[Cite as State v. Grond, 2026-Ohio-1337.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HENRY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 7-25-11 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v. OPINION AND ASHLEY GROND, JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 25 CR 0034
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 13, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Laurel A. Kendall for Appellant
Gwen Howe-Gebers for Appellee Case No. 7-25-11
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ashley N. Grond (“Grond”), brings this appeal
from the November 6, 2025, judgment of the Henry County Common Pleas Court.
On appeal, Grond argues that the trial court erred by ordering Grond to pay court
costs without making any findings related to her ability to pay those costs. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On March 26, 2025, Grond was indicted for Aggravated Possession of
Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(1)(d), a first degree felony (Count 1),
and Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(1)(e),
a first degree felony (Count 2).1 Grond originally pled not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On September 18, 2025, Grond entered into a negotiated plea
agreement wherein she agreed to plead guilty to an amended Count 2, Aggravated
Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(1)(d), a second degree
felony. Pursuant to the agreement, Count 1 would be dismissed. In addition, Grond
also agreed to testify against a co-defendant.
1 The specific drug allegedly involved was methamphetamines in an amount that equaled or exceeded fifty times the bulk amount but less than one hundred times the bulk amount.
-2- Case No. 7-25-11
{¶4} A change-of-plea hearing was held wherein the trial court determined
that Grond was entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The trial court
found Grond guilty of the amended charge and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
{¶5} Prior to sentencing, Grond filed a motion to waive the mandatory fine
associated with her conviction, asserting that she had no money and no income.
{¶6} On November 5, 2025, Grond’s sentencing hearing was held. After
hearing the arguments of the parties related to sentencing, the trial court sentenced
Grond to serve a mandatory, indefinite prison term of 6 to 9 years. The trial court
waived the mandatory fine in light of Grond’s indigence. Nevertheless, the trial
court stated, “you do need to pay the court costs of this action, court costs will be
stayed for collection until sixty days after you are released from incarceration.”
(Nov. 5, 2025, Tr. at 9).
{¶7} On November 6, 2025, the trial court issued its final judgment entry
memorializing Grond’s sentence. The trial court reiterated that it was granting
Grond’s motion to waive the mandatory fine in this case, and stated as follows with
regard to court costs:
Costs of proceedings are assessed against the defendant for which execution is hereby awarded. The Court advised the defendant that if she failed to pay costs as ordered, she may be required to perform community service pursuant to the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2947.23. The collection of court costs shall be stayed until 60 days after the defendant is released from incarceration.
(Doc. No. 46).
-3- Case No. 7-25-11
{¶8} Grond now brings the instant appeal from the trial court’s judgment,
asserting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred to the detriment of Appellant when she was ordered to pay “court costs” without specifying exactly which costs were being imposed, once released from confinement, and arguably without any findings on which to base the ability to pay.
{¶9} In her assignment of error, Grond argues that the trial court erred by
ordering her to pay court costs in this matter without making findings regarding her
ability to pay and without further defining the “court costs.”
Analysis
{¶10} “By statute, the imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants
is mandatory.” State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-3514, ¶ 6. Revised Code
2947.23(A)(1)(a) reads: “In all criminal cases . . . the judge or magistrate shall
include in the sentence the costs of prosecution . . . and render a judgment against
the defendant for such costs.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that the “strict statutory language [of R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a)] ‘requires a court
to impose costs against all convicted defendants,’ indigent or not.” (Emphasis sic.)
Taylor quoting State v. White, 2004-Ohio-5989, ¶ 8.
{¶11} Notably, R.C. 2947.23(C) gives a trial court continuing jurisdiction to
“waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution . . . at the time
-4- Case No. 7-25-11
of sentencing or at any time thereafter.” Thus while a trial court must impose court
costs, it may also waive or suspend them. The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted
that R.C. 2947.23 provides no specific criteria for a court to consider when
determining whether to waive, suspend, or modify court costs. Taylor at ¶ 8.
{¶12} In State v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the
specific question of whether a trial court must consider “the defendant’s present or
future ability to pay the costs” before imposing court costs pursuant to statute. 2020-
Ohio-3514, ¶ 1. After analyzing the issue, the Court held, “a trial court is not
required to consider the defendant’s ability to pay in assessing a motion to waive,
suspend, or modify court costs under R.C. 2947.23(C), though it is permitted to do
so.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶13} Based on the preceding legal authority, we reject Grond’s claim that
the trial court had to make some findings related to her “ability to pay” court costs.
Regardless, there is some implicit consideration of the issue given that the trial court
waived the mandatory fine but not court costs.2
{¶14} We are similarly unpersuaded by Grond’s claim that the trial court did
not explain which “court costs” it was imposing upon her. Again, the trial court is
required by statute to impose court costs and enter a judgment for court costs. Ohio
2 Even if the trial court needed to consider Grond’s ability to pay, the record indicated she was a high school graduate and had either completed an associates degree in culinary arts or was close to completing it. There was no indication in the record that Grond was unable to work, or, in the alternative, perform community service to satisfy the court costs. Grond’s PSI established that she had employment in the past but her drug issues and convictions often caused problems. Grond was born in 1986, thus she would be under 50 years old at the time of her release from prison.
-5- Case No. 7-25-11
Appellate Courts have held that “a trial court does not err when it fails to specify
the amount of court costs at sentencing; the calculation of court costs is a ministerial
act.” State v. Towe, 2023-Ohio-549, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). If Grond feels there is a
miscalculation of her court costs, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to
address that issue. In the record before us, she has not demonstrated any error.
{¶15} Simply put, the trial court complied with its statutorily-mandated duty
to impose court costs in this matter. Grond has not demonstrated that the trial court
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[Cite as State v. Grond, 2026-Ohio-1337.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HENRY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 7-25-11 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v. OPINION AND ASHLEY GROND, JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 25 CR 0034
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 13, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Laurel A. Kendall for Appellant
Gwen Howe-Gebers for Appellee Case No. 7-25-11
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ashley N. Grond (“Grond”), brings this appeal
from the November 6, 2025, judgment of the Henry County Common Pleas Court.
On appeal, Grond argues that the trial court erred by ordering Grond to pay court
costs without making any findings related to her ability to pay those costs. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On March 26, 2025, Grond was indicted for Aggravated Possession of
Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(1)(d), a first degree felony (Count 1),
and Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(1)(e),
a first degree felony (Count 2).1 Grond originally pled not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On September 18, 2025, Grond entered into a negotiated plea
agreement wherein she agreed to plead guilty to an amended Count 2, Aggravated
Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(1)(d), a second degree
felony. Pursuant to the agreement, Count 1 would be dismissed. In addition, Grond
also agreed to testify against a co-defendant.
1 The specific drug allegedly involved was methamphetamines in an amount that equaled or exceeded fifty times the bulk amount but less than one hundred times the bulk amount.
-2- Case No. 7-25-11
{¶4} A change-of-plea hearing was held wherein the trial court determined
that Grond was entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The trial court
found Grond guilty of the amended charge and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
{¶5} Prior to sentencing, Grond filed a motion to waive the mandatory fine
associated with her conviction, asserting that she had no money and no income.
{¶6} On November 5, 2025, Grond’s sentencing hearing was held. After
hearing the arguments of the parties related to sentencing, the trial court sentenced
Grond to serve a mandatory, indefinite prison term of 6 to 9 years. The trial court
waived the mandatory fine in light of Grond’s indigence. Nevertheless, the trial
court stated, “you do need to pay the court costs of this action, court costs will be
stayed for collection until sixty days after you are released from incarceration.”
(Nov. 5, 2025, Tr. at 9).
{¶7} On November 6, 2025, the trial court issued its final judgment entry
memorializing Grond’s sentence. The trial court reiterated that it was granting
Grond’s motion to waive the mandatory fine in this case, and stated as follows with
regard to court costs:
Costs of proceedings are assessed against the defendant for which execution is hereby awarded. The Court advised the defendant that if she failed to pay costs as ordered, she may be required to perform community service pursuant to the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2947.23. The collection of court costs shall be stayed until 60 days after the defendant is released from incarceration.
(Doc. No. 46).
-3- Case No. 7-25-11
{¶8} Grond now brings the instant appeal from the trial court’s judgment,
asserting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred to the detriment of Appellant when she was ordered to pay “court costs” without specifying exactly which costs were being imposed, once released from confinement, and arguably without any findings on which to base the ability to pay.
{¶9} In her assignment of error, Grond argues that the trial court erred by
ordering her to pay court costs in this matter without making findings regarding her
ability to pay and without further defining the “court costs.”
Analysis
{¶10} “By statute, the imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants
is mandatory.” State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-3514, ¶ 6. Revised Code
2947.23(A)(1)(a) reads: “In all criminal cases . . . the judge or magistrate shall
include in the sentence the costs of prosecution . . . and render a judgment against
the defendant for such costs.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that the “strict statutory language [of R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a)] ‘requires a court
to impose costs against all convicted defendants,’ indigent or not.” (Emphasis sic.)
Taylor quoting State v. White, 2004-Ohio-5989, ¶ 8.
{¶11} Notably, R.C. 2947.23(C) gives a trial court continuing jurisdiction to
“waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution . . . at the time
-4- Case No. 7-25-11
of sentencing or at any time thereafter.” Thus while a trial court must impose court
costs, it may also waive or suspend them. The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted
that R.C. 2947.23 provides no specific criteria for a court to consider when
determining whether to waive, suspend, or modify court costs. Taylor at ¶ 8.
{¶12} In State v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the
specific question of whether a trial court must consider “the defendant’s present or
future ability to pay the costs” before imposing court costs pursuant to statute. 2020-
Ohio-3514, ¶ 1. After analyzing the issue, the Court held, “a trial court is not
required to consider the defendant’s ability to pay in assessing a motion to waive,
suspend, or modify court costs under R.C. 2947.23(C), though it is permitted to do
so.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶13} Based on the preceding legal authority, we reject Grond’s claim that
the trial court had to make some findings related to her “ability to pay” court costs.
Regardless, there is some implicit consideration of the issue given that the trial court
waived the mandatory fine but not court costs.2
{¶14} We are similarly unpersuaded by Grond’s claim that the trial court did
not explain which “court costs” it was imposing upon her. Again, the trial court is
required by statute to impose court costs and enter a judgment for court costs. Ohio
2 Even if the trial court needed to consider Grond’s ability to pay, the record indicated she was a high school graduate and had either completed an associates degree in culinary arts or was close to completing it. There was no indication in the record that Grond was unable to work, or, in the alternative, perform community service to satisfy the court costs. Grond’s PSI established that she had employment in the past but her drug issues and convictions often caused problems. Grond was born in 1986, thus she would be under 50 years old at the time of her release from prison.
-5- Case No. 7-25-11
Appellate Courts have held that “a trial court does not err when it fails to specify
the amount of court costs at sentencing; the calculation of court costs is a ministerial
act.” State v. Towe, 2023-Ohio-549, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). If Grond feels there is a
miscalculation of her court costs, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to
address that issue. In the record before us, she has not demonstrated any error.
{¶15} Simply put, the trial court complied with its statutorily-mandated duty
to impose court costs in this matter. Grond has not demonstrated that the trial court
committed any error by imposing the mandated court costs, thus her assignment of
error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to Grond in the particulars assigned
and argued, her assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Henry
County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
-6- Case No. 7-25-11
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED: /jlm
-7-