[Cite as State v. Galloway, 2026-Ohio-2779.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25-COA-017
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23-CRI-007 WALTER GALLOWAY Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: July 20, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges
APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL, JAMES B. REESE, III, for Plaintiff- Appellee; BRIAN A. SMITH, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Walter Galloway appeals the July 3, 2025 judgment of
conviction and sentence of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee
is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On November 21, 2022, a Super 8 Motel employee went to Galloway's room
because Galloway remained in his room past his scheduled checkout time and was not
answering the phone. The employee cracked open the door and observed Galloway sitting on
the end of the bed, slumped over and unconscious with his head between his knees. The
employee called 911. {¶ 3} Ashland County Sheriff's Deputy Hall was first on the scene. The door of the
room was cracked when he arrived, but the security bar was engaged. Hall could not see
Galloway breathing and suspected he was dead of an overdose. Hall called for a squad.
{¶ 4} Once Hall and the paramedics made entry into the room through a second
door, paramedics sat Galloway upright in order to assess his condition. As they did, a plastic
baggie that was stuck to Galloway's face fell to the floor. Galloway was alive, but moving
slowly. Hall picked up the baggie and white powder fell out. The room therefore had to be
immediately cleared as the first responders feared fentanyl exposure.
{¶ 5} Galloway was searched and then loaded into the back of an ambulance for
treatment. Ashland County Deputies Duewel, Banks, Detective Kinter, and Captain Sims
arrived on the scene.
{¶ 6} A paramedic came out of the ambulance and told Hall that Galloway said he
had money in the room and he wanted it. Hall went back into the room, but did not see any
money in plain view. Hall therefore went back out to tell Galloway, but Galloway continued
to ask for his money. At Detective Kinter's request, Hall asked Galloway if he could search
further. Although Galloway was communicating, he was speaking in whispers. Galloway
nodded his head and said yes. Hall therefore believed he had consent to search. He advised
Kitner and Banks they had consent, but did not participate in the search. He instead followed
Galloway to the hospital. While searching the room for Galloway's money, a bulk amount of
fentanyl was found in a trash bag containing Galloway's clothing.
{¶ 7} On January 12, 2023, the Ashland County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Galloway with one count of possession of fentanyl, a felony of the first degree and
one count of trafficking in fentanyl, a felony of the first degree. {¶ 8} Galloway filed a motion to suppress arguing he did not consent to a search of
his belongings, or in the alternative, if he did consent, the consent was limited to a search for
his money.
{¶ 9} A hearing was held on Galloway's motion on October 21, 2024 and February
7, 2025. During his closing argument, counsel for Galloway raised Galloway's capacity to
consent to the search for the first time. The trial court permitted Galloway to argue capacity
in a post-hearing memorandum and the State filed a response. On March 5, 2025, the trial
court denied Galloway's motion to suppress on several grounds including valid consent and
a lack of standing.
{¶ 10} Galloway elected to proceed to a jury trial which took place on July 1-2, 2025.
After hearing the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Galloway guilty as charged. At a
later sentencing hearing, the trial court found the two charges merged for the purposes of
sentencing. The State elected to proceed to sentencing on count two, trafficking in fentanyl, a
felony of the first degree. The trial court sentenced Galloway to 11 to 16.5 years of
incarceration.
{¶ 11} Galloway filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises two assignments of error as follows:
I
{¶ 12} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT
AGAINST THE UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, UNDER THE
FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION." II
{¶ 13} "APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS, ON BOTH COUNT ONE AND COUNT
TWO OF THE INDICTMENT, WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE."
{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Galloway argues he did not consent to a search
of the hotel room and that he did not have the capacity to consent. He further argues the trial
court erred in concluding that he did not have standing to challenge the search because his
rental period had expired.
Standard of Review
{¶ 15} Three methods exist to challenge a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress.
First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In reviewing a challenge of
this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said findings of fact are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73
Ohio App.3d 486 (1991); State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (1993). Second, an appellant
may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of
fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law.
State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's findings of fact
are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly identified the law to
be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court
must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the
facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (1994); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 620 N.E.2d 906 (1993); Guysinger, supra. As the
United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996), "... as a
general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed
de novo on appeal."
{¶ 16} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier
of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 (1995); State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d
19, 20 (1982).
Consent to Search
{¶ 17} Galloway first argues the trial court's finding that he voluntarily consented to
the search is not supported by competent, credible evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 18} As noted above, we review such a challenge under a manifest weight standard.
On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
"whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also, State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). The granting of a new trial "should be exercised only
in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." Martin
at 175.
{¶ 19} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of persons or their property. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968);
State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991).
{¶ 20} Consent to search is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.
No Fourth Amendment violation occurs when an individual voluntarily consents to a search.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002). In determining voluntary consent, the
proper test is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the consent was
voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1983); State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d
234.
{¶ 21} In Robinette, the Supreme Court of Ohio held:
We find Bustamonte instructive in defining when permission to search is
truly consensual under the totality of the circumstances:
"[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts
to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is
a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
voluntary consent." Id. 412 U.S. at 248-249, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.E.2d
at 875. State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762, 1997-Ohio-
343. {¶ 22} In State v. Wiegand, 2017-Ohio-9143, ¶28 (5th Dist.), this court listed six factors
to consider when determining the voluntariness of consent:
(1) [T]he voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the
defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness
of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and
intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found.
{¶ 23} We note that "[t]he voluntariness of a consent search is a question of fact and
will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Bickel, 2007-Ohio-3517, ¶24
(5th Dist.).
Analysis
{¶ 24} This case is somewhat unique as it was Galloway who initiated the search of
his hotel room by telling paramedics he wanted the money he had left in the room before he
was transported to the hospital. Transcript of suppression hearing volume 1 (TS1) 19-20.
Deputy Hall therefore reentered the room, but did not see any money in plain view. TS1 21.
At that point other officers had arrived on the scene. Detective Kinter asked Hall to talk to
Galloway again and ask if they had permission to further search the room. TS1 24-25 and
Transcript of suppression hearing volume 2 (TS2) 24. Hall's body camera was not running
when he spoke with Galloway, however he testified that upon the second conversation, Galloway nodded his head and whispered "yes." TS1 24. Galloway was also still asking about
his money. Id.
{¶ 25} While Hall's body camera was not running, Duewel's was. Duewel was
standing near the side door of the ambulance while Hall spoke with Galloway, however,
Galloway's responses cannot be heard or seen on Deuwel's body camera footage. Galloway
acknowledges this fact.
{¶ 26} Galloway argues he did not consent, but rather said "nah, nah, nah." He bases
this assertion on Duewel's body camera footage from when Duewel reported back to
Detective Kinter as to what Galloway had told Hall. While Galloway offers his own
interpretation of what Duewel told other officers following Hall's conversation with
Galloway, Duewel's conversation with other officers is unintelligible on his body camera
footage. Indeed, even the trial court indicated it had "reviewed that portion of the video
multiple times, using headphones and playing it at full volume, and does not hear "no, no,
no." Judgment Entry, March 5, 2025 at 4, docket item 121. During the suppression hearing,
Duewel was unable to recollect what he said or whether he was repeating what Galloway said
or what Hall said. TS2 49-51. Detective Kinter, however, testified that Hall unequivocally
reported to him that Galloway has given consent to search the room and this is what he relied
upon before searching the room. TS2 56-57.
{¶ 27} Due to the poor audio quality of Duewel's body camera, the trial court looked
to the testimony presented at the hearing and found the testimony of Hall and Kinter to be
"entirely credible." Judgment Entry, supra at 5. Deputy Hall and Detective Kinter's credibility
were a matter for the trial court to determine and we find no error in the trial court's factual findings. This is not, therefore, an exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the trial court's decision that Galloway consented to the search of the hotel room.
{¶ 28} Next Galloway argues he did not have the capacity to consent to the search due
to intoxication. The voluntariness of consent to search is defined by whether the defendant's
"will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired . . .." .
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). To determine whether a defendant's will
was overborne in a particular case, a court is to consider the totality of all surrounding
circumstances. Id. at 226-227. Here, as noted by the trial court, Galloway had the wherewithal
to respond to officers appropriately, to provide his identifying information, voice his concern
about his money and ask officers to find it, explain to officers and paramedics what he had
done prior to the hotel manager calling 911 including calling his children and calling the front
desk, and identifying the drugs found in the hotel room. State's exhibit 1.
{¶ 29} Finally, even if none of the foregoing were true, we ultimately agree with the
trial court's conclusion that Galloway lacked standing to challenge the search because his
{¶ 30} During the suppression hearing, Bobby Patel, the hotel manager, testified that
Galloway's checkout time was 11:00 a.m. on November 21, 2022. When the housekeepers
went to clean Galloway's room on that date and at that time, they received no response when
they knocked at the door. Patel tried calling Galloway's room, but also received no response.
Galloway never advised Patel that he desired to stay another night before checkout time. TS1,
9-11. Thus, Galloway's rental period expired at 11:00 a.m. on November 21, 2022. There is
no dispute that officers entered and searched the room and Galloway's belongings well after
11:00 a.m. {¶ 31} The expectation of privacy in a hotel room and articles therein expire upon the
expiration or termination of the rental period. State v. Montgomery, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
1339 (M.C. 2000), citing State v. Hall, 66 Ohio Misc. 2d 80, 83, 643 N.E.2d 190 (1994), United
States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (C.A.2, 1987) (once a guest's rental period has expired, the
guest "does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room or in any article
therein of which the hotel lawfully takes possession."); United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314,
318, (C.A.9, 1992) (a guest has no expectation of privacy once the rental period of the motel
room has expired),United States v. Parizo (C.A.2, 1975), 514 F.2d 52, 54-55 (a guest's right to
privacy in a motel room expires when the term of the occupancy expires; at that point the
manager of the motel has the right to enter the room and to consent to a search); United States
v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 86-87 (C.A.2, 1968) (guest lost right to privacy in room and luggage
left in room when he failed to pay for room for five days); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d
852, 854 (C.A.8, 1985) (although the guest intended to continue his occupancy in the rented
motel room, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy upon remaining in room beyond
the occupancy period without paying for the next day's rent).
{¶ 32} Galloway argues his rental period had not yet expired because Patel testified
that if Galloway had paid for another night, he would have been free to stay another night.
The argument is nonsensical and contradicted by Larson, supra. The record is clear that
Galloway failed to pay for another night before 11:00 a.m. and never indicated that was his
intention to stay any longer. Galloway therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.
{¶ 33} The first assignment of error is overruled. II
{¶ 34} In his final assignment of error, Galloway argues his convictions are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Galloway argues the weight of the evidence
failed to establish that he was in actual or constructive possession of the fentanyl found in the
hotel room, the State failed to produce typical evidence of trafficking such as scales or baggies,
and did not test the drug packaging for DNA. We disagree.
{¶ 35} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses
and determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also, State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). The granting of a new trial "should be exercised only
in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." Martin
Possession
{¶ 36} R.C. 2925.01(K) defines "possession" as "having control over a thing or
substance," though it cannot be inferred solely from access to the premises where the item is
found. Under R.C. 2901.21(D)(1), possession is a voluntary act if the person knowingly
procured or received the item or was aware of having control of it for a sufficient time to end
the possession.
{¶ 37} Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d 174,
176 (1989); State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus. Constructive possession exists when the defendant can exercise dominion or control over the contraband, even if it is
not in his immediate physical possession. State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 332 (1976).
Dominion and control may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including proximity to the
contraband. State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134 (8th Dist. 2000); State v. Barr, 86 Ohio
App.3d 227, 235 (8th Dist. 1993); State v. Morales, 2005-Ohio-4714, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.).
Ownership of the contraband is unnecessary to establish constructive possession, and multiple
individuals may share constructive possession simultaneously. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d at 332;
State v. Pitts, 2000-Ohio-1986 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 38} Circumstantial evidence is defined as "'testimony not based on actual personal
knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions
are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.'" State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d
147,150 (1988), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979).
{¶ 39} If the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of
an offense, it is not necessary for "such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable
theory of innocence in order to support a conviction." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 272,
(1991) at paragraph one of the syllabus. "Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence
inherently possess the same probative value [.]" Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the
syllabus. Furthermore, "[s]ince circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are
indistinguishable so far as the jury's fact-finding function is concerned, all that is required of
the jury is that it weigh all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, against the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d at 272. The Evidence
{¶ 40} The State provided ample direct evidence to demonstrate Galloway was in
actual possession of the fentanyl. First, Galloway was discovered passed out with a baggie of
white powder on his person which fell to the floor when EMS technicians moved his body to
render aid. Next, Detective Kinter interviewed Galloway following his arrest. Galloway
confessed that the fentanyl found in the hotel room belonged to him. As to Galloway's
complaint that there was no evidence of trafficking such as scales and baggies, Galloway also
admitted that he stole his drug dealer's fentanyl supply but was selling what he stole to support
himself. In fact, counsel for Galloway admitted in opening statement that Galloway stole the
drugs. Transcript of trial (T.) at 73. Galloway additionally stated he believed someone he
sold drugs to also stole $300-500 he had in his possession after he passed out. Text messages
on Galloway's phone suggested his dealer was looking for him as a result of the theft, and
Galloway told hotel management to deny he was staying there if anyone asked. T. at 115,
117, 124, 132-137; State's exhibits 1 and 42. While no DNA testing was conducted on the
drug packaging, no DNA evidence is required to support a conviction or possessing or
trafficking drugs. Moreover, when, as here, the defendant admits the drugs in question belong
to him, DNA testing is unnecessary.
{¶ 41} Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that
the State presented abundant evidence, from which a rational jury could weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and conclude that
Galloway both possessed and trafficked fentanyl. We further conclude that this is not an
exceptional case in the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Accordingly,
Galloway's final assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 42} The judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to Appellant.
By: King, P. J.
Hoffman, J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.