306 Ga. 678 FINAL COPY
S19A0722. THE STATE v. HAMILTON.
WARREN, Justice.
On November 9, 2015, appellee Paul Hamilton was indicted for
the malice murder of Brandon Lay, the felony murder of Lay
predicated on aggravated assault, and the aggravated assaults of
Lay, Teddi Taylor, and Judy Hewatt. On October 5, 2018, a jury
found Hamilton not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the
remaining crimes. On October 25, 2018, the trial court, on its own
motion, granted Hamilton a new trial on general and legal grounds.
The State appeals, see OCGA §§ 5-7-1 (a) (8); 5-7-2 (c), and for the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.1
1 Because we are not reviewing a defendant’s conviction on direct appeal,
we do not review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts under the familiar standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Hamilton owned a mobile home at 1302 Charlie Hall Road in Barrow
County. Lay grew up in the mobile home with Hamilton and his
wife, who was Lay’s aunt.2 When Lay was a teenager, Hamilton
required Lay to leave that residence, and the two did not remain in
contact with each other. In October 2015, Lay, who was then 32
years old, was living in Statham, Georgia, with his girlfriend, Teddi
Taylor. Lay had recently been released from prison and was doing
odd jobs to earn money. Hamilton still owned the property at 1302
Charlie Hall Road, but did not live there, and the mobile home was
in disrepair, with the roof and floor sagging in certain spots and
items strewn all over the floor of the home.
The events that led to Lay’s death began when Lay and Taylor
drove a U-Haul truck to Hamilton’s mobile home in the early
morning hours of October 17, 2015, to take some household items.
Lay proceeded to take items out of the house, including blankets,
towels, and a dresser. Around 7:00 that same morning, James
2 Lay’s mother testified that she “signed” Lay “over to” Hamilton and his
wife when Lay was 17 months old. 2 Wilson, Jacob Wilson (James’s son), and John Johnson arrived at
1302 Charlie Hall Road to hunt on Hamilton’s property. Hamilton
had given the Wilsons permission to hunt there. When they arrived,
they parked their pickup truck behind Lay’s U-Haul. The stories
from Taylor and from the Wilsons differ as to what happened next.
Taylor testified that Lay was locking the mobile home before
she and Lay left and that she was standing near the front passenger
door of the U-Haul when “a truck come flying in the driveway.” The
people that were in the truck began yelling at her and Lay to leave,
saying that they were going to call 911. Lay told Taylor to tell the
people in the truck that they were not stealing, and Taylor walked
toward the back of the U-Haul. She explained that this is where her
boyfriend grew up and that they were not stealing. Taylor said that
the men started shooting at her, that she could “literally feel the
bullet just part my hair,” and that she and Lay jumped into the cab
of the U-Haul, with the men shooting at them the whole time. Lay
backed up the U-Haul, ramming James’s truck several times and
3 enabling Lay and Taylor to escape.3
James Wilson testified that, when he, Jacob, and Johnson
arrived at the property and got out of his truck, it was “dark,”
although it was starting to get “a little daylight,” and that they saw
a U-Haul truck parked in the driveway. James walked in front of
his truck and was standing 15 to 20 feet behind the U-Haul. He saw
a blonde woman standing by the back of the U-Haul, but he did not
recognize her and did not get a good look at her. James asked the
woman what she was doing and said that he was going to call 911.
The Wilsons both testified that they did not fire any shots at Taylor
and that, after James said that he was going to call 911, they heard
the U-Haul’s engine start. The U-Haul then backed up “full
throttle.” James “jumped out of the way,” and the U-Haul rammed
his truck multiple times. James, who had a pistol, fired a shot into
the ground to try to get the U-Haul to stop. Even though James’s
3 Four days after the incident, in contrast to her testimony that “a truck”
came into Hamilton’s driveway, Taylor told a lieutenant with the Barrow County sheriff’s office that “multiple vehicles and six hunters” drove into Hamilton’s driveway on the morning of the incident. 4 truck was in park, the force of the U-Haul’s ramming pushed it out
of the U-Haul’s path. James ran behind his truck, which hit him
and knocked him into a ditch. According to Jacob, his father’s
pickup truck was being pushed toward his father in the ditch,
prompting Jacob to fire several shots at the tires of the U-Haul.
After Lay pushed James’s truck out of the way with his U-
Haul, he and Taylor drove off in the direction of Old Hog Mountain
Road. Because the back of the U-Haul was not closed, some
household belongings fell out of the U-Haul on Hamilton’s property
and along Charlie Hall Road down to its intersection with Old Hog
Mountain Road, which was about a quarter of a mile away. Lay
drove the U-Haul to a place near the home of an acquaintance, Judy
Hewatt, where he parked it. He and Taylor then walked to Hewatt’s
home.
The Wilsons reported the incident to the sheriff’s office, and
James asked his wife, Chanda, to get in touch with Hamilton and
tell him about the incident. James also told Chanda that a blonde
woman was involved in the incident. A deputy sheriff responded to
5 the Charlie Hall Road property, finished his investigation, and left
before Hamilton arrived. When Hamilton arrived, he and the
Wilsons were cleaning up some of the items that had fallen out of
the U-Haul on the driveway and in the road, and during the clean-
up found a purse and cell phone. They called the sheriff’s office, and
the deputy sheriff returned to the property. The deputy collected
the purse and cell phone, and the purse contained a credit card with
Taylor’s name on it. Hamilton told the deputy that “if I catch anyone
else on my property you’ll need to call the coroner.” About 20
minutes after the deputy left, Hamilton and the Wilsons left the
Charlie Hall Road property, with Hamilton leaving first.
Hewatt testified that, later that morning, she drove Lay and
Taylor in her pickup truck to the intersection of Charlie Hall Road
and Old Hog Mountain Road, where some items had fallen out of the
U-Haul. Hewatt testified that she parked her truck, which had only
front-passenger seating, on the side of the road, and she, Lay, and
Taylor began picking up items. At the same time, Chanda Wilson
and her daughter, Celena, were driving to Hamilton’s property and
6 went through the intersection of Charlie Hall Road and Old Hog
Mountain Road, where they saw two blonde women and a man
picking up household belongings that were spread along the side of
the intersection. Chanda then drove down Charlie Hall Road toward
Hamilton’s property, where she saw Hamilton’s car approaching and
stopped it. Because she had been told that a blonde woman had been
involved in the incident at Hamilton’s property, she told him about
the people at the intersection and noted that they might have been
involved in the early morning incident at his property. When
Hamilton left, he drove down Charlie Hall Road toward Old Hog
Mountain Road. Shortly thereafter, the four members of the Wilson
family left Hamilton’s property and headed home in their two
vehicles. Their drive home took them to the intersection of Charlie
Hall Road and Old Hog Mountain Road.
When Hamilton arrived at the intersection, Lay, Taylor, and
Hewalt were walking back to Hewatt’s truck. The three got into the
truck, with Hewatt in the driver’s seat, Taylor in the middle seat,
and Lay in the passenger seat. Hamilton parked his car in front of
7 Hewatt’s truck. James and Jacob Wilson arrived at the intersection
shortly after Hamilton and parked their truck nearby, with Chanda
Wilson and her daughter arriving shortly thereafter. Jacob
recognized Taylor as the blonde woman who had been involved in
the earlier incident, but he did not tell Hamilton.4
What happened next is also subject to dispute. At trial, Taylor
testified that Hamilton got out of his car and approached the driver’s
side of Hewatt’s truck carrying a handgun. She testified that Lay
screamed, “he’s going to kill us,” and pushed Taylor back in her seat.
Hamilton then fired his gun, hitting Lay in the head. Taylor added
that Hamilton said that he had “killed that motherf**ker dead”; that
she did not remember if Hamilton’s gun was inside or outside of the
truck when he fired; and that neither she nor Lay touched Hamilton
before Hamilton shot Lay. On cross-examination, Taylor admitted
that, in her initial statement to the police, she did not tell the
interviewing officer about going to 1302 Charlie Hall Road earlier
4 Neither James nor Jacob could identify the driver of the U-Haul, and
James testified that he could not identify the woman involved in the incident. 8 that morning or about the incident that happened there. She also
admitted that she and Lay had been up most of the night before the
incident and had taken methamphetamine with syringes that were
later found at Hamilton’s property.
Hewatt testified that, after Hamilton parked his car, he came
to the driver’s side of her truck with a gun. She also saw James and
Jacob Wilson there and testified that they said, “that’s her in the
middle.” According to Hewatt, the Wilsons tried to open her door,
and they “kept on saying, he’s going to kill you. He’s going to shoot
you.” Hewatt added that the Wilsons “tried to open my door,” “so I
closed it back and locked it.” She then heard the gun go off. Lay
was shot in the temple and died. Hewatt testified that she did not
know at first that Lay had been shot because Hamilton had his
hands on top of her hands on the steering wheel. Hewatt expressed
a belief that Hamilton must have “shot with his left hand.” Hewatt
added that neither she, nor Lay, nor Taylor attempted to grab or
fight Hamilton.
James Wilson testified that when he and Jacob arrived at the
9 intersection of Charlie Hall Road and Old Hog Mountain Road,
Hamilton was approaching Hewatt’s truck. He and Jacob got out of
their truck; James asked Jacob to call 911, which he did; and James
walked toward Hewatt’s truck. James testified that there was a lot
of “hollering going on” and that Hamilton kept telling Hewatt to give
him the keys to her truck. At one point, according to James, the
truck “revved up” and “made a racket.” About that time, James’s
wife and daughter drove up and parked, and James went to their car
to keep them from approaching the scene. According to James, he
was not by Hewatt’s truck when the shot was fired; Jacob never
approached the truck; and Jacob never identified Taylor as one of
the participants in the incident earlier that morning. James also
never heard Hamilton threaten anyone in Hewatt’s truck.
Jacob Wilson testified that he called 911 after he got out of his
father’s truck. He added that it seemed like Hamilton was arguing
with someone in the truck, but that he could not hear what they
were saying. According to Jacob, he never spoke to Hamilton at the
scene of the shooting; he could not see what Hamilton was doing
10 with his hands; and he was talking to a 911 operator when a shot
was fired. Jacob testified that, after the shooting, Hewatt and
Taylor ran from Hewatt’s truck, and Hamilton walked back toward
his car saying “I told you not to reach for my gun.” Jacob testified
that neither he nor his father told the occupants of Hewatt’s truck
that Hamilton would shoot them, nor did he hear Hamilton threaten
anyone. Although Jacob got a good look at Taylor during the
incident earlier that morning and could identify her, he did not tell
Hamilton about that while everyone was parked at the intersection.
Celena Wilson testified that, when she and her mother arrived
at the intersection of Charlie Hall Road and Old Hog Mountain
Road, Hamilton was standing by Hewatt’s pickup truck and
appeared to be angry. She saw him reach his arms inside the truck,
perhaps in an attempt to get the keys out of the ignition, and
testified that he moved “as if he were being pulled a certain way or,
like, getting — trying to move around somebody or something.”
According to Celena, Hamilton’s movement was “kind [of] like a
bobbing and weaving” and would not have been from just reaching
11 for the keys. Celena also testified that, at the time of the shooting,
her brother was talking on the phone and her father was standing
close to Celena near her mother’s car, which was 30-40 feet from the
shooting.
Chanda Wilson testified that when she and Celena arrived at
the intersection, Celena got out of the car and James walked over to
them and told them to get back in the car. Although she heard loud
voices, she did not see what happened in Hewatt’s truck.
Hamilton did not testify at trial, but in two statements to the
police on the day of the crimes, he said (among other things) that
when he saw Chanda Wilson on Charlie Hall Road, she told him that
the people who had burglarized his property were at the intersection
of Charlie Hall Road and Old Hog Mountain Road. He said that he
then drove to that intersection and parked his car in front of
Hewatt’s truck. He got out of his car holding his gun by his side in
his right hand and approached the driver’s side of the truck, which
had the window rolled down most of the way. According to
Hamilton, at some point after James Wilson arrived at the
12 intersection, James told Hamilton that the male and female
passengers had been involved in the earlier incident at his property.
Hamilton said that he repeatedly told the occupants of the truck not
to leave and insisted that his purpose was to temporarily detain
Taylor and Lay for the police. He added that he thought about
shooting through the truck’s cab to break out the passenger-side
window and “let them know that [he] meant business,” but that he
“probably would not have.” According to Hamilton, when Hewatt
started the truck, Hamilton reached into the truck with his left hand
and attempted to take the key out of the ignition. Lay grabbed
Hamilton’s left hand and began banging his left arm on the keys and
steering wheel. Hamilton stated that at that point, he was
concerned for his safety because he knew that two of the occupants
of the truck had tried to run over James Wilson earlier that morning.
Hamilton then put his right hand into the truck to pull his left hand
away from Lay. Hamilton added that his finger must have been on
the trigger of the gun, although he did not intentionally place it
there. While pulling away from Lay’s grasp, Hamilton said, the gun
13 “unfortunately” discharged; he added that he did not intend to shoot
anybody and that he did not point the gun at the occupants of the
car. Photographs admitted into evidence showed that Hamilton had
an abrasion on his left arm several inches above his wrist.
After five days of trial, a jury found Hamilton not guilty of the
malice murder of Lay, but guilty of the felony murder of Lay, as well
as the aggravated assaults of Lay, Taylor, and Hewatt. The trial
court later granted Hamilton a new trial on two grounds. First, the
court concluded that a new trial was warranted because it had
committed harmful error in its jury charge in several respects.
Second, the court granted a new trial because it found that the jury’s
verdict “was contrary to the evidence and principles of justice and
equity, and that the evidence adduced at trial was decidedly and
strongly against the weight of the evidence to support conviction on
these charges, as determined by the court sitting as a 13th juror.
OCGA §§ 5-5-20, 5-5-21.”
2. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting
Hamilton a new trial on the general grounds. We disagree.
14 It is well settled that
[e]ven when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury is “contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5–5–20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence.” OCGA § 5–5–21. When properly raised in a timely motion, these grounds for a new trial—commonly known as the “general grounds”—require the trial judge to exercise a “broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must consider some of the things that [he] cannot when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. Although the discretion of a trial judge to award a new trial on the general grounds is not boundless—it is, after all, a discretion that “should be exercised with caution [and] invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict”—it nevertheless is, generally speaking, a substantial discretion.
White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524-525 (753 SE2d 115) (2013)
(citations and footnote omitted). Moreover, as directed by OCGA
§ 5-5-50, “[a]n appellate court will not disturb the first grant of a
new trial based on the general grounds unless the trial court abused
its discretion in granting it and the law and the facts demand the
verdict rendered.” State v. Hamilton, 299 Ga. 667, 670-671 (791
15 SE2d 51) (2016).
(a) The State contends that we must reverse the grant of
Hamilton’s motion for new trial on the general grounds because the
trial court erred by applying the legal standard for the sufficiency of
the evidence laid out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99
SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), instead of weighing the evidence as
the thirteenth juror. This contention is without merit. Although the
trial court did briefly mention the Jackson v. Virginia standard at
the hearing at which it granted a new trial, it quickly followed that
statement with the correct standard for the general grounds and by
stating that it would grant a new trial based on those standards.
Specifically, the court stated that it was “sitting as [the] 13th juror,”
that the verdict “at trial was decidedly and strongly against the
weight of the evidence,” and that “a new trial is consistent with the
principles of equity and justice.” Additionally, the court’s written
order unequivocally applied the correct standard of OCGA §§ 5-5-20
and 5-5-21 in granting Hamilton a new trial, explaining that it was
granting a new trial because the verdict “was contrary to the
16 evidence and principles of justice and equity.” And even if there
were a discrepancy between an oral pronouncement and a written
ruling, it is well settled that the discrepancy “‘will be resolved in
favor of the written judgment.’” State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 351
(830 SE2d 206) (2019) (citation omitted). The State’s contention
therefore fails.
(b) Relying on State v. Holmes, 304 Ga. 524 (820 SE2d 26)
(2018), the State also contends that the trial court erred by ruling
that it made several errors in its jury charges during trial and by
then relying on that ruling, at least in part, to grant the motion for
new trial on the general grounds. In Holmes, this Court concluded
that “[a] trial court . . . does not properly exercise its discretion” as
a thirteenth juror under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 “when it applies
an improper legal standard of review, as opposed to its own
discretion as the thirteenth juror, to the general grounds for new
trial.” Id. at 531-532. In granting the motion for new trial on the
general grounds, the trial court in Holmes relied, in part, on a legal,
evidentiary error that it concluded it had made at trial. See id.
17 “Because this legal ground for granting the motion [did] not comply
with OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21,” we vacated the grant of the motion
for new trial on the general grounds. Id. at 532. But here, unlike in
Holmes, the trial court did not, in fact, rely on the legal errors it
identified when it granted a new trial on the general grounds.
Indeed, the trial court’s order granting a new trial bears that out:
following the paragraph in which the court outlined the jury-charge
errors on which it granted a new trial, the court began a new,
separate paragraph in which it clearly and separately applied its
discretion as the thirteenth juror to grant a new trial. Because the
trial court did not purport to grant a new trial on the jury-charge
error under the mantle of its discretion as a thirteenth juror, and
because it separately conducted a thirteenth-juror analysis that
provided a second basis on which a new trial could be granted, this
contention by the State has no merit.
(c) The State also attacks the trial court’s grant of a new trial
on procedural grounds, arguing, among other things, that the court
erred in acting on its own to grant a new trial, erred in failing to
18 specify in detail why it believed the weight of the evidence was
against the verdict, and erred in failing to wait for the transcript to
be prepared before granting a new trial. The contentions are
without merit. First, trial courts are authorized to grant motions for
new trial on their own motion within 30 days of the entry of
judgment, which is what happened here. See OCGA § 5-5-40 (h)
(“The court also shall be empowered to grant a new trial on its own
motion within 30 days from entry of the judgment, except in criminal
cases where the defendant was acquitted.”). Second, we have before
rejected a challenge to the denial of a motion for new trial on the
ground that the trial court did not make detailed findings regarding
its exercise of discretion as a thirteenth juror, explaining that “we
are aware of no authority—and, indeed, [the defendant] has directed
us to none—requiring such express findings.” Wilson v. State, 302
Ga. 106, 109 (805 SE2d 98) (2017). Third, the State has not pointed
to any authority that requires a trial court to wait for a transcript to
be prepared before exercising its discretion as a thirteenth juror.
“The trial judge had presided over the entire trial . . . and thus had
19 sufficient time and familiarity with the case to formulate his
thoughts as the thirteenth juror.” State v. Holmes, 306 Ga. 647, 652
(832 SE2d 777) (2019). See also State v. Harris, 292 Ga. 92, 94 (734
SE2d 357) (2012) (“[T]he trial court is given a significant amount of
deference to exercise its sound discretion because it was an observer
of what transpired at trial.”). Finally, here, the trial court’s written
order specifies that it evaluated the testimony and evidence at trial
in reaching its decision to grant a new trial, and the State has not
demonstrated that the trial court failed to exercise properly its
discretion. See Wilson, 302 Ga. at 108 (“[U]nless the record shows
otherwise, we must presume that the trial court understood the
nature of its discretion and exercised it. This Court will thus
presume, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, that
the trial court did properly exercise such discretion.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)).
(d) The State contends that, on the merits, the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Hamilton a new trial on the general
grounds. In granting the motion, the trial court explained in its
20 written order that, “as determined by [it] sitting as a 13th juror” and
based “on the conflicts in the testimony and in the evidence” and the
“Court’s perception of the credibility of the witnesses,” the grant of
a new trial was consistent with “principles of equity and justice.”
The trial court expressed similar considerations at the hearing at
which it granted Hamilton a new trial.
Having reviewed the entire record, and considering that the
trial court was authorized, as the thirteenth juror, to discount
Taylor’s and Hewatt’s testimony and to credit Hamilton’s story, and
bearing in mind the standard of review set forth in OCGA § 5-5-50,
we cannot say that the trial court’s conclusion was an abuse of its
substantial discretion to grant Hamilton a new trial. See Hamilton,
299 Ga. at 670-671 (“An appellate court will not disturb the first
grant of a new trial based on the general grounds unless the trial
court abused its discretion in granting it and the law and the facts
demand the verdict rendered.”).5
5 Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting a new trial on the general grounds, we do not need to address the
21 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 3, 2019. Murder. Barrow Superior Court. Before Judge Motes. J. Bradley Smith, District Attorney, Patricia J. Brooks,
State’s argument that the trial court erred in granting a new trial based on its conclusion that it had committed errors in its jury charge. See State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 97 n.6 (779 SE2d 603) (2015).
22 Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Jeffrey R. Sliz; Matthew K. Winchester, for appellee.