[Cite as State v. Goodgame, 2025-Ohio-1901.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-L-043
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
RODNEY GOODGAME, Trial Court No. 2022 CR 000227 Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: May 27, 2025 Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Kristi L. Winner, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, and Paul J. Lubonovic, Assistant Public Defender, 100 West Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant- Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Rodney Goodgame (“Goodgame”), appeals the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to dismiss for speedy trial
violations.
{¶2} This case arises from Goodgame’s conviction for Grand Theft, a felony of
the fourth degree, for stealing $21,528 worth of cell phones from Walmart in May 2021.
Goodgame filed a motion to dismiss for violations of his statutory and constitutional
speedy trial right which was denied. On appeal, Goodgame asserts that the trial court erred when it determined that his constitutional right to speedy trial was not violated due
to the 19-month delay between indicting Goodgame and his arrest on that indictment. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the Lake County Court of Common
Pleas, denying Goodgame’s motion.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶3} A complaint was filed against Goodgame for Theft on June 9, 2021, in the
Willoughby Municipal Court. Cty. of Eastlake v. Rodney Goodgame, Willoughby M.C. No.
21CRA01336 (Aug. 3, 2021) (the “Municipal Court Case”). Goodgame was arrested on
July 6, 2021, and posted bond the next day, on July 7, 2021. Goodgame filed twice for a
continuance of the preliminary hearing in the Municipal Court Case, and both were
granted. Included with his motions was a waiver of his speedy trial right. The preliminary
hearing was held on August 3, 2021. The municipal court determined there was no
probable cause at the hearing and dismissed the case.
{¶4} On March 4, 2022, a grand jury returned a bill in a secret indictment for one
count of Grand Theft against Goodgame, arising from the same circumstances involving
stolen cell phones from Walmart in 2021. A warrant on the indictment was issued to the
Lake County Sheriff on March 9, 2022. The warrant was executed by the Lake County
Sheriff’s Department on November 2, 2023, 19 months after being indicted. Goodgame
was released on his own recognizance on November 3, 2023. Defense counsel was
appointed on November 8, 2024.
{¶5} Goodgame requested a continuance of the December 21, 2023, plea
hearing. The request was granted, and the plea hearing was held on January 18, 2024.
Goodgame filed a demand for a bill of particulars on December 27, 2023. The State
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Case No. 2024-L-043 provided the bill of particulars to Goodgame on January 9, 2024. The State requested
discovery from Goodgame but did not receive a response. Goodgame filed a waiver of
jury trial on January 18, 2024. A bench trial was scheduled for March 15, 2024.
{¶6} On March 7, 2024, Goodgame filed a motion to dismiss asserting speedy
trial violations. Specifically, Goodgame argued violations of the statutory time limit
provided by R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and in violation of the speedy trial rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution. The March 15, 2024 bench trial was converted to a hearing
on Goodgame’s motion to dismiss.
{¶7} Deputy William A. Leonello (“Deputy Leonello”) and Lieutenant Bryan
Bowen (“Lt. Bowen”) testified for the State at the hearing on Goodgame’s motion to
dismiss. Deputy Leonello testified that he works in the court service division of the
Sheriff’s Department and one of his duties is civil processing which includes serving
warrants and court orders. Deputy Leonello clarified that by serving a warrant he meant
that the individual was arrested on the warrant. Deputy Leonello indicated that he was the
individual responsible for locating and serving the indictment and warrant on Goodgame.
{¶8} Deputy Leonello stated that he went to the last known address for
Goodgame on record (an apartment complex) and was informed by the rental agent that
Goodgame no longer resided there. The agent gave Deputy Leonello a forwarding
address of a residence in Euclid, Ohio. Deputy Leonello drove to the Euclid residence
and was greeted by a woman identifying herself as Goodgame’s aunt. The woman
explained that Goodgame was not allowed at the house because he would fight with her
sons. The aunt did not indicate to Deputy Leonello that she knew where to locate
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Goodgame, but that she would attempt to let Goodgame know that the Sheriff’s
Department had papers for him.
{¶9} Deputy Leonello testified that it was not until November 2, 2023, that
confirmation was sent to the Sheriff’s Department that Goodgame had been arrested and
was being held in Cuyahoga County. Deputy Leonello testified that he went that same
day to serve Goodgame and transport him to Lake County. Deputy Leonello later learned
that on July 7, 2022, a LEADS update was entered indicating a change in address for
Goodgame. Deputy Leonello explained to the trial court that he does not follow up and
look for alerts unless a Clerk brings it to his attention that there was a change, so he was
not made aware of the July 2022 LEADS address update.
{¶10} Lt. Bowan testified that the Lake County Sheriff’s Department holds
anywhere between 900 to 1,000 outstanding warrants. According to Lt. Bowan, the
Sheriff’s Department has a process for going through the warrants to make sure they are
still good, but that it does not include individually checking for updates on each warrant.
{¶11} On March 25, 2024, the trial court denied Goodgame’s motion to dismiss
for speedy trial violations. The bench trial was held on April 19, 2024, and Goodgame
was found guilty. Goodgame was sentenced on May 23, 2024, to one year of community
control with the conditions that Goodgame serve 60 days in the Lake County Jail, with
two days credit for time served, plus costs.
Assignment of Error
{¶12} Goodgame now timely appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss for speedy trial violations, and asserts one assignment of error:
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Case No. 2024-L-043 {¶13} [1.] “Goodgame was deprived of his right to a speedy trial under U.S. Const.
Amend. IV and Ohio Const. Art. I § and the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss. (Dkt. 58 p. 4-6.)”
Issues for Review
{¶14} Under his assignment of error, Goodgame directs this Court to three specific
issues for review:
{¶15} First, Goodgame asks us to review whether the trial court correctly
calculated the length of delay for speedy trial purposes.
{¶16} Second, whether the trial court correctly weighed the Barker factors when
determining that Goodgame’s delayed assertion of his speedy trial right weighed in favor
the State.
{¶17} Third, Goodgame asks this Court to review whether the trial court conducted
a proper prejudice analysis when determining the delay in serving Goodgame did not
prejudice him.
Standard of Review
{¶18} On appeal, the reviewing court accepts the trial court’s facts, and freely
review the application of law to those facts. “Speedy-trial issues present mixed questions
of law and fact.” State v. Brown, 2023-Ohio-3017, ¶ 44 (11th Dist.), citing State v Kist,
2007-Ohio-4773, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.). “We accept the facts as found by the trial court on
some competent, credible evidence but freely review the application of the law to the
facts.” Id. See also State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15; State v. Bruce, 2018-Ohio-1980,
¶10 (11th Dist.). Therefore, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts
of Goodgame’s case.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Speedy Trial
{¶19} Constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights are coextensive. “The right
to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.” Brown at ¶ 45, quoting Kist at ¶ 18.
“The statutory speedy-trial provisions set forth at R.C. 2945.71 et seq. are coextensive
with these constitutional rights.” Id. As such, the two exist in the same space yet approach
speedy trial differently.
{¶20} Unlike a prima facie showing required for a statutory violation, a
constitutional speedy trial claim requires the trial court conduct a factor weighing analysis.
“To determine whether there has been a denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial, the court considers four factors identified in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972)]: ‘(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion
of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Long at ¶ 14, quoting
State v. Hull, 2006-Ohio-4252, ¶ 22.
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right . . . . Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent on the peculiar circumstances of the case. . . . Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Barker at 530-531. Therefore, Barker’s four factor test serves as a guide for trial courts
evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims.
{¶21} While constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights coexist in the speedy
trial right space, when evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, the focus is on the
prejudice of the delay and the analysis is not constrained by the statutory timeline.
“‘[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional provisions are coextensive, the constitutional
guarantees may be found to be broader than speedy trial statutes in some
circumstances.’” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 19 (2d
Dist.), quoting State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has
recognized that ‘“‘there may be situations wherein the statutes do not adequately afford
the protection guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, in which case it is our
duty to see that an accused receives the protection of the higher authority[.]’”’” (Bracketed
text in original.) Id. “‘“In examining a constitutional claim on speedy trial grounds, the
statutory time requirements of R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 are not relevant; instead, courts
should employ the balancing test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court [in
Barker v. Wingo.]’”’ State v. Ginley, 2024-Ohio-3294, ¶ 147 (8th Dist.). As Goodgame
asserts on appeal that his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, our review
begins with the length of delay and whether it triggered a full Barker analysis.
Length of Delay
{¶22} The first of the Barker factors considers the length of delay. Goodgame
contends that the trial court did not properly calculate the time that lapsed for
constitutional speedy trial purposes in its analysis.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 {¶23} The trial court found that the 19 months between Goodgame’s indictment
and arrest were presumptively prejudicial, meeting the threshold inquiry required to trigger
an analysis of the other three Barker factors. See Barker, 407 U.S. 514, at 531 (“length
of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for the inquiry into the other factors that
go into the balance”). See also State v. Triplett, 1997-Ohio-182, ¶ 17 (a delay of one year
is generally enough to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors). We concur
with the trial court’s conclusion here.
{¶24} Applying Barker, “some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,” combined
with the application of Triplett finding that a delay of one year is generally enough to trigger
the Barker analysis, the trial court focused its analysis on the delay between Goodgame’s
indictment and arrest as the triggering time frame, and any lack of diligence on the part
of the State.
{¶25} Goodgame avers that the trial court should have found that the relevant
length of time began with the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court Case, thereby
extending the length of delay from 19 months to 26 months and necessitating that the trial
court assign more weight to the factor. Goodgame cites to State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d
9 (1971), to support his contention. Meeker is, however, distinguishable from this case.
{¶26} In Meeker, the defendant committed acts at the same time and place in
June 1963 that constituted four different crimes. Id. at 17. With knowledge, the State
elected to accept a guilty plea on one of the crimes which was later voided by a post-
conviction order. Id. at 9. In April of 1969, the State returned an indictment on the
remaining three crimes. Id. at 17. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that this violated the
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Case No. 2024-L-043 defendant’s speedy trial right, explaining that “[c]onsidering the basic purposes of the
constitutional right to a ‘speedy trial,’ we conclude that such constitutional guarantees are
applicable to unjustifiable delays in commencing prosecution as well as to unjustifiable
delays after indictment.” Id. at 16-17. Unlike Meeker, the initial charges against
Goodgame were dismissed, and seven months passed where there were no charges
pending against him. The Barker court stated that all that is required is “some delay which
is presumptively prejudicial” to trigger the Barker analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527. Here,
the trial court found that 19 months had passed between Goodgame’s indictment and
service of the indictment. Therefore, the trial court determined that the delay was
presumptively prejudicial, triggering an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. We
agree with the trial court’s analysis.
{¶27} Goodgame asks, however, that this Court to conclude that the relevant
timeline begins with the filing of charges in the Municipal Court Case and ends with the
service of the secret indictment. The period between the complaint being filed in the
Municipal Court Case and its dismissal was three months. Alone, three months is not long
enough to trigger the Barker analysis. The period after the Municipal Court Case was
dismissed and the secret indictment was seven months. Seven months, even if the three
months prior were included, is still not enough to trigger the Barker factors. The trial court
determined that it was the 19 months delay from the secret indictment to service of the
indictment that met the triggering threshold, and now Goodgame seeks to increase the
weight of that factor by tacking on the Municipal Court Case time and the subsequent
months where no charges were pending against Goodgame. We decline to do so. We
agree that the trial court used the proper time frame. Notwithstanding, the United States
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Supreme Court has held that a constitutional speedy trial claim does not apply to the
“period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused[.]” U.S.
MacDonald, 456 U.S.1, 6 (1982), citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307. The Supreme Court
has further explained:
Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48, 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.
...
Similarly, the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges. Any undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.
MacDonald at 7. Accordingly, Goodgame’s attempt to raise a constitutional speedy trial
claim arising from the seven-month delay between dismissal and secret indictment, is
misguided.
{¶28} Goodgame additionally relies on the case, State v. Selvage, 1997-Ohio-
287, to assert that the holding in Marion does not apply. However, Goodgame’s case is
factually distinguishable from Selvage. The defendant in Selvage had a complaint filed
against her three months after the alleged criminal conduct. The complaint was never
pursued, and the defendant in Selvage was never served with it. The indictment was filed
thirteen months after the date of the offenses in Selvage. Further, in Selvage, other people
implicated in the investigations were arrested significantly sooner than the defendant, who
was not arrested until seven months after those arrests occurred. The court in Selvage
noted that the defendant in that case was “left in limbo for seven months and not given
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Case No. 2024-L-043 an opportunity to answer the criminal charge against her.” Selvage at ¶17. “These facts
led the trial court to conclude that the state did not act with reasonable diligence in
commencing prosecution against appellee.” Id. Here, unlike Selvege, there was a period
of time in between the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court Case and the
indictment where no charges were pending against Goodgame. Therefore, Selvage does
not apply.
Reason for Delay
{¶29} The trial court’s Barker analysis examined the reason for delay, attributing
negligence to the State in its lack of diligence in locating and serving Goodgame.
{¶30} As noted above, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the 19-month
delay between indictment and arrest was the appropriate relevant timeline to examine
and was long enough to trigger the full Barker factor analysis. We further agree that
although the State could have been more diligent in locating Goodgame, the delay was
reasonable. Barker explains that “[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered . . . .” Barker at 531. Here, the government’s delay
was not intentional. There was not a complete lack of diligence to locate Goodgame, but
rather, not enough manpower to manually check each warrant for updates. As soon as
Goodgame’s location was revealed, Deputy Leonello acted and served Goodgame.
{¶31} Finally, Goodgame cites to Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647 (1992) to support
his position that Goodgame was prejudiced by the government’s delay. In Doggett, the
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Supreme Court held that a presumption that a pretrial delay prejudiced the defendant
compounds over time. Doggett at 657.
{¶32} The delay in Doggett, however, stands in stark contrast to the delay in the
present case. In Doggett, the delay between the defendant’s indictment and arrest was 8
½ years. Id. at 658. After Doggett was indicted on federal charges, he left the country
before he could be arrested, and later reentered the country. Doggett lived openly for
years staying within the bounds of law, and the government took no action to locate him.
In the present case, significantly less time elapsed between indictment and arrest.
Further, there simply was not enough manpower available to maintain and act on each
update of the 900 to 1000 active warrants. Once Deputy Leonello was alerted to
Goodgame’s location, he executed the warrant the same day. Accordingly, the trial court
assigned the appropriate weight in its analysis to the State’s delay.
Assertion of Speedy Trial
{¶33} Goodgame contends that the trial court erred in weighing the third Barker
factor against him, for asserting his right to a speedy trial late. Goodgame’s counsel was
appointed on November 8, 2023. Goodgame’s motion to dismiss, based on alleged
speedy trial violations, was filed on March 7, 2024, eight days before the bench trial was
set. The trial court determined that Goodgame’s four-month delay in asserting his speedy
trial rights weighed slightly in the State’s favor.
{¶34} The trial court relied on State v. Rice, 2015-Ohio-5481, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.),
where defendant’s four-month delay in asserting trial right weighed slightly in favor of the
State, to determine that Goodgame’s four-month delay in asserting his speedy trial rights
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Case No. 2024-L-043 weighed only slightly in the State’s favor. Goodgame contends that Rice is inconsistent
with Barker. We disagree.
{¶35} While Barker does reject “the rule that a defendant who fails to demand
speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the defendant
has no responsibility to assert his right. We think the better rule is that the defendant’s
assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be
considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of a right. . . . It allows the trial court to
exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances . . . [and] would also allow a
court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching
significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, at 528-
529. Barker does not preclude any consideration of the defendant’s timeliness in
asserting their speedy trial right. It allows courts to attribute more weight to a defendant
who asserts their rights with “frequency and force.” Id. at 529. The Barker court explained
that the defendant “has some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim,” but that to
show waiver “we do not depart from our holdings in other cases concerning the waiver of
fundamental rights, in which we have placed the entire responsibility on the prosecution
to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.” Barker at 529. The
Barker court goes on to say on this issue, “The approach we accept is a balancing test,
in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Id. at 530.
“Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors . . .
The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by
the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice . . . . We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that
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Case No. 2024-L-043 he was denied a speedy trial.” Id at 531-532. Therefore, Barker instructed that this factor
is particularly fact sensitive.
{¶36} The trial court weighed Goodgame’s delay in asserting his right only slightly
in the State’s favor based on his four-month delay in asserting his right, arguing that
Goodgame could have asserted his right immediately after arraignment. Balancing
Goodgame’s responsibility to assert the right, acknowledging that the frequency and force
of Goodgame’s assertion should weigh in his favor, we agree with the trial court’s
rationale.
{¶37} Goodgame contends that the trial court, relying on State v. Walker, 2007-
Ohio-4666 (10th Dist.), improperly weighted Goodgame’s delay in asserting the right in
favor the State, arguing that the assertion of the right should only attribute weight in favor
of the defendant, not against the defendant, and that the court in Walker misapplied the
law. However, other Ohio courts have applied the third Barker factor similarly. See State
v. McCain, 2016-Ohio-4992, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.); State v. Keaton, 2017-Ohio-7036, ¶ 14 (10th
Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-5196, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. Bailey, 2005-Ohio-
5506, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.); State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-6895, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
{¶38} The trial court appropriately weighed Goodgame’s four-month delay in
asserting his speedy trial right slightly against his contention of a constitutional speedy
trial claim, and in favor of the State’s argument against one.
Prejudice
{¶39} The fourth and final factor in the Barker analysis is the basis of Goodgame’s
third issue for review under his sole assignment of error. Goodgame contends that the
trial court did not properly weigh the prejudice of the State’s delay against him.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 Specifically, Goodgame argues that his defense was impaired by the loss of surveillance
video due to Walmart’s six-month loss prevention limited retention policy, the limited
ability to obtain employment records, and a similar six-month limit on the ability to obtain
cell phone records.
{¶40} The trial court reasoned, “counsel for Defendant suggested during closing
argument that video is retained for six months. The offenses in questions [sic] are alleged
to have occurred in May 2021. Accepting counsel’s argument then, any potential
surveillance video would have been deleted around November 2021, well before
Defendant was even indicted. The same can be said for any potential cell phone records.
Regarding employment records, neither party had success reaching the Canadian-based
employment agency [Goodgame was employed through]. The failure to obtain records
from this agency is not due to any delay; it is due to an apparent lack of cooperation. In
short, the Court finds whatever actual prejudice Defendant has suffered with respect to
the above records is not so great to warrant dismissal.”
{¶41} We agree with the trial court’s rationale on this factor as well. While the
State delayed 19 months from indictment to arrest, Goodgame was no more prejudiced
by the delay than the State was. The State was at the same disadvantage in obtaining
records as was Goodgame, prior to the indictment. The delay in and of itself did not create
any difficulty that Goodgame would not have similarly faced in the months after had the
indictment been brought immediately after the complaint in the Municipal Court Case had
been dismissed. The trial court properly denied Goodgame’s motion to dismiss for speedy
trial.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 {¶42} Accordingly, Goodgame’s sole assignment of error is without merit, and we
affirm the decision of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
MATT LYNCH, J., concurs,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion.
{¶43} I concur in the majority’s judgment but not the majority’s conclusion that the
relevant delay in trying Appellant was reasonable.
{¶44} The trial court used the proper framework for considering Appellant’s claim
of a violation of his speedy trial rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions by
analyzing and weighing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
{¶45} Based on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), and United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982), I agree
that the time for speedy trial compliance here began when Appellant was indicted. In any
event, whether the speedy trial “clock” started running upon Appellant’s 2021 arrest or on
the day he was indicted in early March 2022, the length of the delay was long enough to
be presumptively prejudicial and invoke an analysis of the other Barker factors.
{¶46} But I would not find, as the majority does, that the delay was “reasonable.”
The trial court certainly did not. It found the delay was presumptively unreasonable. Then
the court found the delay was caused by the State’s negligence in not pursuing service of
the warrant on Appellant more diligently. Then it found only that the excuses the State
offered – too many warrants, not enough people to “work” all the warrants, Appellant
moved outside of Lake County (we don’t know when) – were “reasonable” ones. That
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Case No. 2024-L-043 does not make the delay reasonable. If anything, it only lessens the degree to which the
unreasonable delay is weighted against the State.
{¶47} The majority says that “[a]s soon as Goodgame’s location was revealed,
Deputy Leonello acted and served Goodgame.” That ignores the fact that Goodgame’s
location was revealed in the LEADS system in July 2022. So, the State had that
information for almost 16 months before it served and arrested Goodgame. That might
not have been the deputy’s fault, but it certainly was not Goodgame’s.
{¶48} Under Barker, the State’s negligence should be weighted “less heavily”
against the State than “deliberate” actions or inaction. Id. at 531. But here, the trial court
weighed it only “slightly” against the State. Since only the State, its voters, and its agents
have the authority and ability to equip and staff its law-enforcement resources, the court
should have found that the State’s negligence weighed against the State, but less heavily
than a deliberate attempt to delay.
{¶49} In the end, though, I concur because of the trial court’s (and majority’s)
cogent analysis of whether Appellant was prejudiced by the delay and their conclusion that
he was not.
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Case No. 2024-L-043 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error
is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against the appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs with a Concurring Opinion
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2024-L-043