[Cite as State v. Garver, 2017-Ohio-1107.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 2016-L-069 - vs - :
CHARLOTTE GAIL GARVER, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2015 CR 000720.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen A. Sheppert, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Charles R. Grieshammer, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp, Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellee).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellee, Charlotte Gail Garver, to three
years of community control for a fifth-degree felony theft offense after accepting her
plea of guilty. In addition to the community-control sanctions, the trial court ordered
appellee to serve 326 days in jail, with 236 days of credit for time served. The majority
of the jail-time credit arose from time appellee spent in a Missouri prison after Lake County issued an arrest warrant. On appeal, the state asserts that appellee was only
entitled to 69 days of credit because the arrest warrant was not executed until after she
was released from the Missouri prison and the offense for which she was serving time in
Missouri was completely unrelated to the underlying Lake County offense. We agree
with the state’s position. The matter is therefore reversed and remanded.
{¶2} On November 2, 2015, the state filed a precipe in the Lake County Court
of Common Pleas to issue a warrant to arrest on indictment. Appellee was listed as the
named defendant and the document included her address at a Missouri correctional
facility. Appellee was subsequently indicted on two counts of theft, felonies of the fifth
degree; one count of falsification in a theft offense, a felony of the fifth degree; one
count of falsification, a misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of receiving
stolen property, a misdemeanor of the first degree. On November 5, 2015, a “Warrant
on Indictment – Information” was issued ordering the Lake County Sheriff to arrest
appellee and bring her before the court. The warrant was ultimately executed on April
25, 2016, when appellee was arrested and brought to the Lake County Jail. Appellee
eventually pleaded guilty to one count of theft, a felony of the fifth degree.
{¶3} At sentencing, defense counsel argued that, pursuant to State v.
Caccamo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-48, 2016-Ohio-3006, appellee was entitled to jail-
time credit for time served as of the date of the arrest warrant. Defense counsel
asserted that once there is a holder on an individual, jail-time credit shall be given
starting on the date of that holder. Defense counsel observed:
{¶4} It’s my understanding, Your Honor, based upon a warrant to arrest that was sent to the Missouri Correctional Center by the State placing a holder on Miss Garver, there is a date on this - - on this arrest warrant of October 30th, 2015. I do not know the exact date that the actual holder was put into effect but based on - - based on
2 this warrant I do believe that October 30th of 2015 is the date when that credit shall be applied from. So, Miss Garver had served two days prior in - - when this case was in municipal court. So, it’s my understanding based on State v. Caccamo that Miss Garver has 236 days of credit in this matter.
{¶5} The state objected to defense counsel’s position, arguing appellee was
entitled to only 69 days of jail-time credit; it maintained she was entitled to credit for two
days from the date of her arrest until she was bonded out of jail and 67 days from the
time she finished her Missouri prison sentence and was brought back to Lake County
and ultimately sentenced.
{¶6} The trial court ultimately agreed with defense counsel’s position and
sentenced appellee to three years of community control. The trial court also ordered
appellee to serve 326 days in the Lake County Jail, with 236 days of credit for time
served. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), the state now appeals assigning the following
as error:
{¶7} “The granting of jail-time credit was contrary to law.”
{¶8} “‘We review the trial court’s determination as to the amount of credit to
which [a defendant] is entitled under the ‘clearly and convincingly’ contrary to law
standard.” State v. Smith, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3185, 2014-Ohio-5076, ¶15;
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); see State v. Marcum, [146] Ohio St.3d [516], 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶1
(‘an appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial
court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to
law’).” State v. Moore, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0069, 2016-Ohio-3510, ¶15.
{¶9} The calculation of jail-time credit is generally governed by R.C. 2967.191,
which provides, in relevant part: “The department of rehabilitation and correction shall
3 reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the
prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner
was convicted and sentenced * * *.” Furthermore, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) provides it is
the trial court that is obligated to “[d]etermine, notify the offender of, and include in the
sentencing entry the number of days that the offender has been confined for any reason
arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced * * *.”
{¶10} In granting appellee the jail-time credit at issue, the trial court relied upon
this court’s holding in Caccamo, supra. In that case, Caccamo pleaded guilty to seven
charges of identity theft in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. He was sentenced
to two years community control and 150 days in the Lake County Jail. Caccamo was
later arrested in Cuyahoga County and charged with passing bad checks. He was held
in the Cuyahoga County Jail from January 17, 2014 until March 4, 2014, at which time
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas accepted his guilty plea to a new charge
and sentenced him to eight months imprisonment. He was subsequently imprisoned
pursuant to this order.
{¶11} On January 22, 2014, the Lake county probation department caused an
arrest warrant to be issued against Caccamo; the warrant was not executed until April
22, 2014, after his transfer to prison. The state then moved to terminate the community
control sanctions. A termination hearing took place on May 12, 2014, at which
Caccamo pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his community control. The trial court
granted the state’s motion to terminate and the case proceeded to sentencing.
{¶12} During the hearing, the state argued that Caccamo was entitled to 33 days
of jail-time credit (12 days he was held in 2012 prior to pleading guilty to the seven
identity fraud charges and 21 days he was held in the county jail between his
4 conveyance from the state prison and the date of the final hearing). The trial court
ultimately sentenced Caccamo to a prison term of 26 months on the seven charges, to
be served concurrently with the eight-month term in the Cuyahoga County case. The
trail court also adopted the state’s recommendation on Caccamo’s jail-time credit.
{¶13} On appeal, Caccamo argued the trial court erred in calculating the jail-time
credit because his confinement in Cuyahoga County was based upon the alleged
community control violation in Lake County. Relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
decision in State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856, a majority of this court
agreed with Caccamo.
{¶14} In Fugate, Fugate was serving community control sanctions on a previous
offense when he was indicted on two new felony offenses. While he was in jail on those
new charges, the probation department sought to revoke his community control. At the
sentencing hearing on both the new case and the community control violation, the trial
court imposed concurrent prison terms, but gave Fugate jail-time credit on the
community control case only. On appeal, Fugate argued he was entitled to have jail-
time credit deducted from both sentences. The Tenth Appellate District affirmed the trial
court. On discretionary appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with Fugate’s argument,
holding “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced to concurrent prison terms for multiple
charges, jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2967.191 must be applied toward each
concurrent prison term.” Fugate, supra, syllabus.
{¶15} Due to the factual similarities with Fugate, a majority of this court
concluded Caccamo was entitled to jail-time credit for time served. First, this court
noted the trial court in Caccamo’s Lake County case ordered the aggregate sentence
on the identity theft charges be served concurrently with the eight-month term in the
5 Cuyahoga County proceeding. Further, this court underscored that the community
control violation holder was placed upon Caccamo just five days after he was
incarcerated on the Cuyahoga County charge. With respect to the latter point, the
majority opinion observed:
{¶16} In attempting to distinguish Fugate, some appellate courts have concluded that the Fugate analysis should not be followed when the concurrent prison terms are imposed by different trial courts at different times. See, e.g., State v. Marini, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 09-CA-06, 2009-Ohio-4633, ¶23. However, given that the existence of the holder justifies appellant's continuing incarceration had the Cuyahoga County charge been dismissed, the foregoing distinction is unpersuasive because it would defeat the underlying principle that a defendant is entitled to credit for all presentencing incarceration based upon the pending charges in the underlying case. Since appellant’s confinement in the Cuyahoga County Jail was predicated in part upon the seven “identity theft” charges in Lake County, he is entitled to jail-time credit for the days from January 22, 2014 until April 21, 2014.
{¶17} Accordingly, the majority opinion in Caccamo concluded the trial court
erred in failing to grant the additional jail-time credit.
{¶18} This case is distinguishable from both Caccamo and Fugate. Although the
record indicates the state placed a holder on appellee subsequent to issuing the arrest
warrant, appellee was not serving the term of imprisonment in Missouri concurrently
with any other sentence imposed as a result of the warrant. The charges that facilitated
the warrant were unrelated to appellee’s Missouri offense and had not been prosecuted,
let alone adjudicated. While it is true that the holder would prevent her from “walking
away” after her release from the Missouri correctional facility, this fact does not
automatically imply she was entitled to jail-time credit from the time the warrant or
precipe was issued. The Missouri offense and the Lake County offenses were
6 completely unrelated and the holder in this case was simply a tool to secure appellee’s
presence in Lake County upon her release from the Missouri prison.
{¶19} The holding announced in Caccamo, as well as its application of Fugate,
cannot be read in a vacuum. The result in Caccamo was a function of both the
existence of the community-control-violation holder and the imposition of a sentence on
the community-control termination ordered to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed for offenses that caused the issuance of the community-control-violation
holder. These are not the circumstances of this case and the existence of the holder on
the Lake County warrant was insufficient, unto itself, to trigger jail-time credit. As this
court has previously noted “there is no jail-time credit for time served on unrelated
offenses, even if that time served runs concurrently during the pre-detention phase of
another matter.” State v. Struble, 11th Dist. Lake No. 1005-L-115, 2006-Ohio-3417,
¶11. The time appellee spent in a Missouri prison, even after the Lake County holder
was issued, did not arise out of the offense for which she was convicted in Lake County.
See R.C. 2967.191. Accordingly, neither Caccamo nor Fugate entitles appellee to jail-
time credit from October 30, 2015; under the facts of this case, appellee was entitled to
69 days of jail-time credit as proposed by the state at sentencing.
{¶20} The state’s assignment of error has merit.
{¶21} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
_____________________
7 COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶22} It is the majority’s position that this case is distinguishable from both State
v. Caccamo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-048, 2016-Ohio-3006 (Rice, P.J., dissented
with a Dissenting Opinion)1 and State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856.
The majority is reversing and remanding based upon its agreement with the state’s
position that the trial court erred in granting Ms. Garver 236 days of jail time credit
based upon the issuance of the Lake County arrest warrant while she was serving a
prison sentence in Missouri. As I believe the trial court properly applied Caccamo and
Fugate and, therefore, would affirm its judgment, I respectfully dissent.
{¶23} “The practice of awarding jail-time credit, although now covered by state
statute, has its roots in the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States
Constitutions. Recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause does not tolerate disparate
treatment of defendants based solely on their economic status, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down rules and practices that discriminate against
defendants based solely on their inability to pay fines and fees. * * * [C]ourts have held
that defendants who are unable to afford bail must be credited for the time they are
confined while awaiting trial. ‘The Equal Protection Clause requires that all time spent
in any jail prior to trial and commitment by (a prisoner who is) unable to make bail
because of indigency must be credited to his sentence.’ * * *.” (Emphasis sic.)
(Citations omitted.) Fugate, supra, at ¶7.
1. This writer was a member on the panel and concurred.
8 {¶24} This principle is codified in Ohio at R.C. 2967.191, which provides that a
prisoner’s stated prison term shall be reduced “by the total number of days that the
prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner
was convicted and sentenced * * *.”
{¶25} As stated and addressed by the majority, in granting the jail time credit at
issue in the case at bar, the trial court relied upon this court’s ruling in Caccamo, supra.
{¶26} In Caccamo, the appellant, Jason Caccamo, appealed the trial court’s
determination of his jail time credit asserting that he was entitled to additional credit
because the court failed to consider the days he was incarcerated in another county jail
on a detainer. Caccamo, 2016-Ohio-3006, ¶1. In November 2012, Mr. Caccamo
pleaded guilty to seven charges of identity theft in the Lake County Court of Common
Pleas. Id. at ¶2. He was sentenced to two years of community control and 150 days in
the Lake County Jail. Id. at ¶2.
{¶27} Mr. Caccamo was later arrested in Cuyahoga County and charged with
passing bad checks. Id. at ¶3. He was held in the Cuyahoga County Jail from January
17, 2014 until March 4, 2014, at which time the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas accepted his guilty plea to the new charge and sentenced him to eight months in
prison. Id. Thereafter, Mr. Caccamo was transferred from the Cuyahoga County Jail to
the Lorain County Correctional Institution. Id.
{¶28} On January 22, 2014, the Lake County probation department caused an
arrest warrant to be issued against Mr. Caccamo but it was not executed until April 22,
2014, following his transfer to the state prison. Id. at ¶4. The state moved to terminate
the community control sanctions. Id. A hearing scheduled for April 24, 2014 did not
take place. Id. at ¶5.
9 {¶29} A final hearing occurred on May 12, 2014. Id. Mr. Caccamo pleaded
guilty to violating the terms of his community control sanctions. Id. at ¶6. The trial court
accepted the guilty plea, granted the motion to terminate, and the case proceeded to
sentencing. Id. The state argued that Mr. Caccamo was entitled to 33 days of jail time
credit (12 days he was held in 2012 prior to pleading guilty to the seven identity fraud
charges and 21 days he was held in the county jail between his conveyance from the
state prison and the date of the final hearing). Id.
{¶30} The trial court sentenced Mr. Caccamo to an aggregate prison term of 26
months on the seven charges, to be served concurrently with the eight-month term in
the Cuyahoga County case. Id. at ¶7. The trial court also adopted the state’s
recommendation on Mr. Caccamo’s jail time credit, granting 33 days for time served. Id.
{¶31} On appeal before this court, Mr. Caccamo argued that the trial court
incorrectly calculated jail time credit. Id. at ¶9. Mr. Caccamo asserted that his
confinement in the Cuyahoga County Jail was based upon the alleged community
control violation in Lake County because, even if the Cuyahoga County charge had
been dismissed, he still would have remained incarcerated in light of the detainer. Id. at
¶12. In support of his argument, Mr. Caccamo relied upon the holding of the Supreme
Court of Ohio in Fugate, supra. Id.
{¶32} In Fugate, the appellant, Daniel Fugate, was serving community control
sanctions when he was indicted on two new felony offenses. Fugate, 2008-Ohio-856,
¶2-3. While Mr. Fugate was in jail on those new charges, the probation department
moved to revoke his community control in the previous case. Id. at ¶3. At the
sentencing hearing on both the new case and the community control violation, the trial
court imposed concurrent prison terms but gave Mr. Fugate credit for time served on the
10 community control violation case only. Id. at ¶3-6, 13-18. The Supreme Court of Ohio
agreed with Mr. Fugate’s argument that since the two cases were to run concurrently,
he was entitled to have the 213 days of jail time credit deducted from both sentences.
Id. at ¶1, 12.
{¶33} Based on the similar factual scenarios between Caccamo and Fugate, this
court’s majority in Caccamo applied Fugate’s reasoning in holding that Mr. Caccamo
was entitled to jail time credit for time served on his Lake County case due to the
detainer. Caccamo, supra, at ¶15-17. This court’s majority in Caccamo stated:
{¶34} “In attempting to distinguish Fugate, some appellate courts have
concluded that the Fugate analysis should not be followed when the concurrent prison
terms are imposed by different trial courts at different times. See, e.g., State v. Marini,
5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 09-CA-06, 2009-Ohio-4633, ¶23. However, given that the
existence of the holder justifies [Mr. Caccamo’s] continuing incarceration had the
Cuyahoga County charge been dismissed, the foregoing distinction is unpersuasive
because it would defeat the underlying principle that a defendant is entitled to credit for
all presentencing incarceration based upon the pending charges in the underlying
case.” Caccamo, supra, at ¶18.
{¶35} Thus, this court’s majority in Caccamo found that the trial court erred in
failing to grant Mr. Caccamo the additional credit and we reversed and remanded. Id. at
¶19, 27.
{¶36} In the case sub judice, Ms. Garver recognizes that Caccamo and Fugate
involved concurrent prison terms whereas in her case, she was already imprisoned in
Missouri when Lake County issued its arrest warrant and was returned to Lake County
at the conclusion of her Missouri prison sentence. Using the analysis under Caccamo
11 and Fugate, Ms. Garver asserts that had she been released for whatever reason from
her Missouri incarceration, the arrest warrant issued in this matter would have
prevented her from simply walking away. Thus, due to Lake County’s arrest warrant
and resulting holder, Ms. Garver could not have been released from confinement.
Accordingly, Ms. Garver is entitled to jail time credit on her Lake County case from the
date of the warrant.
{¶37} In support of its position, the state relies on this court’s decision in Moore,
supra, which was decided a month after Caccamo. In affirming the trial court’s decision,
this court in Moore found no evidence in the record that a holder existed upon which to
contemplate granting jail time credit for time served. Moore, 2016-Ohio-3510, ¶21-27.
{¶38} Unlike Moore, the record in this case establishes the existence of a holder.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel indicated that an arrest warrant was issued
and referenced the holder. The record shows that on November 2, 2015, the state filed
a “Precipe” in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas to “Issue a Warrant to Arrest on
Indictment,” which was dated October 30, 2015. Ms. Garver was listed as the named
defendant and the document included her address as follows: “c/o Women’s Eastern
REC/Diag/Correctional Center, 1101 E. Highway, Vandalia, MO 63382.” (T.d. 10). As
the “Precipe” lists the Missouri prison address as Ms. Garver’s address, the state clearly
knew where she was being held. At sentencing, the prosecutor told the trial court he
would not “quibble” with the defense attorney’s dates or calculation of credit for time
served. (Sentencing T.p. 8). The prosecutor later referenced the “holder” Lake County
had placed on Ms. Garver and the “diligence” exhibited by Lake County in placing a
“holder” on her. (Sentencing T.p. 18).
12 {¶39} In addition, the record further shows that on November 5, 2015, a
“Warrant on Indictment – Information” was filed ordering the Lake County Sheriff to
arrest Ms. Garver and bring her before the court. On April 25, 2016, a “Return of
Executed Warrant” was filed indicating that a Lake County officer had arrested Ms.
Garver and brought her to the Lake County Jail.
{¶40} It is clear from the record that Lake County issued an arrest warrant for
Ms. Garver after learning she had been incarcerated in the Missouri prison. The
prosecutor, who put the warrant in place, acted with “diligence” in placing a “holder” on
her at the prison, i.e., the state took immediate action upon the issuance of the arrest
warrant to notify the authorities in Missouri that they were not to release Ms. Garver
without Lake County first having the opportunity to retrieve her. Based upon the facts
presented, this writer determines the trial court properly applied Caccamo and Fugate
and did not act contrary to law in granting Ms. Garver 236 days of jail time credit.
{¶41} Because I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, I respectfully
dissent.