State v. . Glisson

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Glisson

61 N.C. 195

DecidedJanuary 5, 1867

StatusPublished

This text of 61 N.C. 195 (State v. . Glisson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Glisson, 61 N.C. 195 (N.C. 1867).

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Opinion

Reade, J.

There is no doubt that in an indictment for larceny, the owner of the property ought to be described *196 with, reasonable certainty to a certain extent in general. But no additions to the name of the owner are necessary. State v. Godet, 7 Ire., 210.

It may be that, when we had two classes of colored persons, slave and free, it might have been necessary to charge the property as belonging to A., a free person of color, as distinguished from A., a slave. But however that may have been, it is not so now, as there is but one class of colored persons, and they are all free and capable of owning property. To describe a person now as a person of color, is the same as to charge him as a free person of color, because all persons of color are free.

We see no reason why the indictment should conclude against the statute, as larceny is a common law offence. The fact that the owner of the property may once have been a slave, certainly cannot make it necessary.

Per Curiam. There is no error.

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Reade, J.

There is no doubt that in an indictment for larceny, the owner of the property ought to be described *196 with, reasonable certainty to a certain extent in general. But no additions to the name of the owner are necessary. State v. Godet, 7 Ire., 210.

It may be that, when we had two classes of colored persons, slave and free, it might have been necessary to charge the property as belonging to A., a free person of color, as distinguished from A., a slave. But however that may have been, it is not so now, as there is but one class of colored persons, and they are all free and capable of owning property. To describe a person now as a person of color, is the same as to charge him as a free person of color, because all persons of color are free.

We see no reason why the indictment should conclude against the statute, as larceny is a common law offence. The fact that the owner of the property may once have been a slave, certainly cannot make it necessary.

Per Curiam. There is no error.

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Bluebook (online)

61 N.C. 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-glisson-nc-1867.