidelines.”10

5. The sentencing judge was within the statutory range by imposing 50 years

suspended Level V time. In addition, the sentencing judge found two aggravating

factors which provided substantial and compelling reason to justify surpassing

the presumptive sentence. Further, the SENTAC guidelines allow the penalty for

an exceptional sentence justified by excessive cruelty to proceed “up to the

statutory maximum,” which, for Henry’s conviction, is life imprisonment.11

10 Shabazz v. State, 877 A.2d 52, *1 (Del. 2005). 11 2024 SENTAC Benchbook, p. 108. 6. The Court disagrees with Henry’s argument that Delaware’s SENTAC guidelines

are, and always have been, binding. The Delaware Supreme Court and

proceeding case law firmly support the proposition that “the sentencing standards

are considered voluntary and nonbinding; thus, no party to a criminal case has

any legal or constitutional right to appeal to any court a statutorily authorized

sentence which does not conform to the sentencing standards.”12 Provided that

the sentencing judge supports their deviation from the guidelines with substantial

and compelling reason, the sentence may deviate from the SENTAC guidelines.13

7. For the above reasons, the Court finds that Henry’s sentence is not illegal and,

therefore, DENIES, his Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: Original to the Prothonotary Erika Flaschner, Deputy Attorney General Oliver Henry, JTVCC, SBI No. 00746078

12 See Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, *2 (Del. 1997); Delaware Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 76. 13 See Benge v. State, 2004 WL 2743431 (Del. 2004).