State v. Glenn

2024 Ohio 3052

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 12, 2024
• Docket: 1-23-67
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Glenn, 2024-Ohio-3052.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-23-67 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

JAQUAN M. GLENN, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR2022 0187

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: August 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee Case No. 1-23-67

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jaquan M. Glenn (“Glenn”), appeals the

September 19, 2023 judgment issued by the Allen County Court of Common Pleas

concerning his conviction and sentence. He contends that his guilty plea was not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. He also challenges the mandatory

nature of part of his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} The charges against Glenn arose from an incident that resulted in the

death of a seventeen-year-old. On July 14, 2022, the Allen County grand jury

indicted Glenn on three counts: (1) murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), with a

firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A); (2) aggravated robbery, in

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), with a firearm specification pursuant to R.C.

2941.145(A); and (3) aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), with

a firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A). Thus, Glenn was charged

with an unclassified felony and two first-degree felonies, along with a firearm

specification for each.

{¶3} On September 19, 2023, following negotiations between the parties,

Glenn withdrew his former plea of not guilty and tendered a negotiated plea of guilty

with the parties making a joint sentencing recommendation to the court. The parties

appeared before the trial court and presented their agreement:

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THE COURT: … We’re here because the Court was notified the parties had reached a plea agreement.

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. It is the State’s understanding that the Defendant will be entering a guilty plea to an amended count one (1), that count being amended to a count of involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree, with an attached firearm specification. With that, the State would dismiss all remaining charges and specifications. There is an agreed joint recommended sentence of fourteen (14) years in prison and the Defendant will not request judicial release, and we are to proceed directly to sentencing.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Vannoy [Glenn’s counsel], is that your understanding as well sir?

[GLENN’S COUNSEL]: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Glenn, do you understand what the attorneys are telling me sir?

MR. GLENN: Yes, ma’am.

(Sept, 19, 2023 Tr. at 1-2).

{¶4} The trial court then proceeded to review with Glenn the Negotiated Plea

of Guilty form that the parties had completed. Among its other sections and

notifications, the form includes sections concerning the offenses to which Glenn

tendered his guilty plea, maximum penalties, judicial release, and postrelease

control. Above the signatures of Glenn, his counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial

court is the following handwritten statement regarding the agreed upon sentence:

“14 yrs agreed sentence, not to request judicial release.”

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{¶5} The following exchanges took place between the trial court and Glenn

during the hearing:

THE COURT: [Under Third District authority I have to sentence you to a mandatory sentence for involuntary manslaughter], there’s other things on appeal though that could get that turned around which would eventually make uh potentially the involuntary manslaughter not mandatory which would open up potential judicial release to you, which is why I tell you that. Right now, there is no potential of judicial release but . . . in the future depending upon how this gets sorted out by the Supreme Court of Ohio, there could be.

...

THE COURT: . . . In the time I’ve been on this bench, I have not gone against an agreement of the parties, I figure if the State and the Defense are comfortable with it, you know far more about the case than I do, I’m gonna do what’s recommended of me but there’s, potentially I don’t have to. Does that make sense to you?

THE COURT: Okay. So now let’s flip [the Negotiated Plea of Guilty form] over on the back. And even though you’re agreeing not to file for judicial release, I’m still going to explain judicial release to you in case something changes. Particularly if the law changes and says you’re eligible. Even though you’ve agreed not to, I still feel like I need to advise you about judicial release eligibility. What that is, is there’s a law in the State of Ohio that allows for someone who is sentenced to prison to ask the court that sentenced them there to let them out earlier than they’re supposed to get out. That’s why it’s called judicial release. How long a sentence you receive though determines when you can ask to be let out early and that also doesn’t include mandatory time. So, right now as the law stands here in the Third District of Ohio where Lima is, you would not be eligible for judicial release because your three (3) year firearm spec is mandatory and the involuntary manslaughter charge would be mandatory time. If that law changes, then once your three (3) year firearm specification is done, you could potentially be eligible for judicial release as to the

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time on the involuntary manslaughter conviction, but right now, no. Does that make sense?

(Sept, 19, 2023 Tr. at 5, 8-9). The trial court went on to, once again, acknowledge

that the parties had “an agreed sentence of fourteen (14) years and no judicial

release.” (Id. at 15-16). Glenn did not ask any questions during the hearing,

although he did answer “Yes, ma’am” or “No, ma’am” to all of the trial court’s

questions apart from his proper response to the trial court’s question about where he

was born. Glenn also indicated he had a chance to discuss his case and guilty plea

with his counsel. (Id. at 15).

{¶6} The trial court accepted Glenn’s guilty plea and found him guilty on

amended count one, the involuntary manslaughter charge (a first-degree felony) and

the firearm specification. The trial court entered convictions for those items,

dismissed counts two and three and their attached specifications, and proceeded

directly to sentencing. The trial court then sentenced Glenn to a mandatory 11 years

minimum, up to a maximum of 16-1/2 years, for the involuntary manslaughter

conviction. It also sentenced him to a mandatory three years for the firearm

specification—to be served prior to, and consecutive to, the term for the involuntary

manslaughter conviction. This resulted in an aggregate prison term of 14 years

minimum to a maximum of 19-1/2 years. The trial court again indicated this was

“an agreed sentence.” (Id. at 33).

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II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Glenn raises two assignments of error for our review:

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in sentencing Defendant-Appellant to a mandatory term of imprisonment on the involuntary manslaughter conviction. (Tr. pg. 24, tab 23; pg. 25, tab 1-2)

Second Assignment of Error

Defendant-Appellant’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. (Tr. pg. 17, tab 21-23; pg. 18, tab 1-4)

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Assignment of Error

{¶7} In the first assignment of error, Glenn asks us to reconsider our holding

in State v. Wolfe, 2022-Ohio-96 (3d Dist.) “and avers that his mandatory sentence

on the involuntary manslaughter conviction is contrary to law. (Appellant’s Brief

at 5). He “concedes that the trial court followed the binding precedent of this Court

in imposing a mandatory sentence on the involuntary manslaughter conviction

pursuant to Wolfe” and “that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires the firearm specification

penalty be made mandatory.” (Id.).

{¶8} Wolfe held that, under R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), when a defendant is

convicted of committing any felony (with the exception of carrying concealed

weapons) while having or controlling a firearm, the court is required to impose a

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prison term—not community control sanctions—in addition to the mandatory

prison term for any firearm specification. Wolfe at ¶ 24. A plea to or conviction of

a firearm specification automatically meets the criteria in R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) that

triggers a mandatory prison term for the underlying offense. Id.

{¶9} Here, the parties agreed to a sentence of 14 years in prison. It is

undisputed that, in line with the mandate in R.C. 2941.145(A), only three of those

years corresponded with the conviction for the attached firearm specification. Thus,

Glenn agreed the trial court would impose a prison term for the underlying felony

involuntary manslaughter conviction and that he would serve that full term without

seeking judicial release. Accordingly, the issue in Wolfe is not implicated under the

facts presented here, and Glenn cannot complain that the trial court imposed a

mandatory prison sentence for the underlying offense. See also State v. Morris,

2013-Ohio-1736, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.) (“[i]n discussing jointly recommended sentences,

the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[t]he General Assembly intended a

jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely because the

parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate’”), quoting State v. Porterfield, 2005-

Ohio-3095,¶ 25; R.C. 2953.08(A)(4), (D)(1). It is not necessary for us to address

Glenn’s argument as it pertains to his sentence because the sentence was imposed

as part of a joint sentencing recommendation. Stated differently, Glenn cannot

complain our decision in Wolfe precludes him from seeking judicial release when

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he agreed to forgo filing any judicial release motion as part of his jointly

recommended sentence.1

{¶10} Regardless, even if this case did implicate the issue in Wolfe and

properly presented an opportunity for this court to reconsider its holding in Wolfe,

we decline to do so. After Glenn filed his appeal and appellate brief, this court

decided State v. Peters, 2023-Ohio-4362 (3d Dist.) and reaffirmed the holding in

Wolfe. Peters at ¶ 85. Here, Glenn pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter in

violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a first-degree felony, and the accompanying firearm

specification. The trial court did not err in following precedent and imposing a

mandatory prison term for the felony involuntary manslaughter conviction.

Glenn’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Second Assignment of Error

{¶11} In the second assignment of error, Glenn argues that, although the trial

court properly conducted a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, it “misinformed him regarding

his future eligibility for judicial release.” (Appellant’s Brief at 14). “[H]e contends

that since his ineligibility for judicial release was incorporated in the plea

agreement, and the trial court misinformed him regarding his future eligibility for

judicial release, his plea was not intelligently and knowingly made.” (Id.).

According to Glenn, the alleged misinformation “prejudicially impacted” his

1 Glenn does not challenge any other aspects associated with a mandatory sentence.

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decision to enter the plea, with a “reasonable probability that, but for the trial

court’s” alleged misinformation, he would not have pleaded guilty. (Id. at 14-15).

Therefore, according to Glenn, his plea is invalid, his conviction should be reversed,

and this case should be remanded.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

{¶12} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 1996-Ohio-179 (1996). “Failure on any of those points renders enforcement

of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio

Constitution.” Id.

{¶13} “When we are determining whether a guilty plea was entered

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, we conduct a de novo review of the record

(looking at the totality of the circumstances) to ensure that the trial court complied

with the constitutional and procedural safeguards.” State v. Conner, 2021-Ohio-

1769, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.); see also State v. McGill, 2020-Ohio-575, ¶ 5, 8, 17-18 (8th

Dist.) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily entered because he did not understand he would forgo eligibility for

judicial release pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement). “When a criminal

defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that

he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings and that he

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was prejudiced by that error.” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 13. Generally,

to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must “establish that ‘his plea would not have

otherwise been made.’” State v. Rudy, 2023-Ohio-2023, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting

Dangler at ¶ 24. Prejudice must be established on the face of the record. Dangler

at ¶ 24.

{¶14} Criminal Rule 11(C) “governs the process that a trial court must use

before accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest.” State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-

5200, ¶ 8. The rule at subsection (C)(2) directs trial courts to engage with the

defendant in a colloquy, which “is designed to ensure that a plea is knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made.” State v. Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, ¶ 24 (3d

Dist.). “Crim.R. 11 does not require a court to inform a defendant that he or she is

ineligible for judicial release unless that condition is incorporated into the plea

agreement.” State v. Duncan, 2018-Ohio-1511, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (Stewart, J.); see also

Crim.R. 11(C)(2).

{¶15} However, if the trial court does embark on a discussion regarding the

applicability of judicial release, a plea may be invalidated if the trial court gives a

defendant misinformation regarding judicial release and the defendant is induced to

enter the plea by that misinformation. Rudy at ¶ 18-19; see also State v. Williams,

2020-Ohio-4467, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.) (“a plea may be invalidated if a defendant shows

that he or she was given misinformation regarding judicial release that prejudicially

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impacted his or her decision to enter a plea” [emphasis in original]). “The rationale

behind the principle is ‘[w]hen a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by

erroneous representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered

knowingly and intelligently.’” Rudy at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Mitchell, 2006-Ohio-

618, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). “Yet, ‘misinformation regarding judicial release does not

always invalidate the plea.’” Id., quoting State v. Robinson, 2018-Ohio-4863, ¶ 25

(8th Dist.).

2. Analysis

{¶16} In accordance with the standards set forth above, we will not reverse

Glenn’s conviction. Here, Glenn admits the trial court properly conducted the plea

colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2). In addition to Glenn indicating at the

hearing he understood the plea included “an agreed joint recommended sentence of

fourteen (14) years in prison and [he] will not request judicial release,” the trial court

properly informed Glenn during the plea colloquy that he was agreeing not to file

for judicial release. (Sept. 19, 2023 Tr. at 1-2, 8, 15-16).

{¶17} Regardless of any potential misinformation or confusion that may

have allegedly been created by the trial court’s discussion of scenarios involving

eligibility for judicial release, there is nothing in the record indicating that Glenn

would not have entered his plea had the trial court never made the alleged

misrepresentations. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 24. We find nothing in the

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record to indicate he was induced to enter the plea by those alleged

misrepresentations. On the contrary, the record shows he would have entered the

guilty plea whether or not the trial court made the statements at issue. For example,

Glenn faced significantly more prison time under the murder charge and two first-

degree felonies charges than he faced without the plea deal. Significantly, Glenn

indicated both orally at the hearing and in writing that he understood his plea

agreement included not requesting judicial release. Additionally, the trial court

indicated during the hearing that the sentence to be imposed was the sentence agreed

to by the parties and the court would adopt the recommended sentence, and Glenn

did not ask any questions during the plea colloquy or make any statement

concerning judicial release. E.g., Robinson, 2018-Ohio-4863, at ¶ 31 (8th Dist.)

(although the trial court provided misinformation concerning defendant’s eligibility

for judicial release and defendant “maintain[ed] that he would not have entered into

his plea if he had known that he was not eligible for judicial release, the record

belie[d] his claim”—including the significant difference between the possible

penalties with the plea agreement versus without); Mitchell, 2006-Ohio-618, at ¶ 9-

11, 15-16 (11th Dist.).

{¶18} Glenn’s assertion that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

the trial court’s [alleged] misstatements regarding his potential eligibility for

judicial release, Glenn would not have pled guilty” is unsupported. The record does

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not indicate Glenn relied on the alleged misstatements in deciding to enter his guilty

plea. Thus, even if an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings, Glenn has not

established that he was prejudiced by that error. See Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at

¶ 13; Rudy, 2023-Ohio-2023, at ¶ 19 (even assuming the trial court made

misrepresentations regarding judicial release, defendant was not “induced to enter

his plea because of the statements or was prejudiced by them”).

{¶19} Glenn’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶20} For the foregoing reasons, Glenn’s assignments of error are overruled.

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and

argued, we affirm the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.

ZIMMERMAN and BALDWIN, J.J., concur.

/jlm

** Judge Craig R. Baldwin of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting by Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.

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