[Cite as State v. Hendrix, 2025-Ohio-1556.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114406 v. :
MATTHEW HENDRIX, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 1, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-22-676488-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jamielle Lamson-Buscho, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
P. Andrew Baker, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Matthew Hendrix, appeals his convictions for
rape and attempted rape, following a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, this
court affirms. I. Procedural History
In December 2022, the State charged Hendrix with seven counts of
rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); each count included a sexually violent
predator specification. Counts 1, 2, and 3 all involved the same victim and alleged
that Hendrix engaged in sexual conduct — digital penetration (Count 1),
cunnilingus (Count 2), and vaginal intercourse (Count 3) — with a minor who was
under the age of 13 at the time of the offenses (“Victim 1”). Counts 4, 5, and 6 all
involved the same victim and alleged that Hendrix engaged in sexual conduct, to
wit: vaginal intercourse, with a minor under the age of 13 at the time of the offense
(“Victim 2”). Count 7 alleged that Hendrix engaged in sexual conduct, to wit:
digital penetration, with a minor under the age of 13 at the time of the offense
(“Victim 3”).
Hendrix pleaded not guilty, and a jury considered testimony from
each of the victims, the mother of two of the victims, the victims’ grandmother, and
the detective who inherited the case from her predecessor. Hendrix also testified
in his defense. The testimonies of these witnesses will be discussed more fully
below. But the testimonies established that during the relevant time periods
specified in the indictment, Hendrix lived with his stepfather, who was the victims’
grandmother’s boyfriend. During some of the timeframes in the indictment, the
victims’ grandmother lived with her boyfriend and Hendrix. When the first
allegation of rape occurred in 2010, Hendrix would have been 16 years old, and
when the last incident occurred in 2017, he would have been 23 years old. Following the close of the testimony, the State, over objection,
amended Count 1 by adding the attempt statute, R.C. 2923.02, to the rape offense.
The jury found Hendrix not guilty of rape as charged in Count 7, but guilty of the
remaining offenses. The jury then considered the sexually violent predator
specifications, finding Hendrix guilty of being a sexually violent predator as
charged in amended Count 1, but not guilty of the specifications as charged in the
remaining offenses.
The trial court ordered Hendrix to serve a prison sentence of 18 years
to life.
II. The Appeal
Hendrix now appeals, raising two assignments of error.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Hendrix contends that the State
presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions in Counts 2 and 4.
Under sufficiency review, this court is required to determine
whether the prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v.
Cottingham, 2020-Ohio-4220, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). An appellate court’s function
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
1. Count 2 — Victim 1
Count 2 alleged that on or about January 1, 2016, to January 31,
2016, Hendrix engaged in sexual conduct, to wit: cunnilingus, with Victim 1, who
was under the age of 13 at the time of the offense. Hendrix contends that the
timeframe in which the victim testified that this incident occurred does not
correlate with the indictment as charged. He acknowledges that while an exact
date is not an essential element to sustain a rape conviction, the elements of the
offense must correlate to the specific timeframe charged in the indictment.
According to Hendrix, Victim 1’s testimony regarding the timing of this incident,
the second rape, did not conform with the indictment — January 1, 2016, to
January 31, 2016, because she subsequently testified that the third rape occurred
a few months later, yet that the date of the third incident occurred around April 7,
2017. He contends that the jury possibly convicted him on an allegation that was
not presented to the grand jury. We disagree.
Victim 1 testified that the incident giving rise to the allegations in
Count 2 occurred after she returned to her grandmother’s care following a brief
reunification with her mother. She stated that this incident occurred in “2017. I
think the weekend in 2017 or 2016.” (Tr. 180.) Victim 1 explained that she
remembered the date because she was living with her grandmother and they
celebrated Christmas late — “[i]t happened after New Year’s.” (Tr. at id.) She agreed with the prosecutor’s clarification that it was “the following January.” (Tr.
at id.)
Victim 1 testified that she was wearing her favorite pair of fleece
leggings that she received as a Christmas gift from her cousin. She stated that
Hendrix took her into his bedroom, which is where he also took her during the first
sexual assault, removed her fleece leggings, and put his mouth on her vagina.
Victim 1 explained, “Like his tongue was all over my vagina, like inside my vagina.
. . . Like not inside of me but it was inside of the lips of the vagina, yes.” (Tr. 181.)
When asked how old she would have been “in 2016/2017,” Victim 1 responded,
“Nine maybe.” (Tr. at id.)
The precise date and time of when a sexual assault occurs is not an
essential element of the crime. See R.C. 2907.02. “‘Where the exact date and time
of an offense are not material elements of a crime nor essential to the validity of a
conviction, the failure to prove such is of no consequence and it is sufficient to
prove that the alleged offense occurred at or about the time charged.’” State v.
Ibrahim, 2015-Ohio-3345, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Madden, 15 Ohio
App.3d 130, 131 (12th Dist. 1984).
Moreover, “particularly in cases involving sexual misconduct with a
child, the precise times and dates of the alleged offense or offenses oftentimes
cannot be determined with specificity.” State v. Hemphill, 2005-Ohio-3726, ¶ 54
(8th Dist.), citing State v. Daniel, 97 Ohio App.3d 548, 556 (10th Dist. 1994). This
rule has been established because “‘[i]n many cases involving child sexual abuse, the victims are children of tender years who are simply unable to remember exact
dates and times, particularly where the crimes involve a repeated course of conduct
over an extended period of time.’” State v. Cochern, 2018-Ohio-265, ¶ 40 (8th
Dist.), quoting State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 296 (2d Dist. 1994).
Moreover, “‘[t]he problem is compounded where the accused and the victim are
related or reside in the same household, situations which often facilitate an
extended period of abuse.’” State v. Thomas, 2011-Ohio-705, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. Robinette, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5996, *8 (5th Dist. Feb. 27,
1987).
Although the exact timing of the rape is not an essential element,
“the victim’s age is an essential element of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).
Accordingly, the State need not establish precise dates of when the offense
occurred, if a rational trier of fact could find that the victim was less than 13 years
of age at the time of the offense.” State v. Schwarzman, 2014-Ohio-2393, ¶ 16 (8th
Dist.).
In this case, whether the second act of rape occurred in January 2016
or 2017 is of no consequence to Hendrix’s conviction because it does not affect the
elements of the offense. Victim 1 confidently knew that the second incident of rape
occurred in January, after Christmas. She further offered sufficient testimony
about Hendrix’s conduct and details surrounding the second rape for a rational
juror to conclude that Hendrix committed this act of rape against Victim 1 when she was under the age of 13. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence
to support Hendrix’s conviction for Count 2.
2. Count 4 — Victim 2
Hendrix contends that Victim 2 did not provide sufficient detail to
support his conviction for rape as charged in Count 4, which alleged that on or
about January 3, 2010, to March 31, 2013, Hendrix engaged in vaginal intercourse
with Victim 2, who was under the age of 13 at the time of the offense.
Victim 2 testified about three instances of sexual abuse perpetrated
by Hendrix. Regarding the conduct giving rise to Count 4, she stated that the
sexual abuse started after her sixth birthday, January 3, 2010, and continued until
she was age nine. (Tr. 146.) She recalled that Hendrix would undress her in the
middle of the night, alleging that she soiled herself, and then “he would force
himself onto [her] . . . sexually.” (Tr. 147.) Victim 2 stated that Hendrix would
“force his penis inside [her] private areas,” and that it “felt like [she] was being torn
apart.” (Tr. at id.) According to Victim 2, this conduct lasted three years and
occurred prior to another significant incident in 2013 at the renovated house. (Tr.
155.)
Although Victim 2 did not give specific details about each act of
sexual misconduct Hendrix engaged in with her during this time period, we find
that Victim 2 provided sufficient detail for a rational juror to conclude that Hendrix
committed an act of rape, to wit: vaginal intercourse, against Victim 2 as charged
in Count 4. Based on the foregoing, this court finds that the State presented
sufficient evidence supporting Hendrix’s convictions for rape as charged in Counts
2 and 4. The assignment of error is overruled.
B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
Hendrix contends in his second assignment of error that his
convictions for all counts are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue
rather than the other. * * * Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends
on its effect in inducing belief.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12,
quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. In a manifest-weight analysis, the
reviewing court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and reviews “‘the entire record, weighs
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact]
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at id., quoting
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). The discretionary power
to grant a new trial should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Thompkins at 386.
1 The testimony and facts surrounding Count 7 will not be discussed because the
jury acquitted Hendrix of that charge involving Victim 3. A victim’s testimony alone, if believed, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction; there is no requirement that a rape victim’s testimony be corroborated.
State v. McSwain, 2017-Ohio-8489, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Blankenship,
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520 (8th Dist. Dec. 13, 2001). Further, a rape conviction
obtained without corroborative evidence does not necessarily render the
conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Wilk, 2022-Ohio-
1840, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.).
1. Trial Testimony
a. Victim 1 — Counts 1, 2, and 3
Victim 1 testified about three separate incidents of rape. The first
occurred in October 2012, when Hendrix sexually abused her by attempting to
digitally penetrate her vagina (amended Count 1). The second incident occurred
in January 2016, when Hendrix sexually abused her by performing cunnilingus
(Count 2). And the final rape occurred in April 2017, when Hendrix engaged in
vaginal intercourse with her (Count 3). Each of these rapes occurred when Victim
1 was under the age of 13.
Regarding Count 1, Victim 1 testified that she lived with her
grandmother, who had custody of her during this time period. She remembered
the incident because she had a special toy, a stuffed brown horse, with her that she
had received for her fifth birthday. Victim 1 stated that after she received this horse
for her birthday and during the nighttime, Hendrix took her from the couch to the
bedroom, where he touched her vagina with his hands. Specifically, she remembered that after Hendrix unzipped her “favorite princess [onesie],” he “tried
to insert his hand [inside her] but it did [not] work.” (Tr. 176-177.) She stated that
Hendrix then zipped up her onesie and returned her to the couch.
Victim 1 testified that she told both her grandmother’s boyfriend and
grandmother about this incident. As a result, Victim 1 returned to live with her
mother, who kept her away from Hendrix. Victim 1’s mother testified that
following this incident, they went to the police and spoke with a social worker. She
stated that she implemented “rules” that Victim 1 could not be around Hendrix.
On cross-examination, Victim 1’s mother admitted that her boyfriends were also
not permitted to be alone with Victim 1, but that Victim 1 never accused anyone
else — “[Hendrix] was more severe.” (Tr. 211-213.)
As previously discussed in addressing Hendrix’s first assignment of
error, Victim 1 testified about the second incident of rape (Count 2) that occurred
sometime after New Year’s during a late-Christmas celebration in 2016 or 2017 at
Hendrix’s house, where her grandmother was living. Victim 1 testified that
Hendrix took her into the same bedroom, where he took her during the earlier
sexual assault, removed her new fleece leggings, and put his mouth on her vagina.
Victim 1 explained, “Like his tongue was all over my vagina, like inside my vagina.
. . . Like not inside of me but it was inside of the lips of the vagina, yes.” (Tr. 181.)
When asked how old she would have been “in 2016/2017,” Victim 1 responded,
“Nine maybe.” (Tr. at id.) According to the victim, Hendrix told her that “if I said
anything that he was going to hurt me. . . . I was scared of him. . . . He was hurting me . . . [w]ith his hands. So I knew that if he could do that to me, he is definitely
going to do more if I would have got him in trouble.” (Tr. 183.)
On cross-examination, Victim 1 stated that she told her uncle
immediately following this rape about what Hendrix had done, including taking
naked pictures of her. Despite this, she admitted, however, that her uncle did not
find any pictures on Hendrix’s cell phone.
Finally, regarding Count 3, Victim 1 testified that the last time she
remembered Hendrix raping her was around her grandmother’s birthday in April
2017. According to Victim 1, Hendrix took her to his bedroom again, removed her
clothes, touched her vagina, performed cunnilingus on her, and then inserted his
penis into her vagina. She remembered that it hurt, and Hendrix was only able to
insert the tip of his penis. (Tr. at id.). Victim 1 described that she “felt like [she]
was being stabbed in [her] vagina multiple times because [Hendrix] kept . . . trying
to force [his penis] in [her vagina], and it wasn’t working.” (Tr. 185). On cross-
examination, Victim 1 denied telling the social worker following this incident that
Hendrix had certain identifying characteristics on his penis.
b. Victim 2 — Counts 4, 5, and 6
Victim 2 testified about three incidents where Hendrix vaginally
raped her. The first occurred between January 2010 and March 2103 (Count 1);
the second incident occurred in the Spring 2013 (Count 2); and the final rape
occurred in the Fall 2013 (Count 3). Each of these rapes occurred when she was
under the age of 13. As previously discussed in addressing Hendrix’s first assignment of
error regarding Count 4, Victim 2 testified that Hendrix started sexually assaulting
her after she turned six years old. Although she could not remember specific
occurrences from January 2010 to March 2013, she was able to remember
generally how the assaults would occur and how it made her feel. Victim 2 stated
that Hendrix would remove her clothes while she was asleep and that she would
wake up to him penetrating her vagina with his penis. She explained that it felt
like “[she was] being torn apart.” (Tr. 147.)
Regarding Count 5, Victim 2 testified that during the spring 2013,
Hendrix was renovating a house on the east side of Cleveland and would often take
Victim 2 and her siblings there to help. She remembered once specific instance
when Hendrix raped her on a mattress still wrapped in plastic in the living room
at the renovated house because “[she] was in a new place and [she] didn’t know
where she was.” (Tr. 152.) Victim 1 stated that Hendrix “grabbed [her] by [her]
hair and tossed [her] onto the mattress” and then held her down by her neck and
chest while he vaginally penetrated her. (Tr. 150-151.)
Regarding Count 6, Victim 2 testified that Hendrix raped her for the
final time in the fall 2013. She stated she remembered this incident because it was
just before she went into foster care. Although she did not recall many details, she
remembered being at her grandmother’s boyfriend’s house and Hendrix tried to
vaginally penetrate her. Victim 2 stated that she initially disclosed the abuse to Victim 3
about two years prior before speaking with her grandmother in 2021. She said she
disclosed Hendrix’s abuse because she learned that another family member came
forward against Hendrix. Victim 2 stated that in 2022 her foster mother took her
to the police.
On cross-examination, Victim 2 admitted that despite testifying that
Hendrix would physically abuse her, no one ever noticed bruising and that she did
not show anyone the bruising Hendrix caused to her arms, neck, face, and head.
c. Hendrix’s Testimony
Hendrix testified in his own defense, denying that he sexually or
physically abused any of the victims. He surmised that the victims’ grandmother
was responsible for generating the allegations against him because in 2021, he fired
her son, who worked for him. He said immediately after this falling out, the
grandmother coordinated these charges against him.
Hendrix testified about his involvement with Cuyahoga County
Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) when Victim 1 previously
made accusations against him in 2013. He stated that after the social worker
interviewed him in 2013, CCDCFS found the allegations unsubstantiated. Hendrix
denied having any “rules” implemented following this allegation but stated that he
voluntarily distanced himself from Victim 1 to avoid any further accusations. (Tr.
at id.) He stated that nevertheless, he found himself again “defending himself”
following another allegation in 2017. According to Hendrix, CCDCFS determined these allegations were also “unfounded” after his cell phone “GPS exonerated him.”
(Tr. 286.)
According to Hendrix, these allegations were all “scripted.” (Tr.
286.) He stated that although Victim 1’s grandmother was aware in 2013 and 2017
that Victim 1 made these accusations against him, she did not believe Victim 1.
Hendrix believed that Victim 1 made up the allegations for more attention from his
stepfather, but now the motivations were different.
d. Victims’ Grandmother
The victims’ grandmother testified, admitting that in November
2012, she learned that Victim 1 made an accusation against Hendrix. She stated
that following the accusation, Victim 1’s mother took her to CCDCFS and to
Fairview Hospital. Grandmother admitted that she did not believe Victim 1 in
2012. Moreover, regarding Victim 1’s 2017 allegations, grandmother testified
about the social worker’s notes that indicated that grandmother did not know why
Victim 1 accused Hendrix of touching her and that grandmother stated that the
dates of the allegations kept changing. (Tr. 240-241.)
Grandmother testified that after Victim 3 told her what Hendrix had
allegedly done to her in 2007 and 2008, she spoke with Victim 2. She stated that
after this conversation, she took both Victims 1 and 3 to the police.
e. Detective Cindy Adkins
Detective Cindy Adkins testified that she inherited the case from her
predecessor, who previously interviewed the victims, their grandmother, and the social worker from CCDCFS, and obtained Victim 1’s records from CCDCFS. She
stated that her file indicated that Victim 1 reported abuse by Hendrix in 2013 and
2017, and that in 2013, Victim 3 denied any wrongdoing by Hendrix. Detective
Adkins stated that Hendrix denied the allegations against him.
According to the detective, victims may delay disclosing abuse due
to fear or because of family dynamics. She stated that in her experience, older
children are more likely to be untruthful whereas small children may be confused
as to timeframes but not confused about the person whom they are accusing.
2. Analysis
Hendrix urges this court to consider our decision in In re Reillo,
2024-Ohio-3307 (8th Dist.), discretionary appeal accepted, 2025-Ohio-705,
wherein this court reversed the appellant’s sexual abuse convictions as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence in a delayed disclosure prosecution due
to the lack of corroborating evidence, details surrounding the abuse, and
inconsistencies in testimony. Hendrix contends that certain similarities exist with
his case and Reillo’s case — the State presented no physical evidence corroborating
the victims’ allegations. Moreover, he contends that unlike Reillo where medical
and professional testimony was advanced supporting the victim’s accusations, no
such testimony was presented in his case. Hendrix recognizes, however, that his
case differs somewhat from Reillo because his case involves multiple victims and
they were able to recall more details than the victim in Reillo. Essentially, Hendrix contends that if the evidence presented in Reillo was the exceptional case
warranting reversal, then his case is equally exceptional. We disagree.
Unlike in Reillo, the jury heard specific details that the victims
offered concerning the abuse suffered by Hendrix. Each victim testified as to either
specific or general time periods when Hendrix abused them, including what they
were wearing and where the rapes occurred. Moreover, Victim 1 stated that in
2012, she immediately disclosed the abuse to family members and professionals,
but either no one believed her or her disclosures did not result in any further
investigation, except the implementation of “rules” that she was no longer allowed
to be alone with Hendrix.
More importantly, unlike in Reillo, Hendrix testified in his defense,
allowing the jury to consider and assess his testimony against that of the
testimonies of the three victims. “If a case amounts to a ‘he said, she said’ dispute,
[this court] will not second-guess the trier of fact’s resolution of that dispute where
the defendant has not set forth any corroborating evidence as to why this court
should disrupt that [resolution], other than reiterating to us what ‘he said.’” State
v. Lanier, 2021-Ohio-379, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-2765,
¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Martinez, 2008-Ohio-4845, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.).
Hendrix’s testimony demonstrated that Victim 1’s allegations of
sexual abuse were not delayed. He testified that after Victim 1 accused him of
sexual misconduct, he spoke with CCDCFS in 2013 and 2017. Hendrix stated that
both times, the allegations were unfounded or unsubstantiated. Accordingly, unlike Reillo, Victim 1’s disclosures were not delayed, just not believed. Although
Hendrix was investigated by CCDCFS previously, he now surmised at trial that the
victims’ grandmother was the reason behind the allegations due to an employment
dispute involving her son. Accordingly, the jury was able to determine whether
charges arose due to grandmother seeking retribution for her son or whether
Victim 1’s allegations were in fact validated because it was discovered that Hendrix
perpetrated abuse on other minor-aged family members around relatively the
same timeframe.
We further find that the jury was able to assess the credibility of each
victim and believe or disbelieve the victims where they deemed it appropriate. The
jury’s ability to make these credibility assessments and segregate proof is reflected
in the not guilty verdict involving one victim in the indictment. See, e.g., State v.
Bonneau, 2012-Ohio-3258, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.) (not guilty verdict as to counts
pertaining to one victim and guilty verdicts as to another demonstrated jury was
able to separate the evidence and consider victims separately).
Based on the foregoing, we find that this is not the exceptional case
requiring this court to step in as the thirteenth juror, reverse Hendrix’s convictions,
and order a new trial. The second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by Assignment: Wiliam A. Klatt, retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)