State v. Hallock

Supreme Court of South Carolina

State v. Hallock

269 S.E.2d 774, 275 S.C. 314, 1980 S.C. LEXIS 442

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedSeptember 15, 1980

Docket21302

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 269 S.E.2d 774 (State v. Hallock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Hallock, 269 S.E.2d 774, 275 S.C. 314, 1980 S.C. LEXIS 442 (S.C. 1980).

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Opinion

Per Cttriam:

Appellant was indicted on charges of assault with intent to kill (two counts) and carrying a pistol (one count). Upon commencement of the second day of trial appellant sought permission to proceed pro se, retaining appointed counsel in *315 an advisory capacity. Stating only that appellant must abide by the rules, the presiding judge granted the request. The jury subsequently found appellant guilty of all charges and consecutive sentences of twenty (20) years on each assault with intent to kill charge and one (1) year on the weapons charge imposed.

The records presently before this Court indicate that the presiding judge failed to properly determine whether appellant’s request to proceed pro se constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. See State v. Dixon, 269 S. C. 107, 109, 236 S. E. (2d) 419, 420 (1977) citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). Accordingly, pursuant to the procedure employed in Dixon, supra, this case is remanded to the lower court for determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made.

Remanded.

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Per Cttriam:

Appellant was indicted on charges of assault with intent to kill (two counts) and carrying a pistol (one count). Upon commencement of the second day of trial appellant sought permission to proceed pro se, retaining appointed counsel in *315 an advisory capacity. Stating only that appellant must abide by the rules, the presiding judge granted the request. The jury subsequently found appellant guilty of all charges and consecutive sentences of twenty (20) years on each assault with intent to kill charge and one (1) year on the weapons charge imposed.

The records presently before this Court indicate that the presiding judge failed to properly determine whether appellant’s request to proceed pro se constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. See State v. Dixon, 269 S. C. 107, 109, 236 S. E. (2d) 419, 420 (1977) citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). Accordingly, pursuant to the procedure employed in Dixon, supra, this case is remanded to the lower court for determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made.

Remanded.

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Bluebook (online)

269 S.E.2d 774, 275 S.C. 314, 1980 S.C. LEXIS 442, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hallock-sc-1980.

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