State v. Gump, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2006)

2006 Ohio 7067
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 28, 2006
DocketNo. 05 JE 12.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2006 Ohio 7067 (State v. Gump, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Gump, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2006), 2006 Ohio 7067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Appellant, Erin Gump, was found guilty of illegally manufacturing an explosive in violation of R.C. § 2923.17(B) and the unlawful possession of a dangerous ordnance in violation of R.C. §2923.17(A) following his April 7, 2005, jury trial in the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant then pleaded guilty to the remaining count against him, possession of a weapon while under a disability in violation of R.C. § 2923.13(A)(3). He was sentenced to seven years in prison for the illegal manufacturing offense concurrent to one year in prison for the possession offense. He was also sentenced to two years in prison for possession of a weapon while under a disability to be served consecutively with the sentences, for a total of nine years in prison.

{¶ 2} Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. In his sole argument he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for the illegal manufacture of an explosive. Specifically, he claims that the state failed to establish with sufficient evidence that he manufactured an "explosive" as that term is defined. Instead, he argues that he simply created a firework. He maintains that there was no evidence that the device he created was an explosive nor was evidence presented establishing that the materials he employed were subject to the rules and regulations of the fire marshal.

{¶ 3} Appellant states that since this device was found under his marital bed, it is unreasonable to believe that it was an explosive. Finally, he argues that the state failed to prove that the blast and sulfur smell from the detonation of his device was not caused by the device that the police used in their countercharge. For the following reasons, however, Appellant's arguments on appeal lack merit and are overruled.

{¶ 4} For Appellant's sole assignment of error he asserts:

{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ACCEPTING A JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY TO ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE OF AN EXPLOSIVE WHEN SAID VERDICT WAS REACHED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE."

{¶ 6} A judgment will not be reversed based on insufficient evidence if it is supported by competent, credible evidence that goes to all the essential elements of the case. Cohen v. Lamko (1984),10 Ohio St.3d 167, 462 N.E.2d 407.

{¶ 7} In State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that sufficiency of the evidence is a term of art that determines, "'whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.'" Id. at 386, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990) 1433. A decision as to whether the state's evidence is sufficient to sustain a jury verdict is a "test of adequacy" and is a question of law. Id.

{¶ 8} R.C. § 2923.17(B) which addresses the illegal manufacture or processing of explosives states:

{¶ 9} "No person shall manufacture or process an explosive at any location in this state unless the person first has been issued a license, certificate of registration, or permit to do so from a fire official of a political subdivision of this state or from the office of the fire marshal."

{¶ 10} It is undisputed in the instant matter that Appellant did not have a license or permit, authorizing him to manufacture explosives pursuant to the statute. The sole question on appeal is whether Appellant manufactured an "explosive" as that term is defined.

{¶ 11} R.C. § 2923.11(M) defines explosive as,

{¶ 12} "any chemical compound, mixture, or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. `Explosive' includes all materials that have been classified as class A, class B, or class C explosives by the United States department of transportation in its regulations and includes, but is not limited to, dynamite, black powder, pellet powders, initiating explosives, blasting caps, electric blasting caps, safety fuses, fuse igniters, squibs, cordeau detonant fuses, instantaneous fuses, and igniter cords and igniters. `Explosive' does not include `fireworks,' as defined in section 3743.01 of the Revised Code, or any explosive that is not subject to regulation under the rules of the fire marshal adopted pursuant to section 3737.82 of the Revised Code."

{¶ 13} R.C. § 2923.11(H) defines an explosive device as,

{¶ 14} "any device designed or specially adapted to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of an explosion, and consisting of an explosive substance or agency and a means to detonate it. `Explosive device' includes without limitation any bomb, any explosive demolition device, any blasting cap or detonator containing an explosive charge, and any pressure vessel that has been knowingly tampered with or arranged so as to explode."

{¶ 15} Appellant first argues that his device was simply a firework.

{¶ 16} "'Fireworks' means any composition or device prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or an audible effect by combustion, deflagration, or detonation, except ordinary matches and except as provided in section 3743.80 of the Revised Code." R.C. § 3743.01(F).

{¶ 17} A review of the jury instructions reveals that the definition of a firework was not before the jury nor was this definition requested by Appellant.

{¶ 18} The record reflects that on January 7, 2005, several City of Steubenville police officers along with Special Agent Doug Filippi of Ohio's Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation searched Appellant's residence pursuant to a search warrant. Appellant evidently knew Filippi, and Appellant offered to assist the officers. Before the police found the device in issue, Appellant advised Filippi that, "there was a — a thing that looked like a bomb in his residence but it wasn't — it wasn't real." (Tr., pp. 111-114.)

{¶ 19} Filippi thereafter found the device in Appellant's bedroom in a drawer under his bed. It was a blue tube wrapped in black tape. Upon inquiry by the police, Appellant told them that it was fake and that it would not explode. (Tr., pp. 119-120.)

{¶ 20} Steubenville police officer Jonathan Sowers testified that he was with Filippi when he found the "bomb" and that Filippi handed it to him. State's Exhibits 16 are photographs depicting the device. Sowers explained that one of the officers cut back the tape on the device, which revealed, "large long nails were attached to the cylinder on the inside of it by the tape. * * * [T]he nails were hidden until you peeled it [the tape] back." Appellant advised the officers that he made the device to "scare people." (Tr., pp. 126-129.)

{¶ 21}

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Dommer
833 N.E.2d 796 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2005)
Cohen v. Lamko, Inc.
462 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Thompkins
678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 7067, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-gump-unpublished-decision-12-28-2006-ohioctapp-2006.