State v. Hall

492 N.W.2d 884, 242 Neb. 92, 1992 Neb. LEXIS 346
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 18, 1992
DocketS-91-919
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 492 N.W.2d 884 (State v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hall, 492 N.W.2d 884, 242 Neb. 92, 1992 Neb. LEXIS 346 (Neb. 1992).

Opinion

Fahrnbruch, J.

Complaining that his sentences are excessive, James T. Hall, also known as Thomas Duane Strawder, appeals his sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder and his consecutive sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for use of a weapon to commit a felony.

George D. “Joe” Allan died January 2, 1991, as a result of Hall’s firing five .357-Magnum revolver shots into Allan’s body. Three of the shots were inflicted upon Allan after he was knocked to the ground by two earlier shots. A sixth shot missed him.

We affirm the sentences imposed by the district court for Hall County following Hall’s guilty pleas, which were entered pursuant to a plea agreement with the prosecutor.

Allan was killed while he was inspecting animal traps he and his 5-year-old son had placed on his property near the Platte River in Hall County the previous day. His 5-year-old son had accompanied Allan in his pickup truck as he inspected the traps on the day he was killed. When Allan arrived at the site of the killing, Hall, armed with a gun and ammunition he had stolen during the burglary of the 3-D “ammunition factory” in Doniphan, was attempting to conceal a car he had stolen in Grand Island. Hall found the gun partially disassembled in a vise when he burglarized the 3-D building. He reassembled the gun and took it and more than 200 rounds of ammunition for it. The record reflects that Hall planned to commit an armed robbery on the evening of January 2 and use the car he had *94 stolen as a getaway vehicle. Hall told the district court judge that he burglarized the ammunition factory to obtain money “to take care of my needs and my insecurities.” He told the probation officer that upon finding the .357-Magnum revolver, his plans changed. After Hall found the gun and ammunition for it, “I was going to go and kill my father and kill my stepfather and I didn’t care what happened to me,” he told the judge. Before confronting Allan, Hall had also burglarized a four-bedroom cabin trailer on Allan’s property and taken clothing and other items.

Hall told the court that as he was covering the stolen car with tree branches, Allan happened on the scene. Hall said he hid among some trees and watched Allan inspecting the stolen car and its license plate. Hall said he was afraid that Allan would remove the keys from the stolen vehicle and that Hall “could not outrun pursuit.” When Hall stepped from his hiding place, Allan asked him if the car was his. Hall said he told Allan that the car was his. Hall claimed that when Allan made a move with his right hand, Hall “came around with the gun [he had stolen], pointed it at [Allan] and pulled the trigger.” Hall shot Allan five times. Allan’s young son, who had remained in the pickup truck, was an eyewitness to his father’s killing. He said his dad fell to the ground after Hall had shot him twice, leaving the inference that Hall had shot Allan three times while he was lying on the ground. A sixth shot by Hall missed Allan. Hall maintains that he kept shooting because Allan kept trying to draw his own handgun from its holster.

Hall attempted to reload his stolen weapon, but it would not open for the reload. Hall claimed he was unaware of the boy’s presence in Allan’s pickup until he approached the truck to make his escape from the scene. Hall pointed his empty gun at the boy, ordered him out of the truck, and then fled the scene in Allan’s truck. The child was left alone with the body of his father, 2 miles from the nearest house. The boy went to a farmhouse. Authorities were notified that Allan had been shot.

Hall was taken into custody in Cimarron, Kansas, by the Gray County sheriff the day after Allan was killed. Hall abandoned Allan’s pickup truck in Kansas. He stole another pickup in Gray County. While in custody for auto theft in Gray *95 County, Hall confessed to killing Allan and taking his truck. Hall also told law enforcement officials that he planned to go to Texas and “maybe across into Mexico and living [sic] off the land.”

Hall was initially charged with first degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, child abuse, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts each of theft by unlawful taking and burglary. At his arraignment on the eight-count information, Hall stood mute. The district judge entered pleas of not guilty to each count for Hall.

A plea agreement was reached between Hall and the prosecutor. At a July 16, 1991, hearing, Hall pled guilty to second degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The remaining charges were dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. On September 5, Hall was sentenced to life imprisonment on the second degree murder charge and 20 years’ imprisonment on the weapons charge, the sentences to run consecutively. Second degree murder is a Class IB felony under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304(2) (Reissue 1989), for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1) (Reissue 1989). The maximum sentence on the use of a weapon to commit a felony is 20 years’ imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, or both, and must be imposed consecutively to the felony sentence. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1205 (Reissue 1989); § 28-105.

Except under certain circumstances when the Supreme Court is reviewing a sentence of death, State v. Reeves, 239 Neb. 419, 476 N.W.2d 829 (1991), it is not the function of an appellate court to conduct a de novo review of the record to determine whether a sentence is appropriate. We have long adhered to the doctrine that to the district court and not to an appellate court is entrusted the power to impose sentences for the commission of crimes against the State; and the judgments of that court cannot be controlled or interfered with in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See Wright v. State, 45 Neb. 44, 63 N.W. 147 (1895). We have also declared that “[a] sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” State v. Coleman, 241 Neb. 731, 733, 490 N.W.2d 222, 226 (1992). This standard has *96 been in effect since at least 1950, when we held in Carr v. State, 152 Neb. 248, 254, 40 N.W.2d 677, 681 (1950), that “ ‘[w]here the punishment of an offense created by statute is left to the discretion of a court, to be exercised within certain prescribed limits, a sentence imposed within such limits will not be disturbed unless there appears to be an abuse of such discretion.’ ” See, also, State v. Start, 239 Neb. 571, 477 N.W.2d 20 (1991); State v. Haynie, 239 Neb. 478,

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652 N.W.2d 9 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2002)
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646 N.W.2d 572 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 2002)
State v. Hall
543 N.W.2d 462 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1996)
State v. Morris
541 N.W.2d 423 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, 1995)
State v. Juarez
528 N.W.2d 344 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, 1995)
State v. George
527 N.W.2d 638 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, 1995)
State v. Ellen
500 N.W.2d 818 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Dandridge
511 N.W.2d 527 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, 1993)
State v. Tlamka
511 N.W.2d 135 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, 1993)
State v. Philipps
496 N.W.2d 874 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Reynolds
496 N.W.2d 872 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Tucker
494 N.W.2d 572 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Hernandez
493 N.W.2d 181 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
492 N.W.2d 884, 242 Neb. 92, 1992 Neb. LEXIS 346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hall-neb-1992.