ACCEPTED 03-14-00588-CR 4737233 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/1/2015 7:07:19 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK
FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR 4/1/2015 7:07:19 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk In The
Court OfAppeals
Third District Of Texas
Austin, Texas
STATE OF TEXAS § APPELLANT
§
HECTOR MARTINEZ § APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 427TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. D-1-DC-13-900228
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
John N . de Ia Vifia Attorney and Counselor at Law State Bar No. 24078407 702 Rio Grande Austin, Texas 78701 512.897.3325 Fax 512.501.6307 Delavina.law@gmail.com www.delavinalaw.com
Oral argument is requested Identity of Parties and Counsel
Trial Judge: Jim Coronado 427th Judicial District Court P.O. Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767
Leon (Leo) Grizzard Magistrate Judge P.O. Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767
Trial Counsel for the State: Kelley Geir and Willis Chambers Travis County District Attorney's Office P.O. Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767
Defendant I Appellee: Hector Martinez
Counsel for John N. de Ia Viiia Defendant/Appellee: 702 Rio Grande Austin, Texas 78701 Table of Contents
Identity of Parties and Counsel. ... ............................................... i .. . .. . I n d ex o fA uthor1t1es.........................................................................111, 1v Statement of the Case.............................................................................v Statement ofFacts..................................................................................2 Summary of the Defendant's Argument.. ..............................................6 Argument. .............................................................................................. ? Point One: The circumstances surrounding the Defendant's behavior and medical intervention did not objectively rise to the standard of true exigency ................................................................................................. 8 Point Two: The mandatory blood draw statute does not circumvent the 4th Amendment's requirement for a warrant.. ...................................... l6 Point Three: A person has an absolute right to refuse a test and it is explicit that implied consent is not an exception to the 4th Amendment's requirement for a warrant.. ........................................... 19 Point Four: McNeely applies retroactively, the State ignores the standard of review, and the State's Point Four can be distinguished..21 Point Five: Good faith under the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in the instant case .....................................................................28 Prayer...................................................................................................29 Certificate of Compliance and Service................................................. 30
ii Index of Authorities
Cases Bowman v. State, 2015 WL 557205 ...............................................22, 23 Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-8 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).....26 Cole v. State, 2014 WL 7183859 ...................................................23, 25 Douds v. State, 434 S.W. 3d 842 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. granted ....................................................................................20, 23 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326-38, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 ( 1987)............................................................................................25 Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W. 3d 680, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) .......... 9 Holidy v. State, No- 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171 (Tex.App.- Texarkana Apr. 30, 2014, pet granted) (mem. Op., not designated for publication)...........................................................................................20 Houghton v. Wyoming, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) ............................................................................................ 17 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987) ...................................................................................................28 State v. Johnson, 871 S.W.2d. 744, 750-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).. 26 Maryland v. King, _U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013) ............................................................................................. 17, 18 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ _ , 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013) ............................................... .4, 5, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24 Miller v. State, 393 S.W. 3d 255, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) ..............20 Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) ................................................................................................ 20 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)...................................................................................... 14, 15 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ...................................................................................... 19, 20 Shepherd v. State, 273 S. W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)......... 7 Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 842 (Tex.App-Amarillo 2014, no pet.).......................................................................................................20 Venn v. State, 85 Tex.Crim. 633,218 S.W. 1060 (1920) .................... .17 State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1898 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014) ................ 6, 7, 16, 18, 19, 20,25 Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, pet. granted)..................................................................................... 15, 20,28
iii Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 467-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ...............................................................................................26, 27
Statutes Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. art. 38.23 ......................................21, 22, 27, 28 Tex. Penal Code §49.04........ ./...............................................................v Tex. Penal Code §49.09.........................................................................v Tex. Transp. Code 724.002(b )......................................................... 5, 22 Tex Transp. Code §724.011(a) ................................................... 5, 19, 22
iv Statement of the Case A grand jury indicted the Defendant for driving while intoxicated with two
prior convictions. CR3-4; Tex. Penal Code § 49.04, 49.09(b)(2). The trial
court granted the Defendant's motion to suprres the blood test results, and
State gave notice of appeal. CR 61-70. On December 31 8 \ 2014, the State
filed its brief in this case.
v CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR
In The
APPEAL FROM THE 427™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
To the Honorable Third Court of Appeals:
Now Comes the Defendant, Hector Martinez, and files this brief, and
in support thereof respectfully shows the following:
State v. Martinez 1 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Statement of Facts
On March 15th, 2013, at around 12:25 a.m. APD Officer Marcos
Johnson was dispatched to 10108 Shinnecock Hills Drive, to investigate a
potential prowler. 2RR 9, 12, 29. Officer Johnson arrived at the scene
roughly 10 minutes after the initial 911 call. 2RR 13-14. Upon arrival
Officer Johnson observed Defendant in the driver's seat of a sports utility
vehicle being confronted by a neighborhood security guard. RR 13-14, 21,
74. Officer Johnson then approached Defendant and detained him in
handcuffs. 2RR 15. Officer Johnson admitted that prior to approaching
Defendant he determined the basis of the call was not violent in nature. 2RR
48.
After detaining Defendant Officer Johnson observed Defendant
exhibiting potential signs intoxication. 2RR 17-18, 30. As a result of his
observations, around 12:41 a.m., Officer Johnson administered Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) on Defendant as part a DWI investigation.
2RR 29. After administering the SFSTs, at around 1:00 a.m., Officer
Johnson placed Defendant under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated. 2RR
29. Once under arrest Officer Johnson read Defendant his DIC-24 statutory
warnings, to which Defendant refused to provide or consent to the taking of
his breath or blood. 2RR 31. State v. Martinez 2 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR After arresting Defendant Officer Johnson took him to "a few places",
before having his blood drawn. 2RR 30. Specifically, Officer Johnson and
Defendant arrived to the APD BAT Bus 1 around 1:45 a.m., with the intent to
turn Defendant over to the APD DWI Task Force for transport. 2RR 30-31,
63. While at the Bat Bus Officer Johnson discovered that Defendant had
two prior DWI convictions. 2RR 30-31, 63. Due to Defendant's felony
enhancement, Officer Johnson transported Defendant to the Travis County
Jail for a mandatory blood draw that "had" to be administered. 2RR 37, 64.
Officer Johnson and Defendant arrived at the "Sally Port" located at
APD's booking facility downtown at about 2:15 a.m. 2RR 67, 71. After
arriving Officer Johnson observed Defendant acting strangely in the
backseat of his patrol vehicle, noting that Defendant was nonresponsive and
breathing in a peculiar manner. 2RR 30. Officer Johnson then called EMS
to assess Defendant's condition, and out of precaution EMS determined
Defendant should be transported to Breckenridge Hospital. 2RR 66-67.
Before and during transport Defendant wrestled with Officer Johnson and
EMS and was sedated by EMS as a result. 2RR 66-67. Dispatch records
reflect that Officer Johnson and EMS were en route to Breckenridge with the
1Please note that Officer Johnson was unsure what the acronym "BAT" in the term BAT Bus stood for, stating verbatim, "I guess it's the blood alcohol testing bus." 2RR 62. State v. Martinez 3 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Defendant at around 3:00 a.m. 2RR 31, 67, 71. Defendant's blood was
drawn at Breckenridge at approximately 3:34 a.m. Id. In total two and one-
half (2 ~ ) hours elapsed from the moment the Defendant was arrested to the
time he had his blood drawn at Breckenridge Hospital. 2RR 29, 31, 67, 71.
At the time of this investigation Officer Johnson had 5 months of
experience with APD and prior to this incident never obtained a blood
search warrant for DWI investigation. 2RR 33, 38-41. During the course of
the investigation Officer Johnson lacked the intent to, and did not attempt
acquire, a search warrant for the Defendant's blood. 2RR 36-37, 40, 59.
Officer Johnson relied on "department policy" as the reason for his inaction.
2RR 37-38, 40, 59. Officer Johnson admitted that if he wanted to obtain a
warrant to search the Defendant's blood that a magistrate would "to the best
of his knowledge" be available to do so. 2 2RR 36. Further, Officer Johnson
stated that he was aware of alternative methods of obtaining search warrants
in Travis County, particularly, via telephone. 2RR 58.
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood evidence, relying on
the Fourth Amendment, due to a lack of warrant and a lack of a valid
warrant exception. Supp. CR 4-6. The Defendant's arguments were Officer
Johnson's lack of obtaining a warrant, even though he had ample time to do
2 Officer Johnson's knowledge of obtaining blood search warrants was derived after this incident and after the Supreme Court's ruling in McNeely. 2RR 39. State v. Martinez 4 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR so, precluded the evidence, and that the implied consent statute runs afoul
the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's ruling in McNeely. 3RR 7-
8.
The State challenged the Defendant's motion arguing that the blood
draw was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement and that the statute that mandated the blood draw, Tex. Transp.
Code § 724.002(b), is constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. CR 45; 3RR7; CR40-44. That State also contended that the
blood evidence was admissible due to the implied consent law per Tex.
Transp. Code § 724.011(a). CR 40-41. Lastly, the State argued that the
Texas exclusionary rule did not apply to the search, and the federal
exclusionary rule did not bar the admission of the evidence, because of good
faith reliance.
After hearing, the magistrate court held in favor of the Defendant
suppressing the blood test for the following reasons; the situation posed by
the medical intervention did not constitute true exigency, if admitted the
blood test would override the Constitution's requirement for a search
warrant, and implied consent does not qualify as an exception to the warrant
requirement. CR 61-63.
State v. Martinez 5 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR The presiding judge signed and adopted the magistrate court's
findings of fact and granted the motion to suppress the blood evidence. CR
64. The State appealed this decision. CR 65-70.
Summary of the Defendant's Argument
POINT ONE: The circumstances surrounding the Defendant's
behavior and medical intervention did not objectively rise to the standard of
true exigency. Put simply, the Defendant was in custody for roughly two and
a half hours (2 'li) and Officer Johnson never intended to, or attempted to,
obtain a blood search warrant even though he roughly had two and a half
hours to do so, relying solely on policy as reason for a warrantless search.
POINT TWO: Pursuant to the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling
in Villarreal, and the rulings of many other Courts throughout Texas, it is
explicit that the mandatory blood draw statute does not circumvent the 4th
Amendment's requirement for a warrant. The State's point lacks merit.
POINT THREE: The Defendant never consented to the blood draw
and a person has an absolute right to refuse a test and it is explicit that
implied consent is not an exception to the 4th Amendment's requirement for
a warrant.. The State's point lacks merit.
State v. Martinez 6 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR POINT FOUR: Texas statutes and recent case law does not carve
out a de facto "good faith" exception when a police officer relies on a law
that is later found to be unconstitutional.
POINT FIVE: Good faith under the federal exclusionary rule
does not apply in this situation because Texas statute offers an individual
more protection than its federal counterpart.
Standard of Review
The appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress for an
abuse of discretion. The appellate court views the facts in light most
favorable to the trial court's decision. The appellate court reviews de novo
the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to those facts.
Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Argument
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a warrantless blood
draw conducted pursuant to a warrantless blood draw statute violates the 4th
Amendment, when the warrantless search does not fall under an exception to
the warrant requirement. The Court also found that implied consent refused
by a suspect does not constitute free and voluntary consent under the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1898 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014).
State v. Martinez 7 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR The State notes in its brief the arguments made in State's points Two
and Three are directly contradicted by the ruling in Villarreal. For the sake
of brevity Defendant will defer the to ruling in Villarreal regarding State's
points Two and Three and asserts they are without merit. The Defendant's
substantive focus will be on State's points, One, Four, and Five.
Point One: The exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply in this case.
In the summary of its frrst argument the State articulates its point as
follows, "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
applies in this case ... not arguing solely based on the dissipation of alcohol
in blood. Instead there was an actual medical emergency and combative
defendant ... ate up time and the office away from the jail and magistrate." 3
State's Brief at 7.
1. Exigent circumstances
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does
not apply in this case. In order for the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement to trigger there typically must be one of the three
3 The State in its summary seems to bootstrap true medical exigency with exigency based on the dissipation of blood in alcohol stating the situation was "an actual medical emergency" and the exigency is not "based solely on the dissipation of alcohol in the blood", but then refers to "eaten up time" and "the officer being taken away from the jail and magistrate". Defendant will address these issues separately. State v. Martinez 8 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03~14-00588-CR following categories: (1) "providing aid or assistance to persons whom law
enforcement reasonably believes are in need of assistance; (2) "protecting
police officers from persons whom they reasonably believe to be present,
armed, and dangerous"; and (3) "preventing the destruction of evidence or
contraband." Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W. 3d 680, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
In the instant case the State seems to be arguing the third, specifically the
dissipation of blood due to a "combative" defendant.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court held that
there were no exigent circumstances, stating:
" ... med'IcaI intervention did not present exigent
circumstances which would have made a warrantless
blood draw objectively reasonable. According to Officer
Johnson's testimony, it would have been the same
amount of time had a warrant been sought."
The State claims that Officer Johnson's delay due to the Defendant's
odd behavior was so substantial that it "ate" into the time Officer Johnson
had to seek a warrant to search the Defendant's blood. However, once it was
established that no search warrant had been obtained the State never met its
burden to prove an exception to the warrant requirement to seize the
Defendant's blood. State v. Martinez 9 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR The State specifically points to the Record and time elapsed due to a
"medical emergency" as the reason behind Officer Johnson's failure to obtain
a warrant. As per Officer Johnson's estimate, the medical intervention cut 1
hour of time out of his investigation. However, Officer Johnson made it
quite clear that he never intended to obtain a warrant, and did not explore the
possibility of doing so. He merely parroted "policy" as the reason behind his
not seeking a warrant during the course of two and one-half hours.
In more detail, the State claims that the Defendant's peculiar behavior
once arriving at the APD Sally Port constituted a medical emergency, and
that consequently Officer Johnson acted accordingly in going forward with a
warrantless blood draw. However, the notion the Defendant's behavior was a
medical emergency is not supported by the Record. Referring to the
testimony of Officer Johnson, at no point does he claim that he was in fear
for the Defendant's life, nor does he claim the Defendant suffered injuries
requiring medical attention. Johnson simply stated that he called EMS merely
as a precautionary measure, and followed stating that the Defendant's
resistance was easily controlled after EMS sedated him via 5 milliliters of
Versed. 2RR 65-66. If anything, the Record reflects that EMS came to
Officer Johnson's aid solely to sedate the Defendant so a warrantless blood
draw could successfully be administered.
State v. Martinez 10 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR The State also cites Officer Johnson claiming a warrant usually takes
45 minutes to an hour to obtain. 2RR 38-39. At the time of his testimony
Officer Johnson openly admitted that he never obtained a search warrant for
blood during the course of any investigation before Defendant's arrest. 2RR
38-39. This testimony brings Johnson's familiarity with the process of
obtaining a warrant (at that time and based on his experience) directly into
question. Further, this lack of experience in obtaining blood warrants sheds
light on Johnson's credibility regarding the various options he had to obtain
a warrant. The Record shows Johnson's testimony merely parroted
"process" and "procedure" regarding APD blood warrant policy as his
excuse for not obtaining a warrant. 2RR 36-37, 39-40, 59.
Next, the State approaches the issue of something that "was not
explored in detail" during the scope of the suppression hearing in this case.
Particularly, how much longer it would take for Officer Johnson to obtain a
warrant for the Defendant's blood while at Breckenridge. Specifically, the
State claims there is no testimony pertaining to Officer Johnson ability to
communicate his need for a warrant to his corporal or a detective. This
argument is sheer speculation and merely a red herring. The State is
attempting to testify on Officer Johnson's behalf as to his availability of
resources to contact other officers. The converse argument can easily be
State v. Martinez 11 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR made that there is no indication that he did not have access to a computer, or
a printer, or a phone to acquire a search warrant. At the bare minimum, the
Court can conclude that an officer of the law in Texas' capital city most
certainly had access to a radio. The one fact Officer Johnson did establish is
that he was full aware he could obtain a warrant via telephone at the time of
the Defendant's arrest, which he did not attempt to do. 2RR 58-59.
The State then assumes that "even if' Officer Johnson obtained a
warrant while at Breckenridge he "would have had to wait for a corporal to
come pick it up and take it to the magistrate at the jail." This argument goes
on to claim that Officer Johnson established it takes up to 45 minutes to an
hour to obtain a warrant at the jail. State's Brief at 11. Here the State
implicitly claims that Officer Johnson's only opportunity to obtain a warrant
during the course of his investigation began the moment that he arrived at
Breckenridge Hospital at roughly 3:00 a.m. 2RR 68. However, Officer
Johnson had an opportunity to begin the process of obtaining a warrant when
he arrived at the BAT Bus and realized that the Defendant was charged with
his 3 rd or more DWI, at roughly 1:45 a.m. 2RR 67. Applying that timeframe
in accordance with Officer Johnson's testimony, had he begun the process to
obtain a warrant once discovering the Defendant was on his 3rd DWI arrest he
State v. Martinez 12 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR would have been clear to draw the Defendant's blood in compliance with the
Fourth Amendment by, at the latest, 2:45 a.m. 4 2RR 38.
The State also urges, "it does not appear that Officer Johnson spent
any part of the night standing around and wasting time." State's Brief at 11.
This argument assumes that Officer Marcos Johnson is the only set of boots
on the ground for the Austin Police Department, which currently boasts
approximately 1,800 sworn peace officers. 5 As supported by the Record,
Officer Johnson directly states that the process of obtaining a warrant
includes not only him, but also a detective or corporal that would take
paperwork to a magistrate for approval. 2RR 36, 59. Considering the
Record, the Court can safely conclude that Officer Johnson failed to utilize
the resources available to him to obtain a warrant and request assistance in
his investigation.
Therefore, m light most favorable to the trial court's finding, the
positions that an exigency exception did not exist and obtaining a warrant
would have taken a similar amount of time as the alleged medical
4 This calculation assumes that Officer Johnson's familiarity with the process of obtaining a warrant at the time of Defendant's arrest is actually credible. 5 This statistic was taken from the City of Austin website, located at the following
URL https:J_/www.austintexa~ov /faq/how-many-sworn-officers-work-austin- yolic~-dEWartment . State v. Martinez 13 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR intervention are abundantly supported by the record, and the State's first
argument fails.
ii. Totality of the Circumstances
The State contends that the trial court's holding regarding Officer
Johnson's decision to conduct a warrantless blood draw was unreasonable
fails on its face. In support of its argument the State points to language in the
Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ , 133 S. Ct.
1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). In McNeely, the Supreme Court held
that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when determining
when the of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement is triggered.
Id at 1552, 1561. However, the State failed to acknowledge the underlying
facts articulated in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the
precedent relied on in McNeely, dictating the "totality of the circumstances"
regarding nonconsensual warrantless blood draws. In Schmerber the suspect
was involved in a collision, suffered injuries worthy of a hospital visit, and
his blood drawn pursuant to a DWI investigation. McNeely at 1561. In
contrast to Schmerber, the Defendant's case in totality lacked a collision,
significant injuries, and it can be concluded his trip to the hospital was geared
solely toward the prospect of sedating him to a point where blood sample for
BAC testing could be acquired. Further, the State compares the facts of the
State v. Martinez 14 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Defendant's case to Schmerber, quoting McNeely, " ...an individual's alcohol
level gradually declines soon after he stops drinking, a significant delay in
testing will negatively affect the probative value of the results." ld.
However, the State fails to take into consideration that Schmerber is almost
50 years old. At the time Schmerber was decided the arresting officer did not
have the wealth of resources Officer Johnson had to obtain a warrant in a
quick and efficient manner. See McNeely, 113 S.Ct. at 1561-62 (stating that
much technological advancement has occurred since Schmberber was
decided); See also Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655-666.
Lastly the State sums its first argument as:
"the State is not arguing exigency based solely on the
dissipation of alcohol in the blood. Instead, there was an actual
medical emergency and a combative defendant, which at up
time and took the officer away from the jail and the
magistrate." State's Brief at 13.
This summarization contradicts itself. The State claims not to be
arguing exigency solely on the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, but then
refers to the Defendant taking the arresting officer away from the jail and the
magistrate, which directly goes to the dissipation of alcohol in the blood. ld.
Based on the time and various avenues Officer Johnson had to obtain a
State v. Martinez 15 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR warrant he easily could have done so if he made an attempt. Further, in tune
with the holdings in McNeely and Villarreal, the dissipation of alcohol in
blood is not a deciding relevant factor to consider when determining
exigency, and neither of those cases makes a ruling as applied to "combative"
defendants. Therefore, the dissipation of alcohol in blood and "a combative
defendant'' should receive no consideration as primary factors in an exigency
determination.
Point Two: Pursuant to the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling in
Villarreal, and the rulings of many other Courts throughout Texas, it is
explicit that the mandatory blood draw statute does not circumvent the 4'h
Amendment's requirement for a warrant. The State's point lacks merit.
The state's second point is meritless when considering the Court of
Criminal Appeals ruling in Villarreal. However, Defendant will address the
State's arguments in States Point 2 in turn.
The state argues that "the warrantless blood draw was mandated by
statute." In Villarreal the Court of Criminal Appeals brought light to the fact
that the mandatory blood draw statute was silent as to whether or not the
arresting officer was required to obtain a warrant before drawing blood,
quoting the statute directly that a peace officer "shall require the taking of a
specimen" but makes no reference to 4th Amendment warrant requirements.
State v. Martinez 16 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Villarreal at 19. However, the ruling in Villarreal did speak to the
Legislature being unable to restrict an individual's constitutionally
guaranteed rights, stating, "The Legislature may not restrict guaranteed rights
set out in constitutional provisions". Villarreal at 19 (quoting Venn v. State,
85 Tex.Crim. 633, 218 S.W. 1060 (1920)). Therefore, the State's first
argument on State's Point 2 fails and lacks merit.
Next, the state argues that, "The court should conduct a traditional
balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of the statue." Once again,
Villarreal speaks directly to this point. Specifically, the Court of Criminal
Appeals opined that "the warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing of a DWI
suspect's blood does not categorically fit within any recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, nor can it be justified under a
general Fourth Amendment balancing test." Villarreal at 1. In Villarreal the
State argued that a traditional approach must be taken when considering
intrusiveness of the mandatory blood draw statute, requiring the court to
weigh the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests' against 'the
degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's right to privacy."
Villarreal at 16 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297). At the
core of their argument for a traditional balancing test the State in Villarreal,
relied on Maryland v. King a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
State v. Martinez 17 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR warrantless collection of DNA from felony arrestees. In King, law
enforcement was collecting DNA from arrestees not for the sake of gathering
evidence against them, but for the simple procedure of inmate identification.
In rejecting the State's argument and its reliance on King, the Court of
Criminal Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's holding in McNeely, stating
"the warrantless search of a person is unreasonable unless it falls within an
establish exception to the warrant requirement." The Villarreal opinion
further speaks directly to the facts in King stating that the intrusion that took
place in King is far less substantial than puncturing a vein in a DWI
investigation. Villarreal at 18. Further, in its rejection of the State's
argument, Villarreal discusses that police officers in King were acting with
no discretion, whereas, during the course of a DWI investigation the primary
purpose of an officer is to make a discretionary probable cause determination
to investigate and search potential intoxication. Villarreal at 17. Last, the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Villarreal rejects the State's balancing test
argument in stating,
"if we were to accept the viability of a Fourth Amendment
balancing test here as a substitute for the established exceptions
to the warrant requirement, we conclude that, on balance, a
DWI suspect's privacy interest outweighs the State's interest in
State v. Martinez 18 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR preventing drunk driving through warrantless searches."
Villarreal at 18.
Therefore, State's second argument to State's Point 2 as well as
State's point 3, fails.
Point Three: The Defendant never consented to the blood draw and
a person has an absolute right to refuse a test and it is explicit that implied
consent is not an exception to the 41h Amendment's requirement for a
warrant. The State's point lacks merit.
Tex. Transp. Code § 724.011(a), or the implied consent statute, has
been deemed to not waive a person's Fourth Amendment rights in relation to
a warrantless blood draw during the course of a DWI investigation, where the
individual unequivocally withdrew or revoked his consent. Villarreal at 11.
The State in Villarreal argued that an individual implicitly gave consent to a
search of their blood or breath by enjoying the benefit of driving on public
roadways in Texas, and this implicit consent could not be withdrawn or
revoked. Id. However, the Court of Criminal held that "implied consent that
has been withdrawn is not voluntary consent." Id. Specifically, the Court of
Criminal Appeals opined that in order to constitute a valid waiver of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights, consent to search must be given
freely and voluntarily. Id (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct.
State v. Martinez 19 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR 2041). Another necessary component of valid consent is an individual's
ability to revoke or limit it. Miller v. State, 393 S.W. 3d 255, 266
(Tex.Crim.App.2012). The analysis of whether consent is given voluntary is
a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Villarreal at 11 (quoting Schneckloth). Moreover, prior to the Court of
Criminal Appeal's decision in Villarreal several appeals courts throughout
Texas held that warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws were
unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. See Reeder v. State, 428
S.W.3d 924 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. granted); Sutherland v. State,
436 S.W.3d 842 (Tex.App-Amarillo 2014, no pet.); Douds v. State, 434 S.W.
3d 842 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. granted; Weems v. State,
434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, pet. granted); Holidy v. State, No-
06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Apr. 30, 2014,
pet granted) (mem. Op., not designated for publication).
As applied to the facts in the Record, Officer Johnson made it clear
that the Defendant unequivocally denied consent for the search of his blood
or breath. 2RR 35. Hence, based on precedent, the State's reliance on Tex.
Trans. Code § 724.011(a) fails to justify the warrantless blood draw in the
instant case due to Defendant asserting his right withdraw his consent for the
search of his blood.
State v. Martinez 20 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR POINT FOUR: The State's argument that Tex. Code Crim. Pro.
Art. 38.23 does not apply: (1) "at the time" evidence was collected in
accordance with then existing law fails due to the retroactive application
of McNeely does not recognize the lights most favorable to the trial court's
ruling; (2) the State fails to acknowledge facts viewed in light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling that exigency in the instant case did
not exist; (3) the State's argument in Point Four can be distinguished.
1. Application of the law and precedent "at the time of arrest."
Defendant takes a multi-faceted approach in addressing the argument
in State's Point 4. Even though it claims it is not arguing a "back door" to
good faith, the State is attempting introduce evidence into a pending criminal
prosecution that was later ruled to have been collected in an unconstitutional
manner, and not in accordance with the laws of Texas. Specifically, the State
is attempting to articulate in a round-a-bout way that the blood draw taken
from Defendant should be allowed in, and that the Supreme Court's ruling in
McNeely, and the subsequent Court of Criminal Appeals ruling in Villarreal
should not retroactively apply to the Defendant' s case. 6
6Please note that Defendant's approach to addressing State's Point 4 is an attempt at making the most sense of the State's argument. In summary, the State claims "assuming arguendo, that the blood draw is unconstitutional, the Texas exclusionary rule still does not bar the admission of evidence". In this particular argument the State concedes the blood draw in the instant case unconstitutional State v. Martinez 21 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR The Texas Fifth Court of Appeals and Sixth Court Appeals have
addressed "whether art 38.23 is triggered'' during a mandatory blood draw in
pending cases that factually occurred prior the Supreme Courts ruling in
McNeely. The Fifth Court in Bowman v. State, opined that a warrantless
blood draw under Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code was a
violation of a suspects Fourth Amendment rights. Bowman v. State, 2015 WL
557205. Further, the Fifth Court stated that the trial court's opinion in
Bowman regarding exigency that qualified a warrantless blood draw was
unconstitutional.
In Bowman, the State advanced an argument much similar to State's
Point Four in the instant case, claiming "everything that he did was
appropriate" according to the Texas Transportation Code regarding the
arresting officer's warrantless draw of the suspect's blood, and that exigent
circumstances existed based on precedent "at the time" the arrest of Bowman
occurred. ld at 9. The Fifth Court however, rejected this argument and
referred to the application of the Supreme Court's ruling in McNeely,
specifically "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
(which is supported by the findings of the trial court and a slew of case law). Hence, Article 38.23 does trigger since the evidence was obtain in violation of the 4th Amendment of the Constitution, and the evidence, by law, is suppressed. Here the State argues the Defendant's position. State v. Martinez 22 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR circumstances." Bowman at 9 (quoting McNeely at 1568). In doing so the
Fifth Court applied the Supreme Court's new rule and standard in examining
warrantless blood draws in DWI investigations retroactively, to cases
pending at the time McNeely was decided. Bowman at 10. Particularly, in
regard to the retroactive use of McNeely in litigation pending at the time it
was decided the Fifth Court stated, "[N]ew rules governing the conduct of
criminal prosecutions apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal
or not yet final at the time the new rule is announced regardless of whether
they constitute a clear break from past precedent." Bowman at 10.
Exigent circumstances in Bowman were found to be nonexistent, the
Fifth Court determining that "[T]he focus of exigent circumstances analysis
in this context (DWI investigation) is not on the delay attendant to an
investigation, ... but on the delay necessary to obtain a warrant." Bowman at
11 (quoting Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. granted)). Factually Bowman differs from the instant case in
that it was an investigation that involved a major traffic accident and backup
arriving late to the scene of the investigation. Id at 11. The Fifth Court
turned their analysis on the different options available to the arresting officer
in Bowman to obtain a warrant, rather than the circumstances surrounding the
accident and arrest. See, ld.
State v. Martinez 23 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR In contrast in the Defendant's case the facts as supported by the
Record drastically detail less exigency. As testified by Officer Johnson, he
arrived at a scene involving no accident that he immediately determined was
not dangerous in nature, he conducted a DWI investigation, and at no time
did he attempt to explore the options available to him to retrieve a warrant,
nor did he call a detective or a corporal to assist him in getting a warrant.
2RR 36, 38, 58. As such, the State is attempting to draw focus away from
Officer Johnson's lack of exploring his various options to obtain a warrant in
their exigency argument, and therefore their argument fails.
The Fifth Court in Bowman relied heavily on the Sixth Court of
Appeals decision in Cole v. State, 2014 WL 7183859. In Cole the Sixth
Court faced a similar argument advanced by the State, claiming that there
was no "retroactive" application of the Supreme Court's ruling in McNeely to
a case whose trial was pending at the time McNeely was issued (referring
here to the State's argument that "at the time" the actions of Officer
Johnson's actions were constitutional). In Cole, the Sixth Court examined
exigency and the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw made pursuant
to the mandatory blood draw statute and implied consent. In their opinion,
the Sixth Court reasoned that McNeely had retroactive application to the
accused's case. Cole at 11. In support of their ruling the Sixth Court
State v. Martinez 24 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Griffith v. Kentucky, which held
that:
"new rules govemmg the conduct of criminal prosecutions
apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal or not
yet fmal at the time the new rule is announced regardless of
whether they constitute a clear break from past precedent."
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326-38, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93
L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). 7
The primary focus of the Sixth Court's reasonmg was to ensure that
defendants in similarly situated positions are granted the same amount of
protection under new precedent set forth by the Supreme Court.
Further, the trial court cites to McNeely in its fmdings of fact and
conclusions of law. CR 61-63. In doing so the it can be determined that the
trial court adopted the standard in McNeely in making its ruling in the instant
case. As such, taking the Sixth Court's position in Cole into consideration,
and applying the rulings in Griffith, McNeely, and Villarreal, the State's
argument that "at the time" the Officer Johnson did not violate the law fails.
ii. Facts must be viewed in light most favorable to the trial
court's ruling.
7The Sixth Court also cites McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15 (Tex.Crim.App.2014); Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 504 n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012)). State v. Martinez 25 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Taking into consideration the State's position that "at the time"
exigency existed, "assuming arguendo" that the blood draw was
unconstitutional, there cannot be a fmding of exigency. The trials court's
decision on the fact of the case must be seen in the light most favorable to its
findings assuming the court's findings were implicitly supported by the
record. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-8 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
As applied to the facts of the case and reflecting on the record and the trial
court's findings of facts and conclusions of law, the circumstances
surrounding the instant case did not constitute exigency. Simply put, the trial
court rejected the State's argument of exigency, and moreover the State
supports that finding in "assuming arguendo" that the blood draw was
unconstitutional. Hence, the State's agrees no viable exception to the warrant
requirement existed, and the blood draw is correspondingly suppressed.
iii. The cases the State cites in Point Four can be distinguished
from the instant case.
The State cites two separate cases in support of its round-a-bout, "not
a back door" argument to good faith, and reliance of case law "at the time".
Specifically the State cites, "State v. Johnson, 871 S.W.2d. 744, 750-51 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994) (no exclusion when there is attenuation of taint);
Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 467-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (no
State v. Martinez 26 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR exclusion when there is an independent source)." In regard to the two cases
cited by the State, the courts of Texas have never prospectively applied art.
38.23, and moreover the statute the State relies on was enacted by the Texas
Legislature, and was not created or articulated by the Supreme Court, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, or the appellate courts of Texas. Further,
based on the plain language of the statute, the Texas Legislature did not
provide for a broad "good-faith" exception, indicating that they wanted the
statute to apply. See, Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 38.23.
Specifically, the facts of the instant case can be distinguished from the
holdings in Wehrenberg and Johnson, in that, those cases involved unlawful
activity, however, the evidence that was ultimately obtained by legal means.
See Wehrenberg at 462, 469 (evidence gathered by the State was pursuant to
a validly executed search warrant reliant on a confidential informant rather
than improper police conduct.); See Davis at _ (the statement of a
defendant after a warrantless arrest was still admissible because and arrest
warrant was obtained after the warrantless arrest but before the statement was
given.) These cases are distinguishable from the instant case. Particularly,
the blood draw in Defendant's case is the only evidence gathered as a result
APD' s investigation and is the only evidence the State wishes to admit
pursuant to the above-cited cases. As applied to the facts and precedent the State v. Martinez 27 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR blood results are inadmissible because they were never obtained in a legal
fashion and is the product of police misconduct.
Based on the foregoing analysis the State's argument in Point Four
fails in all facets.
POINTFWE: Good faith under the federal exclusionary rule does not
apply in the instant case.
The State claims in State's Point Five that the "federal Exclusionary
rule does not bar admission" of the unconstitutional blood draw administered
by the Austin Police Department in the instant case. In support of its
argument the State falls back on the application of the federal exclusionary
rule, rather than the Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
and cites lllinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364
(1987).
This argument was recently addressed by the Fourth Court of Appeals
in San Antonio, in State v. Weems, 434 S.W. 3d 655. In Weems, the State
argued that the good faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule applies
to a warrantless blood draw in Texas, an argument rejected by the 4th Court.
Weems at 666 (21 cases cite this headnote, citations excluded). In support of
their finding, the Fourth Court opined that the Texas exclusionary rule offers
an accused, on its face, more constitutional protection than the federal rule.
State v. Martinez 28 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Id. Explicitly stating, under the Texas exclusionary rule, the good faith
exception can only be triggered when a police officer relies on a warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate. Id. Hence, in application to Defendant's case,
Officer Johnson never attempted to obtain a warrant and the good faith
exception cannot trigger. Put simply, the State's argument fails.
Prayer
The Defendant asks this Court to uphold the ruling of the trial court,
and suppress the blood analysis unconstitutionally obtained by the State in
violation of the United States Constitution, the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, and Texas and federal precedent.
702 Rio Grande Austin, Texas 78701 512.897.3325 (p) 512.501.6307 (f) delavina.law@gmail.com www .delavinalaw.com
State v. Martinez 29 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR Certificate of Compliance and Service
I hereby certify that this letter contains 6,217 words, based upon the
computer program used to generate this letter and excluding words contained in
those parts of the letter that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 .4(i) exempts
from inclusion in the word count, and that this letter is printed in a conventional,
14-point typeface. I further certify that, on the 1st day of April, 2015, a true and
correct copy of this letter was served, electronic mail, facsimile, or electronically
through the electronic filing manager, to the Appellant's attorney, Angie Creasy,
Travis County District A
State v. Martinez 30 APPELLATE CAUSE NO. 03-14-00588-CR