An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-561
Filed 18 March 2026
Surry County, No. 23CR213728-850
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SHANNON EDWARD GAULT, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 10 January 2024 by Judge Angela
B. Puckett in Surry County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15
January 2025.
Yoder Law PLLC, by Attorney Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant- appellant.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Rana M. Badwan, for the State.
STADING, Judge.
Shannon Edward Gault (“Defendant”) appeals from final judgment after he
pled guilty to failure to register changes or obtain a new online identifier. After
careful consideration, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and vacate and remand in
part. STATE V. GAULT
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor on 18
July 2022. As a result, he was placed on supervised probation. As a special condition
of his probation, Defendant “was to have no internet access or access to social
networking sites[.]” While conducting a supervision visit on 8 December 2022,
Defendant’s probation officer discovered various images on Defendant’s cell phone
that originated from a commonly known social media application—SnapChat. It was
later determined that Defendant accessed and controlled various SnapChat accounts
from his cell phone despite the condition of his probation. Following his violation,
Defendant’s probation “was revoked for the original offense.”1
On 11 December 2023, the Surry County Grand Jury returned a true bill of
indictment charging Defendant with one count of failure to register changes or obtain
a new online identifier as a sex offender. Defendant pled guilty on 10 January 2024.
That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 19–32 months in prison,
suspended for 36 months of supervised probation and a 90-day split sentence. The
1 Defendant previously appealed the trial court’s judgment that found a probation violation, revoked
his probation, and activated his sentence. State v. Gault, No. COA24-5, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 375 (2025). Defendant argued “that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation [and] the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated a condition of his probation.” Id. at *1. A prior panel from this Court held that “the violation report complied with the notice requirement under North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-1345(e), so the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in Defendant’s probation revocation hearing.” Id. at *22. The prior panel determined “that there was insufficient competent evidence that Defendant violated his probation by committing a criminal offense” and reversed the “trial court’s judgment revoking Defendant’s probation[.]” Id.
-2- STATE V. GAULT
trial court further ordered that Defendant “have no internet access or access to any
social media” as a special condition of his probation.
Defendant’s trial attorney objected to the imposition of this special condition
of probation, arguing that it was unconstitutional:
[DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY]: [B]efore Your Honor puts one of these conditions to be the internet, I’m not sure that’s a constitutional judgment.
The trial court replied:
[TRIAL COURT]: The Court does hear your argument, but . . . is going to order that he have no internet access or access to any social media. He is to perform 72 hours of community service, pay the community service fee associated with that, not have, use, possess any controlled substance or alcoholic beverage. Submit to warrantless searches of your person, your vehicle, your residence to insure you are complying with that condition of probation, along with unannounced drug and/or breath tests. And, of course, not violate any of the laws of the State of North Carolina.
Following sentencing, Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court. He
also petitioned our Court for a writ of certiorari (“PWC”) on 28 August 2024.
II. Jurisdiction
On appeal, Defendant asserts the trial court erred in ordering 36 months of
probation to commence after he was released from serving a 90-day split sentence
because it exceeded the maximum probationary period allowed under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1343.2(d)(4) (2023). We have jurisdiction to consider this issue under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1444(a2) (2023). See State v. Sale, 232 N.C. App. 662, 663–64, 754 S.E.2d
-3- STATE V. GAULT
474, 476 (2014) (reviewing whether the trial court made the appropriate findings of
fact to impose a longer probationary period under section 15A-1343.2(d) after the
defendant entered an Alford plea); see also State v. Porter, 282 N.C. App. 351, 352,
870 S.E.2d 148, 149 (2022); see also State v. Branch, 194 N.C. App. 173, 178, 669
S.E.2d 18, 21 (2008).
We must next determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider
Defendant’s remaining issues proposed on appeal in view of his PWC. Defendant
requests us to review whether a total ban on accessing the Internet and social media,
as a special condition of probation, is unreasonable, overbroad, and unconstitutional
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the alternative, he
requests that we review whether the imposed total ban was an abuse of discretion in
view of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b1)(10) (2023).
“In North Carolina, a defendant’s right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is
purely a creation of state statute.” State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69, 72, 568 S.E.2d
867, 869 (2002). To that end, a defendant’s right to appeal after the entry of a guilty
plea is limited by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444. That statute provides that a defendant
who pleads guilty to a felony or misdemeanor in superior court may appeal the
following issues as a matter of right:
(a2) A defendant who has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony or misdemeanor in superior court is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the sentence imposed:
-4- STATE V. GAULT
(1) Results from an incorrect finding of the defendant’s prior record level under G.S. 15A-1340.14 or the defendant’s prior conviction level under G.S. 15A- 1340.21;
(2) Contains a type of sentence disposition that is not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant’s class of offense and prior record or conviction level; or
(3) Contains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A- 1340.23 for the defendant’s class of offense and prior record or conviction level.
Id. § 15A-1444(a2). Indeed, “[e]xcept as provided in subsections (a1) and (a2) . . . the
defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he has entered
a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal charge in the superior court . . . .” Id. §
15A-1444(e). Even so, if a defendant has no direct right of appeal via subsection 15A-
1444(a2), “he may petition the appellate division for review by writ of certiorari.” Id.
“The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs,
including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and supersedeas, in aid of its own
jurisdiction . . . .” Id. § 7A-32(c) (2023) (emphasis added); N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1)
(“The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either
appellate court . . . .”). “Our precedent establishes a two-factor test to assess whether
certiorari review by an appellate court is appropriate. First, a writ of certiorari should
issue only if the petitioner can show ‘merit or that error was probably committed
below.’” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA of the United States, 384 N.C. 569, 572, 572,
-5- STATE V. GAULT
887 S.E.2d 848, 851, 851 (2023) (citation omitted). “Second, a writ of certiorari should
issue only if there are ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to justify it.” Id. (citation
omitted). “There is no fixed list of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that warrant
certiorari review, but this factor generally requires a showing of substantial harm,
considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty
at stake.’” Id. at 573, 887 S.E.2d at 851 (citation omitted). “Ultimately, the decision
to issue a writ of certiorari rests in the sound discretion of the presiding court.” Id.
(citing Ricks, 378 N.C. at 740, 862 S.E.2d at 838).
Our review leads us to conclude that Defendant has sufficiently shown merit,
and he has established extraordinary circumstances warranting our issuance of the
writ. See Cryan, 384 N.C. at 573, 887 S.E.2d at 851.
III. Analysis
A. Length of Probationary Period
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in ordering 36 months of
supervised probation to commence after he was released from incarceration.
Defendant maintains, absent specific findings, the 90-day split sentence violates the
36-month maximum set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(4).
“Alleged statutory errors are questions of law, and as such, are reviewed de
novo.” State v. Mackey, 209 N.C. App. 116, 120, 708 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2011) (citations
omitted). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely
-6- STATE V. GAULT
substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C.
162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The trial court may order a defendant to “[s]ubmit to imprisonment required
for special probation under G.S. 15A-1351(a) or G.S. 15A-1344(e).” Id. § 15A-
1343(b1)(3). Indeed, “N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 15A-1351 allows a trial court to order a
defendant to submit to a period or periods of imprisonment in a local confinement
facility or in the custody of the Department of Correction as a condition of special
probation.” State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 135, 567 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2002). The court
determines these periods of imprisonment “at whatever time or intervals within the
period of probation, consecutive or nonconsecutive . . . as provided in [subsection 15A-
1351(a)].” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a). That subsection further provides, “[t]he
original period of probation, including the period of imprisonment required for special
probation, shall be as specified in G.S. 15A-1343.2(d), but may not exceed a maximum
of five years, except as provided by G.S. 15A-1342(a).” Id.
In turn, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d) prescribes the minimum and
maximum length of probation:
(d) Lengths of Probation Terms Under Structured Sentencing. - Unless the court makes specific findings that longer or shorter periods of probation are necessary, the length of the original period of probation for offenders sentenced under Article 81B shall be as follows:
....
-7- STATE V. GAULT
(4) For felons sentenced to intermediate punishment, not less than 18 nor more than 36 months.
If the court finds at the time of sentencing that a longer period of probation is necessary, that period may not exceed a maximum of five years, as specified in G.S. 15A- 1342 and G.S. 15A-1351.
Thus, if a felon is sentenced to intermediate punishment, the maximum probationary
period he may receive is 36 months, “[u]nless the court makes specific findings that
[a] longer . . . period of probation [is] necessary[.]” Id. This 36-month maximum
“includ[es] the period of imprisonment required for special probation . . . .” Id. § 15A-
1351(a); e.g., State v. Hendricks, 277 N.C. App. 304, 307, 858 S.E.2d 384, 386 (2021)
(“[T]he trial court originally sentenced Defendant to an intermediate punishment of
special probation for 60 months, including an active sentence of 330 days. Therefore,
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a), Defendant’s total probationary period included
his 330-day active sentence.”).
Here, after Defendant pled guilty to a felony, the trial court sentenced
Defendant to an intermediate punishment and imposed a 36-month probationary
period—the maximum length allowable by subsection 15A-1343.2(d)(4) without
making specific findings. In addition, pursuant to subsection 15A-1351(a), the trial
court ordered Defendant to serve a 90-day split sentence as a special condition of
probation. The trial court ordered this 90-day sentence to begin “at the expiration of
the sentence [he was] serving in 21 CRS 51052/54”—his previous sentence for second-
degree sexual exploitation of a minor. As to the 36 months of supervised probation,
-8- STATE V. GAULT
the trial court ordered, it “shall begin” once “released from incarceration.” However,
the trial court failed to indicate which period of incarceration it was referencing—the
previous sentence for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor or the 90-day split
sentence pursuant to subsection 15A-1351(a).
Defendant’s 90-day split sentence, as a special condition of probation, must be
calculated into the overall length of his probationary period. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1351(a) (“The original period of probation, including the period of imprisonment
required for special probation, shall be as specified in G.S. 15A-1343.2(d) . . . .”); State
v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) (citation omitted) (“Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial
construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.”).
Subsection 15A-1351(a) confirms that a sentence of special probation occurs within
the period of probation:
Under a sentence of special probation, the court may suspend the term of imprisonment and place the defendant on probation as provided in Article 82, Probation, and in addition require that the defendant submit to a period or periods of imprisonment in the custody of the Division of Community Supervision and Reentry of the Department of Adult Correction or a designated local confinement or treatment facility at whatever time or intervals within the period of probation, consecutive or nonconsecutive, the court determines, as provided in this subsection.
In State v. Hendricks, our Court applied subsection 15A-1351(a) when
calculating the defendant’s aggregate probationary term. 277 N.C. App. at 307, 858
-9- STATE V. GAULT
S.E.2d at 386. There, “the trial court originally sentenced Defendant to an
intermediate punishment of special probation for 60 months, including an active
sentence of 330 days.” Id. Pursuant to “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a),” our Court
reasoned the defendant’s “total probationary period included his 330-day active
sentence.” Id. Applying the same logic here, and as the State concedes, Defendant’s
total probationary period—36 months—included his 90-day split sentence. After
serving his 90-day split sentence, Defendant will have 33 months of supervised
probation remaining.
Thus, contrary to Defendant’s urging, the trial court did not sentence him to a
probationary period in excess of 36 months; as such, no written findings were
necessary. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(4). We therefore affirm this portion
of the trial court’s judgment. But to the extent that the trial court’s written judgment
does not indicate after which period of incarceration his supervised probation will
begin, this is merely a clerical error. See State v. Allen, 249 N.C. App. 376, 380, 790
S.E.2d 588, 591 (2016) (brackets in original and citation omitted) (“A clerical error is
defined as, ‘[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, esp[ecially] in
writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or
determination.’”). And to the extent that the trial court’s written judgment does not
reflect that the 90-day split sentence should be served during the 36-month
probationary period, it is a clerical error and we remand for correction. See id. at 379,
790 S.E.2d at 591 (citation omitted) (“If the alleged sentencing error is only clerical
- 10 - STATE V. GAULT
in nature, ‘it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because
of the importance that the record speak the truth.’”).
B. Special Condition of Probation
Acting under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342(b1), the trial court imposed a special
condition of probation: “no internet access ordered by the court or any social media.”
Defendant challenges the condition as an unlawful “sweeping and total ban.” He
offers a series of arguments aimed at equating generalized Internet access with the
freedom of speech and press protections provided under the United States and North
Carolina Constitutions. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, Defendant frames his
argument that the Internet is “the air we all breathe now.” But, since “cyberspace is
different from the physical world, and . . . we cannot appreciate yet the full
dimensions and vast potential of the Cyber Age, we should proceed circumspectly,
taking one step at a time.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 118–19, 137
S. Ct. 1730, 1744 (2017) (J. Alito, concurring).
Ordinarily, “[a] challenge to a trial court’s decision to impose a condition of
probation is reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard of review . . . .”
State v. Allah, 231 N.C. App. 88, 98, 750 S.E.2d 903, 911 (2013). “An abuse of
discretion is a decision manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it
could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C.
537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998). That said, “[t]he standard of review for alleged
violations of constitutional rights is de novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204,
- 11 - STATE V. GAULT
214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009). “‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the
matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.”
State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation omitted).
The United States and North Carolina constitutions provide freedom of speech
protections. U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”); N.C. Const. Art. I § 14 (“Freedom of speech and of the press
are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but
every person shall be held responsible for their abuse.”). But “[i]nherent in the very
nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled.’”” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S. Ct.
587, 591 (2001) (first quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S. Ct. 3164,
3169 (1987)) (then quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593
(1972)). “Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s
freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive
the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” Knights, 534 U.S. at
119, 122 S. Ct. at 591; see also United States v. Henson, 22 F. App’x 107, 112 (4th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (“A special condition of supervised release may restrict
fundamental rights when the special condition ‘is narrowly tailored and is directly
related to deterring [a defendant] and protecting the public.”).
Although the facts of this case present a novel question under North Carolina
law, the federal courts have addressed comparable matters. In United States v.
- 12 - STATE V. GAULT
Mixell, the defendant argued a condition of supervised release unlawfully infringed
on his First and Fourth Amendment rights since it required him to “participate for
five years in a program monitoring his computer and Internet use.” 806 F. App’x 180,
182 (4th Cir. 2020). Similar to North Carolina state law, the Fourth Circuit noted
the trial court “is afforded broad latitude to impose conditions on supervised release,”
and reviews such conditions “only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 184 (4th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up); see also State v. Johnston, 123 N.C. App. 292, 304-05, 473 S.E.2d
25, 33 (1996) (citing State v. Harrington, 78 N.C. App. 39, 48, 336 S.E.2d 852, 857
(1985)) (“Under N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-1343(b1), the trial court may impose any
conditions on probation that it determines ‘to be reasonably related to [defendant’s]
rehabilitation.’ G.S. § 15A-1343(b1)(10)(1995). The trial court is accorded
‘substantial discretion’ in imposing conditions under this section.”). Citing United
States v. LaCoste, 821 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2016) as an example, the Fourth
Circuit also noted “[s]pecial conditions involving limitations on computer use or
required computer monitoring have been upheld when the defendant has a history of
using a computer or the Internet to commit present or prior crimes.” Mixell, 806 F.
App’x at 185. The Court acknowledged “the centrality of the Internet to modern life,”
but emphasized the special condition did not prevent the defendant from “using a
computer or electronic device to access the Internet or to communicate on it” and was
“for a limited five-year period of supervised release.” Id. (cleaned up). The special
condition was thus appropriate since the defendant “used his computer in his original
- 13 - STATE V. GAULT
crime,” and “was sufficiently tailored because the monitoring program d[id] not
prevent him from speaking online.” Id.
Defendant relies heavily on Packingham v. North Carolina and contends it is
dispositive of this issue. 582 U.S. 98, 137 S. Ct. 1730. He maintains, “[i]f the statute
in Packingham was struck down using intermediate scrutiny, the total Internet ban
in this case must also fail.” In Packingham, the United States Supreme Court
analyzed a state law barring registered sex offenders, “a status that can endure for
30 years or more,” “from gaining access to commercial social networking sites.” Id.
at 102, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court acknowledged
a valid governmental interest but did not believe the statute was narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. Id. at 105–07, 137 S. Ct. at 1736–37. The Court noted, “[i]t is
unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons
who have completed their sentences.” Id. at 108, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. Although the
government’s interests and breadth of the restriction here resemble Packingham,
Defendant’s attempts to portray the case as a perfect analogue are misplaced as his
argument ignores a distinction in the narrow tailoring analysis for probationers and
post-release supervisees.
In United States v. Bobal, the defendant also argued that Packingham was
controlling in his challenge of a special condition of his supervised release that
prohibited him from “using a computer except for work and with the prior permission
of the district court.” 981 F.3d 971, 976–77 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit
- 14 - STATE V. GAULT
disagreed with the defendant for three reasons: (1) the law in Packingham restricted
sex offenders even after completion of their sentence; (2) the law in Packingham
applied to all registered sex offenders, not only those who used a computer in the
commission of their offense; and (3) the restriction in Bobal was “not a complete bar
to the exercise of [defendant’s] First Amendment right.” Id. at 977. The Court
reiterated the principle that a trial court “may impose reasonable conditions that
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens during
supervised release. Id. (cleaned up).
Since federal precedent is not directly on point, but provides a level of guidance,
we must evaluate whether this content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction is
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate interests. Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989). Turning first to the
government’s interest, as in Packingham, the State has a significant interest in
preventing sex offenders from using the Internet to commit further crimes. 582 U.S.
at 105–07, 137 S. Ct. at 1736–37. Turning next to narrow tailoring considerations,
the condition imposed in Mixell met constitutional muster because “the monitoring
program d[id] not prevent [the defendant on supervised release] from speaking
online.” 806 F. App’x at 185. Similarly, the condition at issue in Bobal was “not a
complete bar” to the defendant’s First Amendment rights. 981 F.3d at 977. These
rulings necessarily indicate the special condition of probation ordering “no Internet
access” does not meet narrow tailoring requirements since “its wide sweep precludes
- 15 - STATE V. GAULT
access to a large number of websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the
commission of a sex crime against a child.” Packingham, 582 U.S. at 114, 137 S. Ct.
at 1741 (J. Alito, concurring). We are therefore bound to vacate the trial court’s
imposition of this special condition of probation.
We emphasize that, although this particular special condition of probation is
unlawful in its current form, the trial court has a plethora of options to serve this
compelling state interest. See United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 977 (11th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up) (“Nothing in Packingham undermines the settled principle that a
district court may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens during supervised release.”). For example,
like the federal district court in Bobal, the trial court here could prohibit Defendant
from “using a computer except for work with the prior permission of the . . . court.”
Id. at 976. Also, as in Mixell, the trial court here may impose a special condition of
probation “monitoring his computer and Internet use.” 806 F. App’x at 182. It could
also prohibit Defendant from using those applications and websites that are likely to
facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a child. See Packingham, 582 U.S. at
114, 137 S. Ct. at 1741. Or, as in United States v. Wells, the trial court here may
prohibit Defendant from accessing “the Internet or any ‘on-line computer service’ at
any location (including employment) without prior approval of the probation officer.”
29 F.4th 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Moreover, the trial court could order
regular searches of Defendant’s computers and phones. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
- 16 - STATE V. GAULT
1343(b)(13). Indeed, the trial court could impose all of these special conditions of
probation if it chooses to do so.
Finally, since we vacate and remand this matter to the trial court for the
reasons above, we need not consider Defendant’s other arguments.
IV. Conclusion
After careful consideration, we hold that the length of the probationary period
imposed by the trial court comports with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(4) and thus
affirm this portion of the judgment. However, we must remand the judgment to the
trial court for correction of a clerical error. We are also bound to vacate and remand
only the portion of the judgment containing the special condition of probation that
Defendant have no access to the Internet or social media. On remand, the trial court
may implement special conditions of probation that comply with constitutional
requirements of narrow tailoring, such as those provided above.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED
IN PART.
Judges ARROWOOD and COLLINS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
- 17 -