State v. Goodwin

Court of Appeals of Georgia

State v. Goodwin

538 S.E.2d 159, 245 Ga. App. 505, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3515, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 995

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedAugust 9, 2000

DocketA00A1271

StatusPublished

This text of 538 S.E.2d 159 (State v. Goodwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Goodwin, 538 S.E.2d 159, 245 Ga. App. 505, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3515, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 995 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

Ellington, Judge.

The trial court granted Glenda Goodwin’s special plea in bar to arson charges, and the State appeals. The State concedes “there is no question that the statute [of limitation] had in fact ran [sic] at the time of indictment.” However, the State argues that the statute was tolled pursuant to OCGA § 17-3-2 (1) because Goodwin left Georgia for a period of years and was not amenable to prosecution.

We have reviewed the entire record and find that the trial court’s decision to grant the plea in bar was not clearly erroneous. The evidence adduced by the State failed to show that Goodwin absconded from Georgia or otherwise concealed herself so that she could not be arrested. See Danuel v. State, 262 Ga. 349, 351-353 (2)-(4) (418 SE2d 45) (1992), interpreting OCGA § 17-3-2 (1). Because the trial court’s “Order on Defendant’s Plea in Bar” thoroughly sets forth the relevant facts and applicable law, we adopt it as our opinion in this case.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur.

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Ellington, Judge.

The trial court granted Glenda Goodwin’s special plea in bar to arson charges, and the State appeals. The State concedes “there is no question that the statute [of limitation] had in fact ran [sic] at the time of indictment.” However, the State argues that the statute was tolled pursuant to OCGA § 17-3-2 (1) because Goodwin left Georgia for a period of years and was not amenable to prosecution.

We have reviewed the entire record and find that the trial court’s decision to grant the plea in bar was not clearly erroneous. The evidence adduced by the State failed to show that Goodwin absconded from Georgia or otherwise concealed herself so that she could not be arrested. See Danuel v. State, 262 Ga. 349, 351-353 (2)-(4) (418 SE2d 45) (1992), interpreting OCGA § 17-3-2 (1). Because the trial court’s “Order on Defendant’s Plea in Bar” thoroughly sets forth the relevant facts and applicable law, we adopt it as our opinion in this case.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

538 S.E.2d 159, 245 Ga. App. 505, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3515, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 995, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-goodwin-gactapp-2000.

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