State v. Hambidge

2025 Ohio 1944

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-54
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hambidge, 2025-Ohio-1944.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-54 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022-CR-0121 : OLIVIA K. HAMBIDGE : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 30, 2025, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

[[Applied Signature]] MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

[[Applied Signature 2]] RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE -2- [[Applied Signature 3]] MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

OPINION GREENE C.A. No. 2024-CA-54

COLIN P. COCHRAN, Attorney for Appellant MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Olivia K. Hambidge appeals from a judgment of the

Greene County Court of Common Pleas, which revoked her community control sanctions

and imposed the remainder of her prison sentence. She contends that the trial court’s

decision to revoke her community control sanctions was against the manifest weight of the

evidence because the witnesses who testified at her revocation hearing lacked first-hand

knowledge of her behavior at the treatment program, which led to her discharge. She also

argues that the trial court’s decision to revoke her community control was in violation of her

constitutional right to due process, because she was never informed of the treatment

program’s code of conduct or the program completion requirement as a condition of her

community control. Finally, she asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel

because her trial counsel did not inform her of the conditions of her community control and

did not call a witness from the treatment program to testify at her revocation hearing. We

conclude that these arguments are without merit, and we affirm the judgment of the trial

court. -3- I. Background Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In March 2022, Hambidge was charged with one count of aggravated trafficking

in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the second degree. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, in October 2023 she pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated trafficking in drugs

in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and R.C. 2923.02(A), a felony of the third degree. In

November 2023, the trial court sentenced her to 36 months in the Ohio Reformatory for

Women.

{¶ 3} In May 2024, Hambidge was granted judicial release and ordered to community

control sanctions with a condition that she complete a six-month, jail-based program called

Greene Leaf Therapeutic Program and Aftercare Program (“Greene Leaf”). At that time, the

trial court advised her that she would be returned to prison for the remainder of her 36-month

term if she failed to complete the terms of her community control.

{¶ 4} In July 2024, the Greene County Adult Probation Department filed a motion

alleging that Hambidge had been unsuccessfully discharged from Greene Leaf and seeking

the revocation of her community control sanctions. The matter proceeded to a revocation

hearing.

{¶ 5} Officer Taylor Fry, Hambidge’s probation officer, testified at the revocation

hearing. According to Fry, in order for Hambidge to remain on community control, she had

to fulfill 21 conditions, including completion of the Greene Leaf treatment program (condition

19). Fry had discussed the treatment completion requirement with Hambidge, but he later

received an email from Erin Gribben of Greene Leaf advising him that Hambidge had been

discharged from the program because she had been disrespectful to staff and made physical

threats to other inmates. Fry then sought to revoke Hambidge’s community control sanctions

for failure to comply with condition 19. -4- {¶ 6} Gribben, Greene Leaf’s clinical coordinator, testified that those admitted to the

program, like Hambidge, were advised of Greene Leaf’s code of conduct and were expected

to abide by it. Those conduct rules were outlined in a digital form, and individuals entering

the program, including Hambidge, were asked to sign the form, agreeing to the terms and

acknowledging their understanding. If an individual failed to behave according to the code,

she was given a verbal warning and was potentially subject to administrative discharge for

cause. If discharged, the individual was removed from Greene Leaf and returned to the

general jail population.

{¶ 7} According to Gribben, she was notified that Hambidge had been disrespecting

jail staff and making violent threats against both the staff and other members of Greene

Leaf. Hambidge was name-calling and threatening to engage in physical alterations with

program clients. She was verbally warned by Greene Leaf counselors about their concerns

regarding her general behavior and was advised that, if she continued her behavior, she

would be removed from Greene Leaf for cause. Hambidge apparently continued making

threats. Taking threats of violence seriously and considering the safest solution for all

involved, Gribben determined that Hambidge’s actions constituted violations of Greene

Leaf’s code of conduct and decided to discharge her from the program. She was returned

to the general jail population.

{¶ 8} Hambidge also testified at the hearing. She claimed that she had not been

provided with the terms of her community control sanctions prior to entering Greene Leaf.

However, she understood that she was expected to complete the Greene Leaf program as

part of her community control sanctions and had been advised of Greene Leaf’s rules of

conduct. She stated that she never received her mental health medication during the

program, which negatively affected her behavior. She also claimed that she was frustrated -5- while at Greene Leaf but never disrespected the jail staff or threatened anyone.

{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Hambidge’s community

control, finding that she had violated one of its conditions when she was discharged from

Greene Leaf for failing to comply with its code of conduct. The court explained that

Hambidge’s completion in the Greene Leaf program was a condition of her community

control sanctions, which required her to abide by Greene Leaf’s rules, and that the program

coordinator had the right to discharge Hambidge if her behavior caused concern about the

safety of others. Hambidge was sentenced to finish the remainder of her 36-month prison

sentence. This appeal followed.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 10} In her first assignment of error, Hambidge claims that the trial court’s decision

to revoke her community control sanctions was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

She contends that the State failed to show with specificity that she had violated the

conditions of community control. She suggests that the witnesses who testified at her

revocation hearing lacked first-hand knowledge regarding her behavior and only relied on

statements from other Greene Leaf staff members. She therefore argues that the trial court’s

decision to revoke her community control was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We disagree.

{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.15(B) provides a trial court with three options if an offender violates

a condition of community control: (a) a longer time under community control; (b) a more

restrictive community control sanction; or (c) a prison term that does not exceed the prison

term specified by the court at the offender’s sentencing hearing. Generally, “[t]he right to

continue on community control depends upon compliance with community control conditions

and is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the court.” (Citations omitted.) State v. -6- Lewis, 2010-Ohio-3652, ¶ 11, citing State v. Jackson, 2010-Ohio-2836, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.). “A

trial court’s choice of sanction under R.C. 2929.15(B), where the defendant has violated the

conditions of community control, is subject to review on appeal under an abuse of discretion

standard.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15. “Abuse of discretion has been defined as an

attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11.

{¶ 12} At a final revocation hearing, a trial court must inform the defendant of the

reasons for which community control is being revoked and provide an adequate record for

review on appeal. State v. Delaney, 11 Ohio St. 3d 231, 235 (1984). “Because a community

control violation hearing is not a criminal trial, the State need not prove a violation beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Lewis at ¶ 12, citing State v. Cofer, 2009-Ohio-890, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). “The

State need only present substantial evidence of a violation of the terms of a defendant’s

community control.” Id., citing State v. Brandon, 2010-Ohio-1902, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “A trial

court’s decision to revoke probation will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion.” State v. Dinger, 2005-Ohio-6942, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Scott, 6 Ohio

App.3d 39, 41 (2d Dist. 1982). As the trier of fact, a trial court “is in the best position to weigh

the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Id., citing Kalain v. Smith, 25

Ohio St.3d 157, 162 (1986).

{¶ 13} The issue here was whether Hambidge had violated the conditions of her

community control sanctions, which required her to successfully complete the Greene Leaf

program. Officer Fry and Erin Gribben testified at the revocation hearing that Hambidge did

not successfully complete the program because she was administratively discharged due to

her disrespectful and threatening behavior. Based on the evidence submitted at the hearing,

the trial court found that she had not completed the program as required and thus had

violated the terms of her community control sanctions. -7- {¶ 14} Although Hambidge argues that Officer Fry and Gribben lacked first-hand

knowledge of the alleged behavior leading to her discharge, such testimony was not required

for the trial court to conclude that Hambidge had violated her community control. Those

witnesses were permitted to testify as to whether Hambidge had completed the program,

and her community control sanctions were ultimately revoked not because she exhibited

disrespectful and threatening behavior but because she failed to finish the program. See

State v. Tackett, 2024-Ohio-1498, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 15} The State was only required to present substantial evidence of a violation of

the terms of Hambidge’s community control, which it did. Hambidge’s right to continue on

community control depended upon her compliance with its conditions and was a matter

within the sound discretion of the court. Upon our review of the record, we cannot say that

the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community control sanctions and

reinstating her prison sentence or that the decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Hambidge’s first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 16} In her second assignment of error, Hambidge claims the trial court’s decision

to revoke her community control sanctions was done in violation of her constitutional rights,

particularly her right to due process. She asserts that she was not properly informed of the

conditions of her community control or Greene Leaf’s code of conduct. She claims that she

never signed her probation conditions or was offered a behavior contract before being

discharged from the program, and thus was deprived of due process. We disagree.

{¶ 17} Because a trial court's revocation of community control can result in a serious

loss of liberty, “a probationer must be accorded due process at the revocation hearing.” State

v. Bailey, 2016-Ohio-494, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781

(1973); see also State v. Griffon, 2024-Ohio-5212, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). In general, revocation of -8- community control implicates two due process requirements: (1) a preliminary hearing to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated the

terms of his community control; and (2) a final hearing to determine whether probation

should be revoked. State v. Blakeman, 2002-Ohio-2153 (2d Dist.), citing Gagnon. “A court

must comply with the following minimum due process requirements at a final revocation

hearing: (1) deliver a written notice of the claimed probation violations (2) disclose to the

probationer the evidence against him, (3) provide the probationer with the opportunity to be

heard in person and to present witnesses as well as documentary evidence, (4) provide the

probationer the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, (5) provide the probationer

with a neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) issue a written statement as to the

evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.” State v. Ohly, 2006-Ohio-2353,

¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 34 (10th Dist. 1991),

citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).

{¶ 18} “The failure to object to a due process violation during a community control

revocation hearing waives all but plain error.” State v. Klosterman, 2016-Ohio-232, ¶ 15 (2d

Dist.). Under the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[p]lain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the

court.” State v. Brill, 2023-Ohio-404, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), citing Crim.R. 52(B).

{¶ 19} “In order to find plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), there must be an error, the

error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have affected

‘substantial rights.’ ” Id., citing State v. Bowsher, 2009-Ohio-6524, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “Notice of plain error is taken ‘only to

“prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id. Under Crim.R. 52(B),

“the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plain error affected his substantial -9- rights.” Id., quoting State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14. In other words, the defendant must

show that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different. State v. Long, 53 Ohio

St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of syllabus.

{¶ 20} In this case, Hambidge never objected to a due process violation during her

revocation hearing and does not dispute that she was properly afforded due process

protections during the hearing. Instead, she argues that she was not informed of the

conditions of her community control or of Greene Leaf’s code of conduct, did not sign her

community control conditions, and was not offered a behavior contract before being

discharged from the Greene Leaf program. Upon our review of the record, however, we find

that no plain error existed here.

{¶ 21} The trial court’s admonition during Hambidge’s judicial release hearing and the

witness testimony at the revocation hearing demonstrated that Hambidge was advised

regarding the requirement that she was to complete the Greene Leaf program as a condition

of her community control. She was also provided with all the due process protections

applicable to a revocation hearing; the trial court first decided based on the evidence that

there was probable cause to believe that she had violated the terms of her community

control, and then it concluded that her probation should be revoked. The trial court delivered

a written notice of the claimed probation violation, disclosed the evidence against her,

provided her with the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses as well as

documentary evidence, provided her with the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,

offered a neutral and detached hearing body, and issued a written statement as to the

evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking her community control. Under these

circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court committed an obvious error by revoking

Hambidge’s community control and that, but for that error, the outcome would have been -10- different. Her second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 22} In her third assignment of error, Hambidge claims that she received ineffective

assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings. She asserts that her trial counsel

failed to properly inform her of her community control conditions and failed to present “Larry,”

a Greene Leaf staff member, as a key witness at her revocation hearing. She contends that

Larry would have testified that she had not violated Greene Leaf’s code of conduct, and thus

she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

{¶ 23} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under

the two-pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and

adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989).

“Pursuant to those cases, trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.” State v. Leonard, 2017-Ohio-

8421, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Strickland at 688. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

a defendant must demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable

probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been different.”

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11.

{¶ 24} Strickland charges us to “appl[y] a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments” and to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Sneed, 2002-Ohio-4768, ¶ 7, citing

Strickland at 689 and 691. Additionally, “[m]ere speculation about the testimony of a witness

that was not called at a revocation hearing is not adequate to support an argument that this

evidence was both material and corroborative.” Dinger, 2005-Ohio-6942, at ¶ 44 (7th Dist.).

{¶ 25} Under this standard, Hambidge must prove that her counsel’s performance -11- was objectively unreasonable and that there was a “reasonable probability” that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of her revocation hearing would have been

different. See State v. Leyh, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 18. On this record, however, Hambidge has

shown neither of these things.

{¶ 26} First, while she asserts that her counsel failed to properly inform her of her

community control conditions, the record indicates that she was advised regarding her

mandatory completion of the Greene Leaf program. Additionally, her argument that “Larry”

should have been called to testify rests upon mere speculation, as there is no evidence in

the record to suggest what Larry’s testimony may have been. “Such speculation is

insufficient to establish ineffective assistance.” State v. Snowden, 2019-Ohio-3006, ¶ 101

(2d Dist.), quoting State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-3641, ¶ 119, citing State v. Perez, 2009-Ohio-

6179, ¶ 217. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Larry would have testified that

Hambidge had not violated Greene Leaf’s code of conduct and should not have been

discharged from the program, the fact remains that she was discharged from the program,

which constituted the violation of her community control—no matter the reason. Therefore,

we cannot say that she demonstrated that her counsel was ineffective or that she was

prejudiced by her counsel’s alleged deficiency. Her third assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 27} Having overruled Hambidge’s three assignments of error, the judgment of the

.............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.