[Cite as State v. Grigsby, 2011-Ohio-2062.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24081 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 09-CR-3740 v. : : PAUL GRIGSBY : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 29th day of April, 2011.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. #0067685, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ADELINA E. HAMILTON, Atty. Reg. #0078595, Law Office of the Public Defender, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant, Paul Grigsby, appeals from his conviction for having a concealed
weapon in his car. He argues that the trial court should have sustained his motion to suppress
the weapon because the inventory search that uncovered it was conducted after police 2
unlawfully impounded his car. We conclude that the impoundment and search were lawful, so
we will affirm the trial court’s decision to overrule the motion to suppress.
I
{¶ 2} On November 6, 2009, around 8pm, in Union, Ohio, Union police officer
Michael Fleck, who was in front of a home helping to investigate a domestic violence call,
saw a black Monte Carlo drive past. Thinking the driver might be related to the investigation,
Officer Fleck ran the car’s license plate number through his cruiser’s computer. The car was
registered to Paul Grigsby II. Grigsby was not related to the domestic violence call, but the
computer showed that the car’s license plates and registration were subject to confiscation by
the registrar of motor vehicles because Grigsby had failed to satisfy certain financial
responsibilities imposed by law, 1 in other words, he failed to satisfy Ohio’s automobile
insurance requirements. Officer Fleck radioed fellow Union police officer Matthew Nave, who
was on routine patrol in the area, and gave him a description of the car, along with its license
plate number. When Officer Nave found the car, he too ran the number and verified that the
plates were subject to confiscation. Officer Nave turned on his overhead lights, and Grigsby
pulled into the parking lot of a State Farm Insurance agency just off Main Street in Union.
{¶ 3} After obtaining from Grigsby his driver’s license and running it through the
computer, Officer Nave discovered that Grigsby’s driver’s license was currently suspended.
Rather than arrest him, Nave decided only to cite Grigsby for driving under suspension.
Officer Nave asked Grigsby to step into the backseat of his cruiser while he wrote up a
1 The record does not reveal the precise nature of Grigsby’s failure. 3
citation, and Grigsby agreed.
{¶ 4} Officer Fleck soon arrived, and he and Officer Nave called their supervising
officer, Lieutenant Darren Goudy, and asked him what they should do with the car. When
Lieutenant Goudy arrived at the scene, the officers told him about the registrar’s confiscation
order. Goudy told them that under the City of Union Police Department Vehicle Inventory and
Towing Policy a vehicle that is “inoperable” must be towed. Goudy believed that Grigsby’s
car was inoperable because, without license plates, it could not be lawfully operated on any
public roadway. Goudy also considered the fact that the vehicle was in the parking lot of a
closed business, so the owner’s permission could not be obtained to keep the car there. Goudy
did not, however, consider allowing Grigsby to himself arrange for the car to be towed.
{¶ 5} While Officer Nave wrote up the citation, Officer Fleck, pursuant to the
Department’s inventory and towing policy, began to inventory the items in Grigsby’s car.
When Officer Fleck open the center console, he saw a loaded ammunition magazine. Fleck
walked back to Officer Nave’s cruiser and told Nave of his find. Officer Nave asked Grigsby
if he had a weapon in the car. Grigsby said yes. The officers found a handgun under the
driver’s seat and more ammunition in the trunk.
{¶ 6} The officers then formally arrested Grigsby on gun charges, though they later
released him with just the citation.
{¶ 7} On January 11, 2010, Grigsby was indicted on one count of carrying a
concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and on one count of improper handling
of a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B). Grigsby filed a motion to
suppress the gun and ammunition found in his car. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the 4
motion. On April 12, 2010, Grigsby pleaded no contest to the carrying charge, and, in
exchange, the state dismissed the improper handling charge. The trial court sentenced Grigsby
to community control for up to 5 years.
{¶ 8} Grigsby appealed.
II
{¶ 9} In a single assignment of error, Grigsby alleges:
{¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S
PREJUDICE WHEN IT OVERRULED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THIER [sic] BURDEN AT THE
SUPPRESSION HEARING THAT THE DECISION TO IMPOUND AND TOW THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S VEHICLE WAS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO
REASONABLE STANDARDIZED PROCEEDURES [sic] AND THE DECISION TO
IMPOUND AND TOW THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S VEHICLE CONSTITUTED
AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”
{¶ 11} Grigsby contends that the impoundment of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures, rendering the inventory search unlawful
and the items found inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
{¶ 12} “The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973), 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. It is 5
reasonable of police to exercise their discretion and impound a vehicle, rather than leave it,
“so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Colorado v. Bertine (1987),
479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739. “This discretion is necessarily limited to
circumstances in which the officer is authorized to impound the vehicle.” State v. Huddleston,
173 Ohio App.3d 17, 2007-Ohio-4455, at ¶14, citing Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d
67, 2007-Ohio-1103, and State v. Taylor (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 415. “[A]uthority to
impound should never be assumed,” however. Taylor, at 422. We have identified several
situations in which police have authority to impound a vehicle, among them, “when
impoundment is [] authorized by statute or municipal ordinance.” Id.
{¶ 13} Here, the state argues that an unwritten established practice of the Union Police
Department authorized the impoundment of Grigsby’s car. Grigsby argues that to provide
authority that is constitutionally permissible the authorizing policy must be in writing. Neither
party, however, cites the Union ordinance, which our research uncovered, that authorizes
police to impound a vehicle in two pertinent circumstances.2
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[Cite as State v. Grigsby, 2011-Ohio-2062.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24081 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 09-CR-3740 v. : : PAUL GRIGSBY : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 29th day of April, 2011.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. #0067685, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ADELINA E. HAMILTON, Atty. Reg. #0078595, Law Office of the Public Defender, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant, Paul Grigsby, appeals from his conviction for having a concealed
weapon in his car. He argues that the trial court should have sustained his motion to suppress
the weapon because the inventory search that uncovered it was conducted after police 2
unlawfully impounded his car. We conclude that the impoundment and search were lawful, so
we will affirm the trial court’s decision to overrule the motion to suppress.
I
{¶ 2} On November 6, 2009, around 8pm, in Union, Ohio, Union police officer
Michael Fleck, who was in front of a home helping to investigate a domestic violence call,
saw a black Monte Carlo drive past. Thinking the driver might be related to the investigation,
Officer Fleck ran the car’s license plate number through his cruiser’s computer. The car was
registered to Paul Grigsby II. Grigsby was not related to the domestic violence call, but the
computer showed that the car’s license plates and registration were subject to confiscation by
the registrar of motor vehicles because Grigsby had failed to satisfy certain financial
responsibilities imposed by law, 1 in other words, he failed to satisfy Ohio’s automobile
insurance requirements. Officer Fleck radioed fellow Union police officer Matthew Nave, who
was on routine patrol in the area, and gave him a description of the car, along with its license
plate number. When Officer Nave found the car, he too ran the number and verified that the
plates were subject to confiscation. Officer Nave turned on his overhead lights, and Grigsby
pulled into the parking lot of a State Farm Insurance agency just off Main Street in Union.
{¶ 3} After obtaining from Grigsby his driver’s license and running it through the
computer, Officer Nave discovered that Grigsby’s driver’s license was currently suspended.
Rather than arrest him, Nave decided only to cite Grigsby for driving under suspension.
Officer Nave asked Grigsby to step into the backseat of his cruiser while he wrote up a
1 The record does not reveal the precise nature of Grigsby’s failure. 3
citation, and Grigsby agreed.
{¶ 4} Officer Fleck soon arrived, and he and Officer Nave called their supervising
officer, Lieutenant Darren Goudy, and asked him what they should do with the car. When
Lieutenant Goudy arrived at the scene, the officers told him about the registrar’s confiscation
order. Goudy told them that under the City of Union Police Department Vehicle Inventory and
Towing Policy a vehicle that is “inoperable” must be towed. Goudy believed that Grigsby’s
car was inoperable because, without license plates, it could not be lawfully operated on any
public roadway. Goudy also considered the fact that the vehicle was in the parking lot of a
closed business, so the owner’s permission could not be obtained to keep the car there. Goudy
did not, however, consider allowing Grigsby to himself arrange for the car to be towed.
{¶ 5} While Officer Nave wrote up the citation, Officer Fleck, pursuant to the
Department’s inventory and towing policy, began to inventory the items in Grigsby’s car.
When Officer Fleck open the center console, he saw a loaded ammunition magazine. Fleck
walked back to Officer Nave’s cruiser and told Nave of his find. Officer Nave asked Grigsby
if he had a weapon in the car. Grigsby said yes. The officers found a handgun under the
driver’s seat and more ammunition in the trunk.
{¶ 6} The officers then formally arrested Grigsby on gun charges, though they later
released him with just the citation.
{¶ 7} On January 11, 2010, Grigsby was indicted on one count of carrying a
concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and on one count of improper handling
of a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B). Grigsby filed a motion to
suppress the gun and ammunition found in his car. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the 4
motion. On April 12, 2010, Grigsby pleaded no contest to the carrying charge, and, in
exchange, the state dismissed the improper handling charge. The trial court sentenced Grigsby
to community control for up to 5 years.
{¶ 8} Grigsby appealed.
II
{¶ 9} In a single assignment of error, Grigsby alleges:
{¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S
PREJUDICE WHEN IT OVERRULED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THIER [sic] BURDEN AT THE
SUPPRESSION HEARING THAT THE DECISION TO IMPOUND AND TOW THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S VEHICLE WAS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO
REASONABLE STANDARDIZED PROCEEDURES [sic] AND THE DECISION TO
IMPOUND AND TOW THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S VEHICLE CONSTITUTED
AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”
{¶ 11} Grigsby contends that the impoundment of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures, rendering the inventory search unlawful
and the items found inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
{¶ 12} “The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973), 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. It is 5
reasonable of police to exercise their discretion and impound a vehicle, rather than leave it,
“so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Colorado v. Bertine (1987),
479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739. “This discretion is necessarily limited to
circumstances in which the officer is authorized to impound the vehicle.” State v. Huddleston,
173 Ohio App.3d 17, 2007-Ohio-4455, at ¶14, citing Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d
67, 2007-Ohio-1103, and State v. Taylor (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 415. “[A]uthority to
impound should never be assumed,” however. Taylor, at 422. We have identified several
situations in which police have authority to impound a vehicle, among them, “when
impoundment is [] authorized by statute or municipal ordinance.” Id.
{¶ 13} Here, the state argues that an unwritten established practice of the Union Police
Department authorized the impoundment of Grigsby’s car. Grigsby argues that to provide
authority that is constitutionally permissible the authorizing policy must be in writing. Neither
party, however, cites the Union ordinance, which our research uncovered, that authorizes
police to impound a vehicle in two pertinent circumstances.2
{¶ 14} Section 303.08 of the Union Traffic Code provides:
{¶ 15} “(a) Police officers are authorized to provide for the removal of a vehicle under
the following circumstances:
{¶ 16} “* * *
{¶ 17} “(4) When any vehicle displays illegal license plates or fails to display the
2 Although the ordinance was never cited in this case, this court provided counsel for both parties with a copy of the ordinance prior to oral argument so they would have an opportunity to address it. 6
current lawfully required plates and is located upon any public street or other property open to
the public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking.
{¶ 18} “* * *
{¶ 19} “(9) When any vehicle has been operated by any person who is driving without
a lawful license or while his license has been suspended or revoked and is located upon a
public street or other property open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking.
{¶ 20} “* * *”
{¶ 21} We think that the two subsections quoted above authorized the officers to
impound Grigsby’s car.3 Once the officers confiscated the car’s license plates it no longer
displayed any license plates, let alone “the current lawfully required plates” to which
subsection (a)(4) of the ordinance refers. Further, it is undisputed that, at the time he was
stopped, Grigsby’s driver’s license was under suspension. Finally, the insurance agency’s
parking lot qualifies as “property open to the public for purposes of * * * parking,” as other
Ohio courts have found. At least two courts have determined that city ordinances identical to
Union’s Section 303.08(a) authorize police to impound a vehicle located in a private
business’s parking lot. See State v. Colopy, Licking App. No. 09 CA 105, 2010-Ohio-2804,
at ¶13-15 (parking lot of a grocery store) and State v. Mercer (March 27, 1995), Butler App.
No. CA94-06-133 (parking lot of a restaurant). A third Ohio court has determined that a city
ordinance authorizing impoundment from “public grounds” authorized police to impound a
vehicle located in the parking lot of a shopping center. See State v. Humphrey (Sept. 19,
3 Although the issue was not raised below, we may rely on it to reach our decision. See Iams v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 174 Ohio App.3d 537, 2007-Ohio-6709, at ¶60 (“‘A judgment by the trial court which is correct, but for a different reason, will be affirmed on appeal as there is no prejudice to the appellant.’”), quoting Bonner v. Bonner, Union App. No. 14-05-26, 2005-Ohio-6173, at ¶18. 7
1989), Franklin App. No. 87AP-1137.
{¶ 22} Since we conclude that a municipal ordinance authorized the Union police
officers to tow and impound Grigsby’s car, we need not address any other basis of authority
raised by the parties. 4 Still, we will briefly address Grigsby’s collateral attack on R.C.
4509.101, the statute that authorized the Union police officers to confiscate his license plates
on behalf of the registrar of motor vehicles.
{¶ 23} Grigsby contends that the statute grants individual police officers too much
discretion and contends that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and
Ohio constitutions. But the Union officers did not need the authority in this statute. (And
Grigsby admits that the state never cited it as having provided authority.) It is against the law
to drive on public roads with a suspended driver’s license, see R.C. 4510.11(A), which
Grigsby was doing. On this basis alone, the police were permitted to conduct the initial stop.
The Union ordinance then authorized the police to remove Grigsby’s car because it was being
operated by a person (Grigsby) driving with a suspended license. See Traffic Code Section
303.08(a)(9). Whether or not the police could also confiscate the car’s license plates under
R.C. 4509.101 is immaterial.
{¶ 24} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
4 The state argues that an established practice provided the authority; Grigsby argues that it did not. Grigsby also argues that neither R.C. 4513.60 (authorizing the removal of a vehicle left on private residential or private agricultural property) nor R.C. 4513.63 (authorizing the removal of “abandoned junk motor vehicles”) authorized impoundment in the circumstances of this case. Finally, Grigsby argues that the Union police’s “community caretaking function” to protect his car from theft or vandalism could not have authorized impoundment here. See South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (saying that, “[i]n the interests of public safety and as part of * * * [the] ‘community caretaking functions,’ automobiles are frequently taken into police custody”), quoting Cady, at 441. 8
{¶ 25} The judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
GRADY, P.J., and FAIN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Johnna M. Shia Adelina E. Hamilton Hon. Timothy N. O’Connell