State v. Harris

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-1014
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Valerie Zachary

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-1014

Filed 1 July 2026

Pitt County, Nos. 22CR339184-730, 23CR000882-730

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JARMARLON HARRIS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 August 2024 by Judge Marvin

K. Blount, III, in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 June

2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Stacey A. Phipps, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Candace Washington, for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant Jarmarlon Harris appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered

upon a jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion,

and attaining habitual-felon status. On appeal, Defendant argues that the court erred

by denying his motion to dismiss the extortion and conspiracy charges. Defendant

contends that, therefore, this Court should vacate these convictions as well as his STATE V. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

conviction for attaining habitual-felon status. After careful review, we conclude that

the trial court did not err.

I. Background

Defendant’s case came on for jury trial on 31 July 2024. The evidence tended

to show the following:

Christopher McLawhorn is a fencing and deck contractor. On 7 November

2022, while McLawhorn was at a job site, his secretary alerted him that someone who

had arrived in a Dodge Charger was “beating on the front door of [the] office,” wanting

to speak to him. McLawhorn’s secretary refused to open the door. McLawhorn called

his landlord, who informed the person that McLawhorn was not present. The man

then departed.

“[T]hroughout that day and the next day,” McLawhorn “kept getting phone

calls from a number [he] didn’t recognize.” The caller told McLawhorn that he “had

video evidence of [McLawhorn] with an underage girl and [he was] going to tell

[McLawhorn’s] wife and . . . kids.”1 During these calls, which McLawhorn recorded,

he “was speaking to one main person” but could occasionally “hear someone [else] in

the background.” He was told: “We are both in charge.”

The caller also sent McLawhorn text messages from the same phone number

containing, inter alia, threats and a photograph of “a handwritten letter” that

1 McLawhorn was divorced at the time of this incident.

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included McLawhorn’s name, his girlfriend’s name, his daughter’s name, the name

and address of his business, his personal address, a prior personal address, and his

phone number. The letter was allegedly written by “Destiny’s father” and asserted

that Destiny “was underage.” The letter also claimed that the sender had “video

evidence” and threatened “to go to the police, the media, [and McLawhorn’s] family”

if McLawhorn refused to pay the sender. Screenshots of the text messages, including

the letter, were admitted into evidence at trial and published to the jury as State’s

Exhibit 2.

McLawhorn testified that he met a woman named Destiny Plotzke at a strip

club and that they engaged in sex. Plotzke denied to a law enforcement officer that

she had sex with McLawhorn.

The harassment continued, with “nonstop calls and texts,” sometimes at “1:00,

2:00, 3:00 in the morning.” Additionally, two men “show[ed] up at a place

[McLawhorn] was eating dinner one night”; Defendant was one of the men.

McLawhorn then contacted the Greenville Police Department. In cooperation

with law enforcement officers, McLawhorn told the callers that he would pay the

demanded amount and arranged a meeting for 9 November at the parking lot of a

local grocery store to make the extorted payment. Officers arrested the three men

who arrived to collect payment from McLawhorn, one of whom was Defendant.

Officers seized a cell phone from each of the arrested men. From Defendant,

the officers seized a cell phone with a floral cover belonging to Defendant’s ex-

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girlfriend’s daughter, from whom he had borrowed the cell phone for a week. This cell

phone’s call log reflected numerous calls to McLawhorn’s cell phone number from 7–

9 November. The call log was admitted into evidence at trial and published to the

jury as State’s Exhibit 5. In addition, the cell phone had a “Text Now” app that could

be used to spoof a cell phone number. The number generated by the app was the same

number from which McLawhorn had repeatedly received calls and text messages.

Detective Cameron Donaldson of the Greenville Police Department

interviewed Defendant, who acknowledged that he “was aware of [the] texts and

phone calls” that McLawhorn received and “was well aware of a letter which had been

sent to [McLawhorn] demanding money, essentially blackmailing him or demanding

money in exchange for not doing – not releasing images.” A recording of this interview

was admitted into evidence at trial as State’s Exhibit 1 and published to the jury.

Joyce Parker, Defendant’s ex-girlfriend, testified that she had driven

Defendant in her Dodge Charger to a fencing company prior to his arrest. Recordings

of phone calls between McLawhorn and the men setting up the meeting time and

“negotiating the money” were admitted into evidence at trial as State’s Exhibits 3

and 4 and published to the jury.

Defense counsel moved to dismiss the extortion and conspiracy charges “due to

[the] insufficiency of the evidence” at the close of the State’s evidence and renewed

the motion at the close of all evidence; the trial court denied the motion on both

occasions.

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On 1 August 2024, the jury returned its verdicts finding Defendant guilty of

extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion, and attaining habitual-felon status. That

same day, the trial court entered judgment, consolidating Defendant’s convictions

and sentencing him to 77 to 105 months’ imprisonment in the custody of the North

Carolina Department of Adult Correction.

Defendant gave timely notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that “[t]he trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss

the offenses of extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion.” Accordingly, he

contends that this Court should vacate the convictions for these charges as well as

the conviction for attaining habitual-felon status. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.

Under a de novo review, this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes

its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Fraley, 299 N.C. App. 463,

469, 918 S.E.2d 910, 915 (2025) (extraneity removed).

When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, “the question is

whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense

charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant’s being the

perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” Id. (extraneity

removed). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Sharpe, 289 N.C. App. 84,

87, 887 S.E.2d 116, 119 (2023) (citation omitted).

“In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence

admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,

giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any

contradictions in its favor.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the record developed at trial

contains substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, to

support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant

committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.”

Fraley, 299 N.C. App. at 469, 918 S.E.2d at 916 (extraneity removed).

B. Extortion

Defendant first argues that “[t]he trial court erred by denying the motion to

dismiss when there was insufficient evidence that [he], either by himself or by acting

in concert with another, committed the offense of extortion.”

“[A] person is guilty of extortion if that person threatens or communicates a

threat or threats to another with the intention thereby wrongfully to obtain anything

of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity.” State v. Wright, 240 N.C. App.

270, 273, 770 S.E.2d 757, 759 (extraneity removed), disc. review denied, 368 N.C. 284,

775 S.E.2d 858 (2015); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-118.4 (2025). “Extortion may be

defined as wrongfully obtaining anything of value from another by threat, duress, or

coercion.” State v. Privette, 218 N.C. App. 459, 474, 721 S.E.2d 299, 310 (citation

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omitted), disc. review denied sub nom., State v. Smith, 365 N.C. 566, 724 S.E.2d 532

(2012).

“[A] defendant is said to have acted in concert with another if he acted together,

in harmony or in conjunction with another pursuant to a common plan or purpose.”

State v. Christian, 288 N.C. App. 50, 54, 884 S.E.2d 492, 497 (extraneity removed),

disc. review denied, 385 N.C. 315, 891 S.E.2d 267 (2023). When “two persons join in

a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not

only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also

guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of” the common plan

or purpose “or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the State presented substantial evidence from which the jury could

reasonably infer that Defendant acted in concert with another to extort money from

McLawhorn. At trial, McLawhorn testified that during the phone calls, he could hear

another man in the background, and was told, “We are both in charge”; a recording

of this conversation was admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 3 and published to

the jury. The extortion began with a visit to McLawhorn’s place of business by a man

traveling in a Dodge Charger. Defendant’s ex-girlfriend, with whom he still resided,

testified that she drove Defendant to a fencing company in her Dodge Charger.

Defendant appeared with another man one evening at a restaurant at which

McLawhorn was eating and with two other men at the arranged location to receive

the extorted money from McLawhorn. When arrested, Defendant was in possession

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of a cell phone with a floral cover that had been loaned to him for the week by his ex-

girlfriend’s daughter. The cell phone had a “Text Now” app that could spoof a phone

number, and the number generated by the app was the number from which

McLawhorn received numerous text messages and calls in furtherance of the

extortion scheme. McLawhorn identified some of the text messages on his cell phone

as messages that he had received from the spoofed number, including the screenshot

of the alleged letter from Destiny’s father:

We know without a doubt that you was involved with my daughter and her friend Destiny and Brooke. We have incriminating evidence in relation to you, . . . McLawhorn. You have two options: one, disregard this information and watch your life crumble; or, two, figure out what your reputation and freedom is worth and pay the cost. If you don’t reach out and handle this immediately we will report you to the authorities . . . and every family member of yours, all the media starting with your daughter. By the way, these girls are underage. Be dumb and you will be a sex offender, child molester for life. We have messages, recordings, videos, pics, and everything else. Talk to you soon, Destiny’s father.

Moreover, the cell phone’s call log indicated numerous calls to McLawhorn’s

cell phone number. Defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that he was

aware of the extortion letter, text messages, and calls.

Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient

evidence “tending to prove the fact in issue”—that Defendant committed the crime of

extortion on a theory of acting in concert—and, as such, the trial court did not err by

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss this charge. State v. Chisholm, 288 N.C. App.

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601, 610, 886 S.E.2d 908, 916 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 385 N.C. 317,

891 S.E.2d 269 (2023).

C. Conspiracy to Commit Extortion

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to

dismiss the conspiracy charge “because the State failed to present sufficient evidence

that [he] conspired with another to commit extortion” where Defendant merely had a

“passive cognizance of [the] plan to extort McLawhorn.”

“A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to do an

unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner. In order to prove conspiracy,

the State need not prove an express agreement; evidence tending to show a mutual,

implied understanding will suffice.” State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 575, 780 S.E.2d

824, 826–27 (2015) (citation omitted).

“This evidence may be circumstantial or inferred from the defendant’s

behavior.” State v. Shelly, 176 N.C. App. 575, 586, 627 S.E.2d 287, 296 (2006).

“Because the presence of a common design is often extremely difficult to detect, a

conspiracy may be, and generally is, established by a number of indefinite acts, each

of which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken collectively, . . . point

unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy.” State v. Aleem, 49 N.C. App. 359, 363,

271 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1980) (extraneity removed).

“The crime of conspiracy does not require an overt act for its completion; the

agreement itself is the crime.” Shelly, 176 N.C. App. at 586, 627 S.E.2d at 296.

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In the present case, to convict Defendant of conspiracy to commit extortion, the

State was required to prove that Defendant entered into an agreement with another

to communicate a threat to a third party with the intention of wrongfully obtaining

something of value. See Privette, 218 N.C. App. at 478, 721 S.E.2d at 313; see also

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-118.4. The evidence described above, when taken collectively,

“tend[ed] to show a mutual, implied understanding” rather than Defendant’s mere

passive cognizance of another’s plan to extort money. Shelly, 176 N.C. App. at 586,

627 S.E.2d at 296 (citation omitted). In fact, the evidence shows Defendant’s active

participation in the scheme. Thus, the State presented substantial evidence from

which the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant conspired with another to

commit the crime of extortion.

Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this

evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Defendant committed the crime of

conspiracy to commit extortion. Privette, 218 N.C. App. at 478, 721 S.E.2d at 313; see

also Sharpe, 289 N.C. App. at 87, 887 S.E.2d at 119. The trial court properly denied

Defendant’s motion to dismiss this charge.

D. Habitual-Felon Status

Finally, Defendant maintains that because “[t]his Court should reverse the

denial of the motion to dismiss and vacate [his] convictions” of extortion and

conspiracy to commit extortion, we “should also vacate [his] habitual[-]felon status”

conviction. In that we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s

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motion to dismiss, we will not vacate his conviction for attaining habitual-felon

status.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free

from error.

NO ERROR.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge HAMPSON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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