State v. Guffie
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Opinion
[Cite as State v. Guffie, 2024-Ohio-2163.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 112642 v. :
CURTIS GUFFIE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 6, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-665727-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Brian Callahan, Yasmine H. Hasan, and Mahmoud Awadallah, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant, Curtis Guffie, appeals his convictions for the
murder of Jamir Pollard (“Jamir”) and attempted murder of Kylan Lumpkin
(“Lumpkin”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm his convictions. I. Procedural Background
In 2021, the state charged Guffie in a 13-count indictment accusing him
of aggravated murder (Count 1); two counts of murder (Counts 2 and 3); attempted
murder (Count 4); four counts of felonious assault (Counts 5-8); two counts of
tampering with evidence (Counts 9 and 10); two counts of obstructing justice
(Counts 11 and 12); and conspiracy (Count 13). Each count contained both one- and
three-year firearm specifications. Guffie pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded
to trial before a jury.
II. Jury Trial
A. The Shooting
On July 21, 2021, Guffie, at the suggestion of his friend and rap artist,
Eric West a.k.a. “Fatboi Beanz,” messaged Lumpkin through Instagram about hiring
him as cameraman to film a music video at a church. Lumpkin suggested the
abandoned church on Aetna Road near East 93rd Street. Around 4:25 p.m. on
July 22, 2021, Guffie parked his red Nissan Murano across the street from the
church on Aetna Road. Lumpkin and his friend, Jamir, arrived at the church in
Lumpkin’s silver Mercedes Benz C350, which he parked across the street from the
church, but farther down the street from Guffie’s vehicle. According to Guffie, he
did not know either Lumpkin or Jamir prior to this day.
Over the next 25 minutes, Lumpkin filmed Guffie inside and outside
the dilapidated church while he performed and rapped his lyrics. The state played
clips of the videos filmed by Lumpkin that recorded not only Guffie’s performance, but also conversations between Guffie and Lumpkin.1 In at least two videos, Guffie
is seen looking at his cell phone. Guffie testified that his music for the video played
through his phone but that he also received FaceTime calls from Eric West. In one
video, which was filmed on an outside stoop next to the church, Guffie removed his
Glock 44 handgun from his pants pocket and showed it to the camera as part of his
performance. At the end of this video, Lumpkin asked Guffie if he wanted to film in
front of the church; Guffie agreed. The next video showed Guffie walking down the
sidewalk as his music played. The end of that video showed Guffie taking a phone
call, which he admitted and phone records corroborated, was from Eric West.
The next video showed Guffie walking down the sidewalk in front of the
church, then up the exterior front stairs of the church, opening the church doors,
and walking inside the church while performing his rap as he continued walking
down the aisle toward the altar where a small piano organ sat in front of the altar
steps. (Exhibit No. 322.) As Guffie approached the altar steps, he walked to the
right of the organ, maneuvering his body so that he faced the aisle but his left
shoulder was angled toward the church’s front doors. At approximately one minute
and seven seconds into the video, rapid-fire gunshots rang out and Lumpkin’s video
1 Tom Ciula, a qualified forensic video and audio expert with the Cleveland Division
of Police, testified that he reviewed Lumpkin’s camera, which was recovered by officers at the church, extracted the videos from the camera, and created frame-by-frame still images from the videos. During his testimony, Ciula was not permitted to provide commentary or interpretation about the videos or still frames; he only identified them and played them for the jury. Accordingly, this court is tasked with explaining the information on the recordings. camera swung wildly as it continued to record. The camera recorded various
sounds, including additional gunshots and muffled voices, but at the 1:21 mark, a
voice said, “Get him,” followed by two additional gunshots. At the 1:42 mark, a voice
said, “He’s right here,” and at 1:48 an additional shot is fired. At the 1:50 mark, a
voice said, “You see him,” and at 1:57 two gunshots rang out, followed by one more
shot at 2:01. After approximately the 2:04 mark in the video, no additional sounds
could be heard until 8:49 into the video when police arrived and announced their
presence. The camera continued to record until Officer Neil Pesta discovered it
amongst the debris inside the church and turned it off.
Tessie Alexander, who lives next door to the church, testified that she
called 911 at 4:53 p.m. after hearing gunshots at the church. The jury listened to her
911 call.2 Alexander told the operator that the “shooter left,” she heard “about 14
shots,” that “one ran out and ran that way,” and “one got in the car [and] drove off”
in a red car. She testified that a red van was parked across the street in front of her
house but she did not see who got in the van, nor did she see anyone else leave the
church — contrary to her 911 statement. Alexander testified that as she was talking
with the operator, she went outside and saw Jamir stumbling out from the front of
the church. She told the operator that he had been shot, and the operator coached
2 Throughout trial, the parties objected to interpretations, explanations, and characterizations of written notes, recorded calls, and statements captured by body camera videos. The objections centered around that the recordings or writings “speaks for itself” and the jury could “assess credibility and meaning.” Again, this court throughout this decision is tasked with conveying the information found in these exhibits. her as she provided Jamir with emergency medical treatment in the street until
police arrived.
Dispatch received a 911 call at 4:56 p.m. from Lumpkin, who police later
discovered hiding underneath the floorboards of the church. The jury listened to his
911 call, in which the operator had difficulty understanding Lumpkin because either
he was whispering or due to the quality of the call. During the call, Lumpkin told
the operator that he was “shooting a music video [and] they shot me * * * I’m hit.”
Once officers arrived at the church and discovered Lumpkin, the call ended, but
officers’ body cameras recorded their interactions with him.
Officer Colbert Stadden testified that around 5:00 p.m. on July 22,
2021, he received a call to respond to 9614 Aetna Road for multiple gunshots. He
stated that he was the first officer to arrive on scene and observed a male with
multiple gunshot wounds laying in the street being tended to by bystanders. He
testified that he learned from the male victim, identified as Jamir, that his “bro [was]
in [the] church.” Officer Stadden entered the church with other officers, treating the
area as an active crime scene.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Guffie, 2024-Ohio-2163.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 112642 v. :
CURTIS GUFFIE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 6, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-665727-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Brian Callahan, Yasmine H. Hasan, and Mahmoud Awadallah, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant, Curtis Guffie, appeals his convictions for the
murder of Jamir Pollard (“Jamir”) and attempted murder of Kylan Lumpkin
(“Lumpkin”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm his convictions. I. Procedural Background
In 2021, the state charged Guffie in a 13-count indictment accusing him
of aggravated murder (Count 1); two counts of murder (Counts 2 and 3); attempted
murder (Count 4); four counts of felonious assault (Counts 5-8); two counts of
tampering with evidence (Counts 9 and 10); two counts of obstructing justice
(Counts 11 and 12); and conspiracy (Count 13). Each count contained both one- and
three-year firearm specifications. Guffie pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded
to trial before a jury.
II. Jury Trial
A. The Shooting
On July 21, 2021, Guffie, at the suggestion of his friend and rap artist,
Eric West a.k.a. “Fatboi Beanz,” messaged Lumpkin through Instagram about hiring
him as cameraman to film a music video at a church. Lumpkin suggested the
abandoned church on Aetna Road near East 93rd Street. Around 4:25 p.m. on
July 22, 2021, Guffie parked his red Nissan Murano across the street from the
church on Aetna Road. Lumpkin and his friend, Jamir, arrived at the church in
Lumpkin’s silver Mercedes Benz C350, which he parked across the street from the
church, but farther down the street from Guffie’s vehicle. According to Guffie, he
did not know either Lumpkin or Jamir prior to this day.
Over the next 25 minutes, Lumpkin filmed Guffie inside and outside
the dilapidated church while he performed and rapped his lyrics. The state played
clips of the videos filmed by Lumpkin that recorded not only Guffie’s performance, but also conversations between Guffie and Lumpkin.1 In at least two videos, Guffie
is seen looking at his cell phone. Guffie testified that his music for the video played
through his phone but that he also received FaceTime calls from Eric West. In one
video, which was filmed on an outside stoop next to the church, Guffie removed his
Glock 44 handgun from his pants pocket and showed it to the camera as part of his
performance. At the end of this video, Lumpkin asked Guffie if he wanted to film in
front of the church; Guffie agreed. The next video showed Guffie walking down the
sidewalk as his music played. The end of that video showed Guffie taking a phone
call, which he admitted and phone records corroborated, was from Eric West.
The next video showed Guffie walking down the sidewalk in front of the
church, then up the exterior front stairs of the church, opening the church doors,
and walking inside the church while performing his rap as he continued walking
down the aisle toward the altar where a small piano organ sat in front of the altar
steps. (Exhibit No. 322.) As Guffie approached the altar steps, he walked to the
right of the organ, maneuvering his body so that he faced the aisle but his left
shoulder was angled toward the church’s front doors. At approximately one minute
and seven seconds into the video, rapid-fire gunshots rang out and Lumpkin’s video
1 Tom Ciula, a qualified forensic video and audio expert with the Cleveland Division
of Police, testified that he reviewed Lumpkin’s camera, which was recovered by officers at the church, extracted the videos from the camera, and created frame-by-frame still images from the videos. During his testimony, Ciula was not permitted to provide commentary or interpretation about the videos or still frames; he only identified them and played them for the jury. Accordingly, this court is tasked with explaining the information on the recordings. camera swung wildly as it continued to record. The camera recorded various
sounds, including additional gunshots and muffled voices, but at the 1:21 mark, a
voice said, “Get him,” followed by two additional gunshots. At the 1:42 mark, a voice
said, “He’s right here,” and at 1:48 an additional shot is fired. At the 1:50 mark, a
voice said, “You see him,” and at 1:57 two gunshots rang out, followed by one more
shot at 2:01. After approximately the 2:04 mark in the video, no additional sounds
could be heard until 8:49 into the video when police arrived and announced their
presence. The camera continued to record until Officer Neil Pesta discovered it
amongst the debris inside the church and turned it off.
Tessie Alexander, who lives next door to the church, testified that she
called 911 at 4:53 p.m. after hearing gunshots at the church. The jury listened to her
911 call.2 Alexander told the operator that the “shooter left,” she heard “about 14
shots,” that “one ran out and ran that way,” and “one got in the car [and] drove off”
in a red car. She testified that a red van was parked across the street in front of her
house but she did not see who got in the van, nor did she see anyone else leave the
church — contrary to her 911 statement. Alexander testified that as she was talking
with the operator, she went outside and saw Jamir stumbling out from the front of
the church. She told the operator that he had been shot, and the operator coached
2 Throughout trial, the parties objected to interpretations, explanations, and characterizations of written notes, recorded calls, and statements captured by body camera videos. The objections centered around that the recordings or writings “speaks for itself” and the jury could “assess credibility and meaning.” Again, this court throughout this decision is tasked with conveying the information found in these exhibits. her as she provided Jamir with emergency medical treatment in the street until
police arrived.
Dispatch received a 911 call at 4:56 p.m. from Lumpkin, who police later
discovered hiding underneath the floorboards of the church. The jury listened to his
911 call, in which the operator had difficulty understanding Lumpkin because either
he was whispering or due to the quality of the call. During the call, Lumpkin told
the operator that he was “shooting a music video [and] they shot me * * * I’m hit.”
Once officers arrived at the church and discovered Lumpkin, the call ended, but
officers’ body cameras recorded their interactions with him.
Officer Colbert Stadden testified that around 5:00 p.m. on July 22,
2021, he received a call to respond to 9614 Aetna Road for multiple gunshots. He
stated that he was the first officer to arrive on scene and observed a male with
multiple gunshot wounds laying in the street being tended to by bystanders. He
testified that he learned from the male victim, identified as Jamir, that his “bro [was]
in [the] church.” Officer Stadden entered the church with other officers, treating the
area as an active crime scene. The jury observed video from Officer Stadden’s body
camera. The video revealed that Lumpkin, who was hiding, was hesitant to respond
to officer commands due to his uncertainty about their identities. The officers
located Lumpkin, and he emerged from under the floor of the church. In a second
video taken from Officer Stadden’s body camera, the jury observed a general
overview of the church, including shell casings and pools of blood. Officer Joseph Fitchwell and his partner, Officer Pesta, responded to
Aetna Road regarding shots fired. When they arrived on scene, they discovered a
male lying in the street with gunshot wounds. They learned from bystanders that
another person could be inside the church. Officer Fitchwell described the scene as
“chaotic.” The jury observed video from his body camera. After Lumpkin emerged
from under the floor, Officer Fitchwell escorted him from the church. Body camera
video showed Lumpkin making a phone call, possibly to his mother, and telling the
individual that “they shot at us” and then he made threatening statements seeking
retaliation about “killing” them and “f***ing them up.” (Exhibit No. 426.)
Officer Anthony DeMarco also responded to Aetna Road. He testified
that he observed a male receiving medical treatment from Officer Stecker and saw
Officer Fitchwell escorting Lumpkin from the church to the street where the male
laid injured. He said Lumpkin appeared to have been shot in the shoulder and
described Lumpkin’s demeanor as “like an adrenaline rush. He was very, like, full
of energy, excited, kind of erratic.” The jury watched video from Officer DeMarco’s
body camera, and observed Lumpkin’s demeanor and heard him identify his vehicle
parked on the street. When officers asked whether anyone else was shot, Lumpkin
responded, “It was just us, they shot at us * * * and I got the dude’s number, and he
shot at me, I mean he just * * * the dude just deleted his Instagram * * * his name is
Ace.” (Exhibit No. 425.) Over objection, the state replayed that portion of the video.
Officer DeMarco stated that based on the information Lumpkin provided, officers
learned that the suspect’s nickname was “Ace.” Officer Anthony Sklarsky stayed inside the church to locate evidence
and sweep the area for officer safety. The jury observed video from his body camera,
which provided a general overview of the graffitied and debris-filled church. He
testified that he was familiar with the church because he had responded to calls
regarding break-ins, squatters living in the church, and other incidents there that
involved sounds of gunshots. Officer Sklarsky testified that he also walked down the
street to interview potential witnesses. His body camera captured footage of
Lumpkin’s silver Mercedes Benz C350 SUV parked on the street. The state
introduced photographs generated from the body camera video of the front- and
back-end of Lumpkin’s vehicle.
Officer Pesta also stayed inside the church to locate evidence
connected with the shooting. The jury observed video from his body camera, which
provided a general overview of the church and crime scene, including various exits
and entrances to the church. Officer Pesta testified that he observed blood by the
altar and found shell casings nearby. He also located additional shell casings in the
back of the church, closer to the main entrance. During his search, Officer Pesta
located a video camera and shoe where the floor had caved in and collapsed. He
stated that he recovered the camera and turned it off.
B. Jamir Succumbs to his Injuries
Jamir was transported to MetroHealth Medical Center, where he later
passed away. Dr. Joseph Felo, Chief Deputy Medical Examiner for Cuyahoga
County, testified that he assisted with Dr. Cameron Felty’s performance of Jamir’s autopsy. Dr. Felo testified that Jamir sustained five gunshot wounds — to the neck,
back, buttock, upper thigh, and left lower leg. Although Dr. Felo stated that the
gunshot wound to the neck was the fatal wound, he opined that all the wounds
contributed to Jamir’s death, which was ruled a homicide.
Dr. Felo testified that he recovered two bullets from Jamir’s body —
both were shown to the jury. He described the bullet recovered from Jamir’s buttock
as gray, with no jacket, and consistent with a .22-caliber bullet. As for the bullet
fragment recovered from Jamir’s left lower leg, Dr. Felo described it as brass-looking
and “jacketed” — consistent with a 9 mm bullet. He also testified about the entrance
and exit wounds for each gunshot. He stated that the size of the entrance wounds
to the neck and buttock were similar, and the size of the entrance wounds to the back
and thigh were similar.
C. Lumpkin Identifies “Ace”
EMS transported Lumpkin to MetroHealth Medical Center. His EMS
and hospital records were admitted into evidence, with the trial court overruling
defense objections to the narratives contained in both exhibits. The narrative on the
EMS report provided, “Pt. stated during transport, ‘this was a set up we were
supposed to be shooting a video.’” (Exhibit No. 482.) The narrative contained in
the records from MetroHealth provided, “[Lumpkin] states he went into a church to
record a music video when 5 men dressed in black walked into the church and began
shooting.” (Exhibit No. 485.) A progress note dated July 22, 2021, stated, “[t]he
shooting occurred in an abandoned church on E. 93 & Aetna Rd. [Lumpkin] and his friends were there to film a music video. When they walked into the church, they
were shot. [Lumpkin] stated, ‘we were set up.’” Id. According to Lumpkin’s medical
records, he suffered three gunshot wounds — two to the back and one to the left
shoulder.
Sergeant James Crivel testified that at the time of the shooting, he was
a homicide detective with Cleveland police. He stated that he received the
assignment following Jamir’s death and worked with Detectives Andrew Hayduk
and Fishbach. Sgt. Crivel stated that on July 23, 2021, he interviewed Lumpkin at
MetroHealth, who provided him with a name — “Ace Da Cutta.” He stated that he
searched that name through Facebook, located a post with that name and discovered
a last name of “Guffie.” He stated that based on a license search and subsequent
internet searches, he believed that “Curtis Guffie” was “Ace Da Cutta.” According to
Sgt. Crivel, Lumpkin identified “Ace” from a music video found on YouTube. The
video was titled “Wassup,” and featured Fatboi Beanz (Eric West) and Guffie; Tyler
West was also identified as a person in the video.
Sgt. Crivel stated that after this interview, Lumpkin became
uncooperative during the investigation. In fact, Lumpkin did not testify at trial.
Sgt. Crivel issued a warrant for Lumpkin’s and Guffie’s Instagram
accounts because he learned that was how the two arranged the video session. The
parties stipulated to the authenticity of the records. Lumpkin’s account information
was saved on a disk, admitted into evidence, and provided to the jury without
objection. (Exhibit No. 505.) Sgt. Crivel testified that “kyl0__” was Lumpkin’s username. Guffie’s Instagram account records revealed that “ace_frm_da_4” was
Guffie’s “vanity name.” (Exhibit No. 488.)
Sgt. Crivel testified about the Instagram conversation thread between
“ace_frm_da_4” and “kyl0__” discussing Guffie hiring Lumpkin as a cameraman
for a video. Because Guffie had deleted his Instagram account and messages with
Lumpkin, only Lumpkin’s messages remained in the thread. The thread started with
Lumpkin’s message sent at 12:34 p.m. on July 21, 2021:
Yea tomorrow or the 27th
4 or 6 [Sent at 2:09 p.m.]
Ok so you wanna shoot at da church and yea you can do half today and da other half at the shoot [Sent at 7:10 p.m.]
I know an abandoned one that’s about it
And 350
It’s like 93rd and miles
$KYL0000 [Sent at 11:07 p.m.]
Ok
I got it brody [Sent at 11:18 p.m.]
Yessir send me da song and Imma hit you in da morning 2162058429 [Sent at 12:21 a.m. on July 22, 2021]
(Exhibit No. 487.)
Lumpkin’s Instagram account history also contained conversations
between Lumpkin and others on July 23, 2021, discussing the shooting, Jamir’s
death, YouTube links to Fatboi Beanz’s “Wassup” music video, screenshots taken
from that video, identifying pictures of “Ace Da Cutta” found on the internet, including his Twitter account, and information on an address for “Curtis Guffie, Jr.”
During these conversations, Lumpkin made the following statements:
N***as set us up at ah video shoot;
His name ace wit da cutta;
Some corny a** n***as idk where Dey from and Dey deleted Dey gram.
(Exhibit No. 505.) In response to the posted Fatboi Beanz “Wassup” music video
picture, Lumpkin stated:
Yup dem n***as;
Dey had on masks;
same n***as.
Id. Lumpkin responded, “Hell yea,” when one of his friends responded, “All them
in the video * * * That n***a that died in that video to.” Id. In another thread
following another picture posted of the “Wassup” music video, Lumpkin stated:
Dats who I think was shooting;
Yea but Dey had on masks so we couldn’t tell.
Id.
Lumpkin’s Instagram account history also contained an earlier
conversation from July 7, 2021. The conversation thread included a video recorded
from a bird’s-eye view, i.e., from an upstairs window of a house. The video was of a
person lying on the ground outside a car and receiving emergency medical
assistance from a police officer. The car had crashed into a house and tree.
According to the comments about the video, the unresponsive person was named “Tyler” — “will look at Tyler dead a**,” followed by nine crying-with-laughter face
emojis. Id.
Maple Heights Detective Andrew Sperie testified about a murder in
Maple Heights that occurred on July 5, 2021, two weeks before the church shooting.
He stated that the victim was Tyler West (“Tyler”) — the cousin of Eric West. Det.
Sperie identified exhibit No. 459 as a picture of Tyler’s vehicle that had crashed into
a house and tree. He stated, over objection, that as part of his investigation, he
learned that Lumpkin’s silver Mercedes Benz C350, identified in exhibit Nos. 457
and 461, was the vehicle suspected of being involved in Tyler’s murder. Det. Sperie
stated that he gave Sgt. Crivel shell casings recovered from the Maple Heights crime
scene.
On cross-examination, Det. Sperie admitted that Tyler’s murder was
unsolved and no one had been charged, including Lumpkin, even though he
classified him as “a person of interest.” He admitted that it was unknown whether
Lumpkin was actually in his Mercedes on July 5. Det. Sperie agreed that Guffie was
not connected to Tyler’s murder.
D. Guffie’s First Interview
On July 24, 2021, two days after the shooting, Sgt. Crivel and Det.
Hyudak arrived unannounced at Guffie’s residence. The jury observed video from
Sgt. Crivel’s body camera that recorded this interview.
Sgt. Crivel testified that he learned during this interview that Guffie
had hired Lumpkin based on a recommendation and that he paid him half of the fee. Guffie told Sgt. Crivel that everything was “cool,” but then masked gunmen entered
— he “saw the blitz” — and they went straight toward the cameraman, not toward
him. He said he, nevertheless, discharged his firearm at the ground as a warning
because the “dudes came at my direction.” He said he then exited out the front of
the church and drove away. Sgt. Crivel testified that he found it significant that
Guffie used the term “blitzed” during the interview to describe how the masked
gunmen came into the church because he would later discover lyrics on Guffie’s
phone containing the word “blitzed.”
During the interview, Sgt. Crivel told Guffie that one of the victims had
died and that the family was “pointing” at him, and thus it was important for the
police to recover his firearm. Guffie told the officers that he had a Glock 30, but that
he had disposed of the gun after the shooting by throwing it in the “cut somewhere”
— at first, he said beside the church, then he said down an alley or side street.
Sgt. Crivel asked Guffie during the interview why he did not call the
police following the shooting. Guffie responded that he was not comfortable with
the police due to prior experiences and that he needed to dissociate himself with
Lumpkin, which included deleting his Instagram conversation with Lumpkin.
Guffie voluntarily accompanied the officers to the church to explain to
them the timeline of events; his positioning when the group of masked gunmen
entered the church; where, how, and why he discharged his firearm; and how he
escaped from the situation. He stated that he shot at one of the masked gunmen but aimed at the floor. Sgt. Crivel’s body camera recorded the reenactment that the jury
observed.
Guffie then assisted the officers with attempting to locate his firearm
that he said he discarded outside the church, despite knowing that this was a lie.
After 20 minutes of looking, the officers stopped searching and again questioned
Guffie about the firearm. According to Sgt. Crivel, Guffie’s story about using a Glock
30 did not make sense because the shell casings located where Guffie said he was
standing were .22-caliber shell casings; a Glock 30 uses a .45-caliber bullet, which is
a larger bullet.
When they arrived back at Guffie’s apartment, Sgt. Crivel explained to
Guffie that he wanted to search Guffie’s cell phone. He explained that Guffie could
voluntarily waive his constitutional rights and consent to a search of his phone, or
he would obtain a warrant. Guffie voluntarily signed the waiver and gave the officers
his phone, including password access.
E. Guffie’s Cell Phone Extraction
Jerry Johns testified that he was previously employed as an FBI
intelligence analyst in Cleveland, assisting the Cleveland police homicide division.
He stated that he assisted in the extraction of data from two cell phones — Guffie’s
and Jamir’s.
Sgt. Crivel testified that the extraction of Guffie’s cell phone proved
beneficial to the investigation. Of relevance, the extraction revealed (1) that Guffie’s
Instagram conversation with Lumpkin was in fact deleted; (2) text messages between Eric West (hereinafter “Eric” or “Fatboi Beanz” or “Beanz”) and Guffie had
been deleted; (3) text messages dated July 7, 2021, between Eric and Guffie; (4)
Guffie’s call log, depicting FaceTime calls with Eric on July 21-22, 2021, including
before, during, and immediately after the shooting; (5) photographic evidence of a
Glock Model 44 .22-caliber LR handgun; (6) rap lyrics found in the Notes app that
Guffie admittedly penned on July 22, 2021, at 7:22 p.m.; (7) that Guffie “blocked”
Lumpkin’s cell phone number; and (8) Cash App transactions dated July 21, 2021,
between Eric and Guffie and then between Guffie and Lumpkin.
Regarding the deleted text messages between Eric and Guffie, exhibit
No. 442 showed and Johns testified to, that although Guffie’s texts were deleted, an
emoji response by “Beanz” to Guffie’s deleted text remained.3 In this exhibit, Eric
“loved” three text messages sent by Guffie on July 7, 2021 —
“Definitely keep me in the loop bro. [praying hands emoji]. The moment you know wassup just hml, you know how dis sh*t go [100 emoji]”;
“Anytime gang. If we don’t look out for each other and our folks then nobody will [arm flexing emoji]. Yaw are family to me and TT so ain’t even no question”;
“I’m already knowin [two praying hands emojis]”
(Exhibit No. 442.)
There were no other text messages with Eric on Guffie’s phone until
July 22, 2021, the day after the shooting when Guffie sent Eric a message, “You got
3 Guffie saved Eric West’s contact information in his phone under “Beanz.” Guffie
told officers and testified that “Beanz” is Eric West. more gas on you?? Dat sh*t from yesterday was some pressure.” Eric responded,
“Hell yea I do.”
Guffie’s call log, exhibit No. 443, revealed that on July 21, 2021, the
day before the shooting, Guffie and Eric communicated three times through
FaceTime, a video-chat app, at 10:33 p.m., 10:40 p.m., and 11:08 p.m. These times
corresponded to when Guffie was arranging the video shoot with Lumpkin. In fact,
Guffie’s cell phone revealed Cash App transactions during this time between Eric’s
account, “$FatboiBeanz98,” and Guffie. Guffie admitted that Eric loaned him $175
to pay for the video session with Lumpkin. The Cash App transaction showed that
Eric sent Guffie $175 at 11:16 p.m. on July 21, 2021, and that Guffie sent Lumpkin
(“$KYL0000”) $175 at 11:18 p.m.
On July 22, 2021, Guffie and Eric again communicated through
FaceTime. Guffie’s phone records revealed that they communicated at 2:44 p.m.,
3:52 p.m., 3:55 p.m., 4:10 p.m. (3:37 duration), and 4:23 p.m. (3:34 duration).
Surveillance video showed that Guffie arrived at the church around 4:25 p.m. Guffie
admitted that he spoke with Eric before and on his way to the video session because
he wanted him to be there, but Eric was unavailable.
Guffie’s phone records further revealed that during the video
recording session, Guffie called Eric through FaceTime three different times — at
4:27 p.m. (canceled call), 4:28 p.m. (:44 duration), and 4:32 p.m. (1:02 duration).
Eric then called Guffie once — at 4:48 p.m. (1:19 duration). Based on Lumpkin’s camera recordings and the 911 calls, the evidence demonstrates that the gunfire
started around 4:50 p.m.
Guffie’s phone records revealed that Eric called Guffie at 5:12 p.m.
(:29 duration), and Guffie called Eric at 5:16 (:05 duration). Although Guffie stated
that he called his wife directly after the shooting, his phone records revealed that he
did not call her until 7:30 p.m. and then again at 9:06 p.m. However, he FaceTimed
with Eric again that evening at 10:21 p.m., 10:27 p.m., and then at 12:42 a.m. on
July 23, 2021.4
Sgt. Crivel testified that the phone extraction also revealed that Guffie
had a Glock Model 44 .22 Long Rifle firearm, which would be consistent with the
.22 shell casings found at the church where Guffie admitted he was standing when
he discharged his firearm. Additionally, a review of the videos on Lumpkin’s camera
revealed that Guffie possessed the Glock Model 44 during the video shoot.
F. Guffie’s Arrest
On July 27, 2021, police arrested Guffie without incident and
transported him to Cleveland police headquarters for another interview and
statement, which he voluntarily provided without counsel. Sgt. Crivel recorded the
interview and the video was played for the jury.
During the interview, Guffie again lied to the officers about having a
Glock 30 during the video shoot. After the officers indicated that the video taken
4 Sgt. Crivel testified that he interviewed Eric West. He admitted that Eric had not
been charged with any criminal offense related to this matter. from Lumpkin’s camera revealed that Guffie’s firearm was not a Glock 30, Guffie
admitted that he actually possessed a Glock 44. He further admitted that he lied to
them during the interview on July 24 because he did not discard the handgun in the
overgrown vegetation by the church, but instead, the Glock 44 was in his apartment
during the first interview. He told the officers that the day after the interview,
July 25, 2021, he put the firearm in a blue plastic bag and left it beside a dumpster
on Buckeye and East 116th. Sgt. Crivel testified that when he later searched the area,
he did not discover the firearm and thus assumed Guffie once again lied to them.
Unbeknownst to the officers, on July 27, 2021, the same day Guffie
was arrested, Edward Golden, a then-employee of MetroHealth Medical Center
found a handgun in a blue plastic bag next to a dumpster located in a secure, but
unlocked area at Buckeye Health Center on East 116th Street. He stated that he was
picking up trash when he discovered the bag. Golden testified that he gave the bag
with the handgun inside to “Vincent,” a MetroHealth police officer. Sgt. Crivel
testified that he did not learn about Golden’s discovery of the handgun until
approximately one year later.
During the arrest interview, Guffie questioned the officers whether he
actually shot one of the individuals when he discharged his firearm, and surmised
that, if so, it would have been Jamir, based on his positioning. He reiterated that he
had no intention of shooting at anyone. He stated that he discharged his firearm in
self-defense when he saw the group of masked gunmen enter the church. When
pressed by Sgt. Crivel that “people might have put you in this situation,” Guffie said that he was being “100 percent honest.” Nevertheless, when Sgt. Crivel asked him
about the money paid through Cash App, Guffie hesitated, and stated that he did not
want to get that person involved. The video clearly showed Guffie’s demeanor
change when Sgt. Crivel placed Eric’s picture in front of him and the officers
explained that they did not think Guffie “was the mastermind behind this.” After
Guffie admitted that “Beanz” loaned him the money and said his given name was
“Eric,” he pretended not to know “Eric’s” last name until officers told him that Eric’s
last name was on the Cash App. Guffie then stated “West.” Guffie explained that
Eric only loaned him the money because he did not have the full $350 to pay
Lumpkin.
Guffie denied knowing Tyler West. When Sgt. Crivel showed him the
“Wassup” music video that featured Tyler, Guffie maintained that he did not know
him.
G. Ballistic Testimony and Evidence Makes a Match
Daniel Lentz, a detective with Cleveland police homicide unit, testified
that he and two other detectives identified, preserved, and collected evidence inside
and outside the church. He stated that they discovered three Rimfire .22-caliber
shell casings to the right of the piano organ, where Guffie subsequently told officers
he was standing when he discharged his weapon. Detective Lentz also discovered
the spent tip of a 9 mm bullet and one live 9 mm round behind the organ, up on the altar area, by a pool of blood.5 Finally, he stated that officers discovered eleven 9
mm casings on the right side of the church, near the back by the entrance doors. No
evidence was discovered in the church’s balcony.
James Kooser, a forensic scientist and firearm and tool marks
examiner with the Cuyahoga County Forensic Science Laboratory, testified about his
examination of the bullets, shell casings, and firearms recovered in this matter.
He testified that he examined two firearms — a Springfield Armory 9
mm caliber pistol (“Springfield”) and a Glock Model 44 .22 Long Rifle-caliber pistol
(“Glock Model 44”). Both firearms were test fired and determined to be operable.
Kooser stated that he examined the bullets recovered during Jamir’s
autopsy. According to Kooser, the bullet recovered from Jamir’s leg was consistent
with “380-caliber/9 mm caliber ammunition,” but it was inconclusive whether it
was fired from the Springfield. Regarding the bullet recovered from Jamir’s buttock,
Kooser testified that the bullet was consistent with .22 Long Rifle-caliber
ammunition, and further examination revealed that it was fired from the Glock
Model 44.
Kooser also examined the shell casings recovered from the church. He
stated that ten of the eleven 9 mm shell casings were fired from the Springfield. The
other 9 mm shell casing was fired from an unknown firearm. Regarding the three
5 DNA evidence revealed that only Jamir’s blood was found inside the church. .22 Long Rifle-caliber shell casings found to the right of the organ, Kooser stated
that those casings were fired from the Glock Model 44.
Over objection, Kooser testified that he examined 14 shell casings
recovered from the Maple Heights crime scene where Tyler was killed. He stated
that three of the 9 mm shell casings were fired from the Springfield.
Sgt. Crivel testified that the Springfield was purchased by Tyler West
in June 2020. He further stated that Guffie purchased the Glock Model 44 in 2020
and that it was the firearm that Guffie subsequently admitted he possessed and used
during the church shooting.6
H. Guffie Testifies
Guffie denied that he conspired with anyone, including Eric West, to
kill or harm Lumpkin or Jamir. He recounted what had occurred and asserted that
he discharged his weapon in self-defense when he saw the masked gunman, who
was standing near Jamir, turn and look at him. Guffie stated that he perceived the
look to be a threat and because the male had a gun and Jamir was already down, he
fired three shots aiming toward the gunman, but at the ground — “a leg-type” shot.
He stated that the gunman then ducked down, allowing him to exit out the front
doors and drive away.
6 The court prohibited the defense from introducing an ATF Cleveland Field Office
Crime Gun report (proffered exhibit E) that indicated that the Springfield firearm was recovered following another shooting in Cleveland in September 2021. Guffie testified that he left the scene but stopped on a side street to
collect himself. He said that he deleted his Instagram to dissociate himself from
Lumpkin’s “beef” with someone. Guffie testified that he also called his wife to tell
her what had happened and called Eric to tell him not to come to the video session.
Phone records corroborated that he called Eric West, but the records do not show
that he called his wife until hours later.
Regarding the rap lyrics discovered on his phone, Guffie stated that he
composed the lyrics after the shooting, but that they were not in reference to the
church shooting and were of “no particular significance.” (Tr. 1386-1387.) He did
not offer any further explanation about the lyrics but denied that the lyrics were a
“statement.” (Tr. 1465.)
Guffie admitted that he was untruthful with officers and recognized
that the choices he made — lying to the police, hiding the firearm, not calling 911,
and deleting Instagram messages — were bad decisions and not beneficial to his
case. Nevertheless, he adamantly denied that he had any intention of harming
anyone or that he was the “monster” that people made him out to be. He claimed
that “everything was being misconstrued.” (Tr. 1403.)
I. The Verdict
The jury found Guffie not guilty of aggravated murder as charged in
Count 1, but guilty of the remaining offenses and specifications. After merging allied
offenses, the trial court sentenced him to 24 years to life in prison. Guffie now appeals, raising ten assignments of error that will be
addressed together where appropriate.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Guffie contends that the trial court
erred by denying judgments of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, and thereafter
entering judgments of conviction that were not supported by sufficient evidence, in
derogation of his right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.
Guffie does not separately identify each charge that he was convicted
of or argue that the state failed to prove one or more of the elements of each offense.
Instead, he contends that the evidence was insufficient because (1) Lumpkin did not
testify, and thus the state engaged in a “victimless prosecution”; and (2) the state
impermissibly engaged in inference stacking to obtain a conviction. Both arguments
are without merit.
We reject Guffie’s argument that the state engaged in a “victimless
prosecution” because Lumpkin did not testify. This Confrontation Clause argument
is not appropriate under a sufficiency standard of review.
Rather, the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the
prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Cottingham, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109100, 2020-Ohio-4220, ¶ 32. An appellate court’s function when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541
(1997). The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Guffie next contends that his convictions are based on insufficient
evidence because the state engaged in impermissible inference stacking. We
disagree.
Proof of guilt may be supported “‘by circumstantial evidence, real
evidence, and direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three have
equal probative value.’” State v. Rodano, 2017-Ohio-1034, 86 N.E.3d 1032, ¶ 35
(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Zadar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94698, 2011-Ohio-1060,
¶ 18. Although circumstantial evidence and direct evidence have obvious
differences, those differences are irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence,
and circumstantial evidence carries the same weight as direct evidence. Id., citing
State v. Cassano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97228, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13. Further,
circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, “‘“but may also be more certain,
satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.”’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v.
Hawthorne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96496, 2011-Ohio-6078, quoting Michalic v.
Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 20 (1960). Whether a conviction is based on inference stacking goes to the
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108371, 2020-
Ohio-3367, ¶ 66. Ohio law generally precludes the stacking of inferences to prove a
claim. State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106518, 2018-Ohio-3674, ¶ 19, citing
Estate of Bier v. Am. Biltrite, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97085, 2012-Ohio-1195, ¶ 22.
“An inference which is based solely and entirely upon another inference and which
is unsupported by any additional fact or another inference from other facts is an
inference upon an inference and is universally condemned.” Hurt v. Charles J.
Rogers Transp. Co., 164 Ohio St.3d 329, 130 N.E.2d 820 (1955), paragraph one of
the syllabus; Davis v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97356,
2012-Ohio-3077, ¶ 13.
There are two instances, however, when the rule against inference
stacking does not apply. The first is when “[a]n inference which is based in part
upon another inference and in part upon factual support is called a parallel inference
and is universally approved provided it is a reasonable conclusion for the jury to
deduce.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. The second is when multiple
inferences arise separately from the same set of facts. McDougall v. Glenn Cartage
Co., 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266 (1959), paragraph two of the syllabus.
Guffie contends that the state used impermissible inference stacking
to prove that he conspired in the shooting at the church as revenge for the death of
Tyler. He claims that the jury had to infer that Lumpkin killed Tyler and that Eric
conspired with Guffie to seek retribution against Lumpkin. While Guffie may be correct that the jury needed to make certain inferences, those inferences were
supported by both direct and circumstantial evidence.
First, the state did not have to prove that Lumpkin actually killed
Tyler, but only that Lumpkin was involved in Tyler’s death. Based on the direct
evidence that Lumpkin’s vehicle was seen in the area at the time of Tyler’s murder,
he was a person of interest in the investigation, and because his Instagram account
history contained a video of and comments about Tyler dying and receiving
emergency medical treatment, the jury could reasonably infer that Lumpkin was
connected with Tyler’s death.
According to Guffie’s own testimony, he and Eric were friends that
“grew into like a brotherhood * * * [who] communicated all the time.” In fact, when
Eric’s cousin Tyler passed away, he consoled his friend and testified that he felt bad
about not attending the funeral. Guffie admitted that Eric recommended that he use
Lumpkin as his cameraman and even gave him the money to pay Lumpkin. Guffie
further admitted that he FaceTimed with Eric prior to and throughout the video
recording session. Accordingly, circumstantial evidence existed that proved that
Eric knew that Lumpkin was at the church that day.
Direct evidence was presented linking the Maple Heights murder with
the church shooting. Ballistic testing on shell casings revealed that the Springfield
firearm owned once by Tyler was fired at both the Maple Heights crime scene and
during the church shooting. Accordingly, the jury could infer that someone with a
connection to Tyler was involved in the church shooting. The state also presented evidence that Lumpkin identified Eric and
Guffie as the individuals that shot at him and Jamir. This evidence came in through
(1) Lumpkin’s own statements to police immediately following the shooting; (2) his
statements to police at the hospital, including that it was a “set up”; and (3) his
Instagram account conversations days after the shooting when he told friends that
“Ace wit da Cutta” was involved, identified Guffie through various photographs
taken from the internet, and posted Eric’s music video “Wassup,” where he said,
“Yup dem n***as,” in reference to who shot at him and Jamir. Accordingly, the jury
heard evidence that both Guffie and Eric were involved in the shooting.
Finally, the state presented direct evidence that Guffie was present at
the church with Lumpkin and Jamir and that Guffie discharged his firearm multiple
times, with at least one of the bullets striking Jamir in the buttock. The evidence
showed that the size of the entrance wound to Jamir’s buttock was similar in size to
the entrance wound in Jamir’s neck, which was the fatal wound. Lumpkin was also
shot during the incident, although no bullet was recovered from his shoulder or
back. Accordingly, there was no question that Guffie shot Jamir.
The state also presented sufficient evidence that Guffie tampered with
evidence by deleting his Instagram account and text messages and hiding the Glock
44 he owned and fired during the incident. The state presented sufficient evidence
that Guffie obstructed justice by lying to the officers on multiple occasions, including
about the location of where he discarded his firearm. Finally, sufficient evidence
was presented that he conspired with “unknown conspirators” because the state presented direct evidence that Eric West connected Guffie with Lumpkin, supplied
him with the funds to pay Lumpkin, and communicated with Guffie during the video
session and then immediately following the shooting. Viewing the evidence in favor
of the state, Guffie’s conduct in hiring Lumpkin, arranging to meet him at the
church, and then discharging his firearm during the ambush, constituted a
substantial overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Accordingly, we find that the direct and circumstantial evidence, and
any reasonable inferences that could be made therefrom, sufficiently supported
Guffie’s convictions. The first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
Guffie’s theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense when he
fired his weapon at an unknown masked gunman who was standing near Jamir, who
was lying on the ground. He said that he believed that he was in imminent danger
based on the look the masked gunman gave him. Guffie stated he fired at the ground
or the leg of the gunman because he was not trying to kill anyone (tr. 1429), but just
trying to escape the situation and defend himself. He stated that he did not intend
to shoot at or kill Jamir, only to defend himself from what he perceived to be a
dangerous situation.
Guffie contends in his second assignment of error that the trial court
erred by entering judgments of conviction that were against the manifest weight of
the evidence and in derogation of his right to due process of law, as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he contends that the state failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense when he discharged
his firearm, and thus the jury lost its way in determining that he did not act in self-
defense.
The state’s duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
did not act in self-defense is subject to a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review.
State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, ¶ 27.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
* * * Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517,
¶ 12, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. In a manifest-
weight analysis, the reviewing court sits as the “thirteenth juror” and reviews “‘the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins at id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717
(1st Dist.1983). The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised
only in exceptional cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
Thompkins at 386.
A trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of
each witness testifying at trial. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108371, 2020-Ohio- 3367, at ¶ 85; State v. Sheline, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106649, 2019-Ohio-528,
¶ 100. Thus, “[a] conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply
because the jury believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved the
defendant,” id., or the defendant’s theory of the case.
“Self-defense claims are generally an issue of credibility.” State v.
Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109328, 2021-Ohio-2037, ¶ 13. “Whether the state
disproves any of the elements of self-defense is left to the trier of fact to decide.”
State v. Davidson-Dixon, 2021-Ohio-1485, 170 N.E.3d 557, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), citing
State v. Morton, 147 Ohio App.3d 43, 2002-Ohio-813, 768 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 52 (8th
Dist.). The burden of proof lies with the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused did not use the force in self-defense if the evidence presented at
trial tends to support a self-defense claim. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). State v. Gardner,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110606, 2022-Ohio-381, ¶ 24.
In order to establish the inapplicability of self-defense, the state must
demonstrate that the defendant (1) was at fault in creating the situation giving rise
to the affray; (2) lacked a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm or that another means of escape from such danger existed
negating the need for the use of deadly force; or (3) violated a duty to retreat or avoid
the danger. Walker at ¶ 14, citing State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d
1056, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). Because of the cumulative nature of the elements of self-
defense, “the state need only disprove one of the elements of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial.” Walker at ¶ 13. Although the defense theorized that Eric used Guffie as an
unsuspecting pawn to set up Lumpkin, the jury chose to believe the state’s theory
that Guffie acted in concert with Eric to seek retribution against Lumpkin for the
death of Eric’s cousin Tyler. The evidence established that by Guffie connecting with
Lumpkin, leading him to an area where Eric or others knew he would be, Guffie
contributed to creating the situation giving rise to the affray. Accordingly, the state
satisfied its burden in disproving Guffie’s self-defense claim.
This court finds that the state’s evidence also established that Guffie
lacked a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm. First, by Guffie’s own admission, Jamir was shot and collapsed on the
ground, thereby presenting no danger to Guffie to use deadly force toward Jamir.
More importantly, however, is the sequence of events that occurred
that shows that Guffie lacked a bona fide belief of imminent danger regarding the
gunman. The evidence revealed that a group of masked men ambushed the
“unsuspecting” occupants of the church, initially shooting from the back of the
church by the front entrance where detectives discovered eleven 9 mm shell casings
on the right side of the aisle — the same side to which Guffie had moved immediately
prior to the shooting. Despite the rapid gunfire, only Jamir and Lumpkin were shot.
And despite Guffie seeing the masked gunman who had possibly just shot Jamir and
stood near his body, he never shot at Guffie. Rather, Guffie turned his back and
exited unscathed out the front doors of the church, which was not his closest exit. This evidence and Guffie’s actions do not demonstrate that he had a bona fide belief
of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
Guffie’s self-defense claim is also doubtful because he did not contact
police at any time after the shooting to report the ambush. Understandably, he was
apprehensive about involving himself in what appeared to be a “set up” or “hit,” but
Guffie knew that he had discharged his firearm and that video evidence would reveal
that he was at the church and that at least one person was shot. Accordingly, his
claim of self-defense should have outweighed any thought of being accused of
murder or attempted murder. By not coming forward and then lying to police about
his firearm, the jury and this court can reasonably conclude that Guffie was not
acting in self-defense when he discharged his firearm at the church.
This court, sitting as the “thirteenth juror,” has carefully reviewed the
entirety of the evidence presented at trial, and we conclude that the jury did not lose
its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Guffie guilty of murder
and attempted murder, despite his claim of self-defense. This is not the exceptional
case where the evidence weighs heavily against the jury’s verdict. Guffie’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
V. Transferred Intent — Self-Defense
Guffie contends in his third assignment of error that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to seek a jury instruction on
the issue of transferred intent or transferred justification self-defense. In his fourth assignment of error, Guffie contends that the trial court committed plain error by
failing to instruct the jury on transferred intent self-defense.
The doctrine of transferred intent is generally applied to culpability.
It provides that “where an individual is attempting to harm one person and as a
result accidentally harms another, the intent to harm the first person is transferred
to the second person and the individual attempting harm is held criminally liable as
if he both intended and did harm the same person.” State v. Jones, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 80737, 2002-Ohio-6045, ¶ 79.
Guffie asks this court to recognize the doctrine of transferred intent as
it applies to self-defense to award him a new trial based on a finding that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to seek a jury instruction on this doctrine or that the trial
court committed plain error in not instructing the jury on this doctrine. We decline
to do so under the facts presented and the arguments raised.
This court has not definitively held that the doctrine of transferred
intent applies to self-defense claims. See State v. Hurt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
110732, 2022-Ohio-2039, ¶ 71 (“[I]t is not clear that the doctrine of transferred
intent applies to self-defense.”); State v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112958,
2024-Ohio-1693, ¶ 47; State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2948, 2007-Ohio-
6331; but see State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio App.2d 284, 290 N.E.2d 921 (1st Dist.1972)
(applying the doctrine of transferred intent to self-defense claims). Under the facts
of this case, we cannot find that the trial court committed plain error in failing to
instruct the jury on transferred intent self-defense. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22 (Plain error is an obvious error or defect
in the trial court proceedings that affects a defendant’s substantial right and the
outcome of the trial.).
We find that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for the
same reason. Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel requires
that the defendant show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Nieves, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111161, 2022-Ohio-3040, ¶ 27, citing State
v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 109. Deficient
performance occurs when counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard
of reasonable representation. State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105000, 2017-
Ohio-7168, ¶ 23. Prejudice is found when “there is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). Because we find that Guffie cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel
rendered deficient performance, the two-part Strickland test cannot be satisfied.
State v. Hurst, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2014-02-004, 2014-Ohio-4890, ¶ 7 (failure
to satisfy one part of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other).
Although the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, defense
counsel did not seek an actual jury instruction on the issue of transferred intent or
transferred justification relating to self-defense. But a close review of the record
reveals that counsel advocated for the inclusion of the word “individuals” in the self- defense instruction provided to the jury. The instruction permitted the jury to
consider “the conduct of the individuals at the scene and decide whether their acts
or words caused the defendant to reasonably and honestly believe that the defendant
was about to be killed or receive great bodily harm.” (Tr. 1521.) This instruction
allowed the jury to consider all of the individuals on the scene and permitted the jury
to analyze how the actions of all persons, including the unknown masked gunman,
would have affected Guffie’s belief about the danger he faced.
In fact, throughout the trial and in closing arguments, defense counsel
focused his theory and arguments on Guffie’s claim that he acted in self-defense
when he discharged his firearm at the unknown gunman, but inadvertently shot
Jamir. Accordingly, although defense counsel did not seek an actual “transferred
intent self-defense” instruction, the instructions given, arguments made, and
evidence presented, implicitly permitted the jury to consider whether Guffie’s
actions were inadvertent or purposeful in light of the situation he perceived.
The state reminded the jury, however, that self-defense was not
available if Guffie was responsible for causing the affray, i.e., arranging the ruse with
Eric or other unknown conspirators. In fact, the jury did not find that Guffie had
acted in self-defense when he shot at the unknown masked gunman. It logically
flows that in order to find that transferred intent self-defense applies, the trier of
fact must first find that the defendant acted in self-defense. See Campbell, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 112958, 2024-Ohio-1693, at ¶ 47 (jury found appellant did not act
entirely in self-defense, thus counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a transferred intent self-defense instruction). For the reasons previously discussed,
the weight of the evidence suggested that Guffie did not act in self-defense when he
discharged his firearm inside of the church.
Based on the record, we find that Guffie was not deprived of effective
assistance of counsel and the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to
instruct the jury on transferred intent self-defense. Accordingly, Guffie’s third and
fourth assignment of errors are overruled.
VI. Evidentiary Rulings
In his fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error, Guffie
challenges certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court that he contends
deprived him of due process and a fair trial. We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling
on evidentiary issues absent an abuse of discretion and proof of material prejudice.
See State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 116.
A. Evid.R. 805 — Hearsay within Hearsay
During his cross-examination of Officer Sklarsky, Guffie attempted to
question him about a report he authored following officers interviewing Lumpkin at
the hospital. The state objected, contending that the report contained inadmissible
hearsay because Officer Sklarsky only drafted the report; he did not take the
statements from Lumpkin that were included in the report. The trial court sustained
the state’s objection, finding the report was “classic double hearsay.” (Tr. 657.)
Defense counsel proffered the report and its contents. The proffer
included exhibit B, which was Officer Sklarsky’s authored report. The report provided that Officer Pendleton spoke with Lumpkin at MetroHealth who told him
that
he and [Jamir] were shooting a music video when a black male who[m] he recognized. Lumpkin also stated, the male was started [sic] shooting at him and [Jamir] because they owe him money. Lumpkin stated, “It was a set up.” Lumpkin was uncooperative and would not share any further information. [Jamir] was also uncooperative and would not share any information of the incident.
(Tr. 655); Defendant’s Proffered Exhibit B.
Subsequently, during Sgt. Crivel’s testimony, Guffie attempted to
again introduce Lumpkin’s statement to Officer Pendleton when it was contained in
defendant’s proffered exhibit E, an ATF Crime-gun report. The trial court again
sustained the state’s objection.
Guffie contends in his fifth assignment of error that the trial court
deprived him of the fundamental right to present a defense as guaranteed under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, when the
trial court “mechanicalistically” applied the hearsay rule to defeat exculpatory
evidence.
Evid.R. 801 defines “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls
under an exception. Evid.R. 802. Hearsay within hearsay, or double hearsay, “is
not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception” to the hearsay rules. Evid.R. 805; State v. McKelton,
148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 183.
We find that Guffie has not satisfied his burden by demonstrating
error. He does not explain why the rules of hearsay do not apply or how each part
of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule; he just
contends that the rules should not be applied “mechanically to defeat the ends of
justice.”
Nevertheless, even if the statements made by Lumpkin to Officer
Pendleton were admissible, Guffie has not demonstrated material prejudice. The
statements Lumpkin made to Officer Pendleton indicated that (1) Lumpkin knew
the shooter; and (2) it was a set up. The fact that Lumpkin offered a “motive” — he
owed the shooter money — does not negate the fact that someone set him up. In
fact, Guffie told officers and testified that he believed the shooting occurred because
of a vendetta against the victims; the shooters were more focused on the
cameraman. (Tr. 1383; exhibit No. 700.) This information supports the state’s
theory of the case — Guffie conspired with Eric West or other unknown conspirators
to ambush Lumpkin in retribution. Accordingly, Guffie’s fifth assignment of error
is overruled.
B. Confrontation Clause — Lumpkin Does Not Testify
Officer DeMarco testified that Lumpkin appeared to have been shot
in the shoulder. He described Lumpkin’s demeanor as “like an adrenaline rush. He
was very, like, full of energy, excited, kind of erratic.” The jury watched video from Officer DeMarco’s body camera. The jury also observed Lumpkin’s demeanor and
heard him identify his vehicle parked on the street and tell the officers “it was just
us, they shot at us * ** “and I got the dude’s number, and he shot at me, I mean he
just * * * the dude just deleted his Instagram * * * his name is Ace.” (Exhibit No.
425.) Over objection, the state replayed that portion of the video. Officer DeMarco
stated that based on the information Lumpkin provided, officers learned that the
suspect’s nickname was “Ace.” Officer DeMarco’s body camera video was admitted
into evidence without objection.
In his sixth assignment of error, Guffie contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing Officer DeMarco’s testimony because it violated
hearsay rules and his right to confront witnesses. Although not reiterated in this
assignment of error, Guffie previously asserted that the state engaged in “victimless
prosecutions” where the victim does not testify at trial.
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the admission
of a testimonial out-of-court statement of a witness who does not appear at trial
violates the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of hearsay
statements that are not testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006); State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39, 2007-Ohio-
5637, 876 N.E.2d 534, ¶ 21. Indeed, where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, the
Confrontation Clause is not implicated at all and need not be considered. Cleveland
v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107930, 2019-Ohio-3286, ¶ 14, citing Whorton
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007).
Although it has not defined “testimonial,” in Crawford, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated generally that the core class of statements implicated by the
Confrontation Clause includes statements “made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.” Crawford at 52. “The Court found that at a minimum,
testimonial evidence includes prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial; and statements made during police interrogations.”
Johnson at ¶ 15, citing Crawford at 68; State v. Jones, 135 Ohio St.3d 10, 2012-Ohio-
5677, 984 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 144, citing Crawford at 68.
However, “‘not all those questioned by the police are witnesses and
not all “interrogations by law enforcement officers” * * * are subject to the
Confrontation Clause.’” State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112481, 2024-
Ohio-337, ¶ 24, quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 355, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179
L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), quoting Davis at 826. This court recently stated:
Whether statements to police officers are testimonial depends on the primary purpose of the interrogation. “[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. Further, police interrogations of witnesses and victims can be deemed nontestimonial after the initial encounter if an ongoing emergency exists. Id. An ongoing emergency can exist after the original threat to the victim has ceased to exist if there is a potential threat to the victim, police, or the public, or the victim needs emergency medical services. Bryant at 376. “[T]he Supreme Court has never defined the scope or weight of the ‘ongoing emergency.’” Woods v. Smith, 660 Fed.Appx. 414, 428 (6th Cir.2016). The outer bounds of what is considered an “ongoing emergency” is purposely not defined and is instead based on a “highly context-dependent inquiry.” Bryant at 363.
Williams at ¶ 25.
In this case, an ongoing emergency existed. Both Lumpkin and
Jamir were seriously injured after being shot inside the church. The perpetrator(s)
had not yet been identified and it was unknown whether the shooter(s) were still in
the area. A potential threat still existed to the victims, police, and the public.
Accordingly, we conclude that Lumpkin’s statements to the police “it was just us,
they shot at us * * * and I got the dude’s number, and he shot at me, I mean he just
* * * the dude just deleted his Instagram * * * his name is Ace,” was nontestimonial
because it was made in connection with an ongoing emergency, and thus did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.
Because Lumpkin’s statements are not testimonial, they are
admissible if they fall within a hearsay exception under the evidence rules.
Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112481, 2024-Ohio-337, at ¶ 35. In Williams, this
court stated, “The state’s evidentiary rules, however, are only applicable if the
statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” “Whenever the state seeks to introduce hearsay into a criminal proceeding, the court must determine not only whether the evidence fits within an exception, but also whether the introduction of such evidence offends an accused’s right to confront witnesses against him.”
Id., quoting State v. Powell, 2019-Ohio-4345, 134 N.E.3d 1270, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Kilbane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99485, 2014-Ohio-1228, ¶ 29; see
also State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 60, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).
At the outset, Guffie contends that none of the exceptions to the
hearsay rules exist. We disagree. Lumpkin’s statement to police was admissible, at
the very least, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rules. Hearsay
is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R.
801(C). Such statements are inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule
applies. Evid.R. 802.
One such exception is an excited utterance, which is defined as “a
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of the excitement caused by the event or condition.” Evid.R. 803(2).
“The rationale for the admission of these statements is that the shock of the event
causes the declarant’s reflective process to be halted. Thus, the statement is unlikely
to have been fabricated and carries a high degree of trustworthiness.” State v.
Butcher, 170 Ohio App.3d 52, 2007-Ohio-118, 866 N.E.2d 13, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.).
For a statement to fall within the excited utterance exception, four
elements must be satisfied: (1) a startling event; and (2) a statement relating to that event; (3) made by a declarant with firsthand knowledge; (4) while the declarant was
under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. State v. Smith, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 112880, 2024-Ohio-963, ¶ 14, citing State v. Shutes, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105694, 2018-Ohio-2188, ¶ 36, citing State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d
106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 123.
A statement may be an excited utterance even if it is not made strictly
contemporaneously with the startling event. State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215,
219, 373 N.E.2d 1234 (1978). There is no per se length of time after which a
statement may no longer be considered to be an excited utterance. State v. Taylor,
66 Ohio St.3d 295, 303, 612 N.E.2d 316 (1993). Thus, the passage of time between
the event and the statement is relevant but not dispositive. Id. “Each case must be
decided on its own merits, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an
inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made
in order that it be termed a spontaneous declaration.” Duncan at 219-220. “The
central requirements are that the statement must be made while the declarant is
under the stress of the event, and the statement may not be a result of reflective
thought.” Shutes at ¶ 37, citing Taylor at 303.
There is no question that Lumpkin was still under the stress of the
excitement caused by the shooting when he told officers that “it was just us, they
shot at us * * * and I got the dude’s number, and he shot at me, I mean he just * * *
the dude just deleted his Instagram * * * his name is Ace.” Officer DeMarco
described, and the jury observed, Lumpkin’s demeanor as “like an adrenaline rush. He was very, like, full of energy, excited, kind of erratic.” Additionally, other body
camera evidence showed Lumpkin extremely furious and threatening revenge,
potentially implicating himself. Accordingly, we cannot say that Lumpkin made
these statements with reflective thought.
Even if Lumpkin’s statement somehow violated Guffie’s right to
confront witnesses or was inadmissible hearsay, the error was harmless because
Lumpkin later identified “Ace” at the hospital and the other individuals involved.
Additionally, Lumpkin’s Instagram account history, which was not objected to,
included statements that Guffie was involved and shot at them. Finally, Guffie
testified that he was at the church, deleted his Instagram conversations with
Lumpkin, and admitted to discharging his firearm. Accordingly, when Lumpkin
told police immediately following the shooting, the information was cumulative to
other admissible evidence. Guffie’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
C. Rap Lyrics
Sgt. Crivel testified that during the search extraction of Guffie’s
phone, rap lyrics were found in the “Notes” App that were composed hours after the
shooting. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to prevent the state
from introducing these lyrics, contending that the lyrics were unfairly prejudicial.
The lyrics of this song are as follows:
Dis dat killa Dis dat smooth talkin a** gangsta sh*t. Lil boy mind yo biness, yo best interest, we be flaming sh*t. I come from bendin dem Conrad, send em a message, but n***as ain’t sayin sh*t. Just pull up and airing sh*t out. Thought I been told yaw n***as dis dangerous.
Trappin dat sh*t out da whip. You know I stay wit a Glock and a zip. Say no names inside dis sh*t, but n***as know who do dem hits. You associated wit em so now you part of da lick. Don’t f*ck wit n***as regardless cuz dats how yo ass get blitzed. (FAH, FAH)
Ain’t no getting back. Point em out, we hittin dat. Said you down to catch dat body, but bitch can you sit wit dat?? Pleeeeease don’t move foul, or I’m aiming where yo ceiling at. Buuuuuss dat sh*t down, like a Rolly, ain’t no tick wit dat. (Clock noise)
n***as weird. They do anything fa fame. Most dese n***as don’t get money, dats no cap, this some free game. Yo lil bra been actin different every since they hit dat stain. But he gangsta in his music doe.... dat sh*t strange, huh??
F*ck wit da gang (OSB SH*T) F*ck wit da gang (OSB SH*T) How yo pull up wit a n***a den turn round and leave em to hang?? (N***A WHAT) [N***a] we bang. (DATS OOOON ME) [N***a] we bang. (DATS OOOON ME) Sh*t a hit different I tell em to “freeze”, I ain’t Johnny dang. (OH MY GOD)
(Exhibit No. 443.)
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding the
analysis in Montague v. Maryland, 471 Md. 657, 243 A.3d 546 (2020), instructive. The court therefore concluded that “the probative value outweighs the prejudicial
value there. There’s a close nexus to the details of the alleged crime, and it’s a close
time nexus as well, which tends to prove defendant’s involvement.” (Tr. 176.)
Over the defense’s repeated objections that the lyrics spoke for
themselves, Sgt. Crivel testified during trial about these rap lyrics. And although the
court sustained a majority of the objections and asked Sgt. Crivel to not offer his own
meaning to the lyrics, the state continued questioning him about his interpretation
of what certain lyrics meant. This continued until the court asked the state to “move
on.” (Tr. 1119.)
Sgt. Crivel testified that he found the lyrics significant because they
were written approximately two hours after the shooting occurred and that it started
with the phrase, “Dis Dat Killa.” (Tr. 1114.) He further described certain lyrics that
related to specific facts of the shooting. Sgt. Crivel noted that Guffie used the phrase
that he “stay with a Glock,” which he found significant because Guffie admitted to
carrying a Glock and firing it on the day of the shooting. (Tr. 1115.) Next, he said
that the line, “you associated wit em so now you part of da lick” drew his attention.
Id. He described that a “lick” is “typically a robbery or a hit, or * * * organized
criminal activity. So the line is saying [i]f you’re associated with them, you’re part
of it.” Id.
Sgt. Crivel also focused on Guffie’s use of the term “blitzed” in the
rap, and reminded the jury that Guffie used the term “blitzed” in both of his
interviews with police, describing how the masked gunmen rushed into the church firing their guns. (Tr. 1116-1117.) He stated that this added to his suspicions that the
rap lyrics were directly referencing the shooting that had occurred. Id. Sgt. Crivel
also remarked on the words “airing something out,” which he deduced to mean, “to
put holes into something * * * shooting bullets.” Id. Sgt. Crivel also referenced the
lines, “point em out, we hittin dat,” and “Pleeeeease don’t move foul, or I’m aiming
where yo ceiling at.” Id. Lastly, he testified that the lyrics, “[h]ow yo pull up wit a
n***a den turn round and leave em to hang??” resonated with the evidence that
Lumpkin and Jamir had arrived together, but once the first shots were fired,
Lumpkin ran away from his friend. (Tr. 1118-1119.)
Guffie was asked during his own testimony about the lyrics found on
his phone. He did not attempt to offer his own explanation about the lyrics but
stated that he generally wrote lyrics about how he is feeling (tr. 1387) or “just stuff
that I was observing in the streets. Like I said, I been dealing with it since 13 on to
my adult years, so I kind of have a lot to talk about.” (Tr. 1388.) When questioned
directly, he stated that the lyrics did “not reference the church shooting” and it was
“no particular significance.” (Tr. 1386-1388.) On cross-examination, he denied that
the rap lyrics were a “statement,” but was rather “a general song.” (Tr. 1465.)
Guffie contends in this seventh assignment of error that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his rap lyrics because they were
far more prejudicial than probative of any issue in question, resulting in a
deprivation of his due process right to a fair trial. He summarily contends that the
rap lyrics were irrelevant, and that even if they were relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, outweighed the probative
value. In support, Guffie references no Ohio case law, but cites only to Nevada and
New Jersey case law that held that rap lyrics are often less than truthful accountings
of criminal activity and are highly prejudicial because they contain inflammatory
language that can be distasteful thus risk poisoning a jury. Holmes v. State, 129 Nev.
567, 306 P.3d 415 (2013); State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 95 A.3d 236 (2014).
Under Evid.R. 402, only relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence is
considered relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. Nevertheless, even relevant
evidence “is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Evid.R. 403(A). Further, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evid.R. 403(B). “Unfair prejudice” is “that
quality of evidence that might result in an improper basis for a jury decision.” State
v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 24. Therefore,
evidence that “‘arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or
appeals to an instinct to punish’” may be unfairly prejudicial. Oberlin v. Akron Gen.
Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 743 N.E.2d 890 (2001), quoting Weissenberger’s
Ohio Evidence, Section 403.3, 85-87 (2000). Evidence that is unfairly prejudicial
“appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than intellect.” Id. This court has not considered the admissibility of defendant-
authored rap lyrics in this context where the state is attempting to use the lyrics as a
statement by the defendant or a confession. Other courts in Ohio, however, have
addressed song lyrics, including those that appear in rap form.
In State v. Lee, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160294, 2017-Ohio-7377,
the First District found no error in the trial court’s admission of a “Note” found on
the defendant’s phone that contained rap lyrics, written two hours before the
robbery, which referenced a robbery and needing money. The Lee Court found that
the lyrics were not overly prejudicial because “[t]he subject of the note and its
temporal proximity to [the] robbery is sufficient to demonstrate its probative value.”
Id. at ¶ 10
In State v. Dunn, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00137, 2009-Ohio-
1688, ¶ 131, the court concluded that Dunn’s rap lyrics found in a notebook was a
“confession” because the words and lyrics the defendant used mirrored the wounds
the victim suffered.
In State v. Copley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-511, 2005-Ohio-
896, the Tenth District held that the trial court properly admitted the defendant’s
notepad that contained lyrics the defendant agreed pertained to the victim’s death.
The court found that the lyrics “expound[ed] on [the defendant’s] mental state at
the time he shot [the victim]” and that “aspects of the lyrics rebut [the defendant’s]
self-defense claim.” Id. at ¶ 30. The court also rejected the defendant’s contention
that the lyrics’ probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, noting that the lyrics “vividly describe[d] the shooting and his reactions” and were
“nothing more than [the defendant’s] own version of events surrounding the
shooting.” Id. at ¶ 33.
We find, much like the trial court, Montague, 471 Md. 657, 243 A.3d
546, instructive. In Montague, the court discussed at length the admissibility and
prejudicial effect of rap lyrics authored by a defendant. The court started with the
basic framework set forth in Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339, 23 A.3d 192 (2011),
wherein the court established and held that the admissibility of rap lyrics as
impeachment evidence can be unfairly prejudicial because of the potential to
highlight a defendant’s propensity for violence. The court noted:
we agree with the distinction between the admissibility of rap lyrics that include “statements of historical fact” and those that are “works of fiction.” Indeed, some rap lyrics — and other artistic expressions — that have a close nexus to the details of an alleged crime should be admitted if they are relevant and survive a weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice.
Id. at 679-680, quoting Hannah at 348. After reviewing out-of-state cases, the court
established two guiding principles: (1) even when probative, rap lyric evidence has
inherent prejudicial effect, and; (2) the probative value of rap lyric evidence may
outweigh that prejudicial effect when lyrics bear a close nexus to the details of the
alleged crime. Id. at 687.
Applying its “nexus” test, the Montague Court concluded that the
defendant’s jailhouse rap lyrics were admissible as substantive evidence that the
defendant shot and killed the victim. The court found that a “close factual nexus exist[ed]” between the lyrics and the details of the victim’s murder, including word
choice and usage. The court also found that because the lyrics were recorded less
than a year after the murder and three weeks before trial, “their close temporal
nexus to the crime further[ed] their probative value as substantive evidence of [the
defendant’s] guilt.” Id. at 693-694.
We find that based on the foregoing, lyrics to a song, whether in the
form of a rap or other poetic style, can be insightful tools as to how a person is feeling
during that given moment, or can be entirely works of fiction. See State v. Rohde,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26087, 2014-Ohio-5580 (determined the poem of a child
in a sex abuse case was more fictional).7 Accordingly, poems or lyrics can be very
relevant, depending on the circumstances.
A danger can exist, however, when these words are used for an
improper purpose. See Skinner (state’s use of rap lyrics as other acts evidence held
7 In Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 499, 95 A.3d 236, the court discussed the problems in
interpreting lyrics and other artistic expressions, by noting,
In assessing the probative value of defendant’s fictional lyrics, the Court notes that probative evidence may not be found in an individual’s artistic endeavors absent a strong nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the offense for which the evidence is being adduced. The Court explains that the difficulty in identifying probative value in fictional or other forms of artistic self-expressive endeavors is that one cannot presume that, simply because an author has chosen to write about certain topics, he or she has acted in accordance with those views. One would not presume that Bob Marley, who wrote the well-known song “I Shot the Sheriff,” actually shot a sheriff, or that Edgar Allan Poe buried a man beneath his floorboards, as depicted in his short story “The Tell-Tale Heart,” simply because of their respective artistic endeavors on those subjects. The Court reasons that defendant’s lyrics should receive no different treatment. improper); State v. Evans, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-594, 2001-Ohio-8860
(examined whether a rap poem admitted solely for handwriting comparison was
unfairly prejudicial).
Another danger is what interpretation the reader, who brings in their
own experiences or motivations, gives to those lyrics, certain words, or phrases.8
Accordingly, we find that the trial court was correct in its attempt to limit Sgt.
Crivel’s testimony regarding his interpretation of Guffie’s lyrics.
In this case, whether Guffie’s lyrics qualify as a confession, as the
state suggests, is questionable. But based on the rationale in Lee, Copley, and
Montague, this court finds that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
the state to introduce the lyrics into evidence because of the temporal nexus between
when the lyrics were written — two hours after the shooting — and the words and
phrases Guffie used.
During his testimony, Guffie’s counsel questioned him about the
lyrics and their content. He had every opportunity to explain the context of the
8 In State v. Lavender, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230042, 2024-Ohio-229, ¶ 32, the
defendant sought postconviction relief, contending that counsel failed to adequately explain or mitigate his inculpatory text messages. In support, the defendant submitted the affidavit of Law Professor Andrea Dennis, whose research focused on “the ways in which rap lyrics, hip-hop, and more recently, social media are used as evidence by prosecutors in criminal trials.” In her affidavit, Professor Dennis opined that an expert in African-American Vernacular English should have been used to help the jury understand the defendant’s text messages. For example, she pointed to the state’s interpretation of the defendant’s text that said, “You got some money I can hold.” She stated that the state provided testimony at trial that that text meant the defendant was “asking for money to have” but Professor Dennis said that text would more correctly be interpreted as asking for money to borrow. lyrics, why he used certain words, his interpretation of phrases, and the ultimate
meaning behind the lyrics. Instead, he stated that the lyrics “were not about the
church shooting,” and were “no particular significance.” (Tr. 1386.) It was within
the province of the jury to believe or disbelieve Guffie while keeping in mind that
Guffie used the term “blitzed” and penned the lyrics within hours after the shooting
where Guffie stated that he feared for his life to justify the use of deadly force. A
reasonable juror could believe that the rap was Guffie’s reflection of the event that
occurred, whether he was part of the plan or not.
Even if the court erred in admitting the lyrics or permitting Sgt.
Crivel to offer his interpretation of those lyrics, the error would be harmless because
it would not have affected the outcome of the case. See Crim.R. 52(A) (unless the
error, defect, irregularity, or variance affects a defendant’s substantial rights thereby
causing prejudice, it shall be disregarded.) Other admissible evidence was presented
that permitted the jury to find Guffie culpable, including deleted texts, the money
transaction, FaceTime calls with Eric, Guffie lying to the police on multiple
occasions regarding his firearm, and that he had shot Jamir at least once.
Accordingly, this court finds that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the state to introduce the rap lyrics discovered on Guffie’s
cell phone that he penned just hours after the shooting at the church. The seventh
assignment of error is overruled. D. Maple Heights Murder Connection
Maple Heights Detective Andrew Sperie testified about Tyler’s
murder that occurred in Maple Heights on July 5, 2021, two weeks before the church
shooting. He stated that Tyler and Eric were cousins. Over objection, Det. Sperie
stated that during his investigation he learned that Lumpkin’s silver Mercedes C350,
identified in surveillance videos, was the vehicle suspected of being involved in
Tyler’s murder and that Lumpkin was a “person of interest.” Also, over objection,
Det. Sperie stated that there was an “NIBN [National Integrated Ballistic Imaging
Network] match between [the Maple Heights] case and the [church shooting] case,”
and he gave Sgt. Crivel the shell casings recovered from the Maple Heights crime
scene. On cross-examination, Det. Sperie admitted that Tyler’s murder was
unsolved, no one had been charged, and that Guffie was not connected to Tyler’s
murder.
The defense further objected to Kooser’s testimony about his ballistic
examination and comparison of shell casings found at the church and those
recovered from the Maple Heights homicide. Kooser stated that ten of the shell
casings from the church shooting matched three of the shell casings from the Maple
Heights crime scene and that all 13 were fired from the Springfield firearm that Tyler
had owned.
In his eighth assignment of error, Guffie contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the unprosecuted murder of Tyler in Maple Heights, and a ballistic “match” between the Maple Heights scene and the
Cleveland scene, resulting in a deprivation of his due process right to a fair trial.
Guffie first contends without explanation that the evidence was
improper Evid.R. 404(B) evidence. This court does not find that Det. Sperie’s
testimony or the ballistic evidence qualifies as Evid.R. 404(B) evidence because it
does not implicate Guffie in any way — it was not improper character evidence, nor
was it introduced as other crimes or prior acts involving Guffie. Accordingly, this
argument is without merit.
Guffie next contends that the evidence was irrelevant, lacked
foundation, and thus inadmissible. Under Evid.R. 402, only relevant evidence is
admissible. Evidence is considered relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401.
The evidence presented by Det. Sperie was relevant under Evid.R.
401. Guffie was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and/or felonious assault
under R.C. 2923.01(A)(1). In order to prove conspiracy, the state was required to
prove, in part, that Guffie planned or aided in the planning of a murder and/or
felonious assault with the purpose to commit the aforementioned crimes or that he
promoted the facilitation of said crimes. R.C. 2923.01(A)(1). Additionally, Guffie
was charged (although later acquitted) with aggravated murder under R.C.
2903.01(A), which required the state to prove that Guffie purposely, and with prior
calculation and design, caused Jamir’s death We find that Det. Sperie’s testimony was relevant because it
explained the chain of custody of the shell casings collected in Maple Heights;
demonstrated how Kooser was able to make the connection between Tyler’s firearm
and the two crime scenes; and connected Lumpkin’s vehicle at both scenes. All of
this evidence was probative and relevant to demonstrate Guffie’s connection with
his unindicted co-conspirator(s) and their intent to harm or kill Lumpkin and Jamir.
The testimony and evidence introduced through Det. Sperie was relevant.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of
Tyler’s murder and the ballistic evidence associated with that investigation. Guffie’s
eighth assignment of error is overruled.
VII. Jury Instruction — Flight
In his ninth assignment of error, Guffie contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in giving the jury an instruction on “flight,” thereby resulting
in a deprivation of his due process right to a fair trial.
The giving of jury instructions is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and we review it for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dunn, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 101648, 2015-Ohio-3138, ¶ 48.
In this case, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury
on flight:
Now, “consciousness of guilt,” “flight.” Testimony has been admitted indicating that the defendant fled the scene. You are instructed that the fact that the defendant fled the scene does not raise a presumption of guilt, but it may tend to indicate the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. If you find that the facts do not support that the defendant fled the scene, or if you find that some other motive prompted the defendant’s conduct, or if you are unable to decide what the defendant’s motivation was, then you should not consider the evidence — this evidence for any other purpose.
However, if you find that the facts support that the defendant engaged in such conduct, and if you decide that the defendant was motivated by a consciousness of guilt, you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence in deciding whether the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. You alone will determine what weight, if any, to give to this.
(Tr. 1523-1524.)
“‘“[A] mere departure from the scene of the crime is not to be
confused with deliberate flight from the area in which the suspect is normally to be
found.”’” Dunn at ¶ 51, quoting State v. Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95516,
2011-Ohio-3058, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Norwood, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 96-L-089
and 96-L-090, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4420 (Sept. 30, 1997). It must be clear that
the defendant took affirmative steps to avoid detection and apprehension beyond
simply not remaining at the scene of the crime. Dunn at ¶ 52.
Guffie’s mere departure from the scene was insufficient to trigger the
flight instruction. However, Guffie took additional affirmative steps to avoid
detection and his involvement in the shooting — disposing of his firearm, deleting
social media conversations and text messages, and lying to police. See Hurt, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110732, 2022-Ohio-2039, at ¶ 75 (flight instruction proper when
defendant made a deliberate attempt to conceal evidence and evade detection, and
despite asserting self-defense he did not turn himself in). Accordingly, the flight
instruction was proper. Even if this court were to find that the instruction was not warranted,
we cannot say, nor has Guffie demonstrated, that the error was prejudicial. “A
reviewing court may not reverse a conviction in a criminal case due to jury
instructions unless it is clear that the jury instructions constituted prejudicial error.”
State v. McKibbon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010145, 2002-Ohio-2041, ¶ 27, citing
State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 154, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). In order to
determine whether an erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial, a reviewing court
must examine the jury instructions as a whole. State v. Harry, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2008-01-013, 2008-Ohio-6380, ¶ 36, citing State v. Van Gundy, 64 Ohio St.3d
230, 233-234, 594 N.E.2d 604 (1992). “A jury instruction constitutes prejudicial
error where it results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Hancock, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2007-03-042, 2008-Ohio-5419, ¶ 13. Conversely, “[a]ny error,
defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.” Crim.R. 52(A).
Reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we cannot say that the
trial court’s instruction on flight was prejudicial, such that a manifest miscarriage of
justice occurred. The instruction given allowed the jury to make its own conclusions
on flight and to consider Guffie’s motivation for leaving. In fact, Guffie testified and
explained why he did not stay at the scene until police arrived and why he did not
immediately contact police. Furthermore, the jury heard Guffie explain to Sgt.
Crivel during his July 24, 2021 interview that he was not comfortable calling them,
even when he needed assistance. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in giving a flight jury instruction or that it constituted
prejudicial error if wrongfully given. Guffie’s ninth assignment of error is overruled.
VIII. Cumulative Effect
Guffie contends in his tenth assignment of error that the cumulative
effect of multiple errors at trial, even if singularly not sufficient to warrant reversal,
together deprived him of a fair trial and a denial of due process.
Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed
when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even
though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not individually
constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577,
971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 223. We have found no unfairly prejudicial error. Thus, the
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply to this case, and we overrule this
assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2024 Ohio 2163, 245 N.E.3d 448, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-guffie-ohioctapp-2024.