[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2011-Ohio-1791.]
COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Julie A. Edwards, P.J. : W. Scott Gwin, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Patricia A. Delaney, J. : -vs- : Case No. 10-COA-012 : : TERRANCE HENDERSON : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from Ashland County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 06-CRI-130
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 8, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
RAMONA FRANCESCONI ROGERS TERRANCE HENDERSON Ashland County Prosecutor’s Office Inmate No. A530688 110 Cottage Street, Third Floor Richland Correctional Institute Ashland, Ohio 44805 1001 Olivesburg Road P.O. Box 8107 PAUL T. LANGE Mansfield, Ohio 44901-8107 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Cottage Street, Third Floor Ashland, Ohio 44805 [Cite as State v. Henderson, 2011-Ohio-1791.]
Edwards, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Terrance Henderson, appeals from the April 27,
2010, Judgment Entry of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas overruling his
Motion to Correct Void Sentence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On December 18, 2006, the Ashland County Grand Jury indicted appellant
on one count of possession of marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the
third degree. At the time of the offense, appellant was on post-release control.
{¶3} Subsequently, a jury trial commenced on May 8, 2007. The jury found
appellant guilty as charged. Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on June 8, 2007, the
trial court sentenced appellant to five years in prison. The trial court also terminated
appellant’s post-release control and ordered appellant to serve an additional six
hundred fifty-nine (659) days consecutive to the five year sentence.
{¶4} Appellant then filed an appeal. Appellant, in his appeal, argued that the
trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss on speedy trial grounds, erred in
denying his Motion to Suppress and that the verdict was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Pursuant to an Opinion filed on September 26, 2008, in State v.
Henderson, Ashland Case No. 07COA031, 2008-Ohio-5007, this Court affirmed
appellant’s conviction and sentence.
{¶5} Thereafter, on November 10, 2009, appellant filed a Motion to Correct
Void Sentence. Appellant, in his motion, argued that the 659 days of post release
control sanction time imposed by the trial court stemmed from a previous conviction that
appellant had in Lorain County Case No. 01CR058507. In the Lorain County case, Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 3
appellant was sentenced in 2002 after having pleaded guilty to domestic violence,
felonious assault and child endangering. Appellant argued that post-release control
was never properly imposed in the Lorain County case and that the Lorain County
judgment was, therefore, void. On such basis, appellant argued that the trial court in the
case sub judice lacked authority to issue a post release control sanction against
appellant.
{¶6} In turn, appellee, in its response to appellant’s motion, argued, in part, that
appellant was on post-release control in numerous criminal cases other than the Lorain
County case at the time he was sentenced in the case sub judice, including another
case from Lorain County and cases from Richland and Crawford Counties. In his reply,
appellant argued that each of the sentencing orders issued prior to the case sub judice
were nullities because appellant had not been properly advised of post-release control
in the cases that appellee cited to and that the sentencing entries were, therefore, void.
{¶7} As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on April 27, 2010, the trial court
overruled appellant’s motion.
{¶8} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶9} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, CLAIMING THE CURRENT SENTENCING
ORDER WAS PROPERLY ISSUED WITH POST RELEASE CONTROL SANCTION
TIME.”
I
{¶10} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
in overruling his Motion to Correct Void Sentence. We agree. Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 4
{¶11} As is stated above, appellant specifically contends that the trial court erred
when, in the case sub judice, it imposed 659 day of post-release control time on
appellant as prison time. Appellant argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to do
so because, in the cases in which he was on post-release control, appellant was not
properly advised of post-release control. Appellant further maintains that therefore, “his
current sentencing order is a nullity and void, since the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
imposed (sic) the 659 days of post-release control sanction time from an order that
previously never existed.”
{¶12} R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) provides that if a court imposes a prison term for a
felony, the sentence shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period
of post-release control after the offender's release from imprisonment. R.C.
2929.19(B)(3) requires that the sentencing court notify the offender that the offender will
be supervised under R.C. 2967.28 after the offender leaves prison. The Supreme Court
of Ohio has interpreted these provisions as requiring a trial court to give notice of post-
release control both at the sentencing hearing and by incorporating it into the
sentencing entry. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864,
paragraph one of the syllabus. The trial court must do so regardless of whether the term
of post-release control is mandatory or discretionary. Id. at paragraph two of the
syllabus; Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶
18.
{¶13} In State v. Jordan the Court further held that “[w]hen a trial court fails to
notify an offender about post-release control at the sentencing hearing, but incorporates
that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence, it fails to comply with the mandatory Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 5
provisions of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (d), and, therefore, the sentence must be
vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus.1
{¶14} “[T]he effect of vacating the sentence places the parties in the same
position as they were had there been no sentence.” State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94,
2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, supra at paragraph 13 citing Romito v. Maxwell
(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 266, 267, 227 N.E.2d 223. Thus, the offender is entitled to a de
novo sentencing hearing. Id.
{¶15} A trial court retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and is authorized
to do so when its error is apparent. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-
6085, 817 N.E.2d 864 at paragraph 23. Res Judicata does not act to bar a trial court
from correcting the error. State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 402, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884
N.E.2d 568, citing State v. Ramey, Franklin App. No. 06AP-245, 2006-Ohio-6429, at
paragraph 12.
{¶16} In State v. Fischer, --- N.E.2d ----, 2010-Ohio-6238, syllabus, the Supreme
Court of Ohio limited the nature of the de novo hearing as follows: “2. The new
sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under State v. Bezak is limited to
proper imposition of postrelease control. (State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-
Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, syllabus, modified).” Thus, as stated by the Fischer court
in paragraph two of the syllabus, the new sentencing hearing is limited to the proper
imposition of postrelease control.
1 We note that R.C. 2929.121 sets forth a procedure for correcting a sentence that fails to properly impose post-release control. However, such statute only applies to sentences entered on or after July 11, 2006. State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958. The statute would not apply to appellant’s Richland, Crawford and Lorain County sentences. Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 6
{¶17} In the case sub judice, appellant was on post-release control in cases out
of Richland, Crawford and Lorain Counties at the time he was sentenced in the case
sub judice. Appellant now contends that the entries in such cases mistakenly advised
him of post-release control and, therefore, such entries were void. Appellant further
maintains that, therefore, the trial court in the case sub judice lacked jurisdiction to
impose the 659 days of post-release control as additional prison time.
{¶18} In the case sub judice, appellant was sentenced in July of 2002, in
Richland County Case No. 01 CR 018OH after being convicted of illegal conveyance of
drugs in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree. The Court’s
Sentencing Entry in such case indicated that appellant was subject to “up to 5 years
post-release control (PRC).” The parties, and the trial court in the case sub judice,
agree that a fourth degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 is subject to post-release
control of up to three years rather than five. Because appellant was improperly advised
of post-release control in such case, his sentence in such case was void as it related to
post-release control.
{¶19} Appellant also was sentenced in April of 2002, in Crawford County Case
No. 01-CR-0075 after being convicted of assault of a police officer in violation of R.C.
2903.13, a felony of the fourth degree, and attempted failure to comply in violation of
R.C. 2923.02/2921.331, a felony of the fourth degree. The trial court’s entry in such
case indicates that appellant was notified that “post-release control is optional in this
case up to a maximum of eighteen months on each count.” As is stated above,
pursuant to R.C. 2967.28, fourth degree felonies are subject to up to three years of
post-release control. Appellant, therefore, was improperly advised of post-release Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 7
control in such case. His sentence in Crawford County Case No. 01-CR-0075 was,
therefore, void as it relates to post-release control.
{¶20} In Lorain County Case No. 01CR057450, appellant, in June of 2002, was
sentenced for possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth
degree, and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 2925.14(C)(1), a
misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The trial court’s Judgment Entry in such case states
that appellant was notified “that post-release control is (mandatory optional) in this case
up to a maximum of (3/5) years…” R.C. 2967.28(C) states that, for a conviction of a
fifth degree felony an offender may be subject to a period of post-release control of up
to three years. Appellant, therefore, was not properly advised about post-release
control in such case.
{¶21} Finally, appellant was sentenced in 2002, in Lorain County Case No.
01CR058029 for domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the fifth
degree. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry in such case, stated that if it had notified
appellant that post-release was “(mandatory/optional) in this case up to a maximum of
(3/5) year…” R.C. 2967.28(C) states that with respect to a fifth degree felony, an
offender is subject to up to three years of post-release control. Appellant, therefore,
was improperly advised of post-release control in such case.
{¶22} In short, we find that the trial courts’ entries in the above cases out of
Richland, Lorain and Crawford Counties did not properly advise appellant regarding
post-release control. The sentences in such cases were void as they relate to post-
release control. The trial court, in the case sub judice, therefore, erred in imposing the
remaining 659 days of post-release control time as additional prison time on appellant. Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 8
{¶23} Because the trial court in the case sub judice, therefore, erred in
overruling appellants Motion to Correct Void Sentence, appellant’s sole assignment of
error is sustained.
{¶24} Accordingly, the judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas
is reversed and this matter is remanded for resentencing.
By: Edwards, P.J.
Delaney, J. concurs and
Gwin, J. dissents
______________________________
JUDGES
JAE/d1119 Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 9
Gwin, P.J., dissents
{¶25} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and would affirm the
judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, but for different reasons.
{¶26} I begin my analysis by noting a reviewing court is not authorized to
reverse a correct judgment merely because it was reached for the wrong reason. State
ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty, 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 905 N.E.2d
1192, 2009 -Ohio- 1523 at ¶ 21; State v. Lozier (2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 166, 2004-
Ohio-732 at ¶46, 803 N.E.2d 770, 775. [Citing State ex rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 290, 690 N.E.2d 1273]; Helvering v.
Gowranus (1937), 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158.
{¶27} The Supreme Court explained the difference between a sentence that is
“void” from one that is “voidable.” “A void sentence is one that a court imposes despite
lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or the authority to act. State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio
St.3d 40, 44. Conversely, a voidable sentence is one that a court has jurisdiction to
impose, but was imposed irregularly or erroneously. State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio
St.3d 230, 240.” State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642 at ¶20.
{¶28} In the case at bar, the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas had
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over appellant in order to impose
post release control when sentencing him. By statute the Ashland County Court of
Common Pleas was authorized to impose the unexpired term of appellant’s post release
control even though the post release control had been imposed by a court outside of
Ashland County. R.C. 2929.141 provides in relevant part: Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 10
{¶29} “(A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on
post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court may terminate
the term of post-release control, and the court may do either of the following regardless
of whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the original prison
term for which the person is on post-release control:
{¶30} “(1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison term
for the post-release control violation. The maximum prison term for the violation shall be
the greater of twelve months or the period of post-release control for the earlier felony
minus any time the person has spent under post-release control for the earlier felony. In
all cases, any prison term imposed for the violation shall be reduced by any prison term
that is administratively imposed by the parole board as a post-release control sanction.
A prison term imposed for the violation shall be served consecutively to any prison term
imposed for the new felony. The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control
violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony.
{¶31} “* * *.” (Emphasis added).
{¶32} In State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d
958, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that “[f]or
criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to
properly impose post release control, trial courts shall conduct a de novo sentencing
hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”
{¶33} In reviewing decisions where post release control was lacking, the
Singleton court noted: Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 11
{¶34} “In State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864,
this court considered the consequences of a trial court's failure to advise an offender
about post release control at the sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 1, 817 N.E.2d 864.
Applying [State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 471 N.E.2d 774], we held that
‘[b]ecause a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of post release control at
the sentencing hearing, any sentence imposed without such notification is contrary to
law’ and void, and the cause must be remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 23, 27, 471
N.E.2d 774. (Emphasis added).
{¶35} “We again confronted a sentencing court's failure to notify or incorporate
post release control into its sentencing entry in Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395,
2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301; however, in that case, discovery of the sentencing
error did not occur until after the offender had been released from prison, placed on
post release control by the parole board, and re-imprisoned for violating the terms of
post release control. Id. at ¶ 4-7, 844 N.E.2d 301. There, we granted a writ of habeas
corpus in conformity with our decisions in Jordan and [Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d
504, 2000-Ohio-171, 733 N.E.2d 1103], holding that the parole board lacked authority to
impose post release control because the trial court had failed to notify the offender of
post release control or to incorporate it into the sentencing entry and because
Hernandez had completed serving that sentence when the error was discovered. Id. at
¶ 32, 844 N.E.2d 301.
{¶36} “* * *
{¶37} “In State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961,
we concluded that an offender is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing for the trial Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 12
court to correct a sentence that omitted notice of post release control. (Emphasis
added) * * * Importantly, because Bezak had already completed his term of
imprisonment, the trial court could not, consistent with our decision in Hernandez * * *
conduct a resentencing.
{¶38} “ * * *
{¶39} “Most recently, in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462,
909 N.E.2d 1254, we * * * held that when a court fails to impose post release control
before an offender completes the stated term of imprisonment, under either our case
law or R.C. 2929.191, the offender must be discharged, ¶ 69-71.” Singleton at ¶ 14-18,
20, 909 N.E.2d 1254. See also, State v. Atkinson, Cuyahoga App. No. 93855, 2010-
Ohio-2783.
{¶40} Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Fischer, Slip Opinion No.
2010-Ohio-6238, limited its holding in Bezak and concluded that the defendant is only
entitled to a hearing for the proper imposition of post release control. Accordingly,
appellant may not raise new issues, or issues he had previously raised on his direct
appeal. See also, State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 935 N.E.2d 9, 2010-Ohio-
3831.
{¶41} According to the Supreme Court’s line of cases, appellant’s remedy for not
being properly advised concerning post-release controls would be to vacate and
remanded the cases for resentencing. The sentencing decision from which appellant
has filed this appeal was rendered by the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas on
June 8, 2007. But, appellant is, in reality, collaterally attacking the judgments of the
Court of Common Pleas of Richland, Crawford and Lorain Counties. Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 13
{¶42} A court's subject-matter jurisdiction comprehends its power to grant relief
in justiciable matters. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas and
their divisions is established by statute. Section 4(B); Article IV; Mattone v. Argentina
(1931), 123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N.E. 603. Being courts of general jurisdiction, the
common pleas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in all civil and criminal actions on
claims for relief that arise in the county in which the court sits, except for those actions
in which subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute on another court exclusively.
{¶43} Additionally, the Ohio Constitution grants courts of appeals “such
jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse
judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within
the district.” Section 3, Article IV, Ohio Constitution. (Emphasis added). Our jurisdiction
is therefore limited to that provided by statute; the provision that grants us jurisdiction in
most instances is R.C. 2501.02, which provides that “the court [of appeals] shall have
jurisdiction upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or
reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals
within the district.” (Emphasis added).
{¶44} The Ashland County Court of Common Pleas was therefore without
jurisdiction to declare the judgments of the Courts of Common Pleas of Crawford, Lorain
and Richland Counties void. I likewise note that, since Crawford and Lorain Counties
do not lie within our territorial jurisdiction, this Court does not have the ability to review a
final judgment of the Crawford or Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶45} Appellant’s remedy for any sentence he claims lacks the proper imposition
of post release control is to request from the trial court that issued the sentence either: Ashland County App. Case No. 10-COA-012 14
1) a de novo sentencing hearing as mandated in State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173,
2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958; or 2). for a sentence entered on or after July 11,
2006, a hearing in accordance with R.C. 2929.1912.
{¶46} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Ashland County Court of
Common Pleas, albeit for different reasons.
____________________________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
2 R.C. 2929.191 applies prospectively to sentences entered on or after July 11, 2006, which lack proper imposition of post release control. A trial court may correct those sentences in accordance with the procedures set forth in that statute.” Singleton at 182, 920 N.E.2d at 966, 2009-Ohio-6434 at ¶ 35. [Cite as State v. Henderson, 2011-Ohio-1791.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : TERRANCE HENDERSON : : Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 10-COA-012
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is
remanded for resentencing. Costs assessed to appellee.
_________________________________