State v. Garcia-Vincente

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 2306012469
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) ) Def. I.D. # 2306012469 v. ) ) ) ENRIQUE GARCIA-VINCENTE, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: January 12, 2026 Decided: January 22, 2026

Upon Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (R1)

DENIED

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amanda D. Buckworth, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947; Attorney for State of Delaware.

Enrique Garcia-Vincente, SBI #00620463, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19977; Pro Se.

KARSNITZ, R. J.

1 I. BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2024, a Superior Court jury found Enrique Garcia-Vincente

(“Defendant”) guilty of second-degree rape, stalking, third-degree assault, and

multiple counts of non-compliance with bond. On January 10, 2025, I sentenced

Garcia-Vincente to eleven years of unsuspended Level V incarceration.

Defendant appealed directly to the Delaware Supreme Court which, on

October 17, 2025, concluded that Defendant’s appeal was wholly without merit and

devoid of any arguably appealable issue, and that Defendant’s counsel on appeal

properly determined that Defendant could not raise any meritorious claims on

appeal. The Supreme Court Mandate was filed on November 10, 2025.

On December 18, 2025, I denied Defendant’s Motion for Modification of

Sentence.

On January 12, 2026, Defendant timely filed his first pro se Motion for

Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (the “Motion”). In the

Motion, Defendant raises four (4) claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel

(“Trial Counsel”), as discussed more fully below.

In his Motion, Defendant did not request the appointment of Postconviction

Counsel to represent him. Rule 61(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:

Any indigent movant’s request for appointment of counsel shall be filed contemporaneously with the movant’s postconviction motion. Failure

2 to file a contemporaneous request for appointment of counsel with the movant’s postconviction motion may be deemed a waiver of counsel.

I deem Defendant’s failure to file such a contemporaneous request to constitute a

waiver of the appointment of postconviction counsel to represent him, and I do not

do so.

II. ANALYSIS

I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.1 If a procedural bar exists,

as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim. 2 A Rule

61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise

claims below, or former adjudication.3

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed

more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final. 4 In Defendant’s case,

the judgment of conviction became final when the Supreme Court issued its mandate

or order finally determining the case on direct review.5 The Supreme Court issued

its mandate finally determining Defendant’s case on direct review on September 4,

2025. Defendant filed the Motion on December 4, 2025, well before the one-year

1 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 2 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super. April 28, 2009). 3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2).

3 deadline. Therefore, consideration of the Motion is not barred by the one-year

limitation.

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.6 Since this is Defendant’s first

motion for postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this

provision.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.7 It could

be argued that Defendant’s claims could have been asserted in the proceedings

leading to his conviction and are therefore barred. However, Defendant’s grounds

for relief are couched as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and I will treat

them as such. It is well-settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are properly raised for the first time in postconviction

proceedings. 8 Therefore, my consideration of the Motion is not barred by this

Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including

6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 8 State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).

4 “proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred. Defendant’s claims

have not been formerly adjudicated. My consideration of the Motion is not barred

by this provision.

None of these four procedural bars apply either to (i) a claim that there is new

evidence of actual innocence in fact, or to (ii) a claim that a retroactively applied

rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.9 Defendant makes no such

claims here.

Since none of the procedural bars under Rule 61 apply, I will consider the

Motion on its merits.

To succeed on the merits, Defendant must meet the two-part standard

established in Strickland v. Washington, 10 as applied in Delaware. 11 Under

Strickland, Defendant must show that Trial Counsel’s representation “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance prong”); and (2) the

“deficient performance prejudiced [his] defense.” (the “prejudice prong”).12

As to the performance prong, Defendant must demonstrate that Trial

Counsel’s decisions were unreasonable. There is a presumption that Trial Counsel’s

challenged conduct may be considered a strategic choice, and there is deference

9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 10 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). 12 Strickland at 687.

5 afforded to such strategy.13

As to the prejudice prong, Defendant must demonstrate that there exists a

reasonable probability that, but for Trial Counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial

would have been different. 14 Even if Trial Counsel’s performance was

professionally unreasonable, it would not warrant setting aside the judgment of

conviction if the error had no effect on the judgment. 15 A showing of prejudice

“requires more than a showing of theoretical possibility that the outcome was

affected.”16

Strickland teaches that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective

assistance claim to approach the inquiry in a particular order, or even to address both

prongs of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant because of the alleged

deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.17 In every case, the court

should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the

result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the

13 Id. at 689. 14 Albury, at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 15 Strickland, at 691. 16 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 17 Strickland, at 697.

6 adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.18

Four Grounds for Relief -- Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant asserts four ineffective assistance of counsel claims, stating that his

Trial Counsel failed to:

(1) move for a judgment of acquittal before the case went to the jury;

(2) investigate and utilize defense witnesses;

(3) thoroughly cross-examine the victim; and,

(4) retrieve and utilize exculpatory evidence.

I address these claims seriatim below.

(1) Defendant states that there was insufficient evidence in his case to have

sent it to the jury, because the DNA sample did not match his DNA and the only

evidence against him was the testimony of the victim, even though she had recanted

and wanted to drop the charges against him. Therefore, argues Defendant, Trial

Counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for acquittal before the case went

to the jury. Defendant flatly misstates the record in all three respects.

First, there was not a mismatch of the DNA sample; rather, the swabs which

the hospital nurse collected from the victim’s neck and vagina tested positive for

male DNA but were insufficient to determine if it was Defendant’s DNA.

Second, the victim testified that Defendant had told her to call the police and

18 Id. at 696.

7 tell them to drop the charges because he was remorseful, and it would be good for

their child. On two occasions before Defendant was arrested, the victim made such

calls to the police. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant stated that

there was an affidavit from the victim recanting her testimony. In fact, there was no

such affidavit. Rather, there were Spanish and English affidavits dated October 5,

2023, from someone named Daniel Garcia. In the English affidavit, the victim stated

that she did not want to continue the case and wished to lift the charges against

Defendant. However, in the affidavit the victim did not recant her statement that

Defendant raped her. Rather, she only stated that she did not want the case to

continue because she had a child with Defendant. The victim testified fully at trial

about the rape. On cross-examination she testified that she had asked police to drop

the charges because Defendant told her to do so, but again she did not recant her

statement that Defendant had raped her. Moreover, the prosecution fully disclosed

the October 5, 2023, affidavit to the defense.

Third, at the conclusion of the State’s case, Trial Counsel moved for a

judgment of acquittal, which I denied. Trial Counsel cannot be deemed to be

ineffective for failure to make a motion for acquittal which in fact she made.

In any event, there is sufficient other evidence of Defendant’s guilt on the

charges of which Defendant was convicted that the outcome of the trial would have

been no different, as discussed below.

8 (2) Defendant next asserts that he presented a list of potential witnesses to

Trial Counsel who would have provided testimony that undermined the testimony

of the victim, but she did not interview them or call them at trial. Defendant provides

no list of such witnesses and proffers no testimony that they would have provided.

A self-serving and conclusory statement is no substitute for concrete information.

The decision not to call the witnesses may have been an informed strategic decision

by Trial Counsel. In any event, it is not objectively unreasonable conduct.

In any event, even if Trial Counsel’s conduct were unreasonable, there is

sufficient evidence of Defendant’s guilt on the charges of which he was convicted,

such that the outcome of the trial would have been no different. As the Supreme

Court pointed out in its Order after a de novo review of the sufficiency of the

evidence, the elements of second-degree rape are intentional sexual intercourse with

another person who does not consent.19 Based on the victim’s testimony alone, a

rational juror could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. “A victim’s

testimony alone, concerning alleged sexual contact, is sufficient to support a guilty

verdict if it establishes every element of the offense charged.”20

(3) Defendant next asserts that Trial Counsel’s cross-examination of the

victim ignored significant facts suggesting that she had been coerced to file a report

19 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1). 20 Farmer v. State, 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004).

9 and testify at trial and failed to address what she stood to gain from her allegations.

Again, Defendant proffers no facts that would have been elicited by such cross-

examination. A self-serving and conclusory statement is no substitute for concrete

information. I have reviewed the transcript of the cross-examination of the victim by

Trial Counsel and find it acceptable in every respect. In any event, it is not

objectively unreasonable conduct by Trial Counsel.

In any event, even if Trial Counsel’s conduct were unreasonable, as discussed

above, there is sufficient evidence of Defendant’s guilt on the charges of which he

was convicted, such that the outcome of the trial would have been no different.

(4) Finally, Defendant asserts that Trial Counsel ignored the fact that his

cell phone contained video of the victim stating that he did not commit the offenses.

This evidence, had it been admitted at trial, would have impeached the victim’s

credibility and changed the outcome of the trial. Again, Defendant proffers no video

evidence or other evidence of such a video. As discussed above, Defendant pressured

the victim to recant her charges, and she did state in a third-party affidavit that she

did not want to prosecute Defendant. However, she never recanted the charges or

changed her trial testimony with respect to the rape. A self-serving and conclusory

statement by Defendant that such a video exists is no substitute for concrete

evidence. I am extremely skeptical that, if such a video exists, it would not have been

discovered and utilized by Trial Counsel.

10 In any event, assuming arguendo that such a video exists, and that failure to

use it for impeachment purposes constituted objectively unreasonable conduct by

Trial Counsel, there is sufficient evidence of Defendant’s guilt on the charges of

which he was convicted, such that the outcome of the trial would have been no

different. Based on the victim’s trial testimony alone, a rational juror could find

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even had the video been before the jury.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Enrique Garcia-Vincente’s Motion for

Postconviction Relief is summarily21 DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz ______________________ /s/ Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary Amanda D. Buckworth, Esquire Angela D. Huffman, Esquire Enrique Garcia-Vincente, JTVCC

21 Under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).