State v. Gates

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: July 15, 1982
• Docket: 82-048
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 82-48

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O NONTANA F F

STATE O MONTANA, F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs- J A Y LEE GATES,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The H o n o r a b l e Douglas G. H a r k i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

F e r g u s o n & M i t c h e l l ; C o l l e e n M. Dowdall, M i s s o u l a , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , &Iontana R o b e r t L. Descha~nps, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : May 20, 1982

Decided: J u l y 1 5 , 1982

Filed: dU- L 5 198% Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I , H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.

D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f

h i s p r o s e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . W affirm. e

On December 30, 198G1, defendant was charged by

information with forgery, a felony, He p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y

on J a n u a r y 7 , 1981. On F e b r u a r y 25, 1981, a hearing was

held on defendant's pro s e motion to change his plea to

guilty. After extensive interrogation, the District Court

accepted defendant's guilty plea and on April 8, 1981,

s e n t e n c e d him t o t w e n t y y e a r s a t t h e Montana State Prison.

D e f e n d a n t was d e s i g n a t e d a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r .

Also at the April 8 hearing, defendant's attorney

requested that defendant be allowed to change h i s p l e a to

not guilty by reason of insanity, which was denied, and

thereafter a notice of a p p e a l was filed. While t h e a d d i -

tional transcripts were being prepared, defendant filed a

pro s e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . When t h e D i s t r i c t

Court s e t t h i s motion f o r h e a r i n g , t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l was

withdrawn. After a hearing on S e p t e m b e r 28, 1981, defen-

d a n t ' s m o t i o n was d e n i e d , and he a p p e a l s .

One i s s u e is p r e s e n t e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Did t h e

D i s t r i c t Court abuse its discretion i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s

motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a ?

Both parties cite State v. Huttinger (1979),

Mont . , - 595 P.2d 363, 36 St.Rep. 945, as setting the

s t a n d a r d s by which t o j u d g e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . In Huttinger

we s e t out the factors to be c o n s i d e r e d when reviewing an

a t t e m p t e d withdrawal of a g u i l t y p l e a :

"The t h r e e f a c t o r s of which we s p e a k a r e ( 1 ) t h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e e n t r y o f t h e g u i l t y p l e a a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s under- s t a n d i n g of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , ( 2 ) t h e promptness with which t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t s t o w i t h d r a w t h e p r i o r p l e a , and ( 3 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a was a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n which t h e g u i l t y p l e a was g i v e n i n e x c h a n g e f o r d i s m i s s a l of a n o t h e r c h a r g e Mont. a t . . ." , 595 P.2d a t 3 6 6 , 36 S t . R e p . a t 947.

Both sides agree that the second and third factors

are inapplicable, i.e., t h e motion t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y

plea was made in a timely fashion and there was no plea

bargain in this case. This brings us t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n of

the first factor--the adequacy of the District Court's

i n t e r r o g a t i o n a t t h e t i m e p l e a was e n t e r e d .

In this regard appellant points out that defendant

had n o t d i s c u s s e d t h e c h a n g e of h i s p l e a t o g u i l t y w i t h h i s

a t t o r n e y and t h a t t h e r e was some l a c k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and

rapport between defendant and his attorney at that time.

Appellant argues t h a t from these facts i t c a n be presumed

t h a t defendant d i d n o t f u l l y understand t h e consequences of

h i s g u i l t y plea.

Appellant also contends t h a t defendant's testimony a t

t h e h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w h i s g u i l t y p l e a i n d i -

c a t e d he was e n t e r i n g the plea for reasons other than the

f a c t t h a t he was g u i l t y . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he f e l t he had

been i n t h e M i s s o u l a County j a i l t o o l o n g and t h a t he h e a r d

v o i c e s t e l l i n g him t h a t p l e a d i n g g u i l t y was t h e o n l y way t o

y e t o u t of there. Finally, appellant argues t h a t the f a c t

that the District Court knew that defendant had been in

s e v e r a l mental i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d have i n f l u e n c e d t h e judge

t o a l l o w t h e withdrawal of t h e g u i l t y p l e a .

The S t a t e r e f e r s u s t o l a n g u a g e i n Muttinger wherein

we quoted from S t a t e v . Lewis ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 474, 485, 582 P.2d 3 4 6 , 352, a s f o l l o w s :

". . . when i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court c a r e f u l l y , a s h e r e , examines t h e d e f e n d a n t , f i n d s him t o be c o m p e t e n t , a n d d e t e r m i n e s from him t h a t h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y is v o l u n t a r y , he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e c h a r g e and h i s p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t , he i s n o t a c t i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of d r u g s o r a l c o h o l , he a d m i t s h i s c o u n s e l i s c o m p e t e n t and he h a s been w e l l a d v i s e d , and h e d e c l a r e s i n o p e n c o u r t t h e f a c t s upon which h i s g u i l t is b a s e d , t h e n a p l e a o f g u i l t y a c c e p t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e b a s i s of t h a t examina- t i o n w i l l be u p h e l d .. .I1

The State argues that the District Court complied

with t h e above s t a n d a r d and even went beyond t h a t i n q u e s -

t i o n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h e S t a t e p o i n t s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g

f a c t o r s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a r e f u l l y examined t h e d e f e n d a n t

and determined that defendant was competent and that the

p l e a of g u i l t y was b e i n g v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . D e f e n d a n t was

f u l l y a d v i s e d o f t h e c h a r g e and p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t and was

n o t under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f d r u g s o r a l c o h o l .

With regard to the element in Lewis regarding the

competency of counsel, the State argues that the lack of

communication d i d n o t deny d e f e n d a n t e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of

c o u n s e l b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t had p r e v i o u s l y been f u l l y a d v i s e d

on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e and t h e p r o b l e m s between d e f e n d a n t

and h i s c o u n s e l were o n l y p e r s o n a l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . Finally,

t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h e f a c t s i n open

c o u r t a b o u t how he had f o r g e d t h e c h e c k s .

Both parties agree that the denial of a motion to

w i t h d r a w a g u i l t y p l e a r e s t s i n t h e s o u n d d i s c r e t i o n of t h e

t r i a l c o u r t and w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l , absent the

showing of a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . Huttinger, supra; S t a t e ex

rel. Gladue v. Eighth J u d i c i a l District ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont.

509, 575 P.2d 65. W f i n d t h a t t h e r e was no a b u s e of d i s - e cretion here.

After reviewing the t r a n s c r i p t of the hearing where

defendant entered his guilty plea, the District Court

entered detailed findings regarding what had occurred at

that hearing. In addition to the elements required by

Lewis, s u p r a , t h e c o u r t a d v i s e d him o f h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l b y

jury, t o be c o n f r o n t e d w i t h w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him, and t h a t

he had the right not to incriminate himself. Defendant

stated he was in possession of all his faculties (and it

appeared to the District Court that he was) and that the

f a c t h e was t i r e d o f being i n t h e Missoula County j a i l had

not influenced his decision to plead guilty. Moreover,

d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e a s o n h e was p l e a d i n g g u i l t y was

b e c a u s e h e had c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i ~ n e , w h i c h h e knew t o b e an

unlawful act. Defendant acknowledged there was no plea

bargain in the case and that the judge could impose a

maximum s e n t e n c e o f t w e n t y y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n

f o r the crime.

We hold that the District Court's interrogation of

the defendant a t the time of entering t h e g u i l t y p l e a was

adequate in t h i s case, satisfying the f i r s t element of the

Iiuttinger test, supra. Since both parties agree that the

two other factors are inapplicable to this case, we find

that the District Court did not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n in

denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

Gladue, supra.

Affirmed.

2 4 4 $1 %4, Chief J u s t i c e We c o n c u r :