State v. Grant

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: August 22, 1985
• Docket: 84-356
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 54-356

I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA O R F F

STATE O MONTANA, F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs-

CLIFFORD GRANT,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

APPEAL F O : R M D i s t r i c t Court of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Chouteau, The Honorable J o e l G. Roth, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL O RECORD: F

For A p p e l l a n t :

C l i f f o r d G r a n t , p r o s e t Havre, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana A l l i n Cheetham, Choteau County A t t o r n e y , F o r t Benton, Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : J u n e 1 9 , 1985

Decided: August 2 2 , 1985

Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Frank R. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

Following a non-jury t r i a l i n t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l Dis-

t r i c t C o u r t , County o f C h o t e a u , d e f e n d a n t C l i f f o r d G r a n t was

c o n v i c t e d o f t h e o f f e n s e o f o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e

designated an habitual traffic offender, in violation of

5 61-11-213, MCA. G r a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o one y e a r in the

Choteau County Jail, with six months suspended and given

credit for 16 d a y s already spent in the jail. Defendant

appeals.

Choteau County Deputy Sheriff David Baker observed a

s m a l l r e d c a r l e a v e t h e high.way, t u r n o n t o a r o a d and p r o c e e d

u n d e r n e a t h a r a i l r o a d b r i d g e o u t s i d e o f Loma, Montana, on t h e

evening of January 25, 1984. S i n c e it seemed u n u s u a l for a

c a r t o b e i n t h a t l n c t a i o n , Deputy B a k e r a l s o p u l l e d o f f t h e

r o a d t o o b s e r v e t h e v e h i c l e and i t s o c c u p a n t s . Once t h e dome

l i g h t i n t h e c a r came o n , t h e deputy observed t h e occupants

with his field glasses, noting both the hair color and

c l o t h i n g of each i n d i v i d u a l . When t h e o c c u p a n t s l i t a p i p e ,

Deputy Baker approached the car and asked the passenger,

William Buerkle, to roll down his window. The smell of

m a r i j u a n a was p r e v a l e n t and a p i p e l a y on t h e c a r s e a t . Both

occupants w e r e immediately a r r e s t e d f o r possession of drug

p a r a p h e r n a 1i a .

A d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e check r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n

the driver's seat, defendant Grant, had been declared an

habitual t r a f f i c o f f e n d e r i n August o f 1983. Deputy B a k e r

i n f o r m e d G r a n t t h a t h e would b e i s s u e d a n o t i c e t o a p p e a r f o r

operating a vehicle while designated an habitua 1 t r a f f i c

offender. The two w e r e t h e n e s c o r t e d t o t h e S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e

and "booked. " An a f f i d a v i t and m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o f i l e a n i n f o r m a t i o n

c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e t r a f f i c o f f e n s e was f i l e d i n t h e

District Court on February 8, 1984. The information was issued. T h a t same d a y , d e f e n d a n t made h i s i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e

in court on that charge. Defendant requested a

court-appointed attorney and t h e p r o c e e d i n g was continued.

The t r i a l judge a l s o s e t b a i l a t $500, n o t i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t

was p r e s e n t l y " s e r v i n g some k i n d o f a sentence o u t of the

Justice Court here in Fort Benton," but that once that

s e n t e n c e was s e r v e d , d e f e n d a n t c o u l d p o s t h i s b a i l .

Defendant's attorney entered a plea of not guilty for

him at his a r r a i g n m e n t on March 14, 1984, and a non-jury

t r i a l was h e l d A p r i l 11, 1984. A t t r i a l , Deputy Baker t e s t i -

f i e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s h e had o b s e r v e d t h r o u g h h i s f i e l d

g l a s s e s o c c u p i e d t h e same s e a t s when h e a r r i v e d a t t h e c a r ;

t h a t h e had n o t n o t i c e d any s w i t c h i n g o f p l a c e s ; and t h a t h e

had n o t o b s e r v e d t h e o p e n i n g of any c a r d o o r .

D e f e n d a n t 1s father, Charles Grant, testified that he

r e q u e s t e d h i s son and W i l l i a m B u e r k l e t o d r i v e t h e c a r from

Havre t o G r e a t F a l l s on J a n u a r y 25, 1 9 8 4 , and t o a t t e m p t t o

t r a d e t h e c a r f o r another. H e requested Buerkle t o d r i v e t h e

a u t o m o b i l e a s h i s s o n no l o n g e r had a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .

William Buerkle testified that he drove the car from

Havre t o G r e a t F a l l s and from G r e a t F a l l s t o t h e t u r n o f f n e a r

Loma. The c a r t h e n became s t u c k i n t h e mud and d e f e n d a n t

took over t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t i n an e f f o r t t o f r e e t h e c a r .

Upon cross-examination of Buerkle, t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d an

a f f i d a v i t s i g n e d by B u e r k l e on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1984, s t a t i n g t h a t

d e f e n d a n t had d r i v e n t h e a u t o m o b i l e from G r e a t F a l l s t o Loma.

The d e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y was g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

t h a t o f William Buerkle.

The t r i a l judge found t h F e b r u a r y 8 , 1984, s t a t e m e n t o f ~

William Buerkle t o b e more c r e d i b l e t h a n h i s testimony a t

trial. Relying on Buerkle's affidavit and Deputy B a k e r ' s

testimony, t h e judge found t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f o p e r a t i n g

a motor vehicle while being adjudged an habitual traffic

of fender. D e f e n d a n t r a i s e s e l e v e n i s s u e s i n a p r o se a p p e a l of h i s

conviction. The State condenses those issues into three

major categories. With some amplification, we find the

S t a t e ' s i s s u e s t o be adequate.

1. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y a c t e d w i t h i n t h e r a n g e

o f competence demanded o f a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s ?

2. Whether the District Court properly admitted the

s t a t e m e n t s i g n e d by B u e r k l e ?

3. Whether defendant's due process rights were

violated?

I n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel r e q u i r e s s p e c i f i c a c t s

o r o m i s s i o n s by c o u n s e l which p r e j u d i c e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e and

resu1.t i n t h e d e n i a l o f a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v . Boyer (Mont.

1 9 8 5 ) , 695 P.2d 829, 8 3 1 , 4 2 S t . R e p . 247, 250. I n Boyer, we

a d o p t e d t h e t e s t s e t f o r t h by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t

for d e t e r m i n i n g when ineffective a s s i s t a n c e of counsel has

occurred.

" F i r s t , t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t show t h a t c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t . T h i s r e q u i r e s showing t h a t c o u n s e l made e r r o r s s o s e r i o u s t h a t c o u n s e l was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e ' c o u n s e l ' g u a r a n t e e d t h e d e f e n d a n t by t h e S i x t h Amendment. Second, t h e d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t t h e d e f i c i e n t p e r f o r m a n c e prejudiced t h e defense. T h i s r e q u i r e s showing t h a t counsel's e r r o r s w e r e so serious a s t o deprive the d e f e n d a n t o f a f a i r t r i a l , a t r i a l whose r e s u l t i s re7 i a b l e . " S t r i c k l a n d v . Washington (1984) , U.S. I - , 104 S . C t . 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 6 7 4 , 693.

Defendant points us t o no e v i d e n c e i n support of his

a1l e g a t i o n that his counsel's performance was deficient.

Furthermore, he has failed to prove his counsel's error

d e p r i v e d him o f a f a i r t r i a l . T h e r e f o r e , w e f i n d no m e r i t t o

defendant's claim of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.

11.

D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s that t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e a

r e f e r e n c e t o W i l l i a m B u e r k l e ' s F e b r u a r y 8 , 1 9 8 4 , sworn s t a t e -

ment in its affidavit and motion for leave to file the information against defendant imposed - post facto law on ex defendant. Defendant misunderstands - post facto law. ex

"[Alny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available accord- ing to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto." Beazell v. Ohio (1925). 269 U.S. 167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217. Buerkle's prior statement has none of these effects. The law controlling the operation of a motor vehicle while

designated an habitual traffic offender was the same when defendant performed the offense as it was when defendant was tried. There is no - post facto problem. ex In addition, pursuant to 5 26-1-302(7), MCA, and Rule 613, Mont.R.Evid., the February 8, 1984, statement was admis- sible as a prior inconsistent statement. Buerkel was given the opportunity to explain the statement. Once the opposing

statements were admitted, it was within the province of the fact finder, in this case the trial judge, to determine which statement was more credible. F e find no error in the trial l court's reliance on the prior inconsistent statement.

Defendant's due process rights have not been violated.

Defendant contends that failure to file until February 8, 1984, the information charging him with the traffic of- fense prejudiced him and violated S S 46-7-1.01 through -103,

MCA . Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it.

The judge did not err in ordering a presentence investi- gation. Pursuant to 5 46-18-111, MCA, the judge, in his

discretion, may order a presentence investigation when the potential penalty is less than one year in prison. The judge explained his reasons for the investigation, stating: "Now, b e c a u s e t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l p e n a l t y i n - volved h e r e i n t h i s c a s e , I d o n ' t want t o s e n t e n c e you a t t h i s t i m e . I d o want t o o b t a i n a r e c o r d o f y o u r t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n s , and I d o want t o o r d e r a presentence r e p o r t h e r e t o be prepared by t h e p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e b e f o r e I s e n t e n c e you on t h i s charge . . . ." T r . p . 61.

Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o show how s p e n d i n g o n e week a t

Hi1.1 Top R e c o v e r y C e n t e r , from May 3 1 , 1984 u n t i l June 6,

1984, p r e j u d i c e d h i s a p p e a l . H i s i n i t i a l b r i e f was n o t f i l e d

u n t i l F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1985.

Punishment o f d e f e n d a n t a t t h i s t i m e i s n o t c o n t r a r y t o

t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . D e f e n d a n t c r e a t e d t h e d e l a y when

he chose t o p o s t b a i l pending t h i s appeal.

The c o n v i c t i o n and sentence of defendant i s affirmed.

W e concur: /