State v. Gross

2025 Ohio 1894

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 27, 2025
• Docket: 14-24-34
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Gross, 2025-Ohio-1894.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-24-34

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

V. OPINION AND ROBERT WILLIAM DEAN GROSS, JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2023-CR-0197

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 27, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Alison Boggs for Appellant

Samantha Hobbs for Appellee Case No. 14-24-34

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert William Dean Gross (“Gross”), appeals

the July 3, 2024 judgment of sentence of the Union County Court of Common Pleas.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 3, 2023, K.W. received a message on Snapchat from her ex-

boyfriend, Gross. The photograph alarmed K.W. because the background of the

photograph depicted the interior of her apartment, causing concern that Gross was

inside her apartment uninvited. When K.W. returned to her residence, Gross

approached her in the parking lot of her apartment building as K.W. attempted to

exit her vehicle. K.W. was on a video conference with her friends, and Gross

forcefully took K.W.’s phone and threatened the individuals on the call.

{¶3} When K.W. attempted to retrieve her phone from Gross, he punched

her in the face, knocked her down, and destroyed her phone. Gross then repeatedly

struck K.W. to the point of unconsciousness. Several bystanders came to K.W.’s

assistance and attempted to intervene. She suffered substantial injuries as a result

of the attack.

{¶4} While K.W. remained unconscious on the ground, Gross drove K.W.’s

car away from the scene erratically. Gross then attempted to strike a police cruiser

occupied by C.M. Then, he intentionally drove into the left side of a truck driven

by T.W., causing the truck to spin and wreck. Next, he drove at and intentionally

-2- Case No. 14-24-34

struck a semi-truck operated by J.R. As a result, the semi-truck and attached trailer

left the road and overturned. J.R. escaped from the truck’s cab while diesel fuel

leaked onto him. Gross expressed that he was experiencing suicidal ideations and

intentionally caused the vehicle collisions in an effort to end his life.

{¶5} During the investigation of the August 3, 2023 incident, investigators

learned of a July 17, 2023 incident in which Gross held K.W. against a wall and

strangled her. As a result, K.W. experienced voice changes and hoarseness.

{¶6} On September 7, 2023, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Gross

with ten counts: Count One of burglary in violation of R.C. 29111.12(A)(2), (D), a

second-degree felony; Count Two of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3),

(C)(1), a first-degree felony; Count Three of felonious assault in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a), a second-degree felony; Count Four of aggravated

robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), (C), a first-degree felony; Count Five

of grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), (B)(5), a fourth-

degree felony; Count Six of felonious assault of a peace officer in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A), (D)(1)(a), a first-degree felony; Counts Seven and Eight both charged

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), (D)(1)(a), second-degree

felonies; Count Nine of strangulation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(3), (C)(3), a

fourth-degree felony; and Count Ten of abduction in violation of R.C.

2905.02(A)(2), (C).

-3- Case No. 14-24-34

{¶7} At his arraignment on October 20, 2023, Gross entered not-guilty pleas

to the counts in the indictment. Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, on May 1,

2024, Gross entered guilty pleas to Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven,

Eight, and Nine. The trial court accepted Gross’s guilty plea and found him guilty

of those counts. In exchange, the State made a motion for the dismissal of the

remaining counts, which the trial court granted.

{¶8} The parties appeared for sentencing on July 3, 2024 where the trial court

determined the aggravated robbery and grand theft charges merged, and the State

elected to have Gross sentenced on the aggravated robbery offense. The court then

sentenced Gross to three years in prison for the burglary, six years in prison for the

felonious assault to K.W., an indefinite term of six to nine years in prison for the

aggravated robbery, three years in prison for the felonious assault involving a police

officer, three years in prison for the felonious assault relating to R.W., two years in

prison for the felonious assault with J.R. as the victim, and 12 months in prison on

the strangulation count. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served

consecutively to each other for an aggregate term of 24 to 27 years in prison. The

judgment entry of sentence was filed later that day.

{¶9} On August 1, 2024, Gross filed his notice of appeal. He raises one

assignment of error.

-4- Case No. 14-24-34

Assignment of Error

The trial court’s sentence is contrary to law and must be reversed.

{¶10} In his assignment of error, Gross argues that his sentence is contrary

to law in two respects. First, he argues that the trial court erred in its judgment entry

of sentencing by ordering each of the sentences to be served consecutively to each

other. Gross claims that, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court was silent as to

whether Counts Seven and Eight were to be served consecutively or concurrently,

and thus, the trial court allegedly erred by indicating in the sentencing entry that the

counts were to be served consecutively. Next, Gross argues that the trial court did

not properly consider and balance the sentencing factors found in R.C. 2929.12. For

the reasons that follow, we disagree.

Standard of Review

{¶11} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and

convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a

firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

-5- Case No. 14-24-34

Relevant Authority

{¶12} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the

statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Noble, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). A sentence imposed within the statutory

range is generally valid so long as the trial court considered the applicable

sentencing policies that apply to every felony sentencing, including those contained

in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 2020-

Ohio-5572, ¶ 10 and 14 (3d Dist.); State v. Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31 (3d

Dist.).

{¶13} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and

others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government

resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony

sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the

offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”

Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall

be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony

sentencing . . ., commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the

-6- Case No. 14-24-34

offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences

imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

{¶14} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.

2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.

2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United

States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine

the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶

15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000). Neither statute “requires a trial court to

make any specific factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,

¶ 20; see also R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶15} In considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as they relate to felony-

sentencing appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio has further limited appellate review

by holding that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly does not provide a basis for an

appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does

not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,” and subdivision (b)

“does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based

on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 31, 34, 39 (“an appellate court’s conclusion that the record

-7- Case No. 14-24-34

does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is not the equivalent of

a conclusion that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)”). Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow “an appellate

court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at 42; see also State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶

22. However, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law,” and claims that raise those “types of

issues are therefore reviewable.” Bryant at ¶ 22 (finding the trial court increased

the sentence based on an impermissible consideration).

Analysis

{¶16} Gross argues that his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court

allegedly did not unambiguously order Counts Seven and Eight to be served

consecutively to each other or to the other counts. However, a review of the record

belies his claims.

{¶17} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court announced Gross’s sentence

as follows:

[O]n Count One, burglary, a felony of the second degree, the court is going to impose a sentence of three years.

On Count Three, a felony of the second degree, the court is going to impose a sentence of six years.

-8- Case No. 14-24-34

On Count Four, the aggravated robbery, the court is going to impose a sentence of six to nine years. These sentences all run consecutive.

Under Count Five, I find that Count Five merges with Count Four.

Count Six, a felony of the first degree, the court will impose a sentence of three years to run consecutive.

Count Seven, felonious assault, the court is going to impose a sentence of three years.

Count Eight, felonious assault, the court is going to impose a sentence of two years.

On Count Nine, strangulation, a felony of the fourth degree, the court is going to impose a sentence of 12 months to run consecutive.

So . . . by my math—and I have the Prosecutor’s math here— my math now has 24 to 27. You want to check that.

(July 3, 2024 Tr. at 23-24).

{¶18} Although Gross contends that the trial court did not unambiguously

indicate that Counts Seven and Eight were to be served consecutively, the transcript

of the sentencing clearly indicates that trial court intended all of the individual

sentences to be served consecutively to each other. The trial court stated “[t]hese

sentences all run consecutive” and announced an aggregate sentence that is

consistent with all of the individual sentences, including those for Counts Seven and

Eight, running consecutively. Furthermore, the trial court specifically asked the

parties to “check” its math and neither party indicated any error with the aggregate

-9- Case No. 14-24-34

sentence the trial court announced. Accordingly, at the sentencing hearing, the trial

court ordered all of the sentences to be served consecutively to each other.

Therefore, the trial court did not err by memorializing that sentence in the judgment

entry.

{¶19} Gross also argues that the trial court did not properly weigh the

sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. However, the record reflects that the trial court

considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when fashioning Gross’s sentence.

Specifically, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that “there are a number

of things the court has to consider” when determining a sentence including the

“sentencing factors set forth by the legislature in Section 2929.12.” (July 3, 2024

Tr. at 22). Furthermore, the trial court specified several sentencing factors in detail.

(Id. at 22-23). Moreover, in its judgment entry of sentencing, the trial court stated

that it considered “the record, oral statements, the victim impact statement, the

presentence investigation report, the purposes and principles of sentencing under

R.C. 2929.11, the seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the offense and

offender pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, and the need for deterrence, incapacitation,

rehabilitation and restitution.” (Doc. No. 63). The trial court also specifically

indicated which R.C. 2929.12 factors it deemed were applicable to the instant

offenses.

{¶20} Therefore, because Gross’s prison sentence is within the applicable

statutory range and the record supports that the trial court fulfilled its obligation of

-10- Case No. 14-24-34

considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, Gross’s sentence is valid. See Watts, 2020-

Ohio-5572, ¶ 14. However, Gross argues his prison sentence is not supported by

the record or is contrary to law because the trial court did not properly weigh the

R.C. 2929.12 sentencing factors.

{¶21} “Neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any

specific factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20. “A

trial court’s statement that it considered the required statutory factors, without more,

is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-

Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).

{¶22} Gross alleges that the trial court did not properly weigh the mitigating

factors when imposing his sentence. We note that when imposing a felony sentence,

“it is ‘the trial court [that] determines the weight afforded to any particular statutory

factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances.’” State v. McKennelly,

2017-Ohio-9092, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Steger, 2016-Ohio-7908, ¶ 18

(12th Dist.). “The fact that the trial court chose to weigh various sentencing factors

differently than how appellant would have weighed them does not mean the trial

court erred in imposing appellant’s sentence.” Id.

{¶23} Finally, Gross challenges the trial court’s finding under R.C.

2929.12(B)(9) that indicates that the offense is a violation of section 2903.11 and

involves a “family or household member at the time of the violation, and the

offender committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children who are not

-11- Case No. 14-24-34

victims of the offense, and the offender or the victim of the offense is a parent,

guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or more of those children.”

R.C. 2929.12(B)(9) (Sept. 19, 2014) (current version at R.C. 2929.12(B)(10) (Apr.

9, 2025)). Indeed, Gross and K.W. were not family or household members at the

time of the offense and did not have children; and, thus, R.C. 2929.12(B)(9) did not

apply. However, we do not find that, in the totality of the circumstances, this

constitutes reversible error.

Conclusion

{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, Gross’s assignment of error is overruled.

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned

and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas.

ZIMMERMAN and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.

-12- Case No. 14-24-34

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

-13-