State v. Hammell

31 N.J.L. 446
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 15, 1866
StatusPublished

This text of 31 N.J.L. 446 (State v. Hammell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hammell, 31 N.J.L. 446 (N.J. 1866).

Opinion

Haines, J.

Application is made to this court on behalf of the relators, The Superintendent and Trustees of the Public Schools of the city of Trenton,” a body incorporated by that name, for a peremptory mandamus, to be directed to the collectors of taxes of the several wards of that city,, commanding them to pay over to the superintendent the sum of five thousand dollars, alleged to be due and unpaid of the-money raised for the public schools.

By a state of the case, which the parties have agreed shall-' be taken as a return made to an alternative mandamus, ifc appears that, upon the report and recommendation of the-superintendent and trustees, the inhabitants of the city at their annual ward meetings, held on the tenth day of April, 1865, by a vote taken pursuant to the statute, ordered that the sum of sixteen thousand five hundred dollars should be raised for the support of the public schools for the then current year. The collectors have paid to the superintendent eleven thousand five hundred dollars, leaving unpaid the sum of five thousand dollars now in question, and which they refuse to pay.

The reason assigned for such refusal is, that the common council has ordered them to pay to the superintendent of schools the sum of eleven thousand five hundred dollars only,. [451]*451ancl to pay the balance to the treasurer of the city for other city purposes.

This presents the question, whether the common council have the right to appropriate to other purposes the money which the inhabitants have lawfully resolved to raise for the public schools, or to limit the amount so resolved to be raised. The answer to this question must depend upon the construction to be given to the act respecting public; schools in the city of Trenton, and the provisions of the city charter.

The 12th section of the act respecting the schools of the city, passed March 10th, 1856, Session Laws 177, provides that the inhabitants of the city may, at their annual ward meetings, order to be raised by tax any sum of money for the support of public schools therein that they think proper; each voter indicating upon his ticket the amount he desires to be raised; that the amount of money for which the largest number of votes shall have been given shall immediately be certified by the ward clerks to the common council, who shall add the amount so determined, to the sum of money which they may order to be raised for other city purposes.

It further requires that such amount of money, as it is collected, shall be paid over by the collecting officers to the superintendent of public schools.

The sixth section of the act authorizes and requires the city collectors to pay over to the superintendent, out of the first moneys by them collected, such sums of money as may be directed to be raised for school purposes; and for such payments the receipt of the superintendent is to be a sufficient voucher.

It is insisted, on the part of the respondents, that the power thus given to raise money for the support of public schools, is restricted by the supplement to the city charter, passed on the 14th March, 1856, four days later than the act respecting public schools.

The second section of that supplement authorizes the common council to order and cause to be assessed and raised such sum or sums of money as they shall deem expedient for de[452]*452fraying the expenses of the city, and for all purposes for which they are authorized by the act to which it is a supplement ; to be assessed and collected as the common council may by ordinance direct; which taxes, when collected, shall be paid to the city treasurer and to be subject to the order of the common council.

But this section provides further, that it shall not be lawful for the common council to raise by taxation in any one year in the general assessment, an amount of money which shall cause a greater rate on the real and personal estate of the citizens, than seventy cents to one hundred dollars, unless the same be approved by a vote of the citizens at a special election. It is urged that this limitation of seventy cents to the one hundred dollars embraces the amount of money to be raised for the public schools, and that the common council are required to apportion the money so ordered for the schools, with the other money required to be raised for other city purposes; so that the whole amount assessed shall not exceed that rate. If such is the true construction of the act, the collectors have fully discharged their duty, and a writ of mandamus should not issue.

But in my judgment such is not the true construction of the act. The limitation of the rate applies clearly to the moneys ordered to be raised by the common council. The second section of the supplement specifies that, to be money for defraying the expenses of the city, and for all other purposes for which they are authorized by the original act to raise money.

On reference to that act, it appears that the common council are authorized to raise money for lighting, regulating, paving, flagging, and gravelling the streets, maintaining the poor, schooling poor children, defraying the contingent expenses of the city, and for all other purposes and objects authorized by the act. But there is no mention of public schools or authority to raise money for them. Provision for the education of poor children is a very distinct thing from that for the maintenance of public schools. The [453]*453power to raise money for the latter purpose is not given to the common council, but to the inhabitants at their annual ward meetings. The funds are distinct, and have nothing in common but tlic mere machinery of assessing and collecting. That for defraying the expenses of the city and for all city purposes proper, it is to be ordered by an ordinance of the common council, and when collected to be paid to the city treasurer, and through him disbursed for the purposes for which they were assessed. The fund for the public schools is ordered to be raised by the inhabitants of the city by a direct vote cast at their annual ward meetings. It is to be paid not to the city treasurer but to the superintendent of public schools, to be by him appropriated to the purposes for which it was ordered. The collectors are required to pay it out of the first moneys by them collected, and so to place the school money beyond any contingency of deficit or delay. The receipt of the superintendent is a sufficient voucher, and so the collectors are, as to payment of this fund, wholly independent of the city treasurer.

It is obvious that the legislature intended to place the public schools entirely beyond the control of the common council, and not to subject the fund ordered to be raised for them to any action or limitation by that place. And it is equally clear that the rate of seventy cents to the one hundred dollars applies to the moneys raised by the ordinance of the common council, and not to the money raised by the vote of the inhabitants for the public schools.

On this construction of the act, the common council are not required to apportion the moneys ordered to be raised for the public schools with the money raised for the ordinary city purposes. They have no power to limit the amount ordered to be raised for the public schools, or to apply any part of it to other purposes.

There is no conflict between the provisions of the city charter or of its supplement, and those of the act establishing public schools. The repealing clauses of the two acts,

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Bluebook (online)
31 N.J.L. 446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hammell-nj-1866.