State v. Hatton

Superior Court of Delaware

State v. Hatton

114 A.2d 651, 49 Del. 264, 10 Terry 264, 1955 Del. Super. LEXIS 80

CourtSuperior Court of Delaware

DecidedMarch 23, 1955

Docket944, Civil Action, 1954

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 114 A.2d 651 (State v. Hatton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Hatton, 114 A.2d 651, 49 Del. 264, 10 Terry 264, 1955 Del. Super. LEXIS 80 (Del. Ct. App. 1955).

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Opinion

*266 Layton, J.:

In the following jurisdictions, Appellate Courts have held that a magistrate has no power to reopen or vacate a default judgment rendered by him after the expiration of the period of time within which motions to reopen or vacate are permitted by statute. Jeffries v. Newblock, 56 Okl. 320, 155 P. 1150; State ex rel. Surgeon v. Jones, 106 W. Va. 561, 146 S. E. 372; Pratt v. Roberts, 53 Me. 399, and Hunt v. Kennedy Coal Corp., 140 Va. 17, 124 S. E. 189. In each of the jurisdictions above mentioned, Magistrates’ Courts are established by Constitution.

Pratt v. Roberts, just mentioned, is precise authority for the proposition that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy in a case such as this.

In behalf of the defendant, Magistrate, it is argued that he has inherent power over his own judgments, and, within the limits of sound discretion, the power to reopen or vacate a default judgment such as this. This argument is predicated upon the claim that, in Delaware, Magistrates’ Courts are Constitutional Courts and Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, while Article IV, § I of the Del. C. Ann. Constitution of of the State establishes Magistrates’ Courts, yet the powers and jurisdiction of such Courts are wholly statutory. Moreover, I find no authority for the claim that, in this State, Magistrates’ Courts are Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, Townsend v. Harmon, 5 W. W. Harr. 562, 171 A. 178, classifies them as courts of limited jurisdiction, and Farrell v. Maryland Credit Finance Corporation, 2 W. W. Harr. 569, 127 A. 879, and Howell v. Eastburn, 9 W.W. Harr. 588, 2 A. 2d 899, refer to the jurisdiction of such Courts as entirely statutory.

It is my view of the law that in this State, the Magistrates’ Courts, while created by Constitution, nevertheless are restricted in their jurisdiction. Accordingly, a Magistrate has no powers other than those conferred on him by statute and no *267 power to vacate a default judgment after the expiration of the 15 days period prescribed by 10 Del. C. § 9542.

The writ of mandamus will issue as prayed.

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*266 Layton, J.:

In the following jurisdictions, Appellate Courts have held that a magistrate has no power to reopen or vacate a default judgment rendered by him after the expiration of the period of time within which motions to reopen or vacate are permitted by statute. Jeffries v. Newblock, 56 Okl. 320, 155 P. 1150; State ex rel. Surgeon v. Jones, 106 W. Va. 561, 146 S. E. 372; Pratt v. Roberts, 53 Me. 399, and Hunt v. Kennedy Coal Corp., 140 Va. 17, 124 S. E. 189. In each of the jurisdictions above mentioned, Magistrates’ Courts are established by Constitution.

Pratt v. Roberts, just mentioned, is precise authority for the proposition that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy in a case such as this.

In behalf of the defendant, Magistrate, it is argued that he has inherent power over his own judgments, and, within the limits of sound discretion, the power to reopen or vacate a default judgment such as this. This argument is predicated upon the claim that, in Delaware, Magistrates’ Courts are Constitutional Courts and Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, while Article IV, § I of the Del. C. Ann. Constitution of of the State establishes Magistrates’ Courts, yet the powers and jurisdiction of such Courts are wholly statutory. Moreover, I find no authority for the claim that, in this State, Magistrates’ Courts are Courts of general jurisdiction. To the contrary, Townsend v. Harmon, 5 W. W. Harr. 562, 171 A. 178, classifies them as courts of limited jurisdiction, and Farrell v. Maryland Credit Finance Corporation, 2 W. W. Harr. 569, 127 A. 879, and Howell v. Eastburn, 9 W.W. Harr. 588, 2 A. 2d 899, refer to the jurisdiction of such Courts as entirely statutory.

It is my view of the law that in this State, the Magistrates’ Courts, while created by Constitution, nevertheless are restricted in their jurisdiction. Accordingly, a Magistrate has no powers other than those conferred on him by statute and no *267 power to vacate a default judgment after the expiration of the 15 days period prescribed by 10 Del. C. § 9542.

The writ of mandamus will issue as prayed.

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Bluebook (online)

114 A.2d 651, 49 Del. 264, 10 Terry 264, 1955 Del. Super. LEXIS 80, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hatton-delsuperct-1955.

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