State v. Glover

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: February 5, 2014
• Docket: 2014-UP-043
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tyris Bernard Glover, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-211983

Appeal From Richland County R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-043 Submitted December 2, 2013 – Filed February 5, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Missouri, 361 S.C. 107, 111, 603 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2004) ("When reviewing a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, an appellate court must affirm the trial [court's] ruling if there is any evidence to support the ruling."); State v. Morris, 395 S.C. 600, 608, 720 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The appellate court's task in reviewing the trial court's factual findings on a Fourth Amendment issue is simply to determine whether any evidence supports the trial court's findings."); State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 113, 747 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2013) ("A warrantless search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when voluntary consent is given for the search."); id. ("When the defendant disputes the voluntariness of his consent, the burden is on the State to prove the consent was voluntary."); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) ("[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances."); id. at 226 (analyzing cases determining whether consent to search was voluntary and noting no case "turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling" factor); State v. Wallace, 269 S.C. 547, 552, 238 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1977) (noting a police officer does not have to give Miranda1 warnings before seeking consent to search); State v. Mattison, 352 S.C. 577, 585, 575 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's contention that "the fact that he was 'surrounded' by a drug dog and four police officers with squad cars flashing blue lights demonstrated a 'show of force' that indicate[d] coercion").

AFFIRMED.2

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.