State v. Griffin

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedDecember 1, 2010
Docket03C01-9608-CR-00287
StatusPublished

This text of State v. Griffin (State v. Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Griffin, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE FILED MARCH 1997 SESSION May 7, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9608-CR-00287 Appellee, ) ) Hamilton County V. ) ) Honorable Stephen M. Bevil, Judge ) CHARLES FRANK GRIFFIN, ) (Aggravated Robbery-2 counts) ) Appellant. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

Laura Rule Hendricks John Knox Walkup Eldridge, Irvine & Hendricks Attorney General & Reporter 606 W Main Street, Suite 350 P.O. Box 84 Timothy F. Behan Knoxville, TN 37901-0084 Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Ardena J. Garth Nashville, TN 37243-0493 District Public Defender William H. Cox III Karla G. Gothard District Attorney General Executive Assistant District Public Defender Rebecca J. Stern 701 Cherry Street, Suite 300 Assistant District Attorney General Chattanooga, TN 37402-1910 600 Market Street, Suite 310 Chattanooga, TN 37402

OPINION FILED: ___________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

OPINION The appellant, Charles Frank Griffin, was indicted on two counts of

aggravated robbery. He was convicted by a jury on both counts. He received a

thirty-year sentence on each count. The sentences were ordered to run

consecutively. He appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the

consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon review, we affirm.

I

The appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient

to sustain his convictions. He asserts that the only evidence presented against

him was the identification of him by both of the robbery victims. He claims that

these identifications were tainted.1

Great weight is accorded jury verdicts in criminal trials. Jury verdicts

accredit the state's witnesses and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the state's

favor. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Banes, 874

S.W.2d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, the state is entitled to both

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which

may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978).

Guilty verdicts remove the presumption of innocence, enjoyed by defendants at

trial, and replace it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474

(Tenn. 1973). Appellants, therefore, carry the burden of overcoming a

presumption of guilt when appealing jury convictions. Id.

When appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979);

State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The

1 He contends that the photo array was tainted because each line-up photograph contained at least one person who had already been in a previous line-up photograph.

-2- weight and credibility of a witness' testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to

the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1984);

Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

Both victims testified that they got a very good look at the appellant during

the robbery. Each gave a similar description of the appellant to the police. After

viewing hundreds of photographs, both victims independently agreed the

appellant was the man who had robbed them. Also, a witness testified that he

saw a car, the same make and model as the appellant's car, leaving the scene of

the crime shortly after it occurred.

The jury in this case chose to believe the testimony of the state's

witnesses. A rational trier of fact could have found the appellant guilty of the

charged crimes. This issue is without merit.

II

The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in ordering the

appellant's two thirty-year sentences to be served consecutively. 2 He avers

that, while his criminal record is extensive, this factor was used to enhance his

status to that of a career offender and should not also be used to support the

implementation of consecutive sentences. Also, he argues that the trial court

erred in finding that he acted with no hesitation when the risk to human life was

high. He claims that this factor is an essential element to every aggravated

robbery conviction.

The record reveals that the trial judge followed the sentencing guidelines.

He found the appellant's criminal history to be extensive. The trial court also

2 The appellant stipulates that he was correctly classified as a career offender. He has eight class B, two class D, and fou r class E felon ies on his rec ord. Furthe rmore, h e agrees that a 30-ye ar senten ce on ea ch conv iction was appropria te and that these sentences have to be served consecutively to the life sentence he is now serving resulting from his revocation of parole.

-3- considered the nature of the crime, the appellant's past attempts at parole, and

society's need for protection against such individuals as the appellant. We find

nothing in the record to suggest the ordering of consecutive sentences was

inappropriate or too vigorous for his criminal activities.

The appellant fits Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-115(a)(2) and (4). Frankly,

we think the legislature contemplated criminals like this appellant when they

passed this section on multiple convictions in 1989. The appellant has earned

the reward of being incarcerated consecutively on the two convictions and

consecutively to earlier parole violations or convictions. His incorrigible conduct

necessitates his spending his twilight years in the Tennessee Department of

Correction.

AFFIRMED.

-4- ________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

______________________________ CORNELIA A. CLARK, Special Judge

-5-

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Sheffield
676 S.W.2d 542 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Williams
657 S.W.2d 405 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1983)
State v. Duncan
698 S.W.2d 63 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1985)
Byrge v. State
575 S.W.2d 292 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1978)
State v. Banes
874 S.W.2d 73 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1993)
State v. Cabbage
571 S.W.2d 832 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1978)
State v. Grace
493 S.W.2d 474 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
State v. Griffin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-griffin-tenncrimapp-2010.