State v. Goss

2025 Ohio 3136

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1210
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Goss, 2025-Ohio-3136.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 25CA1210

v. :

JOSEPH GOSS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellant. :

_________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant1.

Aaron E. Haslam, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee. ___________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:8-27-25 ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas Court

judgment of conviction and sentence. Joseph Goss, defendant below

and appellant herein, raises one assignment of error for review:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR. GOSS BY IMPOSING A SENTENCE THAT WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.”

1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings. ADAMS, 25CA1210

2 {¶2} An Adams County Grand Jury returned an indictment that

charged appellant with one count of domestic violence in violation

of R.C. 2919.25(A), a third-degree felony, with the finding that

appellant has a prior felony domestic violence conviction in Warren

County in Case No. 17CR32944 and prior misdemeanor domestic

violence convictions in the Lebanon Municipal Court in Case Nos.

CRB1400549 A/B. After an October 31, 2024 hearing, appellant

entered a guilty plea to an amended domestic violence count in

violation of R.C. 2914.25(A), a fourth-degree felony.

{¶3} The trial court held a December 18, 2024 sentencing

hearing. According to the parties’ plea agreement, appellee made

no sentencing recommendation. Counsel acknowledged appellant’s

prior convictions, the victim spoke on appellant’s behalf and

requested the court to terminate the protection order “because I do

love him very much and I do see a future with him. He is the love

of my life and we, everything just got outta hand that evening.”

The victim minimized her injuries and blamed her mother for calling

the police. When offered the opportunity to make a statement of

allocution, the court asked appellant “how did we get here,” to

which appellant stated, “things were made up about me.” When asked

why he pleaded guilty, appellant stated, “Uh, in a way I feel like ADAMS, 25CA1210

3 I, uh, scare tactic in a way. I feel like I was made to feel

nervous. . . [b]y just the situation, the way it was brought to me,

laid on the table. The jury sees your history either automatically

gonna throw you in the pen.”

{¶4} When asked if he felt like he committed this domestic

violence offense, appellant stated, “I do not,” but appellant

declined to withdraw his plea. The trial court also pointed out

that while on bond, appellant tested positive for methamphetamine.

Appellant, however, maintained he had tried methamphetamine for the

first time the day he tested positive. The trial court then

continued the hearing to allow appellant to “familiarize yourself

with the truth.”

{¶5} At the January 16, 2025 second sentencing hearing, the

trial court observed that appellant “failed to . . . report for

testing as he was required to. He was also found in the presence

of the victim. . . [w]hich he was absolutely to have no contact

with. He had negative contact with law enforcement. . . and he

refused to answer the door when he was with the victim . . . during

a bond check. . . I let him out on O.R. bond on October the 31st.”

{¶6} Appellant’s counsel indicated that ten days after the

last hearing occurred, law enforcement discovered appellant in a ADAMS, 25CA1210

4 vehicle with the victim that resulted in a domestic violence charge

and a weapon under disability charge in Clinton County. Counsel

stated that because appellant appeared to suffer a mental health

crisis, law enforcement transported him to a mental health facility

where he stayed for approximately six days. The victim accompanied

appellant to his home, and, when law enforcement stopped to check

on him he refused to answer the door.

{¶7} Appellant’s father spoke at the sentencing hearing and

explained that his son suffers from “serious depression issues”

that “need to be addressed by professionals” and that he has tried

to speak to him and give him guidance over the years. The court

expressed its frustration that it would prefer to avoid

incarceration, but appellant refused to follow court orders to

avoid the victim and to refrain from using illegal drugs.

{¶8} The trial court stated that it had considered the oral

statements, victim impact statements, the PSI, the R.C. 2929.11(A)

principles and purposes of sentencing, and the R.C. 2929.12

recidivism factors. The court recited the facts of the offenses

and reviewed appellant’s prior criminal record, including newly

pending Clinton County charges in which appellant was in the

company of the victim with a weapon. The court noted that ADAMS, 25CA1210

5 appellant “does not believe he has any drug problem, and he shows

no genuine remorse” even when he violated his bond and tested

positive for methamphetamine. The court further pointed out that

appellant is not amenable to community control, given that

appellant violated the conditions of his bond and failed to avoid

the victim.

{¶9} Consequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to (1)

serve a 16-month prison term, (2) serve an optional 2-year

postrelease control term, (3) pay a $500 fine, (4) submit to DNA

testing, and (5) pay costs. This appeal followed.

I.

{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court erred to his prejudice when it imposed a sentence

that is contrary to law. In particular, appellant contends that

the trial court did not consider the R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12

factors, but instead relied on improper information when it

determined whether a prison sentence was appropriate. Appellant

argues that although appellee agreed not to take a position at

sentencing and the victim asked the court not to incarcerate

appellant, the trial court “went against the wishes of everyone

including its own statements during the plea hearing and imposed a ADAMS, 25CA1210

6 prison sentence.”

{¶11} Appellant also claims that the trial court stated that,

absent the victim’s statements at the previous hearing, the court

would have imposed a community control term rather than

incarceration. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted

its frustration with the situation, and observed that the victim

blamed her mother for pressuring her into calling the police, and

stated that she wanted to have a future with appellant. The court

stated:

I can’t help to think that with the exception of trying to hit a grand slam, um, at the last sentencing hearing, which caused us to stop if the victim, uh, wouldn’t have come in with this extraordinary story if it was the mother’s problem and we wouldn’t have delayed the hearing and try and do other things that he probably would’ve been on community control. Um, but, uh, the efforts to, to do all these things, uh, which was, um, a furtherance of the, uh, the charade, uh, that the court sees of the truth that, um, we ultimately hear, and it flushed itself out within, uh, just a few weeks. Uh, that uh, hey, that would’ve been a bad idea, uh, for the court.. .

Standard of Review

{¶12} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply

the standard of review outlined in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v.

Prater, 2019-Ohio-2745, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Graham,

2018-Ohio-1277, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “[t]he ADAMS, 25CA1210

7 appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing

court abused its discretion.” Instead, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

specifies that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or

vacate and remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly

and convincingly finds either:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶13} “[C]lear and convincing evidence is that measure or

degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the

evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

Thus, an appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is

not clearly and convincingly contrary to law if the appellate court

concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the record does

not support the sentence.

R.C. 2929.11 provides: ADAMS, 25CA1210

8 (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.

(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.

{¶14} Moreover, R.C. 2929.12 sets forth several factors for the

court to consider in exercising discretion in sentencing:

(A) . . . the court shall consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the likelihood of the offender's recidivism, the factors set forth in division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender's service in the armed forces of the United States, and the factors set forth in division (G) of this section relating to Alford pleas and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.

{¶15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has summarized the ADAMS, 25CA1210

9 applicability of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as follows:

In Ohio, two statutory sections serve as a general guide for every sentencing. First, R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding purposes of felony sentencing “are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” To achieve these purposes, the trial court “shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution.” Id. The sentence must be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). * * *

Second, R.C. 2929.12 specifically provides that in exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider certain factors that make the offense more or less serious and that indicate whether the offender is more or less likely to commit future offenses. * * *

[A]n offender's conduct is considered less serious when there are “substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.” R.C. 2929.12(C)(4). R.C. 2929.12(C) and (E) also permit a trial court to consider “any other relevant factors” to determine that an offense is less serious or that an offender is less likely to recidivate.

State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), quoting State v.

Long, 2014-Ohio-849, ¶ 17–18. Moreover, this court has held that,

generally, a sentence is not contrary to law if a trial court

considered the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of sentencing,

as well as the R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors,

properly applied post-release control, and imposed a sentence ADAMS, 25CA1210

10 within the statutory range. Prater at ¶ 20; Graham at ¶ 16; State

v. Perry, 2017-Ohio-69, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.); State v. Bowling, 2020-

Ohio-813, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.); State v. Bell, 2024-Ohio-1502, ¶ 31 (4th

Dist.). Finally, neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial

court to make any specific factual findings on the record. State

v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-

2669, ¶ 31. However, a sentence is contrary to law if the trial

court fails to consider the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of

felony sentencing and the R.C. 2929.12 sentencing factors. State

v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-5452, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

{¶16} In the case sub judice, at the sentencing hearing the

trial court stated that it considered the record, oral statements,

victim impact statements, and the presentence investigation report

(PSI). Further, the trial court referred to the R.C. 2929.11

purposes of felony sentencing and stated that it had “balance[ed]

the seriousness of recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12.” Moreover,

the court’s decision stated that it had considered both the R.C.

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 sentencing factors. As we recently noted

in Bell, supra, 2024-Ohio-1502 (4th Dist.), a trial court’s

statement in its sentencing journal entry that it considered the ADAMS, 25CA1210

11 required statutory factors is alone sufficient to fulfill its

obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Bell at ¶ 32, citing

State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-681 (4th Dist.), State v. Sutton, 2015-

Ohio-4074, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clayton, 2014-Ohio-

112, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).

{¶17} As in Bell, appellant asserts that the trial court relied

on extraneous factors. For example, appellant contends that the

trial court took issue with the victim’s statements made at the

prior hearing in which she minimized appellant’s conduct and blamed

her mother for exacerbating the situation. In particular,

appellant points to the trial court’s statement:

I can’t help to think that with the exception of trying to hit a grand slam, um, at the last sentencing hearing, which caused us to stop if the victim, um, wouldn’t have come in with this extraordinary story if it was the mother’s problem and we wouldn’t have delayed the hearing and try and do other things that he probably would’ve been on community control. Um, but, uh, the efforts to, to do all these things, uh which, um, a furtherance of the uh, the charade, uh, that the court sees of the truth that, um, we ultimately hear, and it flushed itself out within, uh, just a few weeks. Uh, that uh, hey, that would’ve been a bad idea, uh, for the court.

The court pointed to the prior hearing in which the victim

testified that she “wanted to have the protection order dropped”

because “I do love him very much and I do see a future with him.” ADAMS, 25CA1210

12 The victim stated, “[h]e is the love of my life and we, everything

just got outta hand that evening.” She continued that after her

mother picked her up, she told the victim, “I’m either calling the

cops or I’m going to either kill him or be [sic.] his ass.” The

victim continued that she “literally had no option,” and “she like

forced me pretty much into getting this . . . restraining order.”

We note that it is not unusual in a domestic violence case for a

victim to recant or otherwise minimize the behavior of the abuser.

See State v. Thomas, 2003-Ohio-5746, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.)(expert

testified that in her experience, many victims recant and minimize

the abuse; in as many as 85% of the cases she handled, victims

recanted due to factors that include improvements in the

relationship, increased danger to women if they testify against

their abusers, and that many abusers tend to “behave” between the

time of the abuse and the time of trial.) In addition, the court

did not state that but for the victim’s testimony, the court “would

have” sentenced appellant to community control; the court stated

that it “probably would’ve been” community control. However, in

the interim, appellant aptly demonstrated his continued refusal to

comply with orders from the court to avoid contact with the victim.

Further, appellant’s new domestic violence and weapon under ADAMS, 25CA1210

13 disability charges in Clinton County constitute a violation of his

bond.

{¶18} The trial court also considered appellant’s criminal

history, that included a 2002 Warren County Court attempt/assault

conviction, a 2003 Lebanon Municipal Court theft conviction, a 2005

Warren County Court contempt of court conviction, two 2007 Warren

County Court receiving stolen property convictions, a 2009 Lebanon

Municipal Court first-degree aggravated burglary conviction, a 2010

Warren County Court second-degree felony robbery conviction, two

2014 first-degree misdemeanor Lebanon Municipal Court domestic

violence convictions, a 2014 first-degree misdemeanor Lebanon

Municipal Court domestic violence conviction, a 2017 first-degree

misdemeanor Lebanon Municipal Court TPO violation, a 2017 first-

degree misdemeanor Lebanon Municipal Court domestic violence

conviction, a 2017 Warren Common Pleas Court fourth-degree felony

domestic violence conviction, and a December 28, 2024 Clinton

County pending domestic violence and having a weapon under

disability charge.

{¶19} A trial court “has full discretion to impose any sentence

within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not

required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing ADAMS, 25CA1210

14 maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. Chapman, 2022-

Ohio-2853, ¶ 76 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Wolfe, 2020-Ohio-5501,

¶ 61-62 (J. Gwin, concurring), quoting State v. Kalish, 2008-Ohio-

4912; see also Neal, supra, 2015-Ohio-5452, ¶ 61 (4th Dist.),

citing State v. Johnson, 2014–Ohio–2308, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. King, 2013–Ohio–2021, ¶ 45 (2nd Dist.). Thus, courts have

“refused to find that a sentence is contrary to law when the

sentence is in the permissible range and the court's journal entry

states that it ‘considered all required factors of the law’ and

‘finds that prison is consistent with the purposes of R.C.

2929.11.’ ” Neal, citing State v. Williams, 2014–Ohio–1618 ¶ 17

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. May, 2013–Ohio–2697, ¶ 16 (8th

Dist.).

{¶20} After our review in the case sub judice, we believe that

the trial court complied with all pertinent sentencing

requirements, reviewed and considered the presentence investigation

report, parties’ arguments, victim impact statements and sentencing

hearing testimony, and arrived at a sentence that falls within the

statutory range. In particular, the trial court cited: (1)

appellant’s bond violation when he tested positive for

methamphetamine, (2) his new Clinton County domestic violence ADAMS, 25CA1210

15 charges, and (3) his continued failure to avoid the victim.

Consequently, we conclude that the record supports the trial

court's sentence and the sentence is not contrary to law.

{¶21} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant's assignment of error and affirm the trial

court's judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. ADAMS, 25CA1210

16 JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:_____________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL ADAMS, 25CA1210

17 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.