"WalKer, J.,
after stating tbe ease: This statement of tbe facts shows tbat what is termed in tbe case a cartway was only a private way over tbe lands of C. A. Nichols remaining after be bad sold tbe other tract to D. P. Miles, and its use, or the private easement over it, was restricted to him. Besides, there was no certain or definite description of tbe way, and Miles, or tbe persons who lived with him on bis land, members of bis family or tenants, used to go in almost any direction over tbe Haynie land. This surely is not sufficient proof of a right of way, and much less of a cartway, and still less of a public way. It is virtually conceded tbat this is so, if we are to follow
Boyden v. Achenbach,
79 N. C., 539, and tbe very numerous decisions which have affirmed it, and to be found at tbe foot of tbat case as reported in tbe annotated edition of 79 N. C., at marg. p. 543, bottom pp. 405, 406, among tbe most recent of which are
S. v. Lucas,
124 N. C., 806;
Milliken v. Denny,
141 N. C., 227;
Tise v. Whitaker,
146 N. C., 376;
Balliere v. Shingle Co.,
150 N. C., 633;
Snowden v. Bell,
159 N. C., 500.
This being tbe case, it was clearly not within tbe power of tbe Legislature to appropriate tbe land of defendant, or any part thereof, however small, to a public use without just compensation.
R. R. v. Davis,
19 N. C., 451;
Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N. C., 550;
Brown v. Power Co.,
140 N. C., 333. And it cannot, under tbe guise of calling it a cartway, take away this protection from tbe owner. Besides, a cartway is, at least, a gutm-public road, and to convert an ordinary private way, if properly established, into a cartway is a taking of private property for a public , use
(Cook v. Vickers,
141 N. C., 101) which entitles tbe owner to com
pensation. If tbe public needs it, let it pay a fair price for it, as we baye so often said.
S. v. Jones,
139 N. C., 613. As tbe
Chief Justice
said, in
R. R. v. Oates,
164 N. C., at_p. Ill: “A man’s land should stand condemned wben, and only when,’ every step which the law prescribes to that end has been complied with.”. The State cannot even impose a new or additional burden on the land, or increase an easement in it, without just compensation.
Brown v. Bower Co., supra.
This private way is not within the descriptive words of the Public-Local Laws of 1913, ch. 40, sec. 23. It was not a cartway, or used as a cartway, and no particular way which had been marked out and located, by contract or user, had been so used by the public for a period of ten years. It is straining the meaning of the statute and misconstruing the evidence in this case to say that this private way, if it had been delineated, was intended to be affected by the statute. But if we should admit that it does come within its letter or its spirit, another fatal objection arises, namely, that the Legislature has condemned this way to the public use without making any provision for compensation, and, what is worse, without, after the ten years had expired, giving the owner time or opportunity to stop the public user, if there had been any, and save his rights. This is taking private property without due process of law and withdrawing from this landowner the equal protection of the law. He has had no notice, hearing, or judgment. It would be an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power if the Legislature had intended to exercise it, which it manifestly did not, as we have shown.
This statute, while called a public-local law, was evidently promoted to subserve some private end, as acts of the kind usually are, and they deprive people summarily of rights which cannot so easily be taken from them otherwise and by the ordinary course of judicial procedure. This statute shortens the time by ten years for barring such rights, if, under
Boyden v. Achenbach, swpra,
they can be divested at all by such a user. It goes further, and declares that private property shall be devoted to a public use, that is, that á private way shall become a public way, after ten years user, when the time has already elapsed, which the highest Federal court has held is a violation- of the Federal Constitution, and we have held that it is a violation of our own. The property is taken against the will of the owner, without his having a day in court.
Hart v. Lamphire,
3 Peters (U. S.), 280 (7 L. Ed., 679);
Sohn v. Waterson,
17 Wall. (U. S.), 596 (21 L. Ed., 737);
Wheeler v. Jackson,
137 U. S., 245;
McFarland v. Jackson, ibid.,
258. In
Sohn v. Waterson, supra,
the Court held that an existing right of action cannot be divested by shortening the period of limitation to a time which has already run. See, also,
State of Tennessee v. Sneed,
96 U. S., 69;
Terry v. Anderson,
95 U. S., 633, and
Koshkonong v. Burton,
104 U. S., 668 (26 L. Ed., 886), where
the Court held that in this country, where the legislative power is limited by written constitutions, declaratory laws, so far as they operate on vested rights, can have no legal effect in depriving an individual of his rights or to change the rule of construction as to the preexisting law. Courts will treat such laws with all the respect that is due to them as the expression of the opinion of the individual members of the Legislature as to what the rule of law previously was, but beyond that they have no binding effect, and if the judge is satisfied that the legislative construction is wrong, he is obliged to disregard it. The Court then proceeds to declare that such statutes will be construed prospectively rather than retrospectively, as giving the rule for the determination of rights in the future rather than those which are already vested, and, therefore, relate to the past. Any other doctrine would be inconsistent with right and reason. And our law is the same, for our Constitution is as fully adequate to protect the individual against such an encroachment upon his rights as is the Federal Constitution. We have held distinctly that a statute will not be construed as restrospeetive in its operation unless it was clearly intended so to be, and especially where such a construction would take away rights under a former law, though they may he of a kind which the Legislature could divest by proper action, if so minded.
Elizabeth City v. Comrs.,
146 N. C., 542. Statutes which restrict private rights or the use of property, and especially those which tend to destroy them, should be strictly construed in favor of the citizen.
Nance v. R. R.,
149 N. C., 371. It would be contrary to the plainest dictates of justice to hold otherwise. If this statute should be given retrospective operation, so that the ten years already passed would bar the right, it would be the same as appropriating the property directly without any reference to the lapse of time.
There is no evidence of a dedication to the
public
in this case, and we have seen that, under
Boyden v. Achenbach, supra,
there has been no such user as will presume it or give the public any right or easement in the way.
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"WalKer, J.,
after stating tbe ease: This statement of tbe facts shows tbat what is termed in tbe case a cartway was only a private way over tbe lands of C. A. Nichols remaining after be bad sold tbe other tract to D. P. Miles, and its use, or the private easement over it, was restricted to him. Besides, there was no certain or definite description of tbe way, and Miles, or tbe persons who lived with him on bis land, members of bis family or tenants, used to go in almost any direction over tbe Haynie land. This surely is not sufficient proof of a right of way, and much less of a cartway, and still less of a public way. It is virtually conceded tbat this is so, if we are to follow
Boyden v. Achenbach,
79 N. C., 539, and tbe very numerous decisions which have affirmed it, and to be found at tbe foot of tbat case as reported in tbe annotated edition of 79 N. C., at marg. p. 543, bottom pp. 405, 406, among tbe most recent of which are
S. v. Lucas,
124 N. C., 806;
Milliken v. Denny,
141 N. C., 227;
Tise v. Whitaker,
146 N. C., 376;
Balliere v. Shingle Co.,
150 N. C., 633;
Snowden v. Bell,
159 N. C., 500.
This being tbe case, it was clearly not within tbe power of tbe Legislature to appropriate tbe land of defendant, or any part thereof, however small, to a public use without just compensation.
R. R. v. Davis,
19 N. C., 451;
Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N. C., 550;
Brown v. Power Co.,
140 N. C., 333. And it cannot, under tbe guise of calling it a cartway, take away this protection from tbe owner. Besides, a cartway is, at least, a gutm-public road, and to convert an ordinary private way, if properly established, into a cartway is a taking of private property for a public , use
(Cook v. Vickers,
141 N. C., 101) which entitles tbe owner to com
pensation. If tbe public needs it, let it pay a fair price for it, as we baye so often said.
S. v. Jones,
139 N. C., 613. As tbe
Chief Justice
said, in
R. R. v. Oates,
164 N. C., at_p. Ill: “A man’s land should stand condemned wben, and only when,’ every step which the law prescribes to that end has been complied with.”. The State cannot even impose a new or additional burden on the land, or increase an easement in it, without just compensation.
Brown v. Bower Co., supra.
This private way is not within the descriptive words of the Public-Local Laws of 1913, ch. 40, sec. 23. It was not a cartway, or used as a cartway, and no particular way which had been marked out and located, by contract or user, had been so used by the public for a period of ten years. It is straining the meaning of the statute and misconstruing the evidence in this case to say that this private way, if it had been delineated, was intended to be affected by the statute. But if we should admit that it does come within its letter or its spirit, another fatal objection arises, namely, that the Legislature has condemned this way to the public use without making any provision for compensation, and, what is worse, without, after the ten years had expired, giving the owner time or opportunity to stop the public user, if there had been any, and save his rights. This is taking private property without due process of law and withdrawing from this landowner the equal protection of the law. He has had no notice, hearing, or judgment. It would be an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power if the Legislature had intended to exercise it, which it manifestly did not, as we have shown.
This statute, while called a public-local law, was evidently promoted to subserve some private end, as acts of the kind usually are, and they deprive people summarily of rights which cannot so easily be taken from them otherwise and by the ordinary course of judicial procedure. This statute shortens the time by ten years for barring such rights, if, under
Boyden v. Achenbach, swpra,
they can be divested at all by such a user. It goes further, and declares that private property shall be devoted to a public use, that is, that á private way shall become a public way, after ten years user, when the time has already elapsed, which the highest Federal court has held is a violation- of the Federal Constitution, and we have held that it is a violation of our own. The property is taken against the will of the owner, without his having a day in court.
Hart v. Lamphire,
3 Peters (U. S.), 280 (7 L. Ed., 679);
Sohn v. Waterson,
17 Wall. (U. S.), 596 (21 L. Ed., 737);
Wheeler v. Jackson,
137 U. S., 245;
McFarland v. Jackson, ibid.,
258. In
Sohn v. Waterson, supra,
the Court held that an existing right of action cannot be divested by shortening the period of limitation to a time which has already run. See, also,
State of Tennessee v. Sneed,
96 U. S., 69;
Terry v. Anderson,
95 U. S., 633, and
Koshkonong v. Burton,
104 U. S., 668 (26 L. Ed., 886), where
the Court held that in this country, where the legislative power is limited by written constitutions, declaratory laws, so far as they operate on vested rights, can have no legal effect in depriving an individual of his rights or to change the rule of construction as to the preexisting law. Courts will treat such laws with all the respect that is due to them as the expression of the opinion of the individual members of the Legislature as to what the rule of law previously was, but beyond that they have no binding effect, and if the judge is satisfied that the legislative construction is wrong, he is obliged to disregard it. The Court then proceeds to declare that such statutes will be construed prospectively rather than retrospectively, as giving the rule for the determination of rights in the future rather than those which are already vested, and, therefore, relate to the past. Any other doctrine would be inconsistent with right and reason. And our law is the same, for our Constitution is as fully adequate to protect the individual against such an encroachment upon his rights as is the Federal Constitution. We have held distinctly that a statute will not be construed as restrospeetive in its operation unless it was clearly intended so to be, and especially where such a construction would take away rights under a former law, though they may he of a kind which the Legislature could divest by proper action, if so minded.
Elizabeth City v. Comrs.,
146 N. C., 542. Statutes which restrict private rights or the use of property, and especially those which tend to destroy them, should be strictly construed in favor of the citizen.
Nance v. R. R.,
149 N. C., 371. It would be contrary to the plainest dictates of justice to hold otherwise. If this statute should be given retrospective operation, so that the ten years already passed would bar the right, it would be the same as appropriating the property directly without any reference to the lapse of time.
There is no evidence of a dedication to the
public
in this case, and we have seen that, under
Boyden v. Achenbach, supra,
there has been no such user as will presume it or give the public any right or easement in the way. That the defendant is not indictable under the facts of this case, where the public has acquired no such right in the way and the public authorities have not assumed the obligation to work the road and keep it in order, is expressly decided in
S. v. Stewart,
91 N. C., 566;
S. v. Lucas,
124 N. C., 804;
S. v. Purefoy,
86 N. C., 682.
“A public highway
is one established by public authority and kept in order by the public, under the direction of the law; or else it is one used generally by the public for twenty years, and over which the public authorities have exerted control, and for the reparation of which they are responsible.”
S. v. Purefoy, supra
(by
Ruffin,
J.), citing
S. v. McDaniel,
53 N. C., 284, and
Boyden v. Achenbach, supra.
The proof in this case is that the public authorities had never exercised any control over this way and that it was not regarded, in any sense, as
a public way, nor even a cartway, as that term is understood in tbe law. A right of way was granted to Miles as purchaser from the former owner of the land, C. A. Nichols, but it was confined to him and was strictly a private right to cross Nichols’ land between Miles’ home and the public road. This is not a cartway. The distinction between the two is clearly drawn in
Warlick v. Lowman,
103 N. C., 122, 124. There has been neither condemnation, dedication (which must be with the sanction of the public authorities), nor such user by the public as to presume a grant or dedication. The following cases show conclusively that defendant is not indictable at common law or under any statute of this State:
S. v. McDaniel,
53 N. C., 284;
Kennedy v. Williams,
87 N. C., 8;
Stewart v. Frink,
94 N. C., 489;
Warlick v. Lowman, supra; Burwell v. Sneed,
104 N. C., 121;
S. v. Summerfield,
107 N. C., 898;
S. v. Wolf,
112 N. C., 894;
S. v. Fisher, 117
N. C., 739. They were nearly all decided since the statute in regard to the obstruction of roads and cartways was passed. Laws 1872-3, ch. 189, sec. 6; Code, sec. 2065; Eevisal, sec. 3784, referred to by the Attorney-General. Besides; the way subject to this private use or easement is neither a “highway, cartway, mill road, or road leading to a church or other place of worship,” and is not within the letter or spirit of that section, as a bare reading of it will disclose, and as this Court has repeatedly decided. See cases
supra.
Many others might be cited to the same effect.
The Attorney-General frankly says, in his brief, that the defendant was indicted under the act of 1913, and almost admits that it is not applicable, for the reasons above stated, and falls back upon Eevisal, sec. 3784, which, as we have seen, does not apply.
He also concedes that the deed admitted in evidence was defectively probated and registered, after a careful examination of the statute relating to the same.
For these reasons we are unable to agree with the court below, but think the motion to nonsuit should have been sustained. Judgment will be entered in the Superior Coust dismissing the prosecution, with costs as allowed by law.
Eeversed.