State v. Haneberg, 06ca0048-M (5-29-2007)

2007 Ohio 2561
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 29, 2007
DocketNo. 06CA0048-M.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2007 Ohio 2561 (State v. Haneberg, 06ca0048-M (5-29-2007)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Haneberg, 06ca0048-M (5-29-2007), 2007 Ohio 2561 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

Opinions

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: {¶ 1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Medina Municipal Court, which granted, in part, appellee Hallie Haneberg's motion to suppress. This Court affirms.

I.
{¶ 2} On August 16, 2005, appellee was cited after a traffic stop for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol ("OVI") in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and for traveling left of center in violation of R.C. 4511.25. Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence flowing from the traffic stop. The trial court held a hearing on the motion. On June 13, 2006, the trial *Page 2 court issued a judgment entry, denying the motion to suppress in part, and admitting at trial evidence regarding appellee's refusal to submit to a breath test, the BAC Data Master checklist and the one-leg-stand test. The trial court, however, granted the motion in part, excluding at trial evidence regarding the walk-and-turn test and the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") test.

{¶ 3} On June 15, 2006, the State timely appealed the granting in part of the motion to suppress. The State further properly certified that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the ruling on the motion to suppress has rendered the State's proof with respect to the pending OVI charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed. See R.C.2945.67(A); Crim.R. 12(K). The State raises one assignment of error for review.

II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS FIELD SOBRIETY TEST."

{¶ 4} The State argues that the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion to suppress the HGN test. This Court disagrees.

{¶ 5} Regarding the relevant standard of review, this Court has stated:

"An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court acts as the trier of fact during a suppression hearing, and is therefore, best equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve *Page 3 questions of fact. Accordingly, we accept the trial court's findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are afforded no deference, but are reviewed de novo." (Emphasis and internal citations omitted.) State v. Swan, 9th Dist. No. 22939, 2006-Ohio-2692, at ¶ 8.

{¶ 6} The trial court excluded the HGN test for purposes of determining probable cause and suppressed the test at trial on the merits based upon its conclusion that Trooper Crist did not perform the HGN test in substantial compliance with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") standards. Specifically, the trial court found that the respective positions of the trooper and appellee during the administration of the HGN test precluded the trooper's ability to properly estimate the 45-degree angle necessary to attain valid test results. As the finding of a lack of substantial compliance with NHTSA standards constitutes a conclusion of law, this Court conducts a de novo review.

{¶ 7} The version of R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) in effect at the relevant time states:

"In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the *Page 4 national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:

"(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

"(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

"(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate."

See, also, State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37, at ¶ 9 (recognizing that the General Assembly amended R.C. 4511.19, so that an arresting officer no longer must have administered field sobriety tests in strict compliance with testing standards for the test results to be admissible at trial. Rather, the officer may now testify regarding the results of a field sobriety test administered in substantial compliance with testing standards.).

{¶ 8} The parties admitted into evidence the portion of the NHTSA DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing manual in effect at the time of the stop, regarding the concepts and principles of the standardized field sobriety tests. The manual addresses the procedures of the HGN test, including the three clues for which an officer must look. Specifically, an officer must first look for the lack of smooth pursuit, noting whether the eyes jerk or "bounce" as they follow a smoothly moving stimulus. Second, an officer must determine whether *Page 5 there is distinct and sustained nystagmus, or involuntary jerking of the eyes, when the eye is held at maximum deviation for a minimum of four seconds. Maximum deviation occurs when the eye is as far to the side as possible, generally when there is no white visible at the edge. Third, an officer must determine whether the eyes begin jerking prior to moving 45 degrees to the side.

{¶ 9} The manual notes that it is important for an officer to learn how to estimate a 45-degree angle. The manual states that how far the officer positions the stimulus from the suspect's nose is a critical factor in estimating a 45-degree angle. Specifically, the manual directs that the officer should move a stimulus held 12 inches from the suspect's nose 12 inches to the side to reach 45 degrees.

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Bluebook (online)
2007 Ohio 2561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-haneberg-06ca0048-m-5-29-2007-ohioctapp-2007.