State v. Helms

2023 Ohio 1875

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 7, 2023
• Docket: 30455
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Helms, 2023-Ohio-1875.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30455

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE JOEL A. HELMS BARBERTON MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 22 TRD 4391

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 7, 2023

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Joel Helms appeals his conviction by the Barberton Municipal Court. This Court

affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Helms was cited for failure to yield the right of way when turning left after the

car he was driving struck the driver’s side door of a minivan. Following a bench trial, the trial

court found Mr. Helms guilty and fined him $150. Mr. Helms appealed, assigning one error for

this Court’s review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO PROSECUTOR’S WISHES AND NOT SUFFICIENT FOR PROSECUTION.

{¶3} Mr. Helms’ assignment of error appears to be that his conviction is contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence. This Court does not agree. 2

{¶4} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, this Court must:

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶5} Mr. Helms was convicted of failing to yield the right of way when making a

lefthand turn, as prohibited by Revised Code Section 4511.42(A). That statute provides:

The operator of a vehicle * * * intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of way to any vehicle * * * approaching from the opposite direction, whenever the approaching vehicle * * * is within the intersection or so close to the intersection, alley, private road, or driveway as to constitute an immediate hazard.

The “right of way,” in this context, is “[t]he right of a vehicle * * * to proceed uninterruptedly in

a lawful manner in the direction in which it * * * is moving in preference to another vehicle * * *

approaching from a different direction into its * * * path.” R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1).

{¶6} The other driver testified that at the time of the accident, she was driving north on

Massillon Road when Mr. Helms, who was driving south, made a lefthand turn into the driver’s

side of her minivan. She emphasized that Mr. Helms did not turn in front of her but into her

vehicle, striking it from the side. She testified that the accident caused her car to careen to the side

of the road. The deputy sheriff who responded to the scene of the accident described his

interactions with Mr. Helms at the scene, noting that Mr. Helms “stated that he turned left into a

residential driveway off of Massillon Road and that he did not see the victim as he was turning

into it.” 3

{¶7} Mr. Helms also testified. He suggested that given the topography of the area and

the speed of the other driver’s vehicle, she had approximately ten seconds to react to the presence

of his car. He also noted that he was turning left at a low speed and had come to a complete stop

mid-turn partially in the other driver’s lane of travel. Mr. Helms indicated that he was in that

position for about five seconds, but he acknowledged that he was not looking at the roadway and

that he did not see the other driver at any point. Mr. Helms speculated that the damage to the other

driver’s car was not caused by him, but by an evasive maneuver by the other driver that she did

not remember.

{¶8} Mr. Helms has argued that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the

other driver’s vehicle was “so close to the * * * driveway as to constitute an immediate hazard[]”

for purposes of Section 4511.52(A). The question of whether an “immediate hazard” exists turns

on the facts of each case. State v. Upchurch, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011518, 2020-Ohio-4095,

¶ 10. The plain language of the statute also indicates that it is the position of the oncoming vehicle

relative to the defendant—and not the defendant’s position as perceived by the other driver—that

determines whether an “immediate hazard” is present.

{¶9} According to Mr. Helms’ own testimony, he was distracted while making a left-

hand turn and brought his vehicle to a complete stop while located partially in the oncoming lane

before completing the turn. He acknowledged that he was not looking at the road and that he never

saw the other driver, who testified that he drove into the side of her vehicle. This evidence supports

the conclusion that the other driver’s vehicle was “so close to the * * * driveway as to constitute

an immediate hazard[]” for purposes of Section 4511.52(A). Similarly, Mr. Helms appears to

suggest that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the other driver

could have taken steps to avoid the collision. Ohio courts, however, “have held that failure to yield 4

is a strict liability offense, consistently rejecting excuses for failure to yield.” State v. Taylor, 7th

Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 5, 2015-Ohio-745, ¶ 16.

{¶10} Mr. Helms’ conviction, therefore, is not contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence. His assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶11} Mr. Helms’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Barberton

Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Barberton Municipal

Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT 5

SUTTON, P. J. FLAGG LANZINGER, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JOEL HELMS, pro se, Appellant.

LISA O. MILLER, Law Director, and JENNIFER A. ROBERTS, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.