No. 80-407
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA O R F F
1981
T E STATE O MONTANA, H F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS .
MICKEY GENE HANSEN,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n . Honorable R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Hood and Sherwood, M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana W i l l i a m Douglas, County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 8 1
Decided: S e p t . 1 5 , 1 9 8 1
Filed: -
1 5 1981
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court.
D e f e n d a n t , Mickey Gene Hansen, a p p e a l s from a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Nineteenth
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln.
Four i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o use, for t h e purposes of impeachment, statements made by t h e d e f e n d a n t when e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t .
2. Whether the District Court erred i n admitting evidence, over defendant's objection as to relevancy,
S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a mug s h o t p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t .
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d when i t r e f u s e d t o review p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o determine i f t h e r e p o r t s cont a i n e d e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l and w e r e , therefore, discovera b l e t o d e f e n d a n t u n d e r s e c t i o n 46-15-302, MCA.
4. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion f o r a c h a n g e of v e n u e and m o t i o n f o r
individually sequestered voir d i r e .
T h i s i s t h e second t i m e t h i s c a s e h a s been before t h i s Court. On a p r e v i o u s a p p e a l , t h e c a s e was r e v e r s e d , a l b e i t on o t h e r g r o u n d s . S t a t e v . Hansen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont.
, 608 P.2d 1 0 8 3 , 37 S t . R e p . 657. The f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t o p i n i o n and w i l l n o t be s e t f o r t h h e r e e x c e p t where i t is n e c e s s a r y t o do s o i n d i s c u s s i n g a n i s s u e t h a t h a s been r a i s e d .
To d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o consider the background of the f a c t s leading t o t h e problem r a i s e d by i t . D e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d on S e p t e m b e r 6 , 1 9 7 8 , and a n i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d c h a r g i n g him w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r -
course without consent. D e f e n d a n t was arraigned on that c h a r g e , p l e a d n o t g u i l t y , and t r i a l was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 0 ,
1979. On J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 9 , d e f e n d a n t , w i t h c o u n s e l , moved t o w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f g u i l t y . During t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s , i n response t o q u e s t i o n s from t h e
c o u r t , defendant denied having sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining witness. At t h a t time, defendant's privatelyr e t a i n e d c o u n s e l moved t h e c o u r t t o w i t h d r a w a s c o u n s e l , and
the motion was granted. After further conversations in court, defendant admitted the sexual intercourse, and the c o u r t allowed h i s p l e a of guilty. The r e c o r d shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel t h e n withdrew h i s motion t o withdraw a s
counsel.
S e n t e n c i n g was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 5 , f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n o f a p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . That presentence r e p o r t contained t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e n i a l of any sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining witness. The c o u r t ,
on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979, because of the report, entered a not g u i l t y p l e a f o r d e f e n d a n t and s e t t h e t r i a l f o r F e b r u a r y 6 ,
1979. On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p o i n t e d a s u b s t i t u t e counsel for defendant, and t h e t r i a l was r e s e t f o r March 6 , 1 9 7 9 .
F o l l o w i n g t r i a l and g u i l t y v e r d i c t on March 8 , 1 9 7 9 ,
d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o f o r t y y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n and d e s i g n a t e d a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e p u r p o s e s .
A s previously noted, t h i s Court reversed t h a t conviction . A new trial was set for May 6, 1980, which was continued until June 17, 1980, when defendant hired new counsel. New counsel presented motions for a change of v e n u e and t o r e q u i r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e on J u n e 6 ,
1980. The c h a n g e of v e n u e m o t i o n was d e n i e d t h a t d a y and a p o r t i o n of t h e motion t o produce the reports of investig a t i n g o f f i c e r s was d e n i e d l a t e r . Following t r i a l , a g u i l t y verdict was returned on June 18, 1980, and this appeal
resulted.
In h i s f i r s t issue defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o i n t r o d u c e , f o r impeach-
ment p u r p o s e s , s t a t e m e n t s d e f e n d a n t made w h i l e e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t . This i s s u e d i r e c t l y concerns answers defendant gave t o q u e s t i o n s
p o s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t when h e p l e a d e d g u i l t y on J a n u a r y 2, 1979. It raises for t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e problem of t h e
use of t h e s t a t e m e n t s under Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., which provides:
"Offer t o plead g u i l t y ; nolo contendere; w i t h d r a w n p l e a of g u i l t y . Evidence of a p l e a of g u i l t y , l a t e r withdrawn, o r a p l e a of n o l o c o n t e n d e r e , o r of an o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y o r n o l o contendere t o t h e crime charged o r any o t h e r c r i m e , o r o f s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any of t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r o f f e r s , i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e i n any c i v i l o r criminal a c t i o n , case, or proceeding against t h e p e r s o n who made t h e p l e a o r o f f e r . This r u l e s h a l l n o t apply t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o u r t on t h e r e c o r d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any o f t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r o f f e r s where o f f e r e d f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s o r i n a s u b s e q u e n t p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e d e c l a r a n t f o r p e r j u r y o r f a l s e statement."
A t t h e second t r i a l , following defendant's testimony t h a t he d i d n o t have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n i n g witness without her consent, t h e S t a t e used t h e s t a t e m e n t s made on J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 9 , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s , thereby showing that on a previous occasion the defendant had admitted t o such s e x u a l intercourse without consent. Our q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r s u c h s t a t e m e n t s a r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e
l a s t s e n t e n c e of R u l e 4 1 0 , M0nt.R.Evi.d. The s t a t e m e n t s w e r e
made in connection with a withdrawn guilty plea and were u s e d f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s and s o m e e t t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s
of the statute. The r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n is whether o r n o t the statements were "voluntary and reliable" within the
meaning of t h e r u l e .
H u t t o v. R o s s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 429 U . S . 28, 97 S . C t . 202, 50
L.Ed.2d 1 9 4 , is r e l i e d on by d e f e n d a n t . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d
that the federal rules of evidence do not allow use of
statements except in perjury hearings, as contrasted to
M o n t a n a ' s R u l e 4 1 0 , which a l l o w s t h e u s e o f the statements
for impeachment p u r p o s e s a s well as for a prosecution for
perjury or f a l s e statements. I n Hutto, t h e Court s a i d :
" T h e t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e c o n f e s s i o n was 'extracted by a n y s o r t o f threats or violence, [ o r ] o b t a i n e d by any d i r e c t o r i m p l i e d p r o m i s e s , however s l i g h t , [ o r ] by t h e e x e r t i o n of any improper i n f l u e n c e . ' " 429 U.S. a t 3 0 , 97 S . C t . a t 203, 50 L.Ed.2d a t 197.
I n many ways the f a c t s of Hutto are comparable to
those here. In Hutto after entering a plea bargaining
agreement with the prosecuting attorney with regard to a
criminal charge under Arkansas law, the defendant, a t the
prosecutor's request, made a statement confessing to the
crime of embezzlement. The confession was made in the
presence of the defendant's attorney, who advised the
d e f e n d a n t o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e and i n f ormed him
t h a t t h e t e r m s o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d -
less of the defendant's willingness to comply with the
r e q u e s t f o r confession. Subsequently, t h e defendant withdrew
the plea bargain, r e t a i n e d new c o u n s e l , and demanded a j u r y trial. I n t h e c o u r s e of that trial the s t a t e court ruled
that the defendant had confessed v o l u n t a r i l y and admitted
h i s statement a t the t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d .
Subsequent appeals took the defendant in Hutto
t h r o u g h t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s y s t e m s t o t h e Supreme
C o u r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
u n a n i m o u s l y r e v e r s e d t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s and h e l d
that (1) t h e confession was not per se inadmissible in a
c r i m i n a l t r i a l m e r e l y b e c a u s e i t was made s u b s e q u e n t t o and
a s a r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement t h a t d i d n o t c a l l
for such confession, and (2) that the confession was not
involuntary since it had been made in the presence of
defense counsel who had informed the defendant that the
t e r m s of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of h i s
w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e
confession. Such s t a n d a r d s i n H u t t o a r e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e
here. See a l s o , J e n k i n s v. Anderson ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 447 U . S . 231,
100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86; Raffel v. United States
( 1 9 2 6 ) , 271 U.S. 496, 46 S . C t . 5 6 6 , 70 L.Ed. 1054.
I n t h i s c a s e d e f e n d a n t was a p p e a r i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e
of changing a n o t g u i l t y p l e a t o a g u i l t y p l e a p u r s u a n t t o a
plea bargain in which the prosecution would not seek an
increased sentence under the persistent felony offender
laws. At the January 2, 1979, proceeding, d e f e n d a n t was
r e p r e s e n t e d by p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . The c o u r t a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t
of the charge against him, t h e maximum p u n i s h m e n t t h a t he
c o u l d r e c e i v e , and h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r , s p e e d y and i m p a r t i a l
trial. At t h a t s t a g e of t h e proceedings, defendant appar-
e n t l y became c o n f u s e d o r reluctant t o proceed, or did not
u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e r e f e r r e d t o by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . A r e c e s s was t a k e n and upon r e c o n -
vening, the court continued to advise defendant of his
rights. The f o l l o w i n g i s a n e x c e r p t f r o m t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f
t h e January 2, 1979, proceeding:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, a t t h i s p o i n t I believe t h a t I am g o i n g t o h a v e t o move t o withdraw a s counsel f o r t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , i n v i e w of t h e f a c t t h a t t o p r o c e e d t o a t r i a l o f t h i s m a t t e r would i n c u r a b r e a c h o f my ethical obligations. The a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e h a s d r o p p e d down t o a p o i n t where I f e e l I c o u l d n ' t r e p r e s e n t him.
"THE COURT: I u n d e r s t a n d , c o u n s e l and I am going t o permit t h e withdrawal. I am g o i n g t o a p p o i n t someone. This matter is set f o r trial--
"THE DEFENDANT: Ya, I d i d i t .
"THE COURT: N O W , Mr. Hansen, i t i s n o t t h e purpose of t h i s proceeding t o t r y t o g e t a c o n f e s s i o n o u t of you. That i s n ' t the purpose of it. B u t t h e p u r p o s e i s t o make s u r e you u n d e r s t a n d your r i g h t s f u l l y and c o m p l e t e l y and t h a t you a r e n ' t p l e a d i n g g u i l t y t o a c r i m e t h a t i n d e e d you f e e l you s h o u l d have a d e f e n s e t o . And i t p u t s counsel i n a very, very strange place. And i f you w i s h o t h e r c o u n s e l I w i l l g e t you other counsel. Because sometimes people d o n ' t s e e e y e t o e y e on t h e s e t h i n g s . But i t i s n ' t t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s t y p e of p r o c e e d i n g t o t r y t o g e t you t o c o n f e s s . I n other words, I r e a l l y d o n ' t c a r e . I t d o e s n ' t make a n y d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e C o u r t , b u t I w a n t t o be s u r e t h a t i f i n d e e d you e n t e r a p l e a , a s you h a v e d o n e , t h a t t h e p l e a i s i n f o r m e d and w i l l i n g on y o u r p a r t and you a r e n o t g o i n g t o s a y f o r e v e r more ' I was r a i l r o a d e d . ' That is t h e p u rp o s e of t h i s t h i n g . And n o t a n y o t h e r purpose. These a r e r i g h t s of y o u r s under t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t we a r e h e r e d a b b l i n g w i t h t h i s m o r n i n g , and y o u r c o u n s e l knows and t h e J u d g e p r e s u m a b l y knows them, a n d w e d o n ' t want t o e x t r a c t f r o m you a p l e a t h a t you d o n ' t f e e l is p r o p e r . If I don't a s k you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h i n my own mind t h e f a c t t h a t s o m e t h i n g d i d o r d i d n o t o c c u r t h e n I am n o t d o i n g my j o b , you see. And t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you them. So i f you d o n o t a g r e e w i t h y o u r c o u n s e l , s a y so. B e c a u s e he i s n o t e m b a r r a s s e d . He h a s been i n t h i s courtroom a l o t , i n courtrooms b e f o r e , and he u n d e r s t a n d s and h e knows. And p e r h a p s you d o n ' t see e y e t o e y e a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e game, and t h a t i s two d i f f e r e n t people i n t h i s world r e a c t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . So I am n o t t r y i n g t o g e t you t o s a y ' Y e s , I d i d i t ' o r 'No, I didn't.' I am j u s t t r y i n g t o a s k you i f i n y o u r own mind you f e l t t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was-- i n o t h e r w o r d s t h a t you d i d t h e o f f e n s e , t h a t y e s , i n d e e d , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y i s t h a t you a r e guilty. "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am g u i l t y . "THE COURT: And i f you had a t r i a l by j u r y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y would be v e r y g r e a t t h a t t h e y would f i n d you g u i l t y . T h a t is what I am t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h and t h a t i s why I am a s k i n g you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . And I d o n ' t w a n t t o e m b a r r a s s y o u , b u t t h e y m u s t be t h e r e , s o w i t h t h a t i n mind do you w i s h t o p r o c e e d , Mr. Hansen? "THE DEFENDAivT: Yes.
"THE COURT: Now, I d i d a s k you i n r e g a r d t o t h i s m a t t e r , you d i d have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h i s p e r s o n named? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And t h a t person was n o t your spouse? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: And s h e d i d n o t c o n s e n t t o s u c h intercourse? "THE DEFENDANT: No.
"THE COURT: Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g Mr. Hansen t h a t - - I h a v e e x p l a i n e d t o you t h i s m a t t e r o f representation and I want you well represented. Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h a t a t t h i s t i m e t h a t you b e l i e v e you want t o make a statement t o t h e Court about? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: And s u b j e c t t o t h e v a r i o u s explanations then you are f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r i n g your p l e a i n t h i s m a t t e r , is t h a t r i g h t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. "THE COURT: I am g o i n g t o a c c e p t i t . I know sometimes it is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d c o u n s e l i n some o f t h e s e c a s e s and t h e y t r y t o make t h e m s e l v e s known, b u t we d e p e n d somewhat on t h e c o u n s e l - - i n f a c t w e depend a g r e a t d e a l on t h e c o u n s e l i n t h e s e m a t t e r s , Mr. Hansen. And b e c a u s e I know t h e c h a r a c t e r o f y o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I know t h a t h e would t r y v e r y h a r d t o work i n y o u r i n t e r e s t s , y o u r best interests. B u t t h a t i s why I am a s k i n g you t h a t q u e s t i o n , b e c a u s e e v e n t h e b e s t l a w y e r o c c a s i o n a l l y d o e s n ' t q u i t e see e y e t o e y e w i t h h i s c l i e n t . You u n d e r s t a n d t h a t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And you would f e e l you a r e on t h e same wave l e n g t h now? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes." A s previously noted, t h e above d i s c u s s i o n took p l a c e
b e f o r e t h e f i r s t t r i a l and was n o t u s e d by t h e S t a t e u n t i l t h e second t r i a l a f t e r defendant, i n h i s d i r e c t testimony,
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had n e v e r had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining witness. With t h a t , the S t a t e argues t h a t the
f o u n d a t i o n f o r impeachment u n d e r R u l e 4 1 0 , Mont.R.Evid., was properly laid.
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court should adopt any one o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r p e r se r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e v o l u n t a r i -
n e s s of the questioned statements: (1) s i n c e t h e s e statements were g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p l e a t h a t t h e c o u r t
l a t e r a l l o w e d t o b e w i t h d r a w n , t h e y w e r e made i n v o l u n t a r i l y ;
(2) since the s t a t e m e n t s were g i v e n i n connection with a p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e m e n t , which i s i n e f f e c t a p r o m i s e , the
s t a t e m e n t s were involuntary; (3) since defendant was n o t
w a r n e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a t t h e time o f t h e c h a n g e o f p l e a
o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y ; and (4) since defendant's counsel withdrew prior to the time defendant made the s t a t e m e n t s , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y .
I n r e p l y , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t we s h o u l d e x a m i n e t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e ques-
t i o n e d s t a t e m e n t s w e r e v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . It maintains
that, given t h e q u a l i t y of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of r i g h t s and p r o c e d u r e by t h e t r i a l j u d g e , t h e complete l a c k of c o e r c i v e
environment, and t h e l a c k of any i n d u c e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t , t h e s t a t e m e n t was v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . Therefore, the S t a t e contends, t h e s t a t e m e n t was a d m i s s i b l e t o impeach t h e t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by d e f e n d a n t a t t r i a l .
I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i s s u e w e a g a i n t u r n t o Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., and t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n comment on t h a t r u l e .
The c o m m i s s i o n n o t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e
a n d t h e Montana r u l e :
"This r u l e is i d e n t i c a l t o a version of F e d e r a l R u l e 410 c o n d i t i o n a l l y a d o p t e d b y Congress. The c o n d i t i o n was t h a t t h e r u l e would be s u p e r s e d e d by a n y amendment t o t h e Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsist e n t with the r u l e . Such a n amendment was made i n R u l e 6 1 1 ( e ) (6), F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , which was l a t e r s u b s t i - t u t e d f o r t h i s v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e . The Commission p r e f e r s t h e s u p e r s e d e d v e r s i o n o f t h e r u l e b e c a u s e it a l l o w s u s e o f s t a t e m e n t s w h e t h e r o r n o t made u n d e r o a t h , o n t h e r e c o r d , o r i n t h e p r e s e n c e of c o u n s e l , and most i m p o r t a n t , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . The Uniform R u l e 410 ( 1 9 7 4 ) i s s i m i l a r t o t h e f i r s t sentence of t h e r u l e b u t does n o t i n c l u d e a p r o v i s i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e second sentence of t h e r u l e . "This r u l e allows an accused t o o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y or nolo contendere o r t o withdraw such p l e a w i t h o u t e i t h e r a c t i o n being u s e d a g a i n s t him i n any s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l . T h i s is intended t o a i d t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , under s i m i l a r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e n t o o f f e r s o f compromise u n d e r R u l e 4 0 8 , and t o a l l o w h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e t o be excluded under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e reasons f o r o f f e r i n g t o plead or withdrawing p l e a s o f g u i l t y and n o l o c o n t e n d e r e would n o t be u n d e r s t o o d by a j u r y and would a l m o s t p r e - clude a f a i r t r i a l . The s e c o n d s e n t e n c e o f t h i s r u l e i s added t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e a c c u s e d d o e s n o t a b u s e t h i s r u l e and c o n t r a d i c t earlier statements. See H a r r i s v. N e w York, 4 0 1 U.S. 2 2 2 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t i s r e q u i r e d t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were ' v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e ' and i f c o n t r a d i c t e d , t h e s t a t e m e n t s may b e i n t r o d u c e d f o r the p u r p o s e s o f impeachment o r p r o s e c u t i o n for per jury.
" E x i s t i n g Montana l a w h a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t w i t h t h e p r o b l e m of o f f e r s t o p l e a d o r withdraw p l e a s , a l t h o u g h a p l e a of g u i l t y t h a t is n o t withdrawn is a d m i s s i b l e i n subsequent proceedings. S i k o r a v. S i k o r a , 1 6 0 Mont. 2 7 , 3 3 , 499 P . 2 d 8 0 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . T h e r e f o r e t h i s r u l e i s new t o Montana law. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t a l l o w p l e a s of n o l o c o n t e n d e r e ; however, s u c h a p l e a is i n c l u d e d i n t h e r u l e because it h a s b e e n r e c o g n i z e d by Montana c o u r t s i n a c a s e where s u c h a p l e a was e n t e r e d i n f e d e r a l c o u r t and was r e l e v a n t t o a s t a t e c a s e . S t a t e ex r e l . M c E l l i o t v . F o u s e k , 9 1 Mont. 4 5 7 , 461, 8 P.2d 795 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . "
I t is o b v i o u s from t h e a b o v e comment t h a t t h e commis-
s i o n chose t o allow c e r t a i n statements given i n connection with guilty pleas and plea negotiations to be used for impeachment purposes. Rule 410 is an exception to the
g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a d m i s s i o n s by a p a r t y - d e f e n d a n t a r e admiss i b l e . T h i s e x c e p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e comment, was g r a n t e d t o encourage t h e use of p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s . But, t h e r u l e was n o t d e s i g n e d t o a l l o w a d e f e n d a n t t o a b u s e t h e
p l e a b a r g a i n p r o c e s s w i t h no p e n a l t y .
Here defendant is no stranger in court, although
r e a d i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g on J a n u a r y 2 o n e would t h i n k i t had been h i s f i r s t time i n c o u r t . The t r i a l c o u r t
c a r e f u l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y q u e s t i o n e d d e f e n d a n t on t h e v o l u n - t a r i n e s s of t h e p l e a , h i s understanding of the charge, the c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e p l e a and t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r h i s p l e a . When d e f e n d a n t w e n t back on t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s against h i s counsel's wishes, counsel requested the court t o withdraw as counsel because of a breach of professional e t h i c s t h a t h e f e l t was v i o l a t e d . The c o u r t s t a t e d it would g e t d e f e n d a n t a new a t t o r n e y , and d e f e n d a n t t h e n v o l u n t a r i l y
a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had committed t h e act.
C l e a r l y d e f e n d a n t abused t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s
here, and we sustain t h e d e c i s i o n of the trial judge in a l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t t o be i n t r o d u c e d .
I n r e p l y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r p e r se r u l e s a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r g u e d by t h e S t a t e , t h e S t a t e
notes that it was defendant here who moved the District C o u r t t o a l l o w him t o w i t h d r a w h i s n o t g u i l t y p l e a and t o
p l e a d g u i l t y , and t o move t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a c c e p t t h e plea of guilty, d e f e n d a n t must establish that the guilty p l e a was b e i n g k n o w i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . The c o u r t m u s t t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o r e t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s on t h e p a r t o f a
defendant prior to accepting a g u i l t y plea. See s e c t i o n 46-12-204, MCA.
I n S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d
179, this Court noted that the b e s t method to establish
v o l u n t a r i n e s s i s on a f a c t u a l b a s i s and t h a t t h i s s h o u l d b e d o n e a t t h e time of t h e e n t e r i n g of the plea. Here t h e trial judge did all i n h i s power to establish a factual basis for the plea. D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t he had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining w i t n e s s , t h a t s h e was n o t
h i s s p o u s e and t h a t t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e had t a k e n p l a c e without her consent. A r e c e n t c a s e of t h i s Court, S t a t e v.
August L e e White ( 1 9 8 1 ) , , Mont. -
1 - P.2d I
- S t .Rep. (No. 80-351, decided August 31, 1981), noted t h a t S t a t e v. Azure, supra, requires the record to d i s c l o s e t h e defendant has f u l l understanding of t h e crime t o w h i c h he p l e a d s . Absent such understanding, t h i s Court will n o t presume that t h e p l e a was made "with an understanding of the charge." The State agrees that Azure requires a defendant have full knowledge of the charge a d m i t t e d by p l e a d i n g g u i l t y .
We are satisfied that the present case meets the r e q u i r e m e n t s of Azure and that t h e d i s p a r a t e outcomes of -
t h i s c a s e and A z u r e a r e mandated by t h e d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s of e a c h c a s e . F i n a l l y we n o t e t h a t , a s p r e v i o u s l y discussed, the record in this case demonstrates that
d e f e n d a n t was s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m e d t o e n t e r a p l e a t h a t was " v o l u n t a r y w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a r g e , " s e c t i o n 46-12- 204, MCA. I n A z u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t s o i n f o r m e d . We
f i n d no m e r i t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h a t h e was n o t
p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d and s u s t a i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n o f t h e dispute evidence.
The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d i s w h e t h e r S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No.
1, a p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t , was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d by t h e
t r i a l c o u r t over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n .
Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont.
1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 9 6 9 , f o r s u p p o r t o f h i s p o s i t i o n . It states:
". . . p h o t o g r a p h s s t a n d on t h e same f o o t i n g a s d i a g r a m s , maps, p l a n s and t h e l i k e , and a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , whenever r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a person, place, or thing, they are a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a s e . "Photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse t h e s y m p a t h i e s o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e j u r y a r e properly excluded, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they a r e not s u b s t a n t i a l l y necessary or i n s t r u c t i v e t o show m a t e r i a l f a c t s o r c o n d i t i o n s . " 131 Mont. a t 1 5 9 , 308 P.2d a t 973.
H e r e , t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h t a k e n a t t h e t i m e of defendant's a r r e s t . The e x h i b i t was a mug s h o t o f d e f e n d a n t i n an unkept, messy state. Defendant contends that the p h o t o was i r r e l e v a n t and d i d n o t go t o showing any m a t e r i a l fact.
B i s c h e r t was a h o m i c i d e c a s e i n v o l v i n g a s m a l l c h i l d .
The fact situation there is not applicable to the fact situation here. In this case the photo was taken at the time of defendant's arrest. It was admitted as part of the identification testimony of the victim and was corroborative of the victim's ability to identify defendant both at trial and at the time of the incident. A view of the photograph certainly does not arouse anyone's passion or prejudice, nor is it inflammatory. Therefore, we find no merit to this issue.
The next issue for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing to review police reports to determine if they contained exclupatory material and were, therefore, discoverable to the defendant under section 46-15-302, MCA. Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to produce, pursuant to section 46-15-302, MCA, asking to inspect and copy "all papers, documents, oral or written statements . . ." in the hands of the prosecutor. At a hearing on the motion the State took the position that all police reports were work product and not discoverable. Defendant relies on section 46-15-302(2), MCA, which provides in part:
"(2) . .
. This subsection does not apply to the work product of the prosecution, which is documents drawn up by law enforcement officials for internal communications and law enforcement officers' field notes, except that any exculpatory information contained in such documents or notes must be produced." Defendant argues that because the offense was alleged to have occurred some twenty-one months prior to defendant's request at the second trial, because several officers, including Woods and Spain, were no longer employed by the law enforcement officials of Lincoln County, and because there was no independent record of their investigation, defendant was unable to determine whether their statements c o n t a i n e d any e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l . H e , therefore, requested
t h e c o u r t t o review t h e s e p o l i c e reports and d e t e r m i n e if
t h e r e was d i s c o v e r a b l e m a t e r i a l i n them. He a l l e g e s that
t h e c o u r t d e n i e d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s m e r e l y
o n t n e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t a i n e d no e x c u l -
patory matters.
At the omnibus hearing on June 6, 1980, defendant
requested t h e c o u r t t o review t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o d e t e r -
mine if t h e r e were inconsistencies in the victim's early
s t a t e m e n t s and h e r t r i a l t e s t i m o n y . The c o u r t a g r e e d t o d o
s o and d i d . The record does not indicate that defendant
focused on the testimony of Spain and Woods o r made any
w r i t t e n motion for the court to so review those reports.
For that reason, the issue is not properly before this
Court. The m a t t e r c a n n o t be u s e d t o p u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n
error if it was not brought specifically to the court's
attention.
The f i n a l i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s w h e t h e r the court erred
i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a c h a n g e o f v e n u e and a
motion for individually sequestered voir dire. Defendant
filed a motion for a change of venue with a supporting
a f f i d a v i t on May 3 0 , 1980, which was h e a r d and d e n i e d on
June 6, 1980. The m o t i o n was renewed, h e a r d and d e n i e d on
J u n e 1 6 , 1980. Both o f t h e s e m o t i o n s r a i s e d t h e same i s s u e s
of pretrial publicity and the publication of information
w h i c h c l e a r l y would n o t h a v e been a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l .
This Court recently set forth the change of venue
issues which are addressed here as going to the sound
d i s c r e t i o n of the court. See, S t a t e v. Bashor (1980), - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 470, 37 S t . R e p . 1098. In S t a t e v.
Board ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. 1 3 9 , 143-144, 337 P.2d 9 2 4 , 927, we
s e t f o r t h the t e s t a s follows:
"Our c o u r t l o o k s f o r a c h a i n r e a c t i o n . It s t a r t s with the basic premise t h a t the a c c u s e d i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . Next i t checks t h e p u b l i c i t y complained o f , a s t o its c o n t e n t s and more i m p o r t a n t , a s t o i t s t o t a l e f f e c t upon t h e ' f a i r t r i a l r i g h t . ' . . . F i n a l l y , i t o b j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r s t h e end resulk-was a f a i r t r i a l denied a s a r e s u l t of t h e p u b l i c i t y and i t s e f f e c t s ? . . ." W h a v e examined c a r e f u l l y t h e a l l e g a t i o n s g i v e n f o r
e
t h e r e q u e s t e d c h a n g e o f v e n u e and f i n d t h e y f a i l t o e s t a b -
lish any possibility of jury prejudice due to pretrial
publicity. As noted by the State, only two prospective
jurors, Mr. Cook and Mrs. Seekins, r e s p o n d e d t h a t t h e y had
r e a d o r h e a r d a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c a s e i n t h e newspaper o r on
the radio. T h e r e were two M i s t e r s Cook on t h e p r o s p e c t i v e
jury panel and both Misters Cook and Mrs. Seekins were
eliminated by peremptory challenge and therefore did not
s e r v e on t h e t r i a l j u r y . I n a d d i t i o n , Mr. S t e b a n s , who was
s e l e c t e d a s an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r , s a i d t h a t h e had r e a d some
newspapers a r t i c l e s b u t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d . However, the
a l t e r n a t e juror did not sit a s a juror in the deliberations.
T h e r e f o r e , no p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n shown.
The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
We c o n c u r :