[Cite as State v. Hamilton, 2022-Ohio-139.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1150
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202001949
v.
Jacob Hamilton DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 14, 2022
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alyssa Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, and Benjamin G. Padanilam, for appellant.
ZMUDA, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jacob Hamilton, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 60 months in prison after he pled no contest to one
count of aggravated vehicular assault. {¶ 2} On August 14, 2020, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and (B), a felony of the third
degree, one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of
abuse, or a combination of them in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f) and (G)(1)(a), a
misdemeanor of the first degree, one count of operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of no
operator’s license in violation of R.C. 4510.12, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The
foregoing charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on May 23, 2020, in which
appellant, who was under the influence of alcohol at the time, crashed his motorcycle into
an automobile after running a red light. The crash caused serious injuries to a passenger
who was riding with appellant on his motorcycle at the time.
{¶ 3} On January 7, 2021, appellant appeared before the trial court for
arraignment. He entered a plea of not guilty to the aforementioned charges, and the
matter proceeded through pretrial discovery and plea negotiations. Eventually, appellant
and the state reached a plea agreement. Consequently, appellant came before the trial
court for a change of plea hearing on June 28, 2021.
{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, appellant indicated his desire to plead no contest to the
charge of aggravated vehicular assault in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the
remaining charges. The trial court engaged appellant in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy prior to
2. accepting his plea, but failed to address appellant’s constitutional right to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination at trial. During the colloquy, the following exchange took
place between the trial court and appellant concerning appellant’s constitutional rights:
THE COURT: Sir, when you’re entering your plea, you’re giving up
your right to a jury trial or a bench trial. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You’re also giving up your right to have your
attorney use the court’s subpoena power to bring in witnesses to speak on
your behalf or to cross-examine those witnesses speaking against you. Do
you understand you’re giving up that right?
THE COURT: You’re also giving up your right to have the State
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of
this charge. In all likelihood, I’ll be basing my finding of guilt based solely
on the statements made by the prosecutor as to what evidence would be
presented at trial and what facts were alleged in the indictment. Knowing
that, sir, do you still wish to maintain your plea?
{¶ 5} At the conclusion of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court accepted
appellant’s no contest plea without objection from either appellant’s defense counsel or
3. the state. Thereafter, the trial court found appellant guilty of aggravated vehicular
assault, and continued the matter for sentencing. On July 15, 2021, appellant was
sentenced to 60 months in prison. His timely notice of appeal followed.
{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:
Appellant’s no-contest plea is invalid because, when taking his plea,
the trial court erroneously failed to strictly comply with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c) respecting the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court failed
to comply with the dictates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) before it accepted his no contest plea.
More particularly, appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to inform him of his
constitutional right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination at trial prevented him
from entering a plea that was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Consequently,
appellant insists that his no contest plea was invalid and must be vacated. For its part, the
state agrees with appellant and concedes that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to inform appellant that he could not be compelled to testify at trial.
{¶ 8} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
4. The specific matters that must be addressed by a trial court prior to accepting a plea of
guilty or no contest are set forth in Crim.R. 11(C), which provides, in relevant part:
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first
addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote
contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of
the following:
***
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 9} “Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the court must * * * notify the
defendant of the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).” State v. Veney, 120
Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 13. In Veney, the Ohio Supreme
Court examined the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and observed that it consists of the
following five constitutional rights: (1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right to confront
one’s accusers; (3) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (4) the right to
5. compulsory process to obtain witnesses; and (5) the right to require the state to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 19. Later in its decision, the court explained
that each of these rights must be separately addressed by the trial court prior to accepting
a guilty or no contest plea for the plea to be valid. Id. at ¶ 29. When a trial court fails to
do so, “the defendant’s plea is constitutionally infirm, making it presumptively invalid.”
Id., citing State v.
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[Cite as State v. Hamilton, 2022-Ohio-139.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1150
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202001949
v.
Jacob Hamilton DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 14, 2022
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alyssa Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, and Benjamin G. Padanilam, for appellant.
ZMUDA, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jacob Hamilton, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 60 months in prison after he pled no contest to one
count of aggravated vehicular assault. {¶ 2} On August 14, 2020, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and (B), a felony of the third
degree, one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of
abuse, or a combination of them in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f) and (G)(1)(a), a
misdemeanor of the first degree, one count of operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of no
operator’s license in violation of R.C. 4510.12, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The
foregoing charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on May 23, 2020, in which
appellant, who was under the influence of alcohol at the time, crashed his motorcycle into
an automobile after running a red light. The crash caused serious injuries to a passenger
who was riding with appellant on his motorcycle at the time.
{¶ 3} On January 7, 2021, appellant appeared before the trial court for
arraignment. He entered a plea of not guilty to the aforementioned charges, and the
matter proceeded through pretrial discovery and plea negotiations. Eventually, appellant
and the state reached a plea agreement. Consequently, appellant came before the trial
court for a change of plea hearing on June 28, 2021.
{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, appellant indicated his desire to plead no contest to the
charge of aggravated vehicular assault in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the
remaining charges. The trial court engaged appellant in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy prior to
2. accepting his plea, but failed to address appellant’s constitutional right to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination at trial. During the colloquy, the following exchange took
place between the trial court and appellant concerning appellant’s constitutional rights:
THE COURT: Sir, when you’re entering your plea, you’re giving up
your right to a jury trial or a bench trial. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You’re also giving up your right to have your
attorney use the court’s subpoena power to bring in witnesses to speak on
your behalf or to cross-examine those witnesses speaking against you. Do
you understand you’re giving up that right?
THE COURT: You’re also giving up your right to have the State
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of
this charge. In all likelihood, I’ll be basing my finding of guilt based solely
on the statements made by the prosecutor as to what evidence would be
presented at trial and what facts were alleged in the indictment. Knowing
that, sir, do you still wish to maintain your plea?
{¶ 5} At the conclusion of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court accepted
appellant’s no contest plea without objection from either appellant’s defense counsel or
3. the state. Thereafter, the trial court found appellant guilty of aggravated vehicular
assault, and continued the matter for sentencing. On July 15, 2021, appellant was
sentenced to 60 months in prison. His timely notice of appeal followed.
{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:
Appellant’s no-contest plea is invalid because, when taking his plea,
the trial court erroneously failed to strictly comply with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c) respecting the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court failed
to comply with the dictates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) before it accepted his no contest plea.
More particularly, appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to inform him of his
constitutional right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination at trial prevented him
from entering a plea that was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Consequently,
appellant insists that his no contest plea was invalid and must be vacated. For its part, the
state agrees with appellant and concedes that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to inform appellant that he could not be compelled to testify at trial.
{¶ 8} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
4. The specific matters that must be addressed by a trial court prior to accepting a plea of
guilty or no contest are set forth in Crim.R. 11(C), which provides, in relevant part:
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first
addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote
contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of
the following:
***
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 9} “Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the court must * * * notify the
defendant of the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).” State v. Veney, 120
Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 13. In Veney, the Ohio Supreme
Court examined the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and observed that it consists of the
following five constitutional rights: (1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right to confront
one’s accusers; (3) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (4) the right to
5. compulsory process to obtain witnesses; and (5) the right to require the state to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 19. Later in its decision, the court explained
that each of these rights must be separately addressed by the trial court prior to accepting
a guilty or no contest plea for the plea to be valid. Id. at ¶ 29. When a trial court fails to
do so, “the defendant’s plea is constitutionally infirm, making it presumptively invalid.”
Id., citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 481, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). In a
subsequent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court found that “a trial court’s failure to notify a
defendant of his constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) amounts to plain
error.” State v. Miller, 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 13,
citing Veney at ¶ 24.
{¶ 10} In this case, the parties agree, and our review of the record confirms, that
the trial court made no mention whatsoever of appellant’s privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination at the plea hearing. Without this information, appellant’s decision
whether to plead no contest cannot be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State
v. Brinkman, --- Ohio St.3d ----, 2021-Ohio-2473, --- N.E.3d ----, ¶ 11, citing Miller at ¶
18. As such, appellant’s no contest plea is invalid, and the trial court committed plain
error in accepting it. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is well-taken.
{¶ 11} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is reversed, appellant’s no contest plea is vacated, and this matter is
6. remanded to the trial court. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the state under App.R.
24.
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Thomas R. Wright, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
Judge Thomas R. Wright, from the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
7.