State v. Hardy

Connecticut Appellate Court

State v. Hardy

526 A.2d 562, 11 Conn. App. 238, 1987 Conn. App. LEXIS 967

CourtConnecticut Appellate Court

DecidedJune 9, 1987

Docket5312

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 526 A.2d 562 (State v. Hardy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Hardy, 526 A.2d 562, 11 Conn. App. 238, 1987 Conn. App. LEXIS 967 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70.

In the defendant’s first claim of error, he asserts that the trial court erred by denying his supplemental motion to suppress because he was not promptly arraigned in accordance with General Statutes § 54-lc¹ and General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 54-lg.²

The defendant was placed under arrest at 7:11 a.m. on September 19,1985. The defendant was arraigned on the next regularly scheduled court date, September 20, 1985. In State v. Darwin, 155 Conn. 124, 133-34, 230 A.2d 573 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 346, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 20 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1968), our Supreme Court rejected a claim of untimely arraignment under circumstances nearly identical to those in this case. See also State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 39, [240]*240244 A.2d 601 (1968). The trial court, in refusing to suppress the defendant’s statements, properly applied the holding in Darwin.

The defendant’s second claim is that his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses was violated. He claims that the trial court erred in not making a preliminary finding that the failure to produce privileged information contained in the psychiatric records of the victim-witness would be likely to impair the defendant’s right to confrontation. State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 176-80, 471 A.2d 949 (1984). Such a finding could not have been made on the facts of this case.

Here, the defendant not only failed to show that the witness had a mental problem that affected her testimonial capacity, he did not even establish that the witness was under psychiatric care or that any psychiatric records existed. See State v. Burak, 201 Conn. 517, 523-24, 518 A.2d 639 (1986); State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 329-30, 497 A.2d 758 (1985); cert denied, 475 U.S. 1119, 106 S. Ct. 1635, 90 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1986); State v. Esposito, supra. Further, at oral argument in this court defense counsel admitted that, prior to trial, he made no effort to secure the psychiatric records, if any, of the victim-witness, nor, at trial, did he ask for a continuance to do so. We cannot convert the defendant’s default in this regard into error. See State v. Davis, 10 Conn. 130, 133, 521 A.2d 1051 (1987).

There is no error.

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Per Curiam.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70.

In the defendant’s first claim of error, he asserts that the trial court erred by denying his supplemental motion to suppress because he was not promptly arraigned in accordance with General Statutes § 54-lc¹ and General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 54-lg.²

The defendant was placed under arrest at 7:11 a.m. on September 19,1985. The defendant was arraigned on the next regularly scheduled court date, September 20, 1985. In State v. Darwin, 155 Conn. 124, 133-34, 230 A.2d 573 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 346, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 20 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1968), our Supreme Court rejected a claim of untimely arraignment under circumstances nearly identical to those in this case. See also State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 39, [240]*240244 A.2d 601 (1968). The trial court, in refusing to suppress the defendant’s statements, properly applied the holding in Darwin.

The defendant’s second claim is that his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses was violated. He claims that the trial court erred in not making a preliminary finding that the failure to produce privileged information contained in the psychiatric records of the victim-witness would be likely to impair the defendant’s right to confrontation. State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 176-80, 471 A.2d 949 (1984). Such a finding could not have been made on the facts of this case.

Here, the defendant not only failed to show that the witness had a mental problem that affected her testimonial capacity, he did not even establish that the witness was under psychiatric care or that any psychiatric records existed. See State v. Burak, 201 Conn. 517, 523-24, 518 A.2d 639 (1986); State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 329-30, 497 A.2d 758 (1985); cert denied, 475 U.S. 1119, 106 S. Ct. 1635, 90 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1986); State v. Esposito, supra. Further, at oral argument in this court defense counsel admitted that, prior to trial, he made no effort to secure the psychiatric records, if any, of the victim-witness, nor, at trial, did he ask for a continuance to do so. We cannot convert the defendant’s default in this regard into error. See State v. Davis, 10 Conn. 130, 133, 521 A.2d 1051 (1987).

There is no error.

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Bluebook (online)

526 A.2d 562, 11 Conn. App. 238, 1987 Conn. App. LEXIS 967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hardy-connappct-1987.

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