State v. Grissom

492 So. 2d 1324, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 428, 1986 Fla. LEXIS 2480
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedAugust 21, 1986
DocketNo. 66828
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 492 So. 2d 1324 (State v. Grissom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Grissom, 492 So. 2d 1324, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 428, 1986 Fla. LEXIS 2480 (Fla. 1986).

Opinion

SHAW, Justice.

The following question has been certified as being of great public importance:

Has the Supreme Court of Florida, by its agreement in State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955 (Fla.1984), with the analysis of the supervisory powers of appellate courts as related to the harmless error rule as set forth in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), receded from the per se rule of reversal explicated in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787 (Fla.1983), David v. State, 369 So.2d 943 (Fla.1979), and Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811 (Fla.1957)?

Grissom v. State, 469 So.2d 151, 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Grissom was charged with aggravated battery for intentionally pouring hot grease on his wife, causing severe burns. During the defense cross-examination of Mrs. Gris-som at trial, counsel asked her a second time whether she had spoken with the prosecutor regarding her testimony. The trial court sustained the state’s objection, stating:

Yes, it was asked and answered before. No need to emphasize it a second time.
It’s perfectly proper for the witness to discuss her testimony with the State Attorney as well as it is for your client to discuss his testimony with you, and you may proceed.

Defense counsel requested a side bar and then moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, but stated that he would give a curative instruction. The trial court, [1325]*1325over defense counsel’s objection, instructed the jury as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, as I just told you, it is entirely proper for a prosecutor to discuss with the witness the testimony that they are going to give at time of trial. There is nothing wrong with this.
I also told you that it’s proper for ... [the defense attorney] to discuss with his client, the defendant, in any case, whatever testimony if there is going to be any testimony or any of the facts of the case so that they can defend the defendant properly, but at no time — I told you this also — is the defendant required to take the witness stand. The defendant need not prove anything and if the defendant does not take the witness stand, you are not [to] hold that against the defendant. I told you that before and I tell you that again.

The defendant did not testify, and the jury found him guilty of the lesser included crime of battery. The district court reversed, finding that the trial court’s comments were “fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as referring to the defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent.” Grissom, 469 So.2d at 152.

We recently reaffirmed the fairly susceptible test. State v. Kinchen, 490 So.2d 21 (Fla.1985). In Kinchen we stated:

David does not define “fairly” susceptible. A dictionary definition of “fairly,” however, is “[i]n a fair manner; equitably; justly; legitimately; without unfair advantages; ... [plainly; clearly; distinctly.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 911 (2d ed. 1956).

490 So.2d 28.

We disagree with the district court’s assessment of the trial court’s statements in the present case. We find that they were not fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as referring adversely to the defendant’s failure to testify. Taken in context, it is evident that the trial court’s first statement was to inform the jury that, contrary to defense insinuation, it is perfectly proper for both sides to discuss the case with prospective witnesses.

The trial court had previously given preliminary instructions to the jury panel, during which it paraphrased without objection Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 1.01

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rosa v. State
696 So. 2d 1299 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
492 So. 2d 1324, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 428, 1986 Fla. LEXIS 2480, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-grissom-fla-1986.