State v. Graham

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: August 19, 2014
• Docket: 13-1459
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1459 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 19 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Durham County v. Nos. 11 CRS 55324, 55331

DEANDRE GRAHAM

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 July 2013 by

Judge Carl Fox in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the

Court of Appeals 4 August 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Aimee Escueta Margolis, for the State.

Reece & Reece, by Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Deandre Graham appeals from judgments imposing

active sentences of imprisonment upon him based upon his

convictions for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious

injury, robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit

robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial

court committed plain error by allowing the admission of -2- evidence that the victim had heard “on the street” that

Defendant was one of the individuals who had assaulted and

robbed him and that he is entitled to relief from his

convictions on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds in

light of the failure of his trial counsel to object to the

admission of the victim’s testimony to the effect that he had

heard “on the street” that Defendant was the individual who had

robbed him, to request the trial court to deliver an appropriate

limiting instruction applicable to that testimony, and asking

the alleged victim additional questions about this subject on

cross-examination. After careful consideration of Defendant’s

challenges to the trial court’s judgments in light of the record

and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s

judgments should remain undisturbed.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

After working all day on 14 May 2011, Terence Clay stopped

by his girlfriend’s apartment before meeting some friends at a

bar at 1:00 a.m. After leaving the bar at approximately 2:30

a.m., Mr. Clay drove to a McDonald’s restaurant to get something

to eat before returning to his girlfriend’s apartment. As he

left the restaurant, he noticed a Jeep Cherokee with tinted

windows following him. The Jeep Cherokee was still behind him -3- when he reached the parking lot associated with his girlfriend’s

apartment complex.

As Mr. Clay backed his car into a parking space, the Jeep

Cherokee “rode in front of [him] and went out [of] the parking

lot and made a right onto the main road.” Two men, both of whom

brandished handguns, emerged from the Jeep Cherokee and ran

toward him. One of the men, whom Mr. Clay later identified as

Defendant, confronted Mr. Clay at his open car door while the

second man waited by the trunk. As he stood “[d]irectly in

front of” Mr. Clay at a distance of about an arm’s length,

Defendant “kept saying, ‘we want this car, give us this car, we

want this car.’” In light of this set of circumstances, Mr.

Clay surrendered his car keys, wallet, and phone.

After obtaining control of Mr. Clay’s car keys, wallet, and

phone, Defendant struck Mr. Clay twice in the head with the gun

before shooting him as he lay on the ground. As a result of the

fact that his assailant was having difficulty starting the car,

Mr. Clay had to tell him how to do that. At about the time that

his assailant managed to get the car started, Mr. Clay saw the

second armed man “r[u]n back up the sidewalk and g[e]t in the

truck[,]” which drove away from the apartment complex along with

Mr. Clay’s vehicle. -4- Mr. Clay remained on the ground until the armed men left.

After their departure, Mr. Clay walked to his girlfriend’s

apartment and told her to call the police. At the time that he

talked with investigating officers, Mr. Clay did not appear to

be impaired. Paramedics transported Mr. Clay to the hospital,

where he remained for two weeks. At the hospital, attending

physicians removed portions of Mr. Clay’s large and small

intestines and liver that had been damaged as the result of the

gunshot wound that had been inflicted upon him.

Mr. Clay, who is six feet tall, told investigating officers

that the individual who shot him was “[s]horter than me” and had

“dark skin with a close cut” and that he would be able to

identify the person if he saw him again. Mr. Clay described the

second armed individual as “tall, slender[ly] buil[t], and

[having] single plaits.” Although Mr. Clay believed he would

also be able to identify the second armed individual if he saw

him again, he acknowledged that he “got a better look at” the

individual who shot him given that he had been closer to that

person.1

After “asking around[,]” Mr. Clay viewed Defendant’s

photograph on Facebook and “immediately” recognized him as

“[t]he guy that shot me.” On 15 June 2011, Mr. Clay identified 1 Mr. Clay later identified Marcus Wilder as the second assailant. -5- Defendant as the individual who had shot him after viewing a

photographic array prepared by investigating officers. In

addition, Mr. Clay positively identified Defendant in open court

as the man who had stolen his car and shot him on 15 May 2011.

B. Procedural History

On 16 June 2011, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant

with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, assault with

a deadly weapon, and conspiring with Mr. Wilder to rob Mr. Clay

using a dangerous weapon was issued. On 18 July 2011, the

Durham County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging

Defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a

deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury,

conspiring with Mr. Wilder to commit robbery with a dangerous

weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the

trial court and a jury at the 22 July 2013 criminal session of

the Durham County Superior Court. On 22 July 2013, the trial

court allowed the State’s motions to amend the conspiracy to

commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon indictments to correct certain

errors. On 24 July 2013, the jury returned verdicts convicting

Defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a

deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, conspiracy to commit -6- robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon. At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing

hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing Defendant

to a term of 97 to 126 months imprisonment based upon his

consolidated convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and

conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and to a

consecutive term of 38 to 55 months imprisonment based upon his

consolidated convictions for assault with a deadly weapon

inflicting serious injury and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from

the trial court’s judgments.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

A. “Word on the Street” Evidence

In his first challenge to the trial court’s judgment,

Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by

allowing Mr. Clay to testify that the “word on the street”

indicated that one of his assailants was named “D-Block” or

“Deandre Graham.” More specifically, Defendant contends that

the admission of evidence to the effect that “the ‘word on the

street’” indicated that Defendant had been one of Mr. Clay’s

assailants “was clearly hearsay.” We do not find Defendant’s

argument persuasive. -7- As Defendant candidly concedes, he did not object at trial

to the introduction of the evidence that he has challenged in

this portion of his brief before this Court. As a result, we

are limited to reviewing Defendant’s challenge to the admission

of the challenged evidence for “plain error.” N.C.R. App. P.

10(a)(4) (stating that, “[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was

not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed

preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless

may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the

judicial action in question is specifically and distinctly

contended to amount to plain error”).

For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice — that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty. . . . In other words, the inquiry is whether the defendant has shown that, absent the error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict.

State v. Carter, 366 N.C. 496, 500, 739 S.E.2d 548, 551 (2013)

(quotations omitted). We do not believe that the admission of

the challenged evidence constituted error, much less plain

error.

The North Carolina Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the -8- trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” However, out-of-court statements offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay. This Court has held that statements of one person to another to explain subsequent actions taken by the person to whom the statement was made are admissible as nonhearsay evidence.

State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 409, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998)

(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1988)). According

to Mr. Clay, “[o]nce I got a name, I tried to put a name with

the face. . . . I got, I guess, [the shooter’s] government

name, and I went on [F]acebook and tried to look him up.” As

soon as he saw Defendant’s picture on Facebook, Mr. Clay

“immediately” recognized him as “[t]he guy that shot me” and

communicated that information to investigating officers. Thus,

when considered in context, Mr. Clay’s testimony to the effect

that the “word on the street” indicated that Defendant had been

one of his assailants was admissible, not for the purpose of

showing the truth of the matter asserted, but to explain his

decision to look at Defendant’s photograph on Facebook. As a

result, the trial court did not err by allowing the admission of

Mr. Clay’s testimony to the effect that “word on the street”

indicated that Defendant had been one of his assailants.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel -9- Secondly, Defendant contends that he received

constitutionally deficient representation from his trial

counsel. More specifically, Defendant contends that the failure

of his trial counsel to object to the admission of Mr. Clay’s

testimony that the “word on the street” indicated that Defendant

was one of his assailants, to request an appropriate limiting

instruction applicable to that testimony, and to ask Mr. Clay

additional questions concerning this subject deprived him of his

right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant is not

entitled to relief on the basis of these contentions.

In reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel, this Court employs the two-part test enunciated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.

Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted for state constitutional purposes

in State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562-63, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248

(1985). As a result, in order to assert a successful

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must show

that (1) his counsel’s performance fell “‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness[,]’” and (2) “there is ‘a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v.

Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 502, 701 S.E.2d 615, 652 (2010) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 -10- L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698), cert denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 132,

181 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2011). We “need not determine whether counsel

made errors if the record does not show a reasonable probability

that a different verdict would have been reached in the absence

of counsel’s deficient performance.” State v. Banks, 163 N.C.

App. 31, 36, 591 S.E.2d 917, 921 (citing Braswell, 312 N.C. at

563, 324 S.E.2d at 248-49), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 377,

597 S.E.2d 767 (2004).

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted on

direct appeal, such as the claim at issue here, may “be decided

on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further

investigation is required, i.e., claims that may be developed

and argued without such ancillary procedures as the appointment

of investigators or an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Fair, 354

N.C. 131, 166, 557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1114, 122 S. Ct. 2332, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002). As a

result of our inability to see how further evidentiary

development would in any way affect our evaluation of the

validity of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that

Defendant has advanced in this case, we will proceed to address

Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits.

As noted above, the challenged testimony was admissible to

explain Mr. Clay’s decision to look at Defendant’s picture on -11- Facebook and did not, for that reason, constitute inadmissible

hearsay. Call, 349 N.C. at 409, 508 S.E.2d at 513. As a result

of the fact that the failure to raise a futile objection does

not reflect the provision of deficient representation and could

not have prejudiced Defendant, Defendant cannot show that the

failure of his trial counsel to object to the admission of Mr.

Clay’s testimony to the effect that the “word on the street”

indicated that Defendant had been one of his assailants

satisfies either prong of the Strickland test.

Assuming, without in any way deciding, that Defendant’s

trial counsel should have requested that the trial court deliver

a limiting instruction directing the jury to refrain from

considering Mr. Clay’s testimony that “the word on the street”

indicated that Defendant had been involved in robbing and

assaulting him for the truth of the matter asserted, we do not

believe that there is any reasonable probability that the

delivery of such an instruction would have had any impact on the

jury’s decision to return guilty verdicts in this case. As we

have already noted, Mr. Clay positively identified Defendant as

one of his assailants when he looked at his photograph on

Defendant’s Facebook page, when he examined a photographic array

presented to him by investigating officers, and in open court at

trial. Although the record establishes that Mr. Clay had worked -12- for eleven hours during the day before the assault and robbery

occurred, that he had consumed marijuana and alcoholic beverages

earlier in the evening, that there were inconsistences in Mr.

Clay’s descriptions of the vehicle driven by his assailants in

his pretrial statements to investigating officers and his trial

testimony, and that Mr. Clay’s description of his assailant’s

height differed from Defendant’s actual height by several

inches, we do not believe that the existence of these latent

questions about the credibility of Mr. Clay’s testimony suffices

to substantially undercut the strength of the State’s case

against Defendant given the consistency and clarity of his

identification testimony. As a result, we do not believe that

there is any reasonable probability that the outcome at

Defendant’s trial would have been more favorable to Defendant

had his trial counsel requested the delivery of an instruction

precluding the jury from considering Defendant’s testimony

concerning what he heard “on the street” for substantive

purposes.

Finally, we are not persuaded that the decision made by

Defendant’s trial counsel to question Mr. Clay about what he

heard “on the street” about Defendant’s involvement in the

assault and robbery prejudiced Defendant. On cross-examination,

Mr. Clay testified that he talked to a lot of people as part of -13- his effort to ascertain the identity of his assailants, that the

information that Defendant was one of his assailants came from

people that he trusted, and that he was not satisfied that

Defendant was one of his assailants until he saw Defendant’s

photograph on Facebook. The apparent purpose of the cross-

examination questions of which Defendant now complains was to

suggest that, instead of having identified Defendant as one of

the perpetrators of the robbery and assault, Mr. Clay was merely

reciting what he heard “on the street.” We are at something of

a loss to determine how the decision of Defendant’s trial

counsel to ask this line of questions materially harmed

Defendant’s chances for a more favorable outcome at trial. At a

minimum, given that the jury properly heard Mr. Clay testify

concerning what he heard about Defendant’s involvement in the

robbery and assault “on the street” and given the fact that Mr.

Clay identified Defendant as one of the individuals who

assaulted and robbed him at the time that he looked at

Defendant’s Facebook page, when he examined the photographic

array presented to him by investigating officers, and in open

court, we cannot conclude that there is any reasonable

probability that the jury would have returned verdicts that were

more favorable to Defendant had his trial counsel refrained from

asking Mr. Clay additional questions about what he had heard “on -14- the street.” As a result, Defendant is not entitled to any

relief from the trial court’s judgments on the basis of any

aspect of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he

has asserted in this case.

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that

none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments

have any merit. As a result, the trial court’s judgments

should, and hereby are, allowed to remain undisturbed.

NO ERROR.

Judges Robert C. HUNTER and STEPHENS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).