[Cite as State v. Guerra, 2023-Ohio-2920.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT PUTNAM COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 12-23-01 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ERIC JORDAN GUERRA, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Putnam County Municipal Court Trial Court No. 2022 CRB 00155
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 21, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Austin C. Buchholz for Appellant
Nicole M. Smith for Appellee Case No. 12-23-01
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric J. Guerra (“Guerra”) appeals the judgment of
the Putnam County Municipal Court, alleging that his conviction is not supported
by sufficient evidence; that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence; and that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. For
the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} After a birthday party on June 18, 2022, A. went to her cousin’s house
for a sleepover. Her cousin’s mother was Erin T. (“Erin”). However, A. ended up
going with her cousin over to Guerra’s house at roughly 6:00 P.M. for the purpose
of babysitting Guerra’s children. Guerra and his wife, Taylor Guerra (“Taylor”),
went to a community function. When Guerra came home late at night, A. was
watching a movie with her cousin. Guerra asked if they wanted to join the adults at
a bonfire in the backyard. A. and her cousin declined this invitation, opting instead
to finish their movie.
{¶3} After the movie was over, A. fell asleep on the couch in Guerra’s living
room with a blanket on top of her. A. testified that Guerra woke her up at roughly
3:00 A.M. to tell her that he had taken A.’s cousin home. Guerra then went back
outside to tend to the bonfire. Shortly thereafter, Guerra returned to the living room.
A. testified that he asked if he could sit on the couch and watch some television. A.
then made room for Guerra to sit on the couch.
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{¶4} A. testified that, while Guerra was watching the television, he moved
closer to where she was lying down on the couch, reached under the blanket, and
touched her leg. She affirmed that “his hand began to slide up her leg” and testified
that she “felt like something go up [her] * * * leg and grab her right butt cheek.”
(Tr. 23). She testified that no one else was on the couch beside her and that she
pushed Guerra’s hand away from her body. (Tr. 44-45). A. stated that Guerra then
got up and went to the bathroom.
{¶5} A. indicated that, when he returned from the restroom, he “got behind”
her on the couch “like he was giving [her] * * * a bear hug.” (Tr. 46). She testified
that Guerra then began to slide his hand down her shirt towards her breast. She
affirmed that he “touch[ed] the top part of her breast” and that she pushed his hand
away a second time. (Tr. 47). Guerra then sat back up on the couch next to her.
{¶6} A. testified that Guerra then tried a third time to touch her, putting his
hand on her side. After she pushed his hand away for the third time, Guerra went
upstairs and did not attempt to touch her again. A. testified that she then deliberated
about what course of action to take. She did not have her cell phone with her to
contact anyone about this situation. A. ultimately chose to remain on the couch
because another one of her cousins was in the house and she wanted to make sure
her cousin was protected.
{¶7} Later in the morning of June 19, 2019, A. noticed that Guerra had a
security camera in the living room when she saw Taylor repositioning it. A. testified
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that the camera had been turned towards the wall, but after Taylor had adjusted it,
the camera was facing the couch where A. had been sleeping in the living room. A.
was then picked up from Guerra’s house by Erin. On the drive to Erin’s house, A.
shared that she had “felt very uncomfortable” at Guerra’s house and that Guerra had
touched her inappropriately. (Tr. 28). However, she did not disclose the remainder
of her allegations.
{¶8} A’s father, Gabriel T. (“Gabriel”), picked her up at Erin’s house and
then drove with her to a community event in town. Shortly after they had arrived at
the event, Gabriel noticed that A. seemed “really off.” (Tr. 56). A. then began to
cry and disclosed all of her allegations. Gabriel testified that, in this timeframe, A.
was “[h]ysterical, just crying.” (Tr. 64).
{¶9} Gabriel then took A. to the police department where she spoke with
Officer Scott Harshman (“Officer Harshman”). On June 22, 2022, Officer
Harshman contacted Guerra, who denied touching A. inappropriately and suggested
that A. had a nightmare while she was sleeping at his house. Guerra initially denied
having cameras in his living room but later reported that the cameras had been
unplugged. On June 23, 2022, A. sat for an interview at Children’s Services
Department at Putnam County Job and Family Services with Michelle Schumacher
(“Schumacher”).
{¶10} On August 8, 2022, Guerra was charged with one count of sexual
imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4), a third-degree misdemeanor. A.,
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Gabriel, Officer Harshman, Schumacher, and Taylor testified at a bench trial on
January 24, 2023. The Defense called Erin to testify as a witness, but she was not
present by that point during the trial. After considering the evidence, the trial court
found Guerra guilty of the charge against him. On February 16, 2023, the trial court
issued its judgment entry of sentencing.
{¶11} Guerra filed his notice of appeal on February 21, 2023. On appeal, he
raises the following four assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence presented at trial.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial.
Third Assignment of Error
Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when Counsel failed [to] request a recess in order to locate Appellant’s witness when Appellant’s witness was unable to be found.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) on the Sexual Imposition charge and thereafter entering a judgment of conviction on this offense [that] was not supported by sufficient evidence.
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{¶12} Guerra argues that his conviction for sexual imposition is not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Legal Standard
{¶13} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of
production at trial.” State v. Gear, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-22-03, 2023-Ohio-
1246, ¶ 13, quoting In re Swift, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79610, 2002-Ohio-1276, ¶
19. This analysis “addresses the question of whether adequate evidence was
produced for the case to be considered by the trier of fact and, thus, whether the
evidence was ‘legally sufficient to support the verdict * * *.’” State v. Barga, 3d
Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-14, 2018-Ohio-2804, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Worthington, 3d
Dist. Hardin No. 6-15-04, 2016-Ohio-530, ¶ 12.
{¶14} “An appellate court is not to examine whether the evidence presented
should be believed but should rather ‘examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wilson, 2022-Ohio-504,
185 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 57 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274, 574
N.E.2d 492 (1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds,
State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). On
appeal, the applicable standard of review “is whether, after viewing the evidence in
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the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-19, 2018-Ohio-899, ¶ 27,
quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 62 (3d Dist.).
{¶15} To establish a conviction for sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.06(A)(4), the State must establish that the defendant
ha[d] sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * [t]he other person * * * is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of such person, and the offender is at least eighteen years of age and four or more years older than such other person.
R.C. 2907.06(A)(4). The Ohio Revised Code defines “sexual contact” as follows:
any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.
R.C. 2907.01(B). The State need not produce direct testimony to establish the
contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v Lewis, 3d Dist.
Van Wert No. 2-98-1, 2020-Ohio-6894, ¶ 25. “The requisite purpose ‘may be
discerned from the type, nature, and circumstances of the contact * * *.’” Id.,
quoting State v. Uhler, 80 Ohio App.3d 113, 123, 608 N.E.2d 1091 (9th Dist. 1992).
{¶16} Further, R.C. 2907.06(B) states that a person may not be convicted of
sexual imposition “solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other
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evidence.” Thus, the State must produce some corroborative evidence. State v.
Lieurance, 3d Dist. Auglaize Nos. 2-12-21 and 2-12-23, 2013-Ohio-3875, ¶ 27.
Legal Analysis
{¶17} Under this assignment of error, Guerra raises two main arguments.
First, he asserts that the State did not establish that he was eighteen years old and
more than four years older than A. at the time of this offense. At trial, A. gave her
date of birth and testified that she was fourteen. Taylor then testified that she had
been married to Guerra for five years. This would indicate that he is over the age
of eighteen. Further, for Guerra to have been married for five years, he would also
have to be more than five years older than A. The trial testimony also indicates that
Guerra was able to drive; had four children; and had been drinking alcohol. A. also
describes Guerra as being one of the “adults.” (Tr. 16). Gabriel testified that he and
Guerra “grew up together.” (Tr. 65). Based on this evidence, we conclude that the
State produced some evidence to substantiate the age-related elements of the offense
of sexual imposition. Thus, Guerra’s first argument is without merit.
{¶18} Second, Guerra argues that the State did not produce evidence that the
alleged contact was motivated by the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
However, during her trial testimony, A. indicated that Guerra sat down next to her;
put his hand under the blanket covering her; reached up her leg; and grabbed the
right area of her buttocks. A. stated that she pushed his hand away from her body.
She then testified that Guerra left the couch to go to the bathroom but later returned
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to where she was on the couch. A. indicated that Guerra laid alongside her, giving
her a “bear hug.” (Tr. 46). She stated that he then reached under the blanket; down
her shirt; and touched the upper region of her breast. A. stated that she again pushed
his hand away from her body and that he moved away from her.
{¶19} A.’s trial testimony indicates that, to touch her buttocks and the upper
portion of her breast, Guerra had to sit down next to her on the couch; reach under
a blanket; get underneath her clothes; and move his hand across portions of her
body. After he touched her buttocks, he left the living room before returning to the
couch and reaching down her shirt to touch the upper area of her breast. This
testimony suggests that he was intentionally seeking to make contact with these
erogenous zones of A.’s body. A. also affirmed that, in touching these areas, he
“slid” his hand across her leg and down her shirt. (Tr. 45, 47). She also testified
that he positioned himself around her body when he reached down her shirt to make
contact with her breast, affirming that he gave her a “bear hug.” (Tr. 46).
{¶20} Further, A. testified that, after Guerra first touched an erogenous zone
of her body, she pushed his hand away to signal that this contact was unwanted.
However, he put his hands on her two more times before he went to bed, prompting
A. to push his hands away from her body on both occasions. Based on the
circumstances surrounding the contact that Guerra made with these erogenous zones
of A.’s body, a rational trier of fact could infer that he acted with the purpose of
attaining sexual arousal or gratification. See State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Auglaize No.
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2-98-1, 1998 WL 405906, *3 (July 22, 1998); State v. Adams, 5th Dist. Licking No.
02-CA-00043, 2002-Ohio-5953, ¶ 23. Thus, Guerra’s second argument is without
merit.
{¶21} Having examined the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude some evidence was produced at trial from which the trial
court could determine that Guerra was over eighteen years old and more than four
years older than A. Further, we also conclude that some evidence was produced at
trial from which the trial court could determine that Guerra had acted with the
purpose of seeking sexual arousal or gratification. For these reasons, Guerra has
failed to demonstrate that his conviction is not supported by legally sufficient
evidence. Thus, his first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Guerra argues that his conviction for sexual imposition is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶23} “In a manifest weight analysis, ‘an appellate court determines whether
the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion.’” State v. Richey, 2021-
Ohio-1461, 170 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Blanton, 121 Ohio
App.3d 162, 169, 699 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1997). “Unlike our review of the
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight
of the evidence is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence
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supports the verdict.” Plott, supra, at ¶ 73. Thus, “the appellate court sits as a
‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.” State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-
2916, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997). On appeal, courts
must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’
State v. Brentlinger, 2017-Ohio-2588, 90 N.E.3d 200, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting
Thompkins at 387.
{¶24} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate
discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.” State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only
in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’
should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-
Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d
67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.
{¶25} We herein reincorporate our review of the evidence presented in the
sufficiency analysis and proceed to examine the evidence presented by the Defense.
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At trial, Officer Harshman stated that he heard two inconsistencies between A.’s
disclosure to him at the police station and her trial testimony. First, A. had told him
previously that she told Guerra “no” when he was touching her. In her trial
testimony, she indicated that she did not give him verbal commands but just pushed
his hand away. On redirect examination, A. indicated that she pushed Guerra’s hand
away as a way of letting him know she did not want him to touch her. Second,
Officer Harshman said, “My understanding when she told me that he went up under
her shirt * * * versus her stating [at trial that] Eric [Guerra] went down.” (Tr. 91).
He indicated that her statements were otherwise consistent. Schumacher was
questioned about this second inconsistency and affirmed that she did not see any
“substantive difference” between “saying that he went up the shirt, under the shirt,
or in the shirt * * *.” (Tr. 112).
{¶26} On cross-examination, A. testified that, when she mentioned Guerra
touching her inappropriately, Erin said nothing in response. A. explained that she
did not disclose all of the allegations to Erin because she did not trust her. On cross-
examination, Gabriel testified that Erin did not mention A. had told her that Guerra
had inappropriately touched her. He testified that A. was not acting abnormally
during the drive to the community event but that he noticed her behavior seemed off
while they were at the event.
{¶27} The Defense called Taylor as a witness. She testified that A. was over
at their house for a birthday party; that A. babysat their children while they were at
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a community event; and that A. spent the night at their house. Taylor stated that
they left their house at roughly 10:00 P.M. and returned close to midnight. She
stated that she and Guerra were outside at a bonfire for a couple hours and then went
to a relative’s house before coming home and going to bed at roughly 4:00 A.M.
{¶28} Taylor further testified that Guerra did not have any contact with A.
while she (Taylor) was awake. Taylor stated that she tried to wake up A. when
Guerra was going to take A.’s cousin home but was not able to get her up. She
testified that she went to bed at roughly the same time as Guerra and that she
believed she would have woken up if he had gotten up from bed to go downstairs.
After she went to bed, she got up one time to feed her baby. At that time, Guerra
was in their bed. However, she admitted that this feeding lasted a brief period of
time. Taylor also testified that she and Guerra had been drinking that night. She
admitted that Guerra was mildly intoxicated and that he drove A.’s cousin to Erin’s
house in this condition.
{¶29} Having examined the testimony presented at trial on the basis of its
weight and credibility, we cannot conclude that the evidence weighs heavily against
Guerra’s conviction. The record contains no indication that the finder of fact lost
its way and returned a verdict that is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, Guerra’s second assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶30} Guerra argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance
of counsel when defense counsel did not request a recess to locate a witness.
{¶31} “Under Ohio law, ‘a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry
out his duties in a competent manner.’” State v. Harvey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-
34, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9, 1993
WL 270995 (July 22, 1993). “For this reason, the appellant has the burden of
proving that he or she was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 39. “In order
to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the
burden of establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and
(2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 3d
Dist. Allen No. 1-17-42, 2018-Ohio-3618, ¶ 24, quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
{¶32} In order to establish deficient performance, the appellant must
demonstrate that trial “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
State v. Howton, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-35, 2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 23, quoting
Strickland at 687. “[D]ebatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance
of counsel.” State v. Queen, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-41, 2020-Ohio-618, ¶ 14,
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quoting State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶
101.
{¶33} “In order to establish prejudice, ‘the defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’” State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-05, 2021-Ohio-1132, ¶
122, quoting State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, 78 N.E.3d 343, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). If the
appellant does not establish one of these two prongs, the appellate court does not
need to consider the facts of the case under the other prong of the test. State v.
Baker, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-61, 2018-Ohio-3431, ¶ 19.
{¶34} On appeal, Guerra argues that, when the trial court was notified that
Erin was not present to testify as a witness, defense counsel should have requested
a recess and sought to locate Erin. Even if we assume that Erin could have been
located had a recess been requested and granted, Guerra has not demonstrated how
Erin’s testimony would have changed the outcome of this proceeding. At trial,
Gabriel, Officer Harshman, and Schumacher testified about the content of A.’s
disclosures on June 19, 2022 and June 23, 2022. The content of these disclosures
and A.’s trial testimony were repeatedly compared and scrutinized through direct
and cross-examination. Schumacher testified that the content of the forensic
interview and the content of A.’s disclosure to the police were consistent.
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{¶35} However, on direct examination, Officer Harshman identified the two
inconsistencies that he observed between A.’s initial disclosure to him and her trial
testimony. The Defense then recalled Officer Harshman as a witness to testify about
these two inconsistencies at the conclusion of the trial. After hearing all of the trial
testimony, the trial court concluded that A.’s testimony “was extremely credible.”
(Tr. 145). There is no indication that Erin’s testimony would have changed this
conclusion or the outcome of this case. Since Guerra has failed to establish that
defense counsel’s failure to request a recess prejudiced his defense, he has failed to
carry the burden of establishing that he was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Thus, his third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶36} Guerra argues that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29
motion for acquittal.
{¶37} Crim.R. 29 provides for motions for judgments of acquittal and reads,
in its relevant part, as follows:
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
Crim.R. 29(A). “An appellate court reviews a denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal using the same standard that is used to review a sufficiency of
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the evidence claim. Sullivan, supra, at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Lightner, 3d Dist.
Hardin No. 6-08-11, 2009-Ohio-544, ¶ 11.
{¶38} R.C. 2907.06(B) states that “[n]o person shall be convicted of a
violation of this section solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other
evidence.” The Ohio Supreme Court has given the following interpretation of
corroboration requirement in R.C. 2907.06(B):
The corroborating evidence necessary to satisfy R.C. 2907.06(B) need not be independently sufficient to convict the accused, and it need not go to every essential element of the crime charged. Slight circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s testimony is satisfactory. The corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06(B) is a threshold inquiry of legal sufficiency * * * not a question of proof * * * [for] the factfinder.
State v. Economo, 76 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 1996-Ohio-426, 666 N.E.2d 225 (1996).
See State v. Haskell, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3095, ¶ 40.
{¶39} After the State rested, defense counsel made a Crim.R. 29 motion for
acquittal, arguing that the State provided “nothing to corroborate” A.’s allegations.
(Tr. 113). However, Gabriel testified that he picked up A. from Erin’s house on
June 19, 2022. They then went to a community event where Gabriel noticed that A.
“was really off” and was acting “out of character.” (Tr. 56, 63). Based on her
“demeanor,” he asked if anything was wrong. (Tr. 60). In response, A. “just started
crying.” (Tr. 61). He also testified that this was not normal behavior for A. to cry
in front of others. Gabriel then took her to a more private location where she
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disclosed her allegations. He stated that, in this process, A. was “[h]ysterical, just
crying.” (Tr. 64).
{¶40} Officer Harshman also testified that he contacted Guerra about A.’s
allegations. He reported that Guerra indicated that A. was at his house; that “he
heard [her] * * * crying”; that “he went to investigate”; and that A. indicated that
she had a nightmare. (Tr. 83). While Guerra denied having any physical contact
with A., he did confirm that A. was sleeping at his house on that evening. Guerra
also eventually admitted that he had security cameras in his living room as A. had
reported.
{¶41} Further, Schumacher testified that she spoke with Taylor and Guerra.
She indicated that Taylor stated that she had been with Guerra at a community event
until 1:00 A.M. or 2:00 A.M. on the night when A. was at their house. Taylor told
Schumacher that Guerra then left the house to drive two kids home and that she, not
Guerra, attempted to wake up A. that night. This testimony confirms that A. spent
the night at Guerra’s house. Taylor also indicated that they had cameras in their
house but stated that the footage is not retained after each day.
{¶42} After hearing the State’s arguments, the trial court denied Guerra’s
Crim.R. 29 motion, finding that corroborating evidence had been presented by the
State in this case. Having examined the evidence in the record in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding
that the State had presented corroborative evidence that was sufficient to support a
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conviction for the offense of sexual imposition. See Lieurance, supra, at ¶ 28-29;
Economo, supra, at 228-229. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Guerra’s
Crim.R. 29 motion. Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶43} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Putnam County Municipal Court is
affirmed.
WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/hls
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