State v. Grayson

2023 Ohio 4275

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 29, 2023
• Docket: C-230083
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Grayson, 2023-Ohio-4275.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-230083 TRIAL NO. B-2105812 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

: VS. O P I N I O N. :

JACOB GRAYSON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 29, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} During a traffic stop prompted by tinted windows and an unilluminated

headlight, police discovered an outstanding traffic capias for the car’s passenger,

defendant-appellant Jacob Grayson. An ensuing search of Mr. Grayson’s wallet

revealed suspected drugs, which translated into an indictment and a later conviction

for possession of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Mr.

Grayson moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing the search ran afoul of

his constitutional rights. The trial court, however, disagreed and denied his motion to

suppress. He now appeals, challenging the failure to suppress the evidence. After

reviewing the record, however, we reject his argument and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I.

{¶2} In November 2021, as Delhi Township Police Officer Michael Gerde

observed traffic on Delhi Pike from a stationary position, he noticed a vehicle driving

with only one headlight illuminated and darkly-tinted windows. Suspicious, Officer

Gerde ran the license plate number, and it returned multiple people attached to the

vehicle—one of whom had an open traffic capias out of Addyston Mayor’s Court.

{¶3} Based on all of that information, he initiated a traffic stop and

discovered Mr. Grayson in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. Officer Gerde asked

both the driver and Mr. Grayson for identification, and then he proceeded to his

cruiser where he ran the identification, uncovering Mr. Grayson’s open traffic capias.

At that time, Officer Gerde did not know of the specific violation prompting the

capias—only that it was traffic related.

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{¶4} Officer Gerde removed Mr. Grayson from the vehicle and patted him

down, removing a pack of cigarettes and his wallet. He advised Mr. Grayson of the

capias and informed him that he planned to call Addyston Police Department to

determine how to proceed. Testimony at trial established that it was Delhi police

policy to arrest any individual with an outstanding warrant. Officer Gerde placed Mr.

Grayson in the back of the police cruiser without handcuffing him. He then searched

the wallet and found a small paper bindle containing suspected drugs, later identified

as a fentanyl-related compound.

{¶5} After finding the suspected drugs, Officer Gerde handcuffed Mr.

Grayson, placed him under arrest, and read him his Miranda warnings. He then

contacted the Addyston Police Department and confirmed the capias. He also tested

the window tint, establishing its illegality. Mr. Grayson was escorted to the Hamilton

County Justice Center.

{¶6} The Hamilton County Grand Jury returned a one-count indictment

against Mr. Grayson, charging him with possession of a fentanyl-related compound—

a felony of the fourth degree—pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A). Mr. Grayson requested the

trial court suppress the evidence discovered, arguing that the police seized the

evidence without a search warrant or consent and outside the scope of the search

incident to arrest exception because the Addyston traffic capias was illegally premised

on an unpaid fine. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Mr.

Grayson subsequently pleaded no contest, and the trial court found him guilty.

Ultimately, the court sentenced him to two years of community control. Mr. Grayson

now appeals.

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II.

{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Grayson maintains that the trial

court erred by denying his motion to suppress. To advance his argument, Mr. Grayson

presents two issues for our review: his detention and the subsequent search violated

the Fourth Amendment, and the warrant was unlawfully issued by the Addyston

Mayor’s Court, precluding the application of the good faith exception. We proceed to

address each of his arguments in turn.

A.

{¶8} In his first issue presented for review, Mr. Grayson generally attacks the

denial of his suppression motion. This court’s review of a ruling on a motion to

suppress “presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152

Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 14, citing State v. Burnside, 100

Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We “must accept the trial court’s

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State

v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “ ‘But we must independently

determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.’ ” State v.

Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200388, 2021-Ohio-3184, ¶ 10, quoting State v.

Taylor, 174 Ohio App.3d 477, 2007-Ohio-7066, 882 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).

{¶9} Because traffic stops constitute seizures within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, they “must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness

requirement.” State v. Slaughter, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170110, C-170111 and C-

170112, 2018-Ohio-105, ¶ 10, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810,

116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). “When an officer witnesses a specific violation

of the traffic code, a stop of the vehicle in which the violation is committed is supported

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by probable cause.” State v. Howell, 2018-Ohio-591, 106 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.),

citing State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-010621 and C-010622, 2002-Ohio-

2884, ¶ 7.

{¶10} Here, Mr. Grayson does not contest the initial traffic stop or the trial

court’s finding that Officer Gerde witnessed a traffic violation in light of the vehicle’s

one functioning headlight and tinted windows. Instead, he argues that the officer

requested Mr. Grayson’s identification without reasonable suspicion that he had

committed a crime. But “a police officer may request identifying information from a

passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation without particularized suspicion

that the passenger poses a safety risk or is violating the law.” State v. Emmons, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-150636, 2016-Ohio-5384, ¶ 15, citing United States v.

Alexander, 467 Fed.Appx. 355, 362 (6th Cir.2012). Unlike drivers, however,

passengers are “not legally obligated to carry identification or to produce it for a police

officer.” State v. Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 14.

Nevertheless, Mr. Grayson willingly complied with Officer Gerde’s request for his

identification, and we see nothing in the record to suggest that his compliance was not

voluntary.

{¶11} Mr. Grayson also contends that Officer Gerde unreasonably extended

the stop by diverting attention away from the initial reason for the stop and taking the

time to run his identification. In this regard, he points to several cases generally

indicating the taking of identification constitutes a critical factor in determining if a

seizure occurred. See, e.g., State v. Westover, 2014-Ohio-1959, 10 N.E.3d 211 (10th

Dist.); State v. Jones, 188 Ohio App.3d 628, 2010-Ohio-2854, 936 N.E.2d 529 (10th

Dist.); State v. Bermundez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88243, 2007-Ohio-2115. But those

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cases did not involve traffic stops. And “[f]or the duration of a traffic stop, * * * a police

officer effectively seizes ‘everyone in the vehicle,’ the driver and all passengers.”

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), quoting

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007).

Thus, the crucial inquiry is not whether a seizure occurred but rather whether the

traffic stop was “ ‘prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e]

mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, 185

N.E.3d 131, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350,

135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).

{¶12} Generally, during a traffic stop, “a request for identification from a

passenger, followed by a computer check of that information, does not constitute an

unreasonable search and seizure, so long as the traffic stop is not extended in duration

beyond the time reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose.” State v. Matheny,

5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0088, 2022-Ohio-3447, ¶ 37, citing State v. Morgan, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 18985, 2002-Ohio-268. There is no evidence suggesting that

Mr. Grayson’s detention while Officer Gerde ran the two identifications

inappropriately extended the length of time beyond that required to issue a traffic

citation. Within the first minute of the stop, Officer Gerde approached the car and

asked the driver for his identification, proof of insurance, and registration.

Approximately 30 seconds later, he requested Mr. Grayson’s identification for

verification. And about three and a half minutes into the stop, he completed those

tasks, approached the passenger door, and ordered Mr. Grayson out of the car.

{¶13} Additionally, Mr. Grayson argues that the search of his wallet was not

justified as a search incident to arrest. Generally, “warrantless searches are per se

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unreasonable.” State v. Bacher, 170 Ohio App.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-727, 867 N.E.2d

864, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). But there are “a few well-established exceptions” to the warrant

requirement. State v. Ulmer, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-190304, C-190305 and C-

190306, 2020-Ohio-4689, ¶ 13, citing State v. Ward, 2017-Ohio-8141, 98 N.E.3d 1257,

¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

{¶14} One exception to the warrant requirement is the search incident to a

lawful arrest. Upon a person’s lawful arrest, an officer may conduct “a full search of

the arrestee’s person” and the “search is not limited to the discovery of weapons.”

State v. Haynes, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140205, 2015-Ohio-3432, ¶ 25, citing

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Because

at the time of the search, Officer Gerde admitted that he was unsure if he would

proceed by arresting or reciting Mr. Grayson on the outstanding warrant, Mr. Grayson

seizes on this uncertainty to challenge the validity of the search. But a search incident

to arrest may precede the formal arrest “so long as probable cause for arrest existed at

the time of the search and the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.” State v.

Reed, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200104, 2022-Ohio-3986, ¶ 22, citing State v.

Gilmore, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070521 and C-070522, 2008-Ohio-3475, ¶ 14.

Here, the outstanding warrant provided a basis for the arrest, so even assuming Mr.

Grayson was not arrested until after the challenged search, probable cause for the

arrest existed prior to the search. Therefore, the search constituted a valid search

incident to arrest.

{¶15} Finally, Mr. Grayson contests the search as exceeding the scope of a

Terry search. Because the search was justified by the search incident to arrest

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exception to the warrant requirement, however, the officer was allowed to conduct a

full search, obviating our need to consider Terry.

B.

{¶16} In his second issue presented for review, Mr. Grayson argues that the

trial court erred by applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because

the Addyston Mayor’s Court unlawfully issued the arrest warrant.

{¶17} In attacking the arrest warrant, Mr. Grayson—citing Bearden v.

Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664-665, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)—contends that

under constitutional due process and equal protection principles, a court cannot

automatically convert a fine into a jail sentence based solely on the lack of payment.

For further support, he points to R.C. 2947.14(A), which provides that “[i]f a fine is

imposed as a sentence * * * the offender [may] be committed to the jail or workhouse

until the fine is paid * * * if the court or magistrate determines at a hearing that the

offender is able, at that time, to pay the fine but refuses to do so.” Following the

required hearing, if the court determines the offender can pay a fine but refuses, “a

warrant may be issued for the arrest of the offender.” R.C. 2947.14(C). In essence, he

posits that the warrant trespassed on statutory and constitutional grounds because it

sought to jail him for nonpayment of a traffic fine.

{¶18} While we share Mr. Grayson’s concern regarding the process by which

the Addyston Mayor’s Court issued the traffic capias (tellingly, the state does not

defend it), that does not end the inquiry. Rather, the state contends that the good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule applies, insulating the search at hand from

constitutional concern.

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{¶19} In an effort to deter police misconduct, the United States Supreme

Court created the exclusionary rule as a “remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.”

State v. Martin, 2021-Ohio-2599, 175 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.), citing State v.

Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 92. “[W]hen police

act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to

be legal, there is no bad conduct to deter.” State v. Dibble, 159 Ohio St.3d 322, 325-

326, 2020-Ohio-546, 150 N.E.3d 912, citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-

920, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

{¶20} The good faith exception generally applies in circumstances “where an

officer relies, in an objectively reasonable manner, on a mistake made by someone

other than the officer.” State v. Dickman, 2015-Ohio-1915, 34 N.E.3d 488, ¶ 26 (10th

Dist.). But suppression may be an appropriate remedy if the “ ‘issuing magistrate

wholly abandoned their judicial role by taking on the role of law enforcement.’ ” State

v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 32, quoting Leon

at 923. Situations in which courts have applied the good faith exception include where

a database erroneously informed police they had a warrant, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.

1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), and where a probate judge issued a warrant

without the legal authority to issue warrants on criminal manners, State v. Brown, 142

Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-486, 28 N.E.3d 81.

{¶21} Here, while Mr. Grayson’s allegation that the magistrate failed to

conduct the legally-required investigation into Mr. Grayson’s ability to pay the fine

issued, see R.C. 2947.14(A), is very worrisome, the record does not establish that the

investigation never occurred. And regardless, he does not allege (nor do we see

evidence in the record) that the magistrate abandoned their detached and neutral role.

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Therefore, on the record at hand, even assuming the deficiency of the warrant, Officer

Gerde acted reasonably in relying upon the warrant because there is nothing in the

record suggesting he had reason to know of any legal deficiencies of the warrant. The

trial court concluded, correctly in our view: “There is not police misconduct to deter.

Officer Gerde took steps to verify the warrant by placing a call [to] the Addyston police

department. Officer Gerde acted in good faith that the information provided to him

was correct and acted appropriately.” The trial court made these factual findings about

the actions of Officer Gerde, and this court “must accept [these facts] as true if they

are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-

Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8.

* * *

{¶22} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Grayson’s sole

assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed. CROUSE, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.